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PREFACE vii 
With the end of Radical Reconstruction in Mississippi in the 
winter of 1875-1876 the whites came once more into complete con-
trol of the state government. The agency through which the whites 
governed was the Democratic party, and save for one or two occa-
sions, their control was undisputed by the Republicans, whose or-
ganization rapidly disintegrated. Thereafter, all political issues had 
to be settled within the councils of the Democratic party, and con-
trol of the party machinery was, therefore, of paramount impor-
tance. In the early decades after the "revolution" this party 
machinery was in the hands of those who had led the revolt, and 
these leaders were, in general, sympathetic to and influenced by the 
new corporate and financial interests in the state-the railroads, the 
banks, the merchants. 
In post-Civil War years agriculture in Mississippi, as elsewhere, 
was in a depressed condition. The price of cotton steadily declined, 
and the farmer was hard put to meet the payments on his mortgage. 
At the same time the corporate and banking interests of the state 
seemed to prosper. There were reasons for this beyond the ken of 
the poor hill farmer-the redneck, as he was popularly termed. But 
the redneck came to regard this situation-chronic depression for 
him while his mercantile neighbor prospered-as a conspiracy 
against him, a conspiracy which was aided and abetted by the 
leaders of his party. 
This history is a study of the struggle of the redneck to gain con-
trol of the Democratic party in order to effect reforms which would 
improve his lot. He was to be led into many bypaths and sluggish 
streams before he was to realize his aim in the election of Vardaman 
to the governorship in 1903. For almost two decades thereafter the 
rednecks were to hold undisputed control of the state government. 
The period was marked by many reforms and by some improvement 
in the economic plight of the farmer-an improvement largely owing 
to factors which were uninfluenced by state politics. The period 
closes in 1925 with the repudiation and defeat at the polls of the 
farmers' trusted leaders, Vardaman and Bilbo. 
I wish to express appreciation to Professor Charles S. Sydnor of 
the history department of Duke University, whose kindly advice and 
wisdom have done much to bring out whatever merit this study may 
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have. He is, of course, in no way responsible for errors which the 
work may have. 
I acknowledge with gratitude a grant from the University of 
Kentucky Research Fund Committee which aided in the publication 
of the study. 
The staHs in the Manuscripts and Newspaper divisions of the 
Library of Congress gave kindly and courteous assistance to me in 
my research there. The staH of the Mississippi Department of Ar-
chives and History was most helpful. To them, especially to Mrs. 
William Harrell, I wish to express my thanks. I am also indebted to 
the staHs of the Duke University Library and the University of 
North Carolina Library. 
My wife, Betty Kirwan, has aided me throughout the research, 
composition, and revision of the work. Her suggestions and criti-
cisms have been invaluable aids to me. More than this, she has 
borne the drudgery of numerous typings and retypings. Without 
her assistance the study could not have been completed. 
Lexington, Kentucky 
September 6, 1950 
A. D. Kirwan 
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CHAPTER I 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
NEGRO VOTE 
M ISSISSIPPI politics in the period from 1875 to 1890 is a tale 
of almost ceaseless intraparty struggle. To be sure this is 
characteristic of politics in many places and in many periods. But 
whereas in sections blessed with a two-party system the struggles 
climaxed in interparty contests, the main struggle in Mississippi 
was for control of the Democracy. When Radical Governor Adelbert 
Ames resigned in 1876 while undergoing impeachment trial, he 
left the opposition in complete control. To many whites this re-
capture of the state government by the Democrats seemed like a 
return to ante-bellum political conditions. But new factors were 
present in the post-Reconstruction period that were to negate this 
semblance. In the first place the old party leaders had been dis-
credited by the events of the war and Reconstruction, and the new 
leaders were to be men of little prominence in governmental affairs 
in the earlier period. Secondly, and far more important, the six 
years of Radical rule had left as a heritage a bitter racial antipathy 
which was to becloud all issues in the later period. 
For a time after this overthrow in 1876 the Republican party 
lingered on as a threat-albeit a constantly diminishing one-to 
Democratic supremacy. The Democrats were determined, by hook 
or by crook, to retain control, and it soon became apparent that one 
could obtain political power only within that party. The struggle 
was complicated by many factors-personal ambitions, peculiar 
sectional needs, economic distress, and the presence of the Negro. 
In 1875 Mississippians had "defied the federal laws and over-
thrown the government of the state without any regard for statutory 
law or the constitution."l The revolution was organized by two 
men-J. Z. George and L. Q. C. Lamar. George, as chairman of 
the state Democratic executive committee, was the guiding genius 
of the political battle in the Held; while Lamar, from his seat in 
Congress, won the sympathy of the country for the plight of the 
southern whites. Lamar's task was a difficult one. Elected to Con-
gress in 1873, the only representative of the Democratic party from 
the state, he was enveloped in the suspicion and distrust which 
northern congressmen held for the ante-bellum southern leaders. 
lStebement by Dr. F. L. Fulgham, quoted in Jackson 188U6. Aug. 12. 1910. 
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His earnest efforts at reconciliation between the sections :first gained 
the respect and con6dence of his northern colleagues. His astute 
eulogy of Senator Charles Sumner won their admiration without 
offending his own people.2 By supporting the Electoral Commission 
in the disputed presidential election in 1876 he helped win for his 
section noninterference by the federal government in state affairs. 
His contribution to the revolution was a diplomatic one in that it 
helped break down sectional antagonism and made George's path 
less rough. Lamar's achievement has been termed "the most brilliant 
and successful defensive campaign ever fought by a Southerner."3 
Lamar was chosen by the legislature of 1876 to succeed Hiram 
R. Revels, Negro, in the United States Senate. From this vantage 
point he continued to be the con6dant and collaborator of George 
in the struggle against the Mississippi Republicans, with their '1arge 
majority of blacks so well drilled:" In the autumn of 1876 he re-
turned to Mississippi to aid his party in the election. Victory seemed 
a good prospect, but no efforts were spared to make it doubly sure. 
With the establishment of Democratic control in Mississippi, 
Lamar was in a position of pre-eminent political influence. The fate 
of candidates for office seemed to rest in his hands; his approval 
was almost sufficient to guarantee election-his disapproval, to 
insure defeat. IS 
To maintain the supremacy won in the election of 1875 the 
whites resorted to all sorts of stratagems. On election mornings in 
many towns a sunrise cannonade gave warning to the voters that a 
"fair election" would be held. When Negroes came to the polls, a 
sham battle between whites was fought, at which Negroes were 
terrified and fled. Generally one strongbox in each county was 
held in reserve and was stuffed with the required number of ballots 
when it was learned from headquarters how many were needed. 
Election victories were secured not only by intimidation and force, 
but also by social and business ostracism, by a drawing of the color 
III. z. George to L. Q. C. Lamar, May 8, 1874, Lamar Letterbooks, Department 
of Archives and History, Jackson, Miss. 
BGerald W. Johnson, "Live Demagogues or Dead Gentlemen," in Virginia Quar-
terly Review, XII (1986), 8. 
"George to Lamar, Sept. 11, 1876, Lamar Letterbooks. 
ISLamar to John Allen, Mar. 18, 1878, in Willie D. Halsell (ed.), "Democratic 
DissensiODS in Mississippi, 1878-1882," in Journal of Mississippj History. II (1940), 
124D. 
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line, by discharge from employment and forced resignations, and 
by a certain amount of vote-buying.6 "White violence and fraud 
were pitted against black ignorance and corruption, and the former 
won."7 
At first the Negro was intimidated and frightened from the 
polls. In the congressional election of 1876 practices which produced 
the victory of 1875 were repeated. As a result all six Democratic 
congressional candidates were elected, and Tilden carried the state 
by more than 50,000. All but four counties which bordered on the 
Mississippi River gave Democratic majorities. But the Negroes' de-
termination to vote for the Republicans, Independents, or Green-
backers was embarraSSing to the Democrats if not dangerous.8 They 
"never entered into any election," complained a Democrat, "in other 
than partizan spirit." As political partisans they were "the most con-
sistent voting machines ever invested with the right of suffrage." 
They would gladly and readily, it was charged, espouse the cause of 
"any man who appeals to them for their votes on the sole ground of 
opposition to the ... [Democratic] party."9 
At the 1876 election, when the vast majority of whites were 
united in the Democratic party and when factionalism had not yet 
reared its head, it was necessary to keep Republican leaders from 
getting out the Negro vote. All methods were employed to achieve 
this result. Before they learned the dangers of doing so, white 
Republicans resisted the intimidation of their black followers. At a 
joint political speaking at Starkville the audience, Democrat and 
Republican, came armed and mounted, and the Democrats even 
had a fieldpiece. So tense became the atmosphere before the time 
for the speeches that the candidates were asked not to talk and the 
audience was prevailed upon to go home.10 Such a stalemate was 
not often achieved by the Republicans, however, and their press 
carried letter after letter of protest against the intimidating practices 
of the Democrats. They denounced the leaders of the Democratic 
party who "sit back and organize and direct and encourage" young 
6J. S. McNeily, "War and Reconstruction in Mississippi, 1863-1890," in Missis-
sippi Historical Society, Publications, Centenary Series, II (1918), 165-585; Macon 
Beacon, Nov. 20, 1875. 
7Statement by Dr. F. L. Fulgham, Jackson Issue, Aug. 12, 1910. 
8Vernon L. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 (Chapel Hill, 1947), 
201; Natchez Democrat, Apr. 5, 1876. 
9Aberdeen Examiner, Mar. 8, 1883. lOJaclcson Daily Times, Nov. I, 1876. 
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men of their party to "rudeness, indecencies, barbarisms . . . and 
deeds of desperation" in order to carry elections. A Republican 
editor estimated that a third of all Democrats had been coerced 
into joining that party "through fear . . . and intimidation."ll 
The Democrats denied that they were the originators of the 
color line in Mississippi politics. According to them it had been 
initiated by "carpetbaggers," who had, with its aid, "misruled" 
Mississippi for six years; only when driven to desperation had the 
Democrats "accepted the color line" and driven the "carpetbaggers" 
from power. They claimed they "did not seek the aid of Negroes 
but accepted the cooperation of the few who voluntarily" acted 
with them, and "protected them from violence from those of their 
own race."12 Whether this was true or not, the Democrats soon 
went beyond the mere "protection" of Negroes who supported them. 
A white lawyer of Bolivar County complained in 1876 that he was 
ordered by the Democratic club of Rosedale, on threat of violence, 
to leave the county. He had resided there only three months and 
denied that he had participated in politics. Nevertheless, in fear of 
his life, he departed hastily, leaving all of his property behind.13 
In neighboring Washington County, four Negroes complained that 
they had been driven from their homes and had '1ain in the woods 
for weeks." They had "committed no crime," but had been per-
secuted "because of our political opinions." Another Negro had 
received notice from the "Ku Klux" to leave home within twenty-
four hours.14 Mter a Negro riot at an election at Artesia the Demo-
cratic Jackson Clarion, probably the most influential paper in the 
state, sent out a call to all Mississippians to "quench in blood" the 
Negro's '1ust for blood." The "unconquerable Anglo-Saxons," it said, 
must have in every riot "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth."15 
As long as there was complete unity among Democrats the 
threat of a Republican victory could be successfully withstood. 
Soon after 1876, however, factional fights began to appear within 
Democratic ranks. Such divisions might serve to resuscitate the 
expiring Republicans, and strong measures were taken to restore 
unity. In July the Clay County convention had several such con-
llIbid., Oct. 28, Nov. 1, 1876. 
12Ben. G. Humphreys to Lamar, Jan. 3, 1875, Lamar Letterbooks. 
18J. L. Murphy to J. M. Stone, Oct. 29, Nov. 1, 1876, Letters of Governors, Series 
E, 129A, Depamnent of Archives and History, Jackson, Miss. 
14Joshua Page et al. to Stone, Dec. 26, 1876; George Doig to Stone, June 4, 1877, 
ibid. 
lIiJackson Weekly Clarion, Nov. 8, 1876. 
STRUGGLE FOR THE NEGRO VOTE 7 
fJicting elements and succeeded only in making a ticket that was 
unpopular. Opposing elements then put up a slate said to be com-
posed of men of high standing in the Democratic party. When it 
became known that Negroes were going to support the Independent 
ticket a meeting was called at West Point, where violent speakers 
openly stated that if the Independents were elected they should not 
serve. The same night, under the guise of going foxhunting, a mob 
led by civil officers went night riding through the country, «visiting 
negro churches, calling for certain leading negroes." The night 
raids kept up until election day, and all who associated with the 
Independent candidates were ostracized and denounced in harsh 
terms. Negroes were kept from the polls by force or threats of 
force, and many whites dreading violence stayed away also. Negroes 
who went to the polls were compelled to show their tickets to the 
voting officials, who would tear the certificates to pieces. "Never in 
Radical times," said an observer, "was more fraud and intimidation 
practiced." The election was a "complete farce," but even so, it 
was said, «enough votes were put in to elect the Independents but 
by some means were not counted."16 
Not only were Negroes prevented from voting Republican in 
1876, but also dissatisfaction within that party was driving many of 
them over to the Democrats. At the Republican state nominating 
convention in the spring of that year the Negroes were refused 
places on the ticket, and a split occurred between them and their 
white leaders. As a result, the Democrats polled nearly 60,000 
majority, although the votes of all the whites and a fourth of the 
Negroes would only have given them about 20,000 majority. The 
Republicans claimed at least 5,000 white votes in their own party. 
Ballot-box stuffing may have been the explanation for the Demo-
cratic majority, but the Democrats claimed it was due to the great 
numbers of colored voters who had joined them.17 In April a Demo-
cratic paper stated that many Negroes were aligning themselves 
with the party and predicted that more would do so. By August 
Negro Democratic clubs were being formed all over the state and 
all Negroes were invited to join. IS Discredited by their failure to 
rally the Negroes to their support in the election, the white managers 
of the Republican party allowed their organization to disintegrate 
I6W. W. Graham to Stone, Dec. 6, 1877, Letters of Governors, Series E, 135A. 
17Jackson Daily Times, Jan. 16, 1877; Jackson Weekly Clarion, Nov. 29, 1876. 
18Natchez Democrat, Apr. 5, Aug. 12, Nov. 10, 1876. 
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and in July, 1877, actually disbanded it.19 Negro leaders thereupon 
revived the organization, and in some localities, notably in the city 
of Jackson where they maintained control until 1887, they were 
very strong.lIO 
Mter their abandonment by their white leaders, the Negroes 
had for a time undisputed control of the Republican party machin-
ery, deciding nominations and receiving federal patronage. Never-
theless the white wing of the party was standing by, ready at all 
times to ally itseH with any revolting Democratic faction. The situa-
tion in 1881 presented it with such an opportunity, and although the 
alliance did not achieve victory, that year marked the high tide of 
white Republican effort. In some counties Greenbackers and In-
dependents had got control. These groups united with the Republi-
cans in a fusion ticket behind Benjamin King, on a platform demand-
ing fair elections and an elective judiciary. The election was marked 
by fraud and violence. Lamar sanctimoniously attributed all this 
to the opposition, but other Democratic leaders admitted that they 
used "repression, intimidation, and other . . . illegal devices . • . to 
overcome the negro majority." The Democrats polled 47,960 votes, 
while 31,256 were cast for King.21 It was the strongest opposition 
since 1875. 
The group of men who came into power with the overthrow of 
the Radical government in 1875-1876 are frequently referred to as 
"Bourbons." Bourbons were supposed to be those who "never for-
gave and never forgot"; who refused to accept the results of the 
war and the war amendments; and who "stubbornly hold to the 
past and refuse to adapt themselves to a changing world."lI2 They 
were few in Mississippi politics and they exercised little influence in 
the Democratic party. The new leaders after the Democrats regained 
19Jackson Daily Times, July 10, 1877. 
lIOWharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 201; Alf W. Garner, "Public Services of 
E. C. Walthall," in Mississippi Historical SOCiety, Publications, IX (1905), 245. 
lIlLamar to R. H. Henry, quoted in Edward Mayes, Lucius Q. C. Lamar: Hfs 
Life, Times, and Speeches (Nashville, 1896), 435-36; also ibid., 438, quoting Kem-
per Herald and Yazoo Sentinel; Jackson Weekly Clarion, Nov. 22, 1882; Halsell, 
"Democratic Dissensions in MiSSisSippi," lac. cit., 123-35; Frank Johnston, "SuHrage 
and Reconstruction in Mississippi," in Mississippi Historical Society, Publicatiom, VI 
(1902), 218-19; Frank Johnston, "Public Services of Senator George," in Mississippi 
Historical Society, Publications, VIII (1904), 210. 
lIlIWillie D. Halsell, "The Bourbon Period in Mississippi Politics, 1875-1890," in 
TournaI of Southern Hfstory, XI (1945), 521. 
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power in 1875 were, on the whole, men who had exerted little or no 
effect on state policy in ante-bellum days. Of the few who had been 
influential, none refused to accept the reality of Reconstruction, and 
they all set about adjusting the state to face the new conditions. 
A battle early began for control of the party and resulted in the 
ascendancy of the men who had led the revolution. These new 
leaders entrenched themselves in power; and although classing them-
selves as "liberals" because of their policy of resisting the "color 
line" in party affairs, they were given the name "Bourbons" by their 
political opponents. The appellation soon became so loosely tossed 
around that it lost all meaning.23 It was applied indiscriminately 
by all classes of politicians to anybody who differed from them and 
became a convenient though empty name of reproach. A Vicksburg 
editor, in 1882, observed that "Every politician insists that his party 
is the party of progress, of improvement ... and he is of course en-
titled to stigmatize his opponents as Bourbons."2' 
An economic and class significance was given to the term "Bour_ 
bon" when many of the new political leaders began turning to mer-
chandising, railroad promotion, and other business activities, and 
"turning deaf ears to the farmers." The agricultural distress of the 
period was calling for measures which the new leaders' commercial 
interests could not sanction, and those who had been "liberaY' in 
1875 became, as a rule, "conservative" by 1890. There were many 
things for which the new leaders stood, and few stood together on 
everything. Most were friendly to railroads and corporate enter-
prises. They wished to effect a speedy reconciliation with the rest 
of the nation. They all agreed in their determination to "control ... 
the Negro vote to insure the continuation of white supremacy."211 
The most spectacular threat to Democratic unity came in the 
early 1880's in the desertion from the party of James R. Chalmers. 
Chalmers had been a slaveholder and aristocrat, a general in the 
Confederate army, a Democrat of long standing, and a leader in the 
overthrow of the "carpetbag" government. He had been chosen to 
Congress as a Democrat from the sixth or Delta district in 1880, but 
his election had been successfully contested by John R. Lynch, 
Negro Republican, on the grounds of fraud. Chalmers thought 
23Ibid., 521-22. 
2'Vicksburg Daily Commercial, Jan. 31, 1882. 
211Halsell. ''The Bourbon Period," loe. cit., 522-33. 
10 REVOLT OF THE REDNECKS 
Lamar failed to give him the support he deserved in the contest, and 
when the "Lamar legislature" of 1880 changed his district in a gro-
tesque manner to punish him for insubordination, he went into open 
revolt and joined the Republicans. As a personal affront to Lamar 
he moved from Vicksburg to Holly Springs, in Lamar's district, and 
ran for Congress in 1882.26 
Chalmers was supported by James L. Alcorn, a wealthy planter 
of the Delta; George C. McKee, postmaster at Jackson; Jason Niles 
and his son Henry of Kosciusko; Green R. Chandler, United States 
district attorney for north Mississippi; George R. Buchanan of Holly 
Springs; and Judges Luke Lea and Harvey R. Ware of Jackson. 
These men were denounced by the Democrats as "degenerates," 
"moral lepers," and "traitors to their race," but it is well established 
that some of them had abilitv, character, and some means. 
According to a Negro leader who fought against the white Re-
publicans for control of the party, they were "typical representatives 
of the best blood and the finest manhood of the South." Writing 
many years after the bitter struggles of the 1880's John R. Lynch 
compared the white Republicans with their brother Democrats. 
The Democrats had, he said, a slight advantage in experience and 
intelligence, "but in point of honesty and integrity ... the advantage 
was with the [white] Republicans." He denied that they were 
"carpetbaggers," or merely "a few worthless" southern white men, 
but claimed that they were "the better element of native whites."27 
Although these men "elevated the general Republican standard in 
the state," they were slighted in patronage by the Republicans in 
Washington, who favored the Negro wing of the party.28 But Lynch 
was writing years later when both he and they had passed from the 
scene of conflict. 
Throughout the years 1882-1884 Chalmers and his backers 
grappled with both black Republicans and white Democrats for 
political supremacy in sections of the state. The white Republicans 
26Willie D. Halsell, "James R. Chalmers and 'Mahoneism' in Mississippi," in 
Journal of Southern History, X (1944), 38-39, 41; John R. Lynch to Stone, Dec. 2, 
1880, Letters of Governors, Series E, 165A; statement by Chalmers in Brookhaven 
Leader, June 1, 1882, quoted in Willie D. Halsell (ed.), "Republican Factionalism 
in Mississippi, 1882-1884," in Journal of Southern History, VII (1941), 87n; W. E. 
B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction (New York, 1935), 441. 
27John R. Lynch, "Some Historical Errors of James Ford Rhodes," in Journal of 
Negro History, n (1917),350-52. 
28HalseIl, "Chalmers and 'Mahoneism:" loco cit., 41. 
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charged that an alliance existed between the Negro Republican 
leaders and Lamar and George to perpetuate Democratic control. 
Specifically, they charged that the Negro leaders, John R. Lynch, 
James Hill, and Blanche K. Bruce, influenced by Lamar and George, 
persuaded their followers to support Democrats in state and local 
elections, and in exchange Lamar and George worked in Washington 
for patronage for Mississippi Negroes. The purpose of the Democrats 
in fOrming the alliance was twofold. It would exclude the leadership 
of able white men from the Republican party, and thus reduce «to 
a minimum the danger of the Republican party." At the same time 
the Democrats could point out that the Republican party in the 
state was controlled by Negroes, and thus use the old battle cry of 
the color line to rally all whites to them.29 
White Republicans claimed that both Democrats and Negro 
Republican leaders worked to preserve the color line in politics; the 
former because «they know Such Polacy [sic] will bring to its 
Standard an Anglo-Saxon follOwing who will demand and enforce 
their Rights." The Negro leaders' «personal interests lay in parallel 
lines" with the Democrats. They «reason with themselves," said 
Judge Ware, «that if too much worth, merit, and Character, Congre-
gates in a Party to which they are attached in the Same ratio will 
their chances for Federal appointment and other advancements 
lessen." Hence these two groups «while Seeming in Antipodes are 
found running in parallel lines" and were allies. Hill, Negro collector 
of internal revenue for Mississippi, Ware charged, used his office to 
thwart and stifle «every effort in the State to broaden the guage [sic] 
and gather effective recruits for the fight against Bourbonism." 
Judge Ware thought the Republican party could «easily" elect «some 
man of broad national views" to Congress from the seventh district, 
but that Hill was planning «to give [it] to his Allies the Bourbons, by 
having himseH intrigued by his various Deputies" into accepting the 
nomination himseH. Even though it was a Republican district, Ware 
said, Hill knew that he would be overwhelmingly defeated, «for even 
with the rank and file of his own Race he is extremely unpopular." 
By "giving" the district to the Democrats, Hill would retain his office 
"and use it in the future as he has in the past for the good of himseH, 
and for the perpetuity of Bourbon rule in the State." Ware said that 
119HaJsell, "Republican Factionalism," loco cit., 86; H. C. Niles to [George C. 
McICee], June SO, 1882, ibid., 93-94. 
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the "Anti-Bourbon" whites of the state recognized Hill as the "ally 
of the Bourbons."30 
Lamar and George, another Republican said, favored Hilfs re-
taining his office as collector, since a Democrat could not get it 
anyway and since he was of decided benefit to them. Hill was re-
ported to have divulged party secrets to the Democrats in the "close 
and intimate" consultations which he was seen to hold with them 
during the preceding campaign, and he was openly accused by the 
Republicans, Independents, and Greenbackers of being "a regular 
Judas Iscariot."31 "He is in league with the Democrats," complained 
another white Republican, ."and at every election plays into their 
hands." If Hill were removed and General George C. McKee put in 
his place, said still another white Republican, "we can organize an 
independent movement" of all elements "opposed to ballot box 
stuffing," a group which could carry three districts "without a 
doubt."32 
The plight of the white Republicans was indeed a hard one. An 
open accusation and proof of the alliance between Democrats and 
Negro Republicans "would add Negro recruits to the party, while 
the Democrats could then point that the Republican party was 
dominated by Negroes and thus repel white recruits."ss "Between 
the upper millstone [of] Southern folly," lamented McKee, "and the 
lower millstone of Southern crime we are ground to powder, useful 
only for the purpose of sending . . . delegates from rotten borough 
constituencies to National Republican Conventions."34. "If Lamar 
can keep the Negro on top," said Henry Niles, "-the 'race issue' 
will be the cry in every contest-and we will be the sufferers." 
When Hill succeeded in getting the nomination from the seventh 
congressional district the white Republicans resolved they would 
"never raise one arm to aid a band of drunken negroes." If the Re-
publican party was to concentrate on "a miserable scramble for Fed-
eral patronage," it could not gain respectable recruits. "The differ-
30H. R. Ware to w. E. Chandler, May 15, 28, June 14, 1882, ibid., 87·89; George 
M. Buchanan to Chandler, July 11, 1883, ibid., 99·100. 
81Niles to Chandler, June 7, 1882, ibid., 90. 
82J. L. Morphis to Chandler, June 15, 1882, ibid., 91·92-
88Niles to [McKee], June 30, 1882, ibid., 93-94; McKee to Chandler, July 6, 
1882, ibid., 93. 
84M"Kee to Chandler, July 6, 1882, ibid., 93. 
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ence between Jim Hill's crowd and Democracy," said Henry Niles, 
"is scarcely worth fightirig for."85 
The Republican patronage bestowers in Washington were well 
aware of the schism within the party in Mississippi. But there were 
revolts brewing against the national Republican administration in 
other states. It was important that the administration have the 
support of the Mississippi delegation in the next national convention, 
and Hill, at least, had promised to obey orders. He was the boss of 
the Negroes. He had the political machinery in his hands, and it 
would not do "to remove him while both armies are in motion."88 
Nevertheless, by the fall of 1882 Chalmers' prospects were so fair 
that the Washington Republican leaders could not ignore him, and 
jobs and some money were placed at his disposal. 87 
Chalmers used the patronage to advantage. His Democratic op-
ponent in the second congressional district was Van Manning. 
Chalmers was victorious but charges of fraud were made by both 
sides. Since Manning was defeated his cries were louder and more 
prolonged. Chalmers was reported to have personally led United 
States marshals who took possession of the polls in Marshall County, 
"dictated the conduct of the election," and attempted to "awe and 
intimidate [the votersl with threats of Federal prosecution." The 
marshals were reported to have threatened personal violence to 
Manning's followers. Consequently "many of his supporters ... 
either did not vote at all or voted for Chalmers." At Hudsonville, 
after the balloting was over, a United States marshal, on pretense 
of fearing a riot, took the ballot box and jumped on a train with it. 
At Byhalia, John Watson, the Democratic election officer, was ar-
rested on election morning by a United States marshal. Since no 
one else could open the polls, "the legal voters of Byhalia were ... 
disfranchised." More votes were found in the ballot box at Red 
Banks, a strong Greenback precinct, than there were legal voters. 
"Everywhere," said an irate editor, "the United States Deputy Mar-
shals proved by their acts that they regarded Chalmers' election to 
85Niles to Chandler. Nov. 25. 1882, ibid., 96-97. 
88[David B.] Henderson to My Dear Secretary [Chandler], July 4, 1882, Ibid., 
92. 
87ChaJmers to Chandler. Oct. 24, 1882, Ibid., 94-95. 
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be their chief and only duty."88 The incongruity of RepubJican 
federal officials using such tactics to elect a man whom their party 
had recently turned out of Congress "on the ground of force and 
fraud practised against it by himself' did not pass unnoticed. Now, 
it was said, the Republican party had turned to Chalmers "on his 
promise to use the same means in its favor."89 
Hill's district, the seventh, went Republican by more than 10,000, 
but Hill was beaten by more than 7,000. It was reported that 5,000 
white Independents in the district refused to support Hill because 
he "year after year . . . had been bitter in . . . denunciation of In-
dependents" and had repeatedly betrayed both Republicans and 
Independents.4o In their effort to prevent the election of Chalmers, 
Hill and Lynch openly urged fusion of their own organization with 
the Democrats. Hill was reported to have sent instructions to his 
henchmen in Chalmers' district to go to the polls early and "tell 
every colored man you know and have influence with, that there is 
no Republican candidate in the Held. . . . Tell him that the other 
candidate is a Greenbacker, who was formerly a Democrat, and that 
he acknowledges no sympathy with Republicanism."41 Whether or 
not Hill actually gave such instructions, it seems likely that he would 
have preferred Democratic success in Mississippi to any division of 
his power over federal patronage. His own defeat and Chalmers' 
victory intensiHed the feud between them. 
Despite Hill and Lynch's open advocacy of fusion with the Demo-
crats, they were still allowed federal patronage and used it in Hght-
ing the Chalmers group. Chalmers charged that two years later 
Hill "manipulated the convention" in the third, fourth, and fifth dis-
tricts to secure the nomination of his henchmen for Congress. Hill 
knew, said Chalmers, that even if elected his candidates, being Ne-
groes, would be counted out. When Chalmers won the nomination 
in his district again in 1884, Hill and his deputies traveled "all over 
88Aberdeen Examiner, Nov. 16, 23, 1882. For evidence of Democratic fraud see 
M. B. Collins and W. W. Mathes to Stone, Nov. 12, 1882, Letters of Governors, 
Series E, 165A; Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 200; Buchanan to Chandler, 
July 11, 1883, in Halsell, "Republican Factionalism," loe. cit., 99-100. 
89Holly Springs South, quoted in Aberdeen Examiner, Nov. 23, 1882. 
40H. R. Ware to [Chandler], [November], 1882, in Halsell, "Chalmers and 
'Mahoneism:" loe. cit., 95-96. 
41Macon Beacon, Nov. 4, 1882; Hinds County Gazette, Aug. 11, 1883, quoted in 
Halsell, "Republican Factionalism," loco cit., 99n. 
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the State on this work of breaking down the only dangerous oppo-
sition to the democrats."42 
Hill's efforts against Chalmers were rewarded. In the general 
election of 1884 the Democrats won every district, and Chalmers, 
who carried only one county, lost by more than 4,000 votes. The 
third district, which had an estimated Republican majority of 
20,000, elected a Democrat by more than 5,000.48 Chalmers' failure 
was probably due also to the absence of any liberal program in his 
platform and to his failure to work for the small farmer's vote. His 
revolt, it seems, was simply that of a rebellious personality fighting 
against the dictatorship which Lamar and his associates exercised 
over the party. 
That there was an alliance between the Negro leaders and the 
Democrats there can be little doubt. From 1876 on the Democratic 
press courted the Negro vote. The Jackson Clarion became an en-
thusiastic supporter of the principle of Negro suffrage. It pOinted 
to the increased representation in Congress and in the Electoral 
College which had come to the South as a result of emancipation 
and enfranchisement. It had no fear of being unable to control the 
Negro vote, in the absence of federal troops, and said the Demo-
cratic party would continue to be the "protector" of the Negro's right 
of suffrage. It called the Negro's attention to the "improved" edu-
cational system which the Democrats were prOviding him. Pointing 
out, too, that the party had actually placed several Negroes on the 
Democratic ticket in some Delta counties, it urged all Negroes to 
vote for the party." The Aberdeen Examiner lauded the "gallant 
colored men who at so much of personal sacrifice come to us, and 
who were won ... by a canvass ... involving ... months of sleepless 
labor, and expenditures ... of thousands of dollars."4.& 
In the state Democratic convention in 1877 John D. Webster, 
Negro, was placed in nomination for secretary of state and actually 
received 46 votes before withdrawing on the fourth ballot. Many 
Democrats approved of Webster as a candidate and thought he 
would have been nominated but for the convention's surprise at his 
candidacy.46 
4.2Cha1mers to Chandler, July 16, 1864, in Halsell, "Republican Factionalism," 
loco cit., 100-101. 
4.8Halsell, "Cha1mers and 'Mahoneism,''' loco cit., 56. 
4.4.Jackson Weekly Clarion, Oct. 25, 1876, July 25, Oct. 31, 1877. 
4.&Aberdeen Examiner, Oct. 25, 1883. 
46Natchez Democrat, Aug. 1. 1811. 
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Almost invariably Democratic county committees insisted on the 
appointment of a Negro as the Republican member of the local 
election commission.4.'1 Also the readiness with which Mississippi 
Negro appointees to federal offices were confirmed in the Senate 
was remarkable. Blanche K. Bruce was "unanimously" confirmed 
as Register of the Treasury, upon Lamar's motion, and without the 
customary reference to a committee.4S 
In some of the counties with large Negro majorities, the fusion 
tickets between Democrats and the black wing of the Republican 
party led by Hill and Lynch came to be openly reCOgnized. Such 
tickets were formed by agreements between county Democratic 
executive committees and Negro leaders. Each party would name 
its candidates on a joint ticket previously agreed upon, but the 
Negro candidates were subject to «review and approval or disap-
proval by the Democratic committee." Generally the Negroes were 
given «a minority on the county board of supervisors, a few other 
county offices of low pay and responsibility, and one membership 
in the legislature."49 In Hinds County in the election of 1883 the 
fusion ticket gave the Democrats the sheriff, the chancery and cir-
cuit clerks, the treasurer, the state senator, three representatives, 
four supervisors, and an equal number of magistrates and constables 
with the Republicans. Negro Republicans were given the offices of 
county assessor, coroner, one representative, one supervisor, and 
their quota of magistrates and constables.60 The system worked well 
for the outnumbered Democrats. The whites kept all important 
offices, but the Negroes «continued to vote with much freedom and 
... gained valuable political education and experience."u 
4'lL. P. Yerger to George, Aug. 14, 1876; T. C. Catchings to Stone, Apr. 22, 1876; 
and many others in the Letters of Governors Collection. 
4SMemphis Appeal, May 20, 1881. 
49Wharton, The Negro In Mississippi, 202. 
/SOAberdeen Examiner, Aug. 9, 188S. 
UWharton, The Negro In Mississippi, 208. See also Natchez Democrat, Oct. 28, 
1879. Eventually the Negro leaders gained undisputed control of the Republican 
party, but they did not have the solid backing of their race. A Negro paper pub-
lished in Vicksburg complained in 1900 that "a dozen or less of Republicans" had 
met and agreed as to delegates to the next national convention. This same group, it 
said, would meet again shortly and decide the membership of the next state com-
mittee. All of them, it was alleged, were officeholders and merely wished "to fix things 
so that they may continue in office." The Negro leaders made no effort to build up 
the party in the state by getting Republicans to pay the poll tax, but were content to 
pon the "smallest Republican vote of any state in the whole Union." Vicksburg lAght, 
Jm. 18, 1900. 
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The fusion plan was not without opposition among Democrats. 
Minor politicians wanted the small offices held by the Negroes. 
Then, too, the whites in other sections of the state felt that the "re-
demption should be complete." The practice in the river counties 
was encouraging Negroes in other counties "to have similar ambi-
tions." Moreover, it was believed that the Negroes were accepting 
the plan only until they gained such strength as would permit them 
to vote as a party. Worst of all, in case of disagreement among the 
white supervisors, "a Negro sometimes cast the deciding vote."52 
1i2Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 203. 
CHAPTER n 
SUPPRESSION OF INDEPENDENTS 
A PARTY composed of such "incongruous and unsympathetic 
elements" as the Mississippi Democrats could be held together 
only by an appeal to some sentiment which would transcend all 
lesser motives of individual interest. Such an appeal was found in 
"white supremacy." White Democrats who sought to contest policies 
fixed by leaders of the party were cried down as dangers to the state 
and traitors to their race. It was pointed out again and again that 
the Radicals who had controlled the state only a few years before 
were still trying to organize the Negroes and vote them as formerly. 
Disunion of the whites might give them the chance once more to 
seize control. "The safety of Mississippi," said Lamar, 'ues in the 
maintenance of the Democratic organization and in its wise direction 
by conservative leaders."l 
Independent political factions developed in a number of coun-
ties soon after the triumphs of 1875-1876. Differences of opinion 
and clashes of ambition were fed by the impossibility of rewarding 
everyone to the degree that his self-valuation merited. One asked 
office of the governor because he was "very poor and [had] a wife 
and six children to support and needled] the emoluments of the 
office."2 Another thought he should be state superintendent of 
education because he was "both honest and competent," because he 
had been engaged for some time in "teaching the young to shoot," 
and because he "had done his best for [Governor Stone] on two 
r previous] occasions."3 Still others sought pardons for erring rela-
tives who had run afoul of the law. All promised their unqualified 
support to the governor in future campaigns; but the implication 
was clear that the degree of their support might depend upon the 
satisfaction which their petitions received. To humor all but a few 
was impOSSible, and unsuccessful suitors swelled the ranks of dis-
content which hard times produced. 
lL. Q. C. Lamar to C. E. Wright, Feb. 21, 1879, quoted in Mayes, Lamar, 395-
97; also ibid., 394-95. 
2W. C. Bromley to J. M. Stone, Mar. 25, 1876, Letters of Governors, Series E, 
126A. 
BF. M. Shields to Stone, May 6, 1877, ibid., 135A. 
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Within a year after overthrow of the Radicals a Republican 
paper in Jackson reported "serious trouble brewing" in the Demo-
cratic party. "When it comes to a division of the spoils," said the 
Jackson Times, "'reformers' even will fall out. . . . They are de-
nouncing each other now in almost as bitter terms as they are wont 
to denounce the much hated . . . carpetbaggers."· 
The first general election under the new regime was to be held 
in 1877. Months before the nominating convention the Democratic 
press was loud in its praise of the new order and the virtues of its 
leading candidates for the gubernatorial nomination. Relating the 
venality which had accompanied Republican political ascendancy 
the Democrats said that all this was now changed and that "the 
office was seeking the man." Such seM-glorification brought from 
a Republican editor the cryptic observation that "instead of candi-
dates running for office, we now see them running and dodging to 
get out of the way." General Robert Lowry, he observed, was a 
possible victim, but he was young, active, and vigorous, and his 
friends hoped that the gubernatorial office would not be able to 
catch him. Another candidate was somewhat advanced in years, 
not as lithe of limb or light of foot as LOWlY, and was therefore in 
imminent danger of being victimized. His one hope of escape was in 
Governor Stone, "who though in the prime of life and able bodied, 
is understood to be rather slow. His excellency may, therefore, not 
succeed in escaping."5 
The 1875 upheaval had been a united action by an overwhelming 
majority of the white people motivated by a feeling of necessity. 
With that motivation removed the danger of discord loomed. Dif-
ferences might be created by personal ambition, by a minor question 
of policy, or by "a natural and almost invincible tendency of the 
masses to divide into opposing parties." Division took shape in the 
form of the Independent party movement. It grew with the struggle 
to combat the ironclad Democratic state and county rings. It was 
looked upon with distrust as an entering wedge of a new Radical 
party and was accordingly discouraged. Soon the Independent 
movements sought the support of the Negroes, who "followed the 
advice of some of their leaders in voting for any Independent ticket 
that threatened Democratic solidity."6 
4Jackson Daily Times, Feb. 5, 1877. 
51bid., June 27, 1877. 
6Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 204; Mayes, Lamar, 319-21. 
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In addressing the Democratic state convention of 1877, J. Z. 
George warned that while the party was temporarily supreme, 
undisputed supremacy would lead to division on minor matters and 
eventually to disintegration and political death. There must, he 
said, be no division. The white men must settle their disputes among 
themselves. Nothing would be so harmful as "the victory of one 
section of the party over another, secured by the aid of the common 
enemy of both." Their aim must be, he urged, to elevate the con-
dition of the people and not to advance the fortunes of any c1ass.7 
FollOwing George's address the convention resolved that unity 
and harmony were essential to victory; that all Independent move-
ments were "dangerous to the integrity of the party or~anization"; 
that all Independent candidates were "inspired solely by lust for 
office"; and that they should be treated as "common enemies to the 
welfare of the people and avowed enemies of the Democratic party 
of Mississippi."8 
At first the Democratic press scoffed at the possibility of a 
serious rift within the party.9 But the Jackson Times early saw the 
inevitability of such a separation. In August, 1877, it reported that 
the division had already come. A convention of farmers had just 
resolved "to secure to the farmers that recognition in the political 
affairs of this state which their services, their sacrifices, their nu-
merical strength and their intelligence so much entitled them." The 
Times thought this resolution responSible for the action taken by 
the Democratic convention.10 Soon the Democrats recognized the 
seriousness of the situation. The Clarion. bv October, was denounc-
ing the Independents as Republicans in disguise. Warning all good 
Democrats to shun them the Clarion said they but "sing the song 
that leads you ... to destruction." "The snake," it added, "is only 
scotched, not killed." Another Democratic organ which had felt 
secure in August was warning in October that the Independent 
movement was an attempt of "the old Radical party for a new lease 
of power." It saw the movement as "an effort to foist upon the 
7Jackson Weekly Clarion, Aug. 1, 1877; Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Aug. 
16, 1877. 
8Jackson Daily Times, Aug. 8, 1877; Jackson Weekly Clarion, Aug. 8, 1877. 
9Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Aug. 16, 1877; Aberdeen Examiner, Sept. 6, 
1877; Jackson Weekly Clarion, June 16, 1877. 
lOJackson Daily Times, Aug. 8, 1877. 
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people again, men who have heretofore been extremely obnoxious."ll 
The New York Tribune reported that Mississippi Independents were 
developing such strength that the "Bourbon" was wildly alarmed 
and that the "Solid South is quaking." "The trouble is," said the 
Tribune, "that so soon as an opposition ticket takes the field the 
negro vote becomes of great importance, for both parties seek it."12 
Any national third-party movement was apt to gain a receptive 
hearing in agriculturally depressed Mississippi. The Greenback 
party was the first of these movements whose program seemed so 
enticing to the desperate Mississippi farmers. The Toledo platform 
( 1878) advocated the suppression of bank notes and the issue of all 
legal tender money by the federal government in sufficient quantity 
"to insure the full employment of labor" and to effect a reduction 
in the interest rate. It also advocated free coinage of silver, reserva-
tion of public lands for actual settlers, reduction of the hours of 
labor, abolition of convict-leasing, and suppression of Chinese im-
migration.13 It was more of a labor program than agrarian, but cer-
tain of its features, notably that which prOmised more money and 
lower interest rates, had a strong appeal to the farmers. A convention 
in Hinds County in 1877 urged repeal of the resumption act and the 
issuance of greenbacks. It expressed its belief that the "taxed laborer 
should be protected from the ravages of the untaxed bond-holder," 
and favored capital legislation in order "to build up our internal 
improvements. "14 
The Greenback movement reached its peak nationally in 1878, and 
by 1879 there were signs that its influence was waning in Mississippi. 
The Greenback state convention in August was reported "a failure," 
only a dozen of the seventy counties being represented. By October 
the Democrats were confident of carrying the election but were re-
sentful of the fright the Greenbackers had given them. The Green-
back candidates had made appeals to the Negroes for their votes and 
had told them that the Democrats were depriving them of their 
privileges. This brought bitter denouncements from the Democrats, 
who charged that the Greenbackers were "warming the viper, 
Radicalism," back to life and threatening to engulf the state.16 
llJackson Weekly Clarion, Sept. 26, Oct. 10, 1877; Vicksburg Democrat-Com-
mercial, Aug. 16, Oct. 29, 1877. 
12New York Tribune, quoted in Jackson Daily Times, Oct. 29, 1877. 
lsSolon J. Buck, The Agrarian Crusade (New Haven, 1921), 89-90. 
14.Jackson Daily Times, Oct. 18, 1877. 
16Jackson Weekly Clarion, July 23, Aug. 20, Oct. 15, 29, 1879. 
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The Independent movement was a many-headed monster. The 
Greenback head might be severed from its body, as it was by 1880, 
but like the mythological dragon, another grew in its place. If no 
national issue was present to which the Mississippi malcontents 
could ally themselves, they were able to survive on local discontents. 
Only infrequently did they put state-wide tickets in the field, but 
again and again they contested county elections. 
Independents themselves did not often represent a large follow-
ing of whites and alone would have been no threat to Democratic 
control. But there was the inevitable danger of a union between 
them and local Republican leaders who could command a large 
Negro support. It was charged that 95 per cent of the membership 
of such fusion parties was Negro and that the blacks would have to 
be recognized in the distribution of offices. Election of such a ticket, 
it was warned, would result in "mismanagement, extravagance, and 
all the evils ... of government" by those who were incompetent.16 
An Independent convention in Momoe County in 1883 was said to 
have been composed of about 50 Independents, 50 Republicans, "12 
or 15 Radicals," and about 75 'Kicking Democrats."17 
The Independents denied that they were carpetbaggers, Repub-
licans. or Negroes. The Memphis Avalanche. an out-of-state paper, 
said that in general they were "men who for ten years have fought 
under the Democratic-Conservative banner," who had "shed their 
blood for the Confederate cause" during the war. They had merely 
grown tired of selfish politicians who kept urging the color line in 
politics in order to perpetuate their control of the partisan organiza-
tion. In reality, said the Avalanche, they were the liberal, progres-
sive elements.18 In view of the common conception of the terms 
"liberal" and "progressive," some justification existed for this claim. 
Among the programs urged by Independent conventions were: 
"free schools, free suffrage, and equal rights"; "equal and exact 
justice for all classes, no class legislation, no sectional lines, no pro-
scription for opinion['s] sake"; the breaking of "present political 
bon<ls which bind us; refusal to be partisans of any class or party; 
and refusal to vote for men Simply because they . . . be in accord 
16Statement by Governor Robert Lowry. quoted in Vicksburg Democrat-Com-
nww~ Feb. 28. 188~ 
17Aberdeen Emminer, Sept. 6, 1883. 
18Memphis Acalanche, quoted in Jackson Daily Times, Aug. 6. 1877. 
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with . . . any convention."19 At the same time some Democratic 
stalwarts were urging such undemocratic measures as literacy tests 
for voters and the poll tax for both whites and Negroes as a method 
of curbing "radical" legislation.20 
But the Democratic machines did not stop at considerations of 
legal disfranchisement. They used violence, intimidation, and fraud 
in counteracting Independent movements, and in some cases they 
even solicited, bought, or bargained for the Negro vote.21 Tactics 
known as "bulldozing" were employed against those who showed an 
inclination to contest the supremacy of the Democratic organization. 
Stalwart Democrats who did not defend "bulldozing" contended that 
it had "no political significance whatever"; that Negroes were 
whipped, "not because they were radicals or voters," but because a 
class of men-the leaders of whom were themselves Radicals when 
it paid to be-undertook to supersede the administration of law "so 
far as it applied to the colored population."22 No doubt this was 
true in some instances, for it is difficult to make hoodlumism con-
form to any set pattern. Frequently, however, those whipped were 
not Negroes but whites who would not accept the dictates of the 
Democratic oligarchs. A Republican editor pointed out the remark-
able coincidence between the crusade of the Democratic leaders 
against the Independent movement and the revival of "bulldozing" 
tactics. 23 
Nor were white victims of the "bulldozers" always Republicans 
or carpetbaggers. Colonel R. H. Truly, who had been indicted by a 
federal grand jury in 1875 for intimidating Negroes to vote Demo-
cratic, announced two years later as an Independent candidate for 
state senator from Jefferson County. Several weeks later he an-
nounced his withdrawal. "I thought," he said, "I had a legal and 
constitutional right to run for office, but subsequent events in this 
county have convinced me that pOSSibly I have no such . . . rights. 
I therefore withdraw."24 Two years later an Independent movement 
19Jackson Daily Times, Oct. 18, 1877; Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Oct. 1, 
1877; Memphis Avalanche, quoted in Jackson Daily Times, Aug. 6, 1877. 
20Vicksburg Herald, quoted in Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Oct. 1, 1877. 
21Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 204. 
22J. B. Chrisman to Stone, Apr. 2, 1879, Letters of Governors, Series E, 143A. 
23Jackson Daily Times, Oct. 16, 1877. 
24Ibld., Sept. 18, 1877. 
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sprang up in Yazoo County which threatened the defeat of the 
"straight-outs." It became so formidable that "the best men of the 
county-the merchants, the planters, the farmers" -gathered to-
gether and appointed a committee to call on Captain H. M. Dixon, 
the head of the movement, "and request him to retire from the 
canvass." At first he refused, but eventually he decided to comply 
"for the sake of peace and harmony ... and for the love I bear my 
family." He insisted, as a provision of his withdrawal, that he "be 
protected in [his] rights as any other citizen," and that his friend, 
R. A. Flanagan, be "unmolested in his rights." In jubilation over this 
victory a Democratic editor wrote: "The Democratic flag now waves 
over this glorious old county; and long may it wave."25 
Despite Dixon's withdrawal the election in Yazoo did not go off 
without incident. "Peaceable blood" was shed, and a respected 
Democrat reported that qualified voters had been refused admission 
at the polls by "a lawless band and by force." Other voters had had 
tickets "contrary to their wishes" forced upon them. "More out-
rageous and unlawful conduct at the polls and around them," he 
reported, "I never witnessed or read of in all my life." The election, 
he said, was a "farce and a sham." It could not stand judicial 
scrutiny. "A greater fraud and cheat than our sheriff under whose 
nose these things are allowed and smiled upon, never existed."26 
A most sensational incident of violence occurred in Kemper 
County in the spring of 1877. Political differences of long standing 
there had created bad blood between John Gully, Democrat, and 
Judge W. W. Chisholm, an Independent who had been a Republican. 
When Gully was ambushed and murdered, Chisholm was imprisoned 
in the county jail, under suspicion that he had conspired with the 
Negro who confessed to firing the fatal shot. Alarmed for the safety 
of his family Chisholm obtained permission for them to accompany 
him in his incarceration. There at daybreak on a Sunday morning 
a mob, variously estimated at from one hundred to three hundred 
armed men, rode into town and demanded that the jailer surrender 
Chisholm to them. The jailer and his deputy Hed in terror. Chisholm 
and two loyal friends, arming themselves from the jail arsenal, pro-
posed to sell their lives dearly. Several of the attackers fell mortally 
25Yazoo City Herald, quoted in Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, July 29, 1879; 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, quoted in Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, July 31, 1879. 
36Robert S. Hudson to Stone, Nov. 4, 1879, Letters of Governors, Series E, 156A. 
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wounded before the besieged were forced from their stronghold by 
the firing of the building. Chisholm, his fourteen-year-old son, his 
fifteen-year-old daughter, and one of his friends, a British national, 
were shot down as they ran from the building. 
The massacre did not receive the universal condemnation which 
it merited. The Meridian Mercury, Jackson Clarion, and Vicksburg 
Herald openly approved Chisholm's liquidation, and other papers 
were halfhearted in their criticism. The state nominating convention 
was only a few months off, and Governor Stone was in a quandary. 
Strong action on his part in prosecuting the criminals might result 
in his defeat and in Robert Lowry's nomination; for Lowry's follow-
ers, if not approving of the crime, opposed prosecution of the 
criminals. Stone vacillated, and no convictions were obtained. The 
Lowry press, which originally had criticized Stone when it thought 
he would take action, now criticized him for not doing so. "Stone 
knows," said the Brookhaven Comet, "that a vigorous effort to prose-
cute the Kemper County murderers would insure his certain defeat" 
because nine-tenths of his party sympathized with the mob. "The 
judges are Democrats, the prosecuting attorney is a Democrat," said 
the Republican Times, "and all have to be reelected next fall. The 
'white-liners' ... run the state, its courts, Governors and all." Stone's 
inaction did not antagonize the party leaders, for he was renomi-
nated in August by the convention.27 
In such manner did the Democratic party maintain its supremacy 
in the years immediately following its ascendancy to power. "Inde-
pendent voting was denounced; black solidarity was opposed by 
white solidarity; bigoted partisanship dominated both races." Even 
when no threat of Negro supremacy existed the race question was 
used as a pretext for a solid white vote. It was but natural that, out 
of such conditions, "rings and cliques should spring forth." Thus 
Mississippi, "sorely in need of progressive leadership," was actually 
in the grasp "of oligarchies that stifled freedom and hindered pro-
gress."28 
27A. G. Horn to Stone, Oct. 29, 1877, Letters of Governors, Series E, 135A; Vicks-
burg DemoC1'at-Commef'cial, June 1, 1877; Jackson Daily Times, May 12, 17, June 2, 
19, 1877; ibid., quoting Handsboro Democrat, Meridian Mef'cury, Jackson Clarion, 
Brandon Republican, Vicksburg Hef'ald, Cincinnati (Ohio) Times, Brookhaven 
Comet. 
28Clarence H. Poe, "Suffrage Restriction in the South; its Causes and Conse-
quences," in North Ame1'ican Review, CLXXV (1902), 536. 
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Democratic leaders charged that Independent movements were 
always led by disappointed aspirants for office and that they always 
showed a disposition to make use of «Republican and colored ele-
ments."29 They insisted that white supremacy was the only issue in 
politics; all others were dangerous and must be suppressed. News-
papers generally refused to print letters attacking the party. Such 
a policy, if followed, would result in the people passively receiving 
the candidates named by the machine-controlled nominating con-
ventions. By the 1880's the majority of people, even if disgusted, 
could not fight against the party which to them meant white su-
premacy. 
29Natchez Democrat, July 12, Aug. 6, 1879. 
CHAPTER m 
PARTY MACHINERY 
THE highest party authority in the state was the Democratic 
state convention. While it was in session it exercised unlimited 
authority concerning party affairs. It apportioned among the coun-
ties representation within the convention and decided the admission 
of contesting delegations. It fixed the rules for nomination proce-
dure, named candidates for state offices, and drew up a statement 
of party policy. The convention was in session, however, only a few 
days each year, and when it adjourned its authority devolved upon 
a state Democratic executive committee. This committee was the 
supreme governing body of the state party until its authority was 
in turn surrendered to the next convention. 
Immediately after the revolution of 1875-1876 there were nine-
teen members of the committee-five chosen by the convention, and 
two by each of the seven congressional districts-but this number has. 
been changed from time to time. The powers and duties of the 
committee were numerous. It was supposed to look to the success of 
the party in state elections and to aid in electing the party's candi-
dates to Congress and to the Electoral College. It arranged meetings, 
raised campaign funds, prepared and distributed publicity, allocated 
speakers, made arrangements for and organized state conventions, 
and fixed qualifications for voting in the county primaries. State and 
federal patronage were the weapons used by the committee, and its 
chairman was frequently the most important political functionary of 
the state. 
The basis of representation followed by all state conventions was 
double the number of representatives which each county had in the 
lower house of the legislature.1 The apportionment of the legislature 
in the constitution of 1868 was made on the basis of total population 
rather than of white population. This removed control of the state 
from the white counties which had held it under the apportionments 
of the constitutions of 1836 and 1846. Thus the plantation counties, 
which were by far the most populous of the state, elected a majority 
of the legislators.2 After 1875 comparatively few Negroes voted and 
lJackson Weekly Clarion, Aug. 1, 1887; Mississippi, Laws, 1892, Chap. LXIX, 
150-51. 
2Missfssippi Constitution, 1868, Art. XI, Sec. 1. UDfted States CBMII of 1880, 
857-68. Wharton. The Negro In Ml88f88lppI. 151. 
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most of those who did voted Republican. Therefore this scheme of 
apportionment gave the few whites in the heavily Negro populated 
counties an exceedingly large voice in determining party affairs and 
thus in government of the state. Everyone was aware of the situa-
tion, and voices were raised in protest and in defense of the scheme. 
White counties contended that it violated fundamental democratic 
principles, while black counties defended it as warranted by the 
greater taxes paid by their section. The Brandon Republican com-
plained that it gave representation in party affairs to Negroes who 
did not vote Democratic, and suggested in 1877 basing representa-
tion on the number of Democratic votes cast in each county in the 
preceding election.3 
When this suggestion was unheeded the Republican renewed its 
plea four years later. It pOinted out that Smith County with 1,006 
white voters had only two representatives in the convention, while 
Warren with 2,217 had eight; Jackson County with 1,673 white 
voters had two representatives, while Lowndes with only 1,430 had 
six; and Harrison with 1,392 white voters had two representatives, 
while Washington with 1,726 had four. Furthermore, said the 
Republican, in the white counties almost all whites were Democrats, 
and there being few Negro voters, they too voted Democratic. On 
the other hand, in the black counties many whites belonged to the 
Republican party in order to gain local office. "As long as the repre-
sentation in our Conventions remains as it is now," concluded the 
editor, "the few white men in the negro counties will name our can-
didates, and the white counties will have to elect them.'" This was 
no idle complaint, for the five members of the executive committee 
chosen by the state convention from the state at large in 1877 were 
from the five black counties of Hinds, Yazoo, Lowndes, Washington, 
and Marshall.5 
The county executive committee exercised the same powers in 
regard to party affairs in the county that the state executive com-
mittee wielded in state affairs. It was the undisputed authority in 
theory and fact save for the brief period when the county conven-
tion was in session. In theory it surrendered its authority when the 
8Brandon Republican, quoted in Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Aug. 10, 1877. 
'Brandon Republican, quoted in Jackson Clarion, Aug. 4, 1881. 
5Jackson Weekly Clarion, Aug. I, 1877. 
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convention met; in practice it controlled the convention and in most 
cases dictated the disposition of business there. Actually, therefore, 
the committee and its chairman ruled the county through their con-
trol of county patronage. Its approval was indispensable for those 
seeking office and frequently was all that was necessary. County 
committees were uniform in number throughout the state. Each 
county was divided into five supervisors' districts, and each district 
chose in a mass meeting a member of the C01lllty committee.6 As a 
rule these meetings were perfunctory affairs, attended only by a 
few party regulars and run by the district boss. Occasionally, how-
ever, the meetings were revolts from boss rule and several hundred 
might attend. 7 
Within each supervisor's district one or more Democratic clubs 
held regular meetings, arranged to challenge doubtful voters at the 
polls, inspected registration lists, and made active canvasses in 
election campaigns. A regular chain of command descended from 
the state executive committee to the supervisors' district clubs. The 
clubs made regular reports to the county committee, and the county 
committee kept the state committee informed of all important mat-
ters within the county. 
The county committee determined the method of choosing 
county nominees and of delegates to county, district, and state con-
ventions.s Since 1902 all nominations have been made by primary, 
but before then the committee ordered nominations by primary or 
convention and fixed the time and place. It could order preferential 
primaries for nomination of United States senators. This choice 
was binding in theory, but not always in fact, upon the county's 
representatives in the legislature which ultimately elected the 
senators. In theory, the :fixing of qualifications for voting in county 
primaries was the province of the state committee, but frequently 
this authOrity was usurped by the county committee.9 The county 
committee prorated expenses of the primary among candidates, and 
6Mter 1892 county committees were enlarged by law to thirteen, two chosen 
from each district and three from the county at large. They could be chosen "as 
the party may determine." MiSSissippi, Laws, 1892, Chap. LXIX, 149. 
7Jackson Weekly Clarion, Aug. 22, 1887; Aberdeen Examiner, Oct. 18, 1883; 
Macon Beacon, Dec. 10, 1887, May 23, 1891. 
sMississippi, Laws, 1892, Chap. LXIX, 149-50. 
9Mter 1892 the county committee was authorized by law to fix qualifications. 
Ibid., 152. 
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decided all disputed elections. It canvassed returns of the county 
primary, announced the names of victorious candidates, and in 
case of a tie, made provision for a second primary between the two 
highest candidates.lo 
Whether nomination for county offices was by primary or con-
vention, a county convention was held to ratify the decision of the 
primary, to choose a new executive committee, and to transact other 
business. If the committee feared the convention might reject the 
decision of the primary, however, it ordered the returns to be made 
directly to it instead of to the convention. Occasionally the county 
committee let the voters decide by ballot whether to hold a nominat-
ing primary or convention. Where nominations for county offices 
were made by primary, the county convention still retained the privi-
lege of choosing delegates to the state convention.ll 
In case no county primary was held, and as frequently as not this 
seems to have been the case, the county convention was preceded 
by district or "beat" conventions or mass meetings. These district 
meetings chose delegates to the county convention, and frequently 
agreed upon certain candidates whose cause they proposed to 
further in the county convention. The delegates to the county 
assembly were then instructed "to vote as a unit for the nominees 
of this Convention as long as there is a possible hope of success."12 
One cause for the numerous intracounty quarrels with which 
the state was constantly plagued was the method of representation 
in county conventions. The Negro population in a county generally 
settled together in a local community, and this «black" district con-
sequently had very few whites. Representation in county conven-
tions was apportioned equally among the five supervisors' districts 
or else in proportion to total population. This gave the few whites 
in the "black" districts the same advantage in county conventions 
which the delegates from the black counties enjoyed in the state 
convention. As a rule, the Negroes did not vote Democratic, or if 
they did, their vote was controlled by the few white men in the 
district. Thus these white men had influence in the county conven-
lOIn case of a tie vote in the second primary the county committee was empow-
ered to decide the nomination by lot. Macon Beacon, May 23, 1891, Dec. 10, 1887; 
Aberdeen Examinef', Oct. 18, 1883; Jackson Weekly Clarion, Aug. 22, 1877; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledgef', Apr. 20, 1899; Mississippi, Laws, 1892, Chap. LXIX, 151-52. 
llMacon Beacon, Dec. 10, 1887; Chickasaw Messengef', Feb. 24, Mar. 10, 1887. 
Jackson Clarion-Ledgef', Apr. 20, 1899. 
l2Aberdeen Examiner, Oct. 25, 1883. 
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tion many times that of the whites in the white districts. Where 
representation in the county convention was based on total popula-
tion, the heavily populated Negro districts made the disparity even 
greater. This frequently led disgruntled candidates who did not 
have the support of the "black" districts to clamor for cutting down 
the representation of those districts in the convention. IS Yazoo, one 
of the black Delta counties, gave equal representation in its conven-
tion to each of its five beats. Beat 5 there had only 78 registered 
Democratic voters, but it had 30 delegates in the county convention 
just as did Beat 3, which had 534 Democratic voters. Ethelbert 
Barksdale, who had great strength in Beat 3 but little in Beat 5, 
attributed his failure to control the convention and carry the county 
in his race against Senator George in 1891 to this inequitable repre-
sentation.14 So great was the opposition to this system that some of 
the county committees yielded to pressure and apportioned repre-
sentation in the convention on the basis of votes which the party 
had polled in each district in the preceding election.15 
County conventions were apt to be drab affairs if the executive 
committee had firm control or if there was no vital issue stirring the 
people. Such a convention was held in Adams County in 1899. There 
the chairman of the committee called the "large assemblage" to order 
at noon on August 4 and explained the purpose of the convention as 
the naming of delegates to the state convention and "the considera-
tion of such business as may legally come before it." A permanent 
chairman and a permanent secretary were named "by acclamation," 
and five men were then appointed by the chairman as a resolutions 
committee. A committee of five others was appointed "to select 20 
delegates and 20 alternates to represent Adams County at the State 
Convention." "Out of respect for Honorable Ed. H. Ratliffe," the 
county's choice for the nomination for Congress from the fifth dis-
trict, he was allowed to name the county's six delegates to the con-
gressional district convention. While the several committees were 
meeting the convention was "at ease" and listened to "impromptu 
addresses" by such candidates "as happened to be present." The 
I8Aberdeen Examiner, Oct. 18, 25, 1883; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 11, 1891, 
May 25, 1899; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 5, 1899. 
I4Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 11, 1891. 
I5The executive committee of Monroe County in 1883 awarded to each beat one 
, delegate for "every 50 Democratic votes or fraction over half thereof polled at the 
preceding general county election of 1881." Aberdeen Examiner, Oct. 18, 1883. 
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committees then reported and the reports were unanimously 
adopted. The convention had organized, completed its business, 
and adjourned within the space of three hours.16 
More frequent, however, were conventions such as that held in 
Noxubee County in 188l. A two-thirds majority was required for 
nomination and the balloting was long and furious. It required 88 
ballots to nominate the candidate for sheriff, 19 for the county 
treasurer, and 14 for the legislative representatives. The county 
assessor was nominated after a "long contest." "After a most labori-
ous session all day and all night the Convention adjourned Saturday 
morning at 5 o'clock."17 
In addition to the state and county conventions there were also 
state senatorial district conventions, congressional district conven-
tions, judical district conventions, and £lotorial legislative repre-
sentative district conventions. These district conventions were rela-
tively unimportant. Generally only one office was at stake, and no 
permanent organization such as the county and state executive com-
mittees was attempted. The purpose of a £lotorial convention was to 
nominate a candidate for the legislature who had been jointly ap-
portioned to two counties. In such a convention one county might 
dominate. The rule of representation established for the state con-
vention applied to the flotorial convention, and each county had 
twice as many delegates as it had representatives in the lower house 
of the legislature. Thus, in the Holmes-Yazoo flotorial convention, 
Holmes, which had two representatives of its own and a £loater with 
Yazoo, was given five representatives. Yazoo, which had three rep-
resentatives of its own in the legislature in addition to the £loater, 
had seven delegates to the flotorial convention and could thus out-
vote Holmes. When the Yazoo County chairman offered equal rep-
resentation to Holmes in the convention of 1881, he was taken to 
task by his constituents. But frequently agreements were made 
which permitted each county to name the £lotorial candidate in 
alternate elections.18 In any of the conventions a county might 
divide its allotted votes among as many delegates as it chose to 
honor. 
16Natchez Democrat, Aug. 5, 1899. 
17Macon Beacon, Aug. 13, 1881. 
18Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 12, 13, 1881; Aberdeen Examiner, Aug. 23, 1883; 
Macon Beacon, July 15, 1882. 
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The rigid control which the leaders of the Democratic party 
wielded in Mississippi in the years following the revolution of 1875 
produced dissatisfaction among those who were outside the magic 
inner circles. Throughout the period from 1876 until 1902 there was 
a ceaseless clamor against the evils of the convention, state and local. 
Many who had taken an active though subaltern part in the revolu-
tion felt that they were not adequately rewarded. It was inevitable 
that ambitious outsiders who could not gain admittance should 
think of the small central body as a corrupt ring or clique. The 
leading Republican paper in the state reported having heard many 
representatives from the "cow counties" at the Democratic state 
convention of 1877 speak in disgust of the "Jackson Clique" which 
"dicta.ted" Stone's nomination for governor. "The Democrats are 
united in only one thing-to get office-and this union becomes the 
source of the bitterest and most incurable division of all." A large 
number, it thought, had come to the convention "for office," but had 
gone home "in disgust."19 
There was plenty of evidence in the Democratic press of dis-
content with this convention. The Raymond Gazette concluded 
:lfter the convention that the party showed no disposition "to re-
ward ... those who have performed valuable services in overthrow-
ing the Radicals." If a man wished position in the party, he must 
"be always on the alert for himself." The Forest Re(!ister condemned 
the platform adopted as "cut and dried," and caIJed it "the most 
arrant clap-trap and machinery ever thrust down the throats of the 
people." Both the Re(!ister and the Canton Mail condemned the 
"dictatorial methods" of Lamar at the convention. "Col. Lamar has 
demonstrated to the people of Mississippi," said the Mail editor, 
"that he's more concerned about himself and his own success than 
he is about the affairs of the State. He is for Lamar first and Missis-
sippi next."20 
The party leaders had early mastered the technique of conven-
tion control and were reluctant to change. The dissatisfied elements, 
rebuffed at conventions, sought to better their chances by changing 
the rules of the game by making primaries mandatory. Throughout 
the period the convention-primary controversy raged. One "progres-
19Jackson Daily Times, Aug. 8, 4, 1877. 
20Raymond Gazette and Forest Register, quoted in Jackson Daily Times, Aug. 10, 
1877; Canton Mail, quoted in Jackson Daily Times, Sept. 4, 1877. 
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sive" editor in 1879 noted that all "bourbon journals" were attempt-
ing to "whip the various Democratic county committees into line" 
for conventions. The editor admitted that conventions and "strict 
party organzation" were all right in the past when it was deemed 
necessary that "Mississippians should rule Mississippi." Now that 
that condition existed he thought that the party should be run de-
mocratically, without "the dictates of a few ... self-interested 
politicians."21 
A specific charge made against the convention was that nomina-
tions were frequently the result of barter. The Natchez Democrat 
admitted that trading was a common practice at conventions, and 
the Aberdeen Examiner blandly published an account of a trade 
between Monroe and Yazoo counties in the state convention of 1885. 
"Our candidate for Auditor," said the Examiner, "received the 7 
votes of Yazoo . . . on everv ballot, and when the nomination for 
attorney-general was reached Monroe supported her candidate until 
he was withdrawn."22 A Republican paper reported widespread 
dissatisfaction amon~ Hinds County Democrats with their county 
convention in 1877. The charge was freely made, said the editor, 
that nominations were "the result of bargain and sale among the 
delegates."28 
Dissatisfaction led to revolt. The disgruntled voters of Hinds in 
1877 called a rump convention and nominated a new ticket of county 
officers; and reports came into Tackson of Independent tickets com-
plete from governor to beat officers in other parts of the state. The 
movement, however, proved abortive; the Independents met the fate 
of most third parties, and the regular tickets had their own way in 
the election.24 As time went on the practice of revolt spread and 
Independent tickets were formed in many sections. A group of 
Democrats met at Athens Camp Ground in Monroe County on 
September 4, 1883, in protest against the "combinations and tricks" 
and "glaring frauds" in the county primary held on July 21 and rati-
fied by the county convention of Tuly 28. The meetin~ declared 
nine of the nominees to have been illegally and fraudulently chosen. 
It nominated nine others in opposition, acceded to the other nomina-
21Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, June 4, 1879; Macon Beacon, July 80, 1881. 
22Natchez Democrat, Aug. 27, 1885; ibid., quoting Aberdeen Examiner. 
23Jackson Daily Times, Nov. 2, 1877. 
24Ibid., Nov. 2, 6, 8, 1877. 
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tions made by the primary, and appointed a committee of fifteen, 
three from each district, as an executive committee to manage the 
campaign. This movement, too, proved futile; three of the men 
nominated by the meeting declined the honor, and the other six 
were defeated.25 
A revolt against the action of the county convention in N oxubee 
in 1889 was barely averted. There a county primary had been held, 
but the county committee had highhandedly refused to confirm the 
nomination of the candidate for sheriff who had polled the highest 
vote. When the state executive committee refused to order another 
primary in the county the charge was made that it was partisan. 
Later the state committee reversed itself and ordered a second pri-
mary, at which time the original victor won again. This produced a 
kind of harmony, but wounds remained.26 
Even the advocates of reform in the practices of nominating con-
ventions to eliminate «machine politics" admitted that the system 
«with all its ... evils" had given good officials. But fears were ex-
pressed that if party dissension continued to grow, the Republicans 
would «quietly 8tep into office."27 
In the political machinery of the state, election officials were 
only slightly less important than party officials. A state board of 
election commissioners, composed of the governor, secretary of state, 
and attorney-general, appointed county boards, consisting of «three 
discreet persons" not all of the same party. The state board also ap-
pointed a registrar in each county to register the names of the voters. 
County election commissioners were appointed two months before 
each congressional election and held office for two years unless 
removed. The registrar was appointed for a four-year term. The 
county election commissioners appointed three managers for each 
election district, not all of the same party, and they also had appel-
late jurisdiction from decisions made by the ref.!;istrar. The managers 
were to see that the election was conducted «fairly and agreeably to 
law," and were to be the judges of the qualifications of electors pre-
senting themselves at the polls.28 After 1875 two of the commis-
25Aberdeen Examiner, Sept. 13, 20, Nov. 12, 1883. 
26Macon Beacon, Oct. 5, 12, 26, 1889. 
27Ibid., May 7, 1881, March 31, 1883. 
28Mississippi, Laws, 1876, Chap. LXVII; ibid., 1880, Chap. LVI; Code, 1880, 
Sees. 121, 124, 128, 133, 138-140. 
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sioners were always Democrats and the other a Republican. As a 
general practice the state board named the Democratic members to 
the county boards upon the recommendation of their respective 
county committees. But where a county committee was hostile to 
the state administration, its recommendation was frequently disre-
garded. Also, the Republican member was supposed to be ap-
pOinted upon the recommendation of the Republican county com-
mittee. But if the Republican recommendation did not meet the 
approval of the Democratic county committee, it had little chance 
of acceptance.29 
The local election officials occupied positions of great power. By 
encouraging some to register and by discouraging others they could 
influence elections. They could also exercise influence by locating 
voting places close to certain groups of voters and distant from 
others.80 The choice of the election commissioners by Democratic 
state officials «made all things pOSSible." Thousands of opposi-
tion votes were thrown out on technicalities, fraudulent returns were 
frequently made, and, if necessary, ballot boxes were stuffed.31 
Since Independent movements were widespread it was thought that 
any methods which would insure victory were justifiable. 
With so much at stake there was certain to be great interest in 
securing "proper" parties for election officials in the several counties. 
In 1876 Warren Cowan wrote Governor Stone from Vicksburg pro-
testing against the appointment of the Republican member of the 
county board who had been recommended by Thomas C. Catchings, 
Democratic congressman from the district. According to Cowan 
the man had served on the old Republican board during Reconstruc-
tion, had then switched to the Democratic party, but had recently 
rejOined the Republicans. "He is utterly unreliable," wrote Cowan, 
"and keeps a small drinking saloon." He had no "permanent property 
interests" in the county, and his appointment would "produce dis-
29Charles A. Stovall to J. Z. George, June 27, 1876; Stovall to J. M. Stone, Sept. 
18, 1877; Warren Cowan to Stone, Apr. 19, 1876; T. C. Catchings to Stone, Apr. 22. 
1876; L. P. Yerger to George, Aug. 14, 1876; J. L. Lake to Stone et al., Aug. 7, 1876; 
Robert Lowry to Kinloch Faulconer, Nov. 3, 1877, Letters of Governors, Series E, 
128A, 136A, 126A, 135A; Jackson Clarion, Aug. 18, 1881; Wharton, The Negro in 
Mississippi, 201; Macon Beacon, Mar. 12, 1881; Chickasaw Messenger, Sept. 1, 8, 15, 
29, Oct. 20, 1887. 
80Stovall to George, June 27, 1876, Letters of Governors, Series E, 128A. 
81Wharton, The Negri) in Mississippi, 204. 
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satisfaction and create distrust among the better classes."82 In 
Leflore County the Radicals were attempting to have Sam McRae, 
Negro, removed as Republican member of the election commission, 
but the Democrats were insisting that he be retained. «By his fair 
dealings, his conservative views, and his gentlemanly deportment," 
wrote L. P. Yerger, he had made friends «among his political 
enemies, the Democrats." Frequently complaint had been made that 
Republican members of the county commissions were illiterate, but 
Yerger pointed out that McRae was not, since «he can sign his own 
name." Invariably the Democrats recommended a Negro as the Re-
publican election commissioner. aa 
Within a few years after the overthrow of the Radicals fear of the 
Republican party in itself disappeared, but danger of a fusion of 
dissident groups of Democrats with Republicans remained. Inde-
pendent factions were striving to secure representation on the elec-
tion boards, and frequently there was danger they might succeed. 
Learning that a vacancy was about to occur on the Clarke County 
board in 1877 and "knowing the importance to the Democratic 
party of maintaining a proper control of the registration," Charles 
Stovall wrote Governor Stone urging the appointment of W. C. Mc-
Donald. "We have much to contend with in this county," wrote 
Stovall, "to maintain the party conquests recently made. We have 
local complications and broils which must be delicately handled." 
The Independent spirit was abroad in the county and had to be 
dealt with. It was "vital to the party to see that [the] Board of 
Registrars are 'Sound on the Goose'."34 
Unfairness on the part of election officials was repeatedly 
charged, not only by Republicans and Independents but, in the few 
cases where the opposition had gained local control, by regular 
Democrats. During the campaign of 1876 the secretary of the Re-
publican state central committee charged that in Washington 
County, where there were over 6,000 registered voters, the election 
commissioners had reduced the voting precincts to seven and had 
"determined to remain only two days" at each precinct to conduct 
registration. In one district with 250 voters two voting precincts 
82Cowan to Stone, Apr. 19, 1876; W. H. McCardle to Stone, Apr. 17, 1876, Let-
ters of Governors, Series E, 126A. 
8SYerger to George, Aug. 14, 1876; Catchings to Stone, Apr. 22, 1876, ibid. 
84Stovall to Stone, Sept. 18, 1877, ibid., Series E, 1S6A. 
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were established, while in another with 1,700 voters "provision has 
been made for only one polling place. It is obvious," he wrote, "that 
such arrangements are well calculated to deprive many citizens of 
an opportunity to register and vote." Election under such circum-
stances would be a "farce." He urged the removal of the Washington 
board and the choice of another.35 The following year a prominent 
Democrat of Hinds County charged R. H. Reeves, the Hinds regis-
trar, with "fraudulent action" in registering unqualified voters and in 
refusing to register some who were qualified.36 
By 1887 agrarian factions had gained control in some counties 
and were engaged in a bitter duel with the administration of Gov-
ernor Lowry. Mter a nominating convention in Chickasaw the suc-
cessful candidates requested the county executive committee to 
recommend to the state board of election commissioners three men 
to serve on the county election board. But the county executive 
committee was split by factionalism, and while nine of the fifteen 
members made the requested recommendation, the other six refused 
to do so and started a petition for the appointment of three other 
men. The nominees thereupon addressed a letter to the public 
charging the six dissident committeemen with being "unfriendly 
to . . • the Democratic ticket and in sympathy with an opposition 
movement, which means the antagonism of the races in this county." 
When the state board appOinted the opposition men the nominees 
published compromising letters of the dissident committeemen to 
the governor plotting the defeat of the Democratic nominees. 
A correspondent from Holmes County reported a similar occur-
rence there. The state board had given two of the three commis-
sionerships to the opposition-one to the regular Republican organi-
zation and one to the Independent Democrats-while giving only 
one to the regular Democratic organization. The correspondent 
attributed the action to the fact that Holmes had gone against Lowry 
in the preceding election, as had Chickasaw, and that the adminis-
tration was simply "settling old scores." In both instances Lowry 
was thus in the position of supporting Independents, some of whom 
had been Republicans in the past and were suspected of being 
allied with them now. The Fayette Chronicle openly charged that 
Lowry was trying to beat Frank Burkitt, agrarian leader of Chicka-
86Lake to Stone et al., Aug. 7, 1876; W. A. Percy to State Board of Registrars, 
Aug. 14, 1876, ibid., Series E, 128A. 
86Lowry to Faulconer, Nov. 3, 1877, ibid., Series E, 135A. 
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saw, with an Independent because Burkitt was an "anti-Lowry 
Democrat." The Kosciusko Star echoed the charge, and the Jackson 
New Mississippian added that Lowry had done the same thing in 
his own county of Rankin, which had opposed his renomination.37 
At the same time the Bolivar County Democratic executive com-
mittee was protesting the reappointment of the election board in 
Bolivar, charging it was dominated by George Y. Scott, the "politi-
cal boss" of the county. One of the commissioners, it was claimed, 
was the brother of the chancery clerk who was a candidate for re-
election, and was also the attorney for the Negro county treasurer 
who was a candidate for re-election. Another of the commissioners 
was a brother-in-law of the chancery clerk and "a close relation" of 
George Scott.38 
Thus the struggle went on. Where the interests of the faction in 
control of the state administration coincided with those of the group 
in charge of local affairs, things moved on a comparatively even 
keel. Complaints there were to be sure, but frequently these were 
the complaints of Republicans and Independents, often a discredited 
set among the more substantial folk. But where state and local 
leaders were at variance, the struggle was of more consequence to 
the state party organization. When the local respected leaders broke 
with the authority at Jackson trouble was sure to follow. Generally 
such revolts were not confined to one area, and there was danger not 
only that such factions might unite, but also that they might ally 
themselves with Republican leaders who had influence with the 
great potential voting masses of Negroes. Any and all factions made 
use of these black "pawns" where it was necessary and it suited their 
purpose to do so. This bidding for the Negro vote, it was felt, was 
damaging to the prestige and morals of the whites and, more im-
portant still, was a threat to "white supremacy." 
37Chickasaw Messenger, Sept. 1, 8, 15, 29, Oct. 6, 1887; ibid., Sept. 29, 1887, 
quoting Fayette Chronicle and Kosciusko Star; ibid., Oct. 6, 1887, quoting Jackson 
New Mississippian. 
38Chickasaw Messenger, Oct. 20, 1887. 
CHAPTER IV 
AGRARIAN DISCONTENT 
ONE cannot view the politics of Mississippi without seeing that 
sectional interests within the state produced political issues. 
In the northwest comer of the state, in a region formed by the con-
fluence of the Mississippi and Yazoo rivers, is the Delta. Here cen-
turies of inundations have built up an alluvial soil thirty feet deep. 
It is a region of large plantations heavily populated by Negro ten-
ants, and the rich soil is almost exclusively devoted to the production 
of long-staple cotton. Fifteen hundred pounds to the acre is not an 
unusual yield in the Delta, whereas in other parts of the state six 
hundred pounds is considered good. Twelve of Mississippi's eighty-
two counties are entirely within the Delta region and hall a dozen 
more are partly so. In all of these counties the population is pre-
dOminately Negro, varying in ratio from 3 to 1 in some, to 8,10, and 
even 15 to 1 in others.! The Delta was by far the wealthiest region 
of the state, and should therefore have borne a considerable portion 
of the tax burden. It did not always do so, however, and attempts 
to redistribute tax loads were resisted as strongly in the Delta and 
other rich counties as they were urged by less fortunate sections. 
Then, too, the constitutional machinery, inherited from Reconstruc-
tion days and preserved for more than a dozen years thereafter, gave 
the same wealthy counties an influence in politics far beyond that 
warranted by the number of their voters. Efforts to reform this 
inequity were marked by the same sectional cleavages as was the 
struggle over finances. Indeed the two movements converged in one 
and it was impossible at times to distinguish them. 
Nor when political reforms were finally effected-they were 
begun in 1890 and consummated twelve years later-did the sec-
tional struggle cease. Thereafter the Delta counties felt that their 
taxes were out of all proportion to their political influence, and the 
hill counties and Piney Woods section were dissatisfied because they 
felt that the political influence of the Delta was still greater than its 
voting population warranted. 
lThis and succeeding paragraphs concerning geography and population are based 
on E. N. Lowe, A Preliminary Study of Soils of Mi88issippi (Nashville, 1911), 61-67; 
United States C6f18U8 of 1890, 1,770-71. 
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The hill counties are those at the northeast comer of the state 
bordering the Tennessee River. Here the land is rough, unproduc-
tive, and ill-suited for profitable agriculture. At the same time fail-
ure of nature to provide the essential ingredients of industry-coal 
and water power-has relegated the inhabitants to subsistence farm-
ing. It is a region of small farms where the whites outnumber the 
Negroes as greatly as the Negroes outnumber the whites in the 
most densely populated Delta counties. 
The Piney Woods is a region including approximately the south-
east quarter of the state. Here the soil is sandy and unproductive, 
but the region is heavily timbered with pine. This timber was to 
furnish the Piney Woods with its one brief period of prosperity in 
the early years of the twentieth century. But that time was not 
yet, and in the period before 1890 the region was one of small farms 
where cotton growing and truck gardening were carried on at a 
subsistence level. Both here and to the south in the sandy Coastal 
Plain the population is overwhelmingly white. 
In general, the richest counties of the state are in the Delta and 
the poorest are in south Mississippi. Next to the Delta in wealth is 
the strip of brown loess counties on its eastern border, with scattered 
here and there a county in the prairie region. Next in poverty to 
the Piney Woods region of the south is the Tennessee River Hills 
area to the north and east. In the assessment valuations in 1888 the 
thirteen counties of the first class were all Delta counties, and the 
fifteen counties of the fourth and last class were all located either 
in south Mississippi or in the northeastern area.2 
The variance of economic advantages in the different sections 
was re:Bected in the political struggles within the state, although 
not with perfect consistency and unanimity. To classify certain 
regions of the state as committed entirely to this or that political 
philosophy would be oversimplification. It must be borne in mind 
that there were rich and poor, educated and uneducated, cultured 
and uncultured in all regions, and as often as not class interests 
did not follow sectional lines. 
It would be too simple to think of Mississippi as divided into 
merely the large landowners of the Delta in an area that is predom-
inantly Negro, and the small landowners of the hill country where 
2M aeon Beacon, Dec. 22, 1888. 
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the population is predominantly white. Yet these two classes do 
exist and there is little love between them. The small hill farmers, 
who work their farms with their own hands, dislike and distrust 
the plantation owners, whose lands are worked almost entirely by 
Negroes. The whites beyond the Delta greatly exceed those within, 
and frequently the two groups are in opposing political factions. 
On the other hand, the whites within the Delta thought that the 
white counties had abandoned them to the Negroes in the con-
gressional redistricting after the overthrow of the Radical regime 
in 1876, and their pride in their self-salvation was rivaled only by 
their resentment against the white counties who had left them 
to their fate.a "The river counties will certainly be represented on 
the next State ticket," wrote a Delta editor in 1887, "or the little 
Shoe-String District will have a ticket of its own." The district 
might divide on political and race issues but would "be solid" on 
a sectional fight and "all lump in together, Republican and Demo-
crats, white and black, and poll such a vote" as would make the 
political aspirants of "north Mississippi and of the Cow Counties 
open their eyes in astonishment."4 
Peculiar sectional needs were a source of irritation. In the 1880's 
sheep raising was a considerable industry in northeast Mississippi, 
and the people of that region were resentful when they could not 
persuade the state legislature to instruct the congressmen and 
senators to vote for a tariff on wool. 5 South Mississippi and the 
white counties in general could not provide adequate schooling 
for their children, and their pleas for a redistribution of school funds 
persisted for half a century. The particular need of the Delta was 
levees to protect it from the annual overflows of the Mississippi 
and the Yazoo. But levees cost money and the rest of the state 
was slow to see any advantage it could derive from taxing itself 
to protect the property of the plantation owners. In their extremity 
the Delta farmers actually considered allying themselves with the 
Republican party in an effort to get federal aid for levee construc-
tion. "If we of the Delta are subjected to the annual floods of the 
river," wrote a farmer to Governor Lowry, "our country is not 
SNatchez Democrat, Jan. 26, 1877. 
4Vicksburg Daily Commercial, Mar. 23, 1877. 
5Aberdeen Examiner, July 19, 1883. Said the Examiner, "the wool tariff is the 
farmer's tariff." 
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habitable, and the character of the government that may prevail 
over it becomes a minor question."6 
Although Mississippi was and has remained predominantly an 
agricultural state, industry began to develop in the period after the 
Civil War. Lacking water power and coal, industry never flour-
ished to the extent it did in other southern states; yet in the decade 
of the 1880's it increased threefold. The depreSSion in cotton prices 
impressed the need of a more varied industry. In his message to 
the legislature in 1882 Governor Lowry urged industrial encour-
agement, and the legislature responded by an act exempting new 
industries from taxation for a period of ten years after starting 
operation.7 Much was expected as a result of this measure, but the 
deficiency in coal and water power restricted development. In 
1890 lumber, textiles, oil, and raihoads were Mississippi's leading 
industries. Most of this industry was located in southern Mississippi, 
but even there it took second place to agriculture whose products 
were valued at four times those of industry.s 
Industry was gaining an importance, however, not indicated 
by statistics. Before the war agriculture had dominated southern 
thought and society. The clergy, press, bar, and other opinion-
forming agencies reflected its views and represented its interests. 
Despite differences in wealth and social status the small farmer's 
interests were in many cases tied closely to those of the planters. 
While the Civil War brought "desolation and ruin to the farmer 
and planter, it wrought a revolution within the towns." Many were 
turning from agriculture to merchandising, banking, railroading, 
manufacturing, and other occupations. Reconstruction transferred 
social and economic power from the farms to the towns. The store 
usurped the prestige of the plantation, and towns grew in popu-
lation and importance. By the 1880's agriculture was no longer 
the dominant influence it had been. The farmer's social pre-
eminence had been taken by the merchant, the banker, and the 
lawyer who found he could get fatter fees from this new clientele 
than from the old.9 
6A. J. Paxton to Robert Lowry, July 9, 1882, in Letters of Governors, Series E, 
176A; also Green Clay to Lowry, July 6, 1882, ibid. 
7Mississippi, Laws, 1882, Chap. XLIX, Sec. 1. 
SHalsell, "The Bourbon Period," loco cit., 534-35. 
9Benjamin B. Kendrick, "Agrarian Discontent in the South: 1880-1890," in Amer-
ican Historical Association, Annual Report (1920), 271-72, 274; Daniel M. Robison, 
"From Tillman to Long: Some Striking Leaders of the Rural South," in Journal of 
Southern History, III (1937),294-95. 
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A divergence was evolving between the economic interests of 
farm and town that was to effect a change in politics. "The una-
nimity with which the spokesmen of the people had championed 
the cause of agriculture was no more."lO The farmers realized that 
they had lost their leaders, and resentment against them and against 
political "machines" and "rings" grew up.n Economic distress was 
upon them, and they felt they must have new leaders to replace 
the old. 
One particular grievance of the farmer in the 1870's and 1880's 
was the lien law. This was a mortgage on the crop to be planted 
and was Originally designed to give the landlord security for 
supplies furnished his tenants. But soon it began to be used by the 
merchants to the disadvantage of the landlord. If the landlord had 
had the capital to finance his tenants, all would have been well. 
But he did not, and he had to borrow it either directly from the 
banks or indirectly through the merchants who furnished supplies 
to both him and his tenants. Because of the low value of land after 
the war, merchant and banker had suffered losses on real security, 
and when the lien law was passed they quickly took advantage of 
it to demand one of these ironclad mortgages of any farmer desiring 
credit. In return for the credit extended him, and through him to 
his tenants, the farmer mortgaged his crop, stock, and agricultural 
implements to the merchant. The contract usually provided that the 
merchant's accounts were incontestable. The crops when sold fre-
quently brought less than these accounts, so that the farmer "con-
tinued from year to year in debt to the same merchant under the 
same galling conditions." Because of the monopoly which the mer-
chant enjoyed, as well as the uncertainty of the investment, the 
prices charged the farmer were generally from 25 to 50 per cent 
above the cash price. Better to secure himself and to increase his 
sale of supplies, the merchant insisted that the farmer plant most 
of his land in cotton. Frequently, under the prevailing low price 
of cotton, the farmer failed to make both ends meet, and "the land 
began to go piece-meal to the merchant." The merchant then 
cropped it with Negro tenants. The Negroes preferred to crop with 
lORobison, "From Tillman to Long," loco cit., 294. 
llSee Memorial of State Farmer's Alliance to legislature, in Mississippi, HOII86 
Journal, 1890, pp. 145-48. 
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merchants because they gave less supervision, and thus the mer-
chants were able to obtain the better tenants.12 
During the 1880's recorded mortgages increased from less than 
five thousand to more than eleven thousand. Cotton prices con-
tinued low and farm tenantry was increasing, but the "lien merchant 
rose in prosperity [while] the farmer sank further into the slough 
of economic despondency."13 The farmer sought by devious means, 
some legal and some violent, to extricate himself from this depressed 
condition. A meeting of farmers in Brookhaven in the fall of 1877 
demanded a price of fifteen cents for cotton, and denounced mer-
chants who by "usurious rates and enormous profits supped the 
life blood from the farmers."14 In many places the rougher element 
organized into gangs of "bulldozers" and took direct action against 
farmers who rented land from merchants. In Amite, Wilkinson, 
Franklin, and Pike counties in the southwest corner of the state, 
the most diabolical crimes were secretly committed. Whippings, 
mutilations, robberies, rapes, and murders by bands of men under 
the guise of "Bulldozers or protective clubs" were common occur-
rences. When good men denounced these practices, they too were 
mysteriously threatened with violence.15 But the lawlessness was 
not altogether unpopular even among the "good citizens." A cor-
respondent from Amite reported that reputable men were publicly 
applauding the "bulldozers" and that politicians were making 
capital of the farmer's grievances. Indeed it was commonly thought 
there, he wrote, that the "bulldozers" were authorized agents of 
the Farmers' Alliance. In any event, prominent farmers were openly 
repudiating contracts made with merchants, and the latter were 
desperate as they realized that in the present state of feeling they 
could not collect. So bad did "bulldozing" become that the governor 
I2Kendrick, "Agrarian Discontent," loe. cit., 274-76. Both Negroes and whites 
made up the tenant population of MissiSSippi, but the Negro tenants greatly out-
numbered the whites. The planter had found in the years after the war that the 
Negro was an agricultural worker far superior and more easily controlled than the 
white, and thus the Negro became a victim of the share-cropper system. In seven-
teen counties in 1880 not one Negro in a hundred owned the land he worked. In 
twelve counties the proportion was less than one in twenty; in many other counties 
it was less than one in fifty. According to Vernon L. Wharton these ratios had 
undergone some change by 1890 when, of the 87,819 Negro farm homes, 10,032 were 
owned by their occupants. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 61-62. 
lsHalsell, "The Bourbon Period," loe. cit., 533. 
14Jackson Daily Times, Sept. 19, 1877. 
lIIBrookhaven Ledger. Vicksburg Herald. and Holly Springs South. quoted in 
JacksoD Daily Times, Aug. 29, 1877. 
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asked and the legislature granted funds to suppress the lawless-
ness.16 
Violence was not the only attack made by the farmers on the 
lien law. For months preceding and during the legislative session 
of 1878 active propaganda for repeal of the law was carried on. 
Most of the rural papers advocated outright repeal, while the jour-
nals of the larger towns joined in the defense of the law. The Jackson 
Daily Times, a Republican paper, took a middle-of-the-road attitude 
and suggested making the lien legal only for necessities.u The 
Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial violently attacked the law because 
of its injustice to tenants by protecting the usurious rates charged 
by the merchants.18 The Democrat called on the legislature to "do 
something practical" for the farmers, pointing out that all other 
classes were aided in some way by the government-mechanics 
could obtain patents, vending taxes protected the merchant from 
outside competition, and the lawyer's license guaranteed exclusive 
privileges to the members of that profession. "But the farmers," 
said the editor, " ... are left to struggle alone and unassisted in their 
laborious efforts to contribute to the wealth and prosperity of the 
state."19 
The farmers traced many of their ills to middlemen whose toll 
of goods passing through their hands was not commens~rate to the 
services rendered. To the farmer it seemed that the middleman was 
an invisible but strongly unified monopoly, and he became an in-
veterate foe of anything that smacked of monopolism.20 
The greatest of all monopolies, as the farmer saw it, was the 
railroad. It was the main highway which furnished him with an 
outlet to a market for his produce. Only in rare instances did the 
farmer have the benefit of competing lines, and even here he fre-
quently suspected that the competitors were in secret agreement 
against him. The railroad problem most closely affected the farmer 
on the question of rates. It was believed that the tariffs were too 
high and that "gross discrimination was practiced in fixing them." 
In the days before the Interstate Commerce Commission, clamor 
16Jackson Daily Times, Sept. 20, 1877, Feb. 4, 1878. 
17Ibid., Jan. 10, 1878. 
18Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Jan. 18, 1878. 
19Ibid., Jan. 2, 1882. 
20James S. Ferguson, "Cooperative Activity in the Grange in Mississippi," in 
Journal of Mississippi History, IV (1942),5-19. 
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began for state regulation.21 There was much agitation about the 
inequalities, discriminations, and extortions of the railroads, par-
ticularly the Mobile and Ohio.22 So strong was the feeling that a 
prominent Democratic paper urged the defeat of any legislative 
candidate, "even if beaten by a Radical," who did not favor federal 
aid to the Texas-Pacific which, it was hoped, would break the 
monopoly. 23 
Frequently the farmer's animosity toward the carriers sprang 
from an even more personal grievance than that of discriminatory 
and oppressive rates. Quite often he had invested in stock of a 
proposed road in order to gain access to market. In addition counties 
and towns furnished loans and rights of way, and purchased stock. 
Because of corrupt construction rings, unscrupulous directors, or 
inefficiency, many of the roads went through receivership before 
the undertaking was completed, sometimes before it was begun. 
When the stock failed to pay dividends, the farmer who had fre-
quently mortgaged his land to buy it suffered. When his taxes were 
increased to pay the county's or town's gift to the road a blind 
antagonism grew up in him against railroads in general. 24 He might 
not understand just what the situation was or where the trouble 
really lay, but that did not lessen his antagonism. When his govern-
ment failed to protect him against the predatory practices of the 
"monster," he denounced the government as an ally of the "interests." 
When the legislature of 1882 passed legislation favorable to rail-
roads and industrial enterprises, the Macon Beacon and the Enter-
prise Courier were outspoken in their criticism. The Courier charged 
the legislature with "class legislation in favor of capital and corpora-
tions" and predicted that its actions would be a heavy weight for 
the Democratic party to carry in the next campaign. The editor 
foresaw a revolution within the party against the monopolists and 
the money power, and the Beacon echoed the sentiment.25 
That the farmer's grievance was real there has long ceased to 
be any doubt. The railway corporation's power was growing "and 
21SoIon J. Buck, The Granger Movement, A Study of Agricultural Organizations 
and its Political, Economic, and Social Manifestations, 1870-1880 (Cambridge, 
1933), 13-14. 
22Jackson Weekly Clarion, most issues through the winter and spring of 1878. 
23Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Oct. 5, 1877. 
24Buck, The Granger Movement, 10-11. 
25Enterprise Courier, quoted in Macon Beacon, Mar. 18, 1882. 
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was being used to influence public officials." Construction systems 
were wasteful and corrupt; watering of stocks and securities was a 
common practice; and rates were ''higher than was necessary for 
a fair return on the physical value of the road."26 There were dis-
criminations against shippers which injured not only them but 
consumers as well. The legislator's plight was not an enviable one. 
He was ''between the devil and the deep sea" in the fear of offending 
the farmers, who had votes, and the railroads, who had money. 
Whether or not the numerous charges of bribery were true, "railroad 
favors were undoubtedly distributed among well disposed legisla-
tors."27 
The farmers, however, were not without representatives during 
the period. The three most prominent of the new leaders-General 
James Z. George, Lucius Q. C. Lamar, and Edward C. Walthall-
were all corporate lawyers. George, who by all odds had the largest 
corporate practice in the state, was not as clearly identified with 
corporate interests politically as were Lamar and Walthall. At 
times he seemed to enioy the confidence of the small farmers, who 
were dubious of the other twO.28 But of the seventeen congressmen 
, elected from 1876 to 1890, "seven ... svrnpathized with, worked for, 
and were approved by the farmers." The lower house of the legis-
lature "was controlled by the farmers throughout the ... period," 
and there was always a large minority of farmers in the Senate.29 
With such representation it is remarkable that the farmers were 
not able to secure more favorable legislation than they did. But 
they were not politically organized, and they lacked able leadership. 
Their two outstanding leaders-Putnam Darden and Frank L. 
Burkitt-never occupied offices of great importance, and generally 
the disorganized farmers "worked along with and voted for" the 
men in power. Until the turn of the century they "were generally 
content to accept the so-called Bourbon senators and representa-
tives ... or, if unwilling, they did not make their influence felt."Bo 
But agrarian journals did not join in the eulogies which were so 
26Buck, The Granger Movement, 15. 
27Buck, The Agrarian Crusade, 52, 53. 
28Halsell, "The Bourbon Period," loco cit., 524-26; R. T. Wilson to L. Q. C. 
Lamar, Sept. 15, 1891, Lamar Letterbooks. 
29Halsell, "The Bourbon Period," loco cit., 524-28. 
80Ibld .• 531. 
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frequently and with such abandon showered upon officeholders by 
their supporting press. Grange papers were both articulate and 
devastating in their attacks upon politicians who did not favor 
agricultural interests. But for a long period their voices were un-
heard, or if heard were disregarded. The control of the entrenched 
leaders was too complete to be upset by this leaderless and dis-
organized opposition. When the opposition showed signs of unifica-
tion, as it did in 1881, 1888, and again in 1895, the cry of "white 
supremacy and party regularity" sufficed to scatter its forces. 
CHAPTER V 
CORPORATION S AND THE FARMERS 
ONE of the Democratic leaders of the state who had contributed 
mightily to the victory of 1875-1876 was Ethelbert Barksdale, 
editor of the Jackson Clarion. Barksdale was frequently denounced 
as an "ultra-Bourbon" by editors pr0fessing to be "progressive." 
But Barksdale was an advocate of railroad regulation, the elimina-
tion of the convict lease system, cheap currency, free coinage of 
silver, the sub-treasury, and other programs not generally identified 
with "Bourbonism." Barksdale did riot approve of Lamar's policy 
of conciliating northern Republicans ~J)d had taken issue with him 
on his eulo{!V of Sumner. When Lam~r snpported the report of the 
Electoral Commission in the Haves-Tilden election of 1876, the 
f':~tranQ'ement widened between him and Barksdale. Barksdale even 
('han:rf':d that Lamar had exchanged hi'> vote for the commission 
report in return for his own admission to the United States Senate.1 
The controversv between silver and rrold was {!ettin{! under way 
in Mis<;j'1sinpi in thp latp 1870's. an(J nol1ti('al factions were forminp; 
on thi<; is<;lle. Harhdale. as a Farmers' AlH::mce man. favored the 
nmeal of the SDeC'ie Resumption Act and the passaO'e of the Bland 
hill. T ,~m~r on thp other h::md. was a "Coklbuq" and svmn~thized 
v;rith bqnkinrr and railroad interests. 'PannIar sentiment in Missis-
sinn1. howf':ver. was overwhelminO'lv in favor of ('heap money, and in 
1 ~7R the lprrj<;latme c;pnt iP'1h1'C'tions to L:lmllr and Blanche K. 
'Rn,,"p to Sl1nn01't thp Bhnd hill !'In(J to vot'" for TPm~al of t'hf': 'Recmmn-
Hnn A('t in the Spnate Brl'('e (Jid so. hut Lamar. te'1tin~ }-li<; hold on 
1->i<.: ppon1p 1l1moc:t to the brNI.kinO' noint. n~fll~f'(J. For this he was 
e'l'('ori~ted bv a lal'O'e D~rt of thf': Mise;issinni nress and snffered the 
hHmi1i~tion of navinO' thf': st~te H011C:p of Henree;entatives pass 3. 
1'PsolHnon C'ommpnclin~ the adion of hie; NeO'ro ('olleaO'l1e while 
hrnorlDO' hirn.2 Tl"lf~ C7f1rirm mlhliClhe~ a letter from TefFerson Davis 
f':XT'ressinO' his bf'lipf in the ob1i~ation of a Senator to folIow instmc-
ITackson Weeki" C7ar;on. Dpe'. 10. lR74. Feb. 9f-1. 1876: Maves. Lamar. 302; 
V;d:~bnr~ Democrat-Commercial. MaT. 24, 1877: Natchez DaillJ Democrat, July 14, 
1881. 
2Natchez Democrat, Feb. 3, 1878: Mississippi, Senate lournal, 1878, pp. 212, 
215, 235, 236, 343; Mayes, Lamar, 330-48. 
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tions from his legislature,3 and the Natchez Democrat, heretofore a 
loyal supporter of Lamar, said he had "destroyed his usefulness and 
popularity" in the state.4 
The struggle between Lamar and Barksdale for party control 
came to a head in 1880 over the choice of a successor to Bruce in 
the Senate. Barksdale and Congressman Otho R. Singleton, both 
silverites, had announced themselves as candidates. Edward C. 
Walthall, close personal and political friend of Lamar and like him 
a "hard money man," had not announced, but it was known that 
Lamar was grooming him for the race. The choice rested with the 
state legislature, meeting in joint session. This body was composed 
overwhelmingly of regular Democrats, but there were twenty-seven 
"mongrel" members variously classed as Republicans, Greenbackers, 
and Independent Democrats. To prevent this group from promoting 
"geographical jealousy" among the Democrats,5 and to prevent the 
"unseemly spectacle" of Lamar and Barksdale appealing to this 
opposition group, it was agreed that the Democratic members should 
decide in caucus on a candidate and then unite behind him in the 
legislative election. 6 This would exclude Republicans and Green-
backers but would not decide the status of Independent Democrats. 
Barksdale demanded that "only straight-laced Democrats" be ad-
mitted to the caucus. This wo~ld exclude the Independent Demo-
crats, who at this time were aligned with Lamar. But Lamar won 
on this point and the Independents joined the caucus.7 
Lamar, Walthall, Singleton, Barksdale, and several lesser candi-
dates descended on Jackson for the caucus. "Button-holing and soft 
sawder, to say nothing of less justifiable measures are made use of 
to gain votes," said an observer. Lamar's activities came in for 
particular censure. It was thought undignified and unfair for him 
to use his position and influence in behalf of one of the candidates.8 
SJefferson Davis to Ethelbert Barksdale, Dec. 14, 1878, published in Jackson 
Weekly Clarion, Jan. 15, 1879; also in Mayes, Lamar, 363-64. 
4Natchez Democrat, Feb. 17, 1878. 
5Lamar, whose term did not expire for two more years, was from north Missis-
sippi, as were Walthall and Singleton. It was argued by the Barksdale supporters 
that a "geographical distribution" should be made, and that Bruce's seat should go 
to a man from south Mississippi, that is, Barksdale. 
6Port Gibson Reveille, Jan. 7, 1880; Jackson Weekly Clarion, Jan. 14, 1880. 
7Hnlsell, "Democratic Dissensions," loco cit., 127. 
8Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Feb. 11. 1880; Jackson Weekly Clarion, Jan. 
7, 14, 1880. 
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The charge of "Bourbonism" was freely tossed back and forth by 
adherents of both Lamar and Barksdale. 
The caucus developed into a deadlock. On the sixth ballot, 
Barksdale led all other candidates and was within two votes of the 
required majority.9 But the Lamar forces held at that point, and the 
caucus dragged on. Suddenly, on the forty-ninth ballot, Barksdale 
threw his support to J. Z. George, who had been belatedly nomin-
ated, and George was elected.1o Since Walthall had finally sup-
ported George too, both the Lamar and Barksdale factions claimed 
victory in George's nomination. Barksdale said it was evidence of 
Lamar's waning power, but Lamar's supporters maintained that 
George was of the same political school as Lamar, and that they 
saw eye to eye on many questions. Nevertheless, George had not 
been Lamar's first choice, and he had won only with Barksdale's 
help. 11 
Lamar's successor would be chosen by the legislature to be 
elected in 1881, and conventions or preferential primaries were 
ordered in many of the counties to indicate choices for the Demo-
cratic senatorial candidate. The le,gislators thus chosen would be 
pledged. The necessity of choosing both a senator and a governor 
in the same year complicated the Lamar-Barksdale feud. Lamar 
people said they would support none but a Lamar man for governor, 
and denounced as "Bourbons" all who opposed him. The Tupelo 
]oUTfUll ridiculed this "everlasting and senseless tirade against an 
imaginary ... Bourbonism." It and other journals supporting Barks-
dale held that if a Lamar man were nominated for governor, Barks-
dale should replace Lamar in the Senate. Others, such as the 
Grenada Sentinel, suggested a compromise whereby Lamar would 
be renamed to the Senate and Barksdale chosen governor. The 
Natchez Democrat, which was again supporting Lamar, protested 
against such an arrangement as smacking of "bossism."12 
The senatorial preferential primaries were bitterly fought 
9Halsell, "Democratic DissenSions," loco cit., 127. 
lOJackson Weekly Clarion, Jan. 28, Feb. 4, 11, 1880; Mayes, Lamar, 411-12; 
Halsell, "Democratic Dissensions," loco cit., 128. 
11Halsell, "Democratic DissenSions," loco cit., 128; Mayes, Lamar, 412; Jackson 
Weekly Clarion, Feb. 11, 1880. 
12Grenada Sentinel and Vicksburg Herald, quoted in Mayes, Lamar, 481-88; 
Jackson Weekly Clarion, June 2, 1881, quoting Vicksburg Herald, Holly Springs 
South, Yazoo Sentinel, and Tupelo Journal; Natchez Daily Democrat, June 18, July 
8, 1881. 
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through the spring and early summer. The Lamar press charged 
that Barksdale's course was dictated by resentment over his defeat 
for the Senate in 1880. They tried to link him with the numerous 
Independent movements in the state, despite the fact that no one 
was as straightforward in his denunciation of party irregularity as 
was Barksdale, and despite the fact that it was Lamar's alliance with 
Independents which had prevented Barksdale's election by the 
caucus the year before. 13 By the end of July, county conventions 
and primaries had indicated their choice of Lamar, and his election 
was conceded. Attention then centered on the gubernatOrial race 
in which Lamar's enemy, Barksdale, was opposing Lamar's friend, 
Stone, running for a third term. The convention met on August 3, 
and a stalemate again developed between the two factions of the 
party. Mter the twenty-ninth ballot, Barksdale called a caucus of all 
anti-third termers. He announced his withdrawal and succeeded in 
uniting all present in support of Robert Lowry, a dark horse. When 
the convention reconvened the Lamar forces were thrown into 
consternation by the sudden announcement of Barksdale's with-
drawal, and the placing of Lowry's name in nomination. They were 
granted an hour's recess by the Barksdale faction, which now that 
Barksdale was out of the race had control of the convention. The 
hour's respite served no useful purpose for the Lamar forces, and 
Lowry was chosen on the next ballot.14 
Again Barksdale had failed to reach his goal, but again he had 
stopped Lamar. Lowry's nomination was undoubtedly a blow to 
Lamar. On the other hand, Barksdale's failure to win the guber-
natorial nomination for himself angered and disappointed his fol-
lowers, and a movement was started to contest in the legislature the 
election of Lamar, but this did not materialize.15 As an indication 
of the control which the black counties had over the convention, 
it may be noted that from them came all candidates but one. The 
press of other parts of the state said that their people did not feel 
"very amiable over this persistent neglect" of their sections.16 
13Natchez Daily Democrat, July 8, 1881; Jackson Weekly Clarion, all issues dur-
ing May, June, and July, 1881; Vicksburg Herald, quoted in Jackson Clarion, June 
30, 1881; Macon Beacon, March 12, 1881. 
14Mayes, Lamar, 433-34; Jackson Weekly Clarion, Aug. 4, 1881; Macon Beacon, 
Aug. 13, 1881; Lexington Advertiser and Port Gibson Reveille, quoted in Jackson 
Clarion, Aug. 18, 1881; Halsell, "Democratic Dissensions," loco cit., 134. 
15Mayes, Lamar, 434; Halsell, "Democratic Dissensions," loco cit., 134. 
16Jackson Weekly Clarion, Aug. 4, 1881; Macon Beacon, Aug. 18, 1881. 
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The reaction to Lowry's nomination was as varied as might have 
been expected. He had had some dealings with the Republicans 
during Reconstruction days, and was classed by some as a "ring" 
politician.17 Some hoped his nomination would have a harmonizing 
influence on the factions; others branded him as "a representative 
of the Bourbons"; most saw in it a Barksdale victory. The Lamar 
press was bitter over Barksdale's strategy in calling the caucus, 
charging that it resulted in a "minority" nomination and hinting 
that a deal was made whereby Lowry promised support for Barks-
dale against Lamar in the coming senatorial election.18 Perhaps 
the Natchez Democrat and Courier summed up the popular reaction 
in its prediction that "Some will support it [the ticket] because 
Stone is not on it; some because Barksdale's name does not appear 
in the list, some because neither Stone nor Barksdale were [sic] 
nominated."19 
In the early 1880's opposition to corporations was not as strong 
as it later became, and there were many rural areas that feared a 
regulatory commission would discourage railroad building. The 
Aberdeen Examiner, a rural paper, opposed regulation as a matter 
of policy and reported that all east Mississippians-Democrats, Re-
publicans, Greenbacks, and Independents-did also, as they wanted 
to encourage, not discourage, more railroad building in their sec-
tion.20 The Examiner thought it would be well for Mississippians, 
instead of listening to the abuse of railroads by demagogiC aspirants 
for office, to consider how important railroads were to them. Across 
the state in the Delta the Democratic convention in Washington 
County declared against railroad regulation "for the present" as 
"especially hurtful."21 
Within a few years, however, a different tune was heard. Frank 
Burkitt, a leader in the state Grange and Farmers' Alliance, and later 
a Populist leader, became the most outspoken critic of corporate 
17Jackson Daily Times, July 15, 1877; Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, May 15, 
1877. 
18Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal, New Or-
leans States, New Orleans Democrat, Meridian Mercury, and Vicksburg Herald. 
quoted in Jackson Weekly Clarion, Aug. 11, 1881; Natchez Democrat and Courier. 
Aug. 9, 1881; ibid., quoting Chickasaw Messenger and Columbus Dispatch. 
19Natchez Democrat and Courier, Aug. 16, 1881. 
20Aberdeen Examiner. May 17, 1883. 
21Ibid •• June 21. 1883. quoting Columbus South; Aberdeen Examiner. Sept. 20. 
1883. 
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interests. In issue after issue of his Chickasaw Messenger he exposed 
their venality, as well as that of the "corrupt political rings" which 
formed the basis of their control. He charged that this unholy union 
of politicians and corporate interests, backed by money "extorted 
from the people" and by "the corrupt use of the election machinery," 
resulted in the choice of officials unsympathetic with the farmer's 
interests. He saw the political rings in the black counties joining 
hands with the monopolists to corral the Negro vote.22 
In the early years after the war the Memphis, Birmingham, and 
Atlantic Railroad had received a charter from the state government. 
According to Burkitt, Nathan Bedford Forrest, the organizer of the 
company, had gone over the proposed route taking subscriptions 
for capital stock from counties, towns, and individuals. Years had 
passed without the line having been completed, and when the coal 
and iron fields of north Alabama were opened the promoters of 
the road sought an amendment to their charter which would permit 
it to deviate from its proposed line through Chickasaw, Pontotoc, 
and Lowndes counties. Burkitt opposed the bill authorizing the 
changed route, and when he saw that its passage was inevitable he 
offered an amendment requiring the railroad to repay the subscrip-
tions with interest. But the amendment, too, had been defeated, 
Burkitt thought, "through the conivance [sic] of members" of the 
legislature who were interested in the new route.23 
At the same time Burkitt was leveling his attack on the Gulf and 
Ship Island Railroad, a line proposed through east Mississippi to 
the Gulf. Hamilton, Hoskins and Company, lessees of the state's 
convicts, were some seventy-five or eighty thousand dollars in 
arrears in payments to the state, and their lease was to expire in 
1888. They ''hatched a scheme" to transfer the convicts to the Gulf 
and Ship Island and to extend the lease to 1892. In order to do so 
they secured from the attorney-general, Thomas C. Catchings, a 
certificate which he later repudiated as "an error," stating that 
their arrears to the state had been paid. Burkitt charged that Gov-
ernor Lowry and Catchings were in this conspiracy. The move, he 
said, was "intended more to control and concentrate influences than 
to build railroads." Support for the scheme was obtained by "shrewd 
lobbyists" telling people the road would run by their property. Their 
22Chickasaw Messenger, Mar. 20, 1884. 
23Signed statement by Frank Burkitt published in Chickasaw Messenger, Jan. 18, 
1877. 
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real purpose, according to Burkitt, was to pass a bill "to relieve 
them of the payment of money they owed the state on the present 
lease."24 
The farmers linked Lowry with their oppressors, the corporations, 
and in the spring of 1885 a movement was started in the hill counties 
to prevent his renomination. It was even reported that there was 
strong opposition to him in the river counties, but this was stoutly 
denied by one of the leading papers there.25 An energetic campaign 
was waged by Putnam Darden, head of the state Grange and the 
farmer's idol, and by S. S. Calhoon, a wealthy lawyer and planter 
of Hinds County. But the Lowry machine was too well oiled and 
he was nominated in the convention on the first ballot. Besides, the 
apathy of the farmers toward ring-selected candidates was growing. 
The farmers had come to feel that their aims were popular with a 
vast majority of the voters, but that the rings, through bribery and 
other unfair means at primaries, nominating conventions, and even 
in the halls of the legislature, were preventing their attainment. 
To the farmers had come disillusionment and distrust of their 
old leaders. Lowry, as present head of the administration, became 
the target of most of their invective. When Lamar reSigned from 
the Senate in 1885 to enter the Cleveland cabinet, they saw little 
chance of preventing Lowry's succeeding to his seat. Even though 
his administration had been "weak and wicked," said the Chickasaw 
Messenger, his chances were good. The appointing power which 
he could bring to bear at the next session of the legislature, the aid 
which he could expect from the Gulf and Ship Island Railroad, and 
the numerous vetoes which he could hold over the heads of the state 
institutions, would be hard to overcome.26 The Messenger charged, 
and the Clarion, a supporter of Lowry, was forced to admit, that 
the state debt had increased by more than $650,000 during the six 
years of Lowry's incumbency.27 It was after this exposure that 
Lowry invaded Chickasaw in the interest of Independent legislative 
candidates and in an effort to defeat Burkitt. The Independents, 
24For an account of the penitentiary controversy see Report of the Senate Stand-
ing Committee on Penitentiary and Prisons, in Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1886, 
Appendix; also Signed statement'by Frank Burkitt published in Chickasaw Messeng81', 
May 6, 1887; ibid., July 7, 14, 1887. 
25Natchez Democrat, June 26, 1885; ibid., quoting Memphis Avalanche. 
26Chickasaw Messenger, Mar. 31, 1887. 
27Ibid., Aug. 11, 25, 1887, quoting Jackson Weekly Clarion. 
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said Burkitt, would not, if elected, favor an investigation of the 
administration's connection with the penitentiary scandal and the 
Gulf and Ship Island. When Lowry canvassed the state in an at-
tempt to refute the charge of corruption, he only convinced many 
farmers that he himself "is a thief and guilty as charged."28 
Even the great Lamar did not escape the suspiCion with which 
the farmers were coming to regard their leaders. The Brookhaven 
Leader recalled the incongruity of Lamar's "exceedingly liberal and 
conciliatory utterances at Washington" closely followed by a series 
of speeches in Mississippi "which caused the heart of every bull-
dozer and ballot-box stuffer in the state to leap for joy." "Can it be," 
the Leader pondered, "that our Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus is only 
a selfish demagogue after all-deeper and shrewder than the rest 
of his class?" The editor concluded that he was, and that "so long 
as he himself holds a fat office and is floating upon the flOwing 
stream of popular adulation," his attitude would be "the people be 
d--d." The Woodville Republican echoed the Leader's sentiment.29 
The regular Democratic press defended its idols and charged 
their critics with fostering division within the party in order to 
expedite the return of the "Republican gang with all their vileness 
and infamy." Burkitt and the Messenger were termed "Republicans 
in diSguise" by the Vicksburg Herald, but both denied any con-
nection with the Republican party.so For better or worse the farmers 
of Mississippi were on the march. They were fed up with a condi-
tion where party affairs were dictated by a small oligarchy whose 
great power rested on the narrow base of a small group of whites 
in the heavily populated Negro counties. They were tired of having 
these oligarchs name their candidates and then call upon them to 
elect the candidates in the face of a violent and popular opposition. 
They would change this set of conditions by rewriting the funda-
mental law. 
281bid.; Greenville Daily Review, quoted in Chickasaw Messenger, Sept. 1, 1887. 
29Brookhaven Leader and Woodville Republican, quoted in Chickasaw Messenger, 
Apr. 7, 14, 1887. 
SOChickasaw Messenger, Mar. 10, Sept. 22, 1887. 
CHAPTER VI 
CALLING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 
BY THE late 1880's it had become apparent to many leaders in 
Mississippi that the body politic was unable either to assimilate 
or to eliminate "the unholy African leaven." With the growth of 
class and factional divisions within the white man's party, there was 
a growing tendency for both factions to compete for the Negro vote. 
Negro domination once more seemed possible when all that stood 
between the Negro majority and control were "election methods 
and contrivances, ... not sanctioned by law, and which were in 
themselves harmful to the cause of public morals."l "With each 
succeeding election after 1875," said a contemporary, "restiveness 
and revolt against the party bonds became more menacing." More-
over, it was a serious matter to suppress or count out the lawful 
Negro vote polled by a white candidate with a considerable white 
follOwing. Riot and bloodshed generally threatened and were some-
times involved in such an undertaking. In the decade of the 1880's 
"it became apparent that the 'Mississippi' plan of dealing with black 
majorities would, unless checked, pollute the very sources of repre-
sentative government."2 The tremendous internal struggles in the 
Democratic party, of which those led by Barksdale and Chalmers 
were only the most publicized, convinced many of a need for perma-
nent disfranchisement of the Negro. 
While specific charges of corruption were naturally denied by 
the participants at the time, it was commonly known that illegal 
tactics were the general rule at elections. This was freely confessed 
by Democratic leaders. Judge J. J. Chrisman, a prominent Demo-
crat, said on the Hoor of the Constitutional Convention of 1890: 
. . . it is no secret that there has not been a full vote and a fair count in 
Mississippi since 1875-that we have been preserving the ascendency of 
the white people by revolutionary methods. In plain words we have 
been stuffing the ballot boxes, committing perjury, and here and there in 
the state carrying the elections by fraud and violence until the whole 
machinery for election was about to rot down. 3 
IJohnston, "Public Services of Senator George," lac. cit., 211; McNeily, "War 
and Reconstruction," loco cit., 531. 
2McNeily, "War and Reconstruction," loco cit., 531-33. 
BJackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 11, 1890. 
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Equally incriminating was a statement in an address by S. S. Cal-
hoon, president of the convention: «Besides the exercise of force. 
there was also brought into use fraud in the manipulation of ballot 
boxes, ... and it, unfortunately became chronic. It began to be used 
even as between the whites themselves, and follOwing this, came a 
train of political juggling."4. 
These practices were putting «too great a strain on the public 
conscience,"5 and one of the causes for the calling of the Constitu-
tional Convention was a desire to revise the franchise law so as 
legally to eliminate the Negro vote. But there were other reasons. 
One was the gaining of control of both houses of Congress by the 
Republicans in the election of 1888, and the growing fear that fed-
eral control of elections might result. It was noted that the Negroes 
were "more aroused" after returns had shown the Republican ma-
jority in the national legislature. They were demanding more offices 
in counties where fusion tickets were customary and were even re-
fusing to pay taxes until the right to vote was guaranteed. In July, 
1889, a Negro convention in Jackson asked the Democrats for a 
state fusion ticket. When this was refused, a Republican convention 
nominated a complete ticket for the first time since 1876.6 
In June, 1890, Henry Cabot Lodge moved in Congress to institute 
federal supervision of congressional elections. The bill passed the 
House but was defeated in the Senate. This threat of federal inter-
vention argued the necessity of substituting legal for illegal tactics 
in disfranchising the Negro. It was thought by some that the elec-
torate should be restricted before a federal «Force Bilf' should pass. 
Even the Clarion-Ledger, which had been opposed to the conven-
tion, saw virtue in such a policy and thought it might render the 
Lodge bill «largely nugatory and deprive it of much of its power 
for evil."7 
<lIbid., Nov. 1, 1890. 
5Walter C. Hamm, "Three Phases of Colored Suffrage," in North American He-
clew, CLXVIII (1899), 290; Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 207. 
6Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 209. In 1881 the Republicans had staged 
a state-wide campaign in an attempt to elect Ben King, but they did not have a 
complete ticket. 
7Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 7, 1890; William A. Mabry, "Disfranchise-
ment of the Negro in Mississippi," in Journal of Southern History, IV (1938), 322; 
McNeily, "War and Reconstruction," loe. cit., 534. 
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There were other motives, however, for the calling of the con-
vention. These were disconnected from the desire of eliminating 
the Negro vote-or at least sought it for reasons different from those 
expressed by the Clarion. Voters in the white counties believed that 
a corrupt ring was kept in office by "the power and fraud of the 
Democratic cliques in the black counties." The cry of white suprem-
acy was to them merely a blind to hide the politicians' debauchery 
of the ballot box, enabling them to maintain control of the state 
"through the instrumentality of the stolen negro vote." On the other 
hand, there was no urgency for suffrage restriction insofar as affairs 
in the white counties themselves were concerned. In fact there was 
a repugnance to any scheme for disfranchising the Negro which 
might also disfranchise some whites. Quite aside from the franchise 
question there was considerable sentiment in white counties for 
genuine democratic reforms-amendment of the judiciary system 
to make judges elective, elimination of convict leaSing, more equit-
able distribution of public school funds, and restriction of the powers 
of corporations.8 
The question of calling a constitutional convention first came 
up in 1877. Many state papers advocated it, but the two most in-
fluential, the Clarion and the Vicksburg Herald, were opposed, as 
were Democratic leaders generally. Bills were introduced in both 
houses of the legislature the following year, but they did not pass. 
Frank Burkitt introduced a bill in 1886 submitting the question to 
the voters at the next election. It passed the House but was defeated 
in the Senate ''by sharp practice on the part of the machine crowd," 
so Burkitt charged. A bill passed both houses in 1888, but was 
vetoed by Governor Lowry.9 The follOwing year the legislature 
passed a resolution urging that the question be made an issue in the 
election that year. 
Although Frank Burkitt and the Farmers' Alliance were the early 
advocates of the convention, they were suddenly joined by Senator 
George, who took the leadership of the movement from Burkitt. 
George's conversion was due, he said, to his fear of the Lodge "Force 
8Chickasaw Messenger, Jan. 27, Mar. 24, 1887; Wharton, The Negro in Missis-
sippi, 207-208; McNeily, "War and Reconstruction," loe. cit., 535. 
9Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1878, p. 17; Senate Journal, 1886, pp. 66,.536; 
Senate Jouma~ 1888, p. 146; McNeily, "'War and Reconstructioo," loco cU., 531-33; 
Chickasaw Messenger, Mar. 24, 1887; Macon Beacon, Jan. 8, 1888, Oct. 15, 1892; 
W. H. Hardy to Robert Lowry, Mar. 18, 1888, Letters of Governors, Series E, 195A. 
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Bill. "10 Another powerful advocate was the Prohibition organiza-
tion. This group had succeeded in carrying local option elections in 
forty of the seventy-five counties of the state. The thirty-five wet 
counties were mostly in the black belt and it was held that they "are 
kept wet by the negro vote."ll 
In general the "conservative" press and leaders in the black 
counties were opposed to the calling of a convention, and Senator 
Walthall was their spokesman. In a speech at Macon, in October, 
1889, he argued that disfranchisement of the Negro was «impossible 
without disqualifying tens of thousands of white men."12 In a later 
speech in Jackson he leveled the heaviest guns of his oratory against 
it. He called it «an unnecessary, expensive, and dangerous experi-
ment." He pOinted out that the greatest objection to the existing 
constitution was sentimental, being based on the fact that it had 
been framed by "aliens" during Reconstruction. The Negroes, he 
said, were now quiet, but their interest in politics would be revived 
by the excitement of a convention called to make their disfranchise-
ment legal and permanent. Why arouse them? Evil whites, he said, 
were lying in wait for some serious division among the Democrats, 
when they would "rally the disorganized negro and attack us . . . 
weakened by divided counsels." Why give them the opportunity? 
Disfranchisement, which would necessarily include tens of thousands 
of the best white Democrats in Mississippi, would create such a 
division.1s 
Walthall's views were given strong support. Writing in the 
Clarion "Prudentia" opposed the convention. He pointed out the 
similarity of the present constitution with that of 1832. The ap-
pointive judiciary, he said, was the greatest difference, and this was 
a worthy departure because of the inexperience of the newly en-
franchised freedmen. Any attempt to change the suffrage laws to 
10Speech by J. Z. George in Jackson, Oct. 21, 1889, quoted in Jackson Dally 
Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 24, 1889; Ibid., Nov. 28, 1889. 
llMemorial of J. B. Gambrell, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the 
Prohibition State Convention, to the Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890, 
in Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Mis-
sisrippi Begun at the City of Jackson on August 12, 1890 and Concluded November 
1, 1890 (Jackson, 1890), 94; Wharton, The Negro in Missisrippi, 207. 
IIlNatchez Dally Democrat, Oct. 25, 1889. 
lSSpeech of E. C. Walthall delivered in Mississippi House of Representatives, 
Oct. 28, 1889, quoted in Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 31, 1889; Natchez 
Dally Democrat, Oct. 29, 1889; Wharton, The Negro in Missisrippi, 209. 
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exclude the Negro would, he thought, bring federal intervention. 14. 
Others thought after the failure of the Force Bill to pass that it had 
only been intended to frighten the Democrats into support of the 
tariff bill. 15 
The most influential papers of the state were opposed to the 
convention and gave strong support to Walthall. Pitted against 
them were the comparatively feeble voices of the Okolona Times 
and the Chickasaw Messenger. 16 • 
The Natchez Democrat criticized George for raising "this deep 
and most delicate question" without advancing a solution. It cited 
the unprecedented peace and prosperity in Mississippi and thought 
the move to foist a convention on the people was without reason 
and "springs from individual motives." It condemned the various 
plans suggested for disfranchising the Negro as proposals «to remove 
the temptation by legalizing the fraud." It denounced George's 
expressed fears of Negro supremacy as "hypothetical and imaginary 
dangers" and said need of a convention had not been established, 
nor had the will of the people expressed itseH in favor of it. On the 
contrary, it thought, "every indication points to an overwhelming 
opposition to it." White domination was "as complete as the superior 
race chooses to make it."17 
The Clarion-Ledger, though not as vocal as the Democrat, was 
also opposed to the convention. It denied that an additional guar-
antee of white supremacy was needed by the state or could be pro-
vided by the convention.18 The Columbus Index, even more than 
the Democrat, questioned "the sincerity of Senator George when 
he favors a constitutional convention."19 "Conservative," writing in 
the Raymond Gazette, said the charges against Negro suffrage made 
by the advocates of the convention were unfounded, and that 
actually the Negro co-operated with the ''better class of whites" in 
supporting the public interests.20 
14Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 24, 1889. 
15New Orleans Daily States, Aug. 13, 1890. 
16Excerpts quoted in Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 14, 1889. 
17Natchez Daily Democrat, Oct. 22, 25, 29, 1889, Jan. 4, 21, 80, Aug. 24, Oct. 
21, 1890. 
18Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 26, 1888, Oct. 81, 1889. 
19Columbus Index, quoted in Natchez Daily Democrat, Oct. 29, 1889. 
20Raymond Gazette, Apr. 26, 1890, quoted in Wharton, The Negro in Missis-
6ippi, 211. 
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It is difficult to say which of the several motives gave greatest 
impetus to the convention movement. Governor Lowry, in vetoing 
the convention bill in 1888, said: "Quiet reigns throughout our 
borders .... The colored people are content and happy .... Why 
disturb society ... ? Why agitate and convulse the country?"21 The 
legislature in debating the veto message failed to mention the need 
of disfranchising the Negroes, but discussed the desirability of limit-
ing the governor to one term, of making the judiCiary elective, and 
of arranging a more equitable scheme of representation in the legis-
lature.22 Undoubtedly there was greater support for the convention 
in the white counties than in the black; more support from the rural 
than from the urban areas; and the farmers favored it more than did 
the mercantile, banking, and corporate classes. It is not so clear, 
however, that all those who favored the convention were as pleased 
with the result as were some of those who had opposed it. 
It has been suggested that the convention movement was spon-
sored by the "intrenched ruling class" and the commercial and 
industrial interests in an effort to prevent the growing radicalism of 
the strong agrarian movement. If this is true, it was indeed subtly 
done. The political powers of the state, with the exception of George 
and Stone, were strong in their vocal opposition, and their voices 
had a sincere ring. On the other hand such agrarian leaders as 
Burkitt and Putnam Darden were consistent in their advocacy of a 
convention, and most of the farmers' journals supported them. At 
the same time the control of the state was so completely in the hands 
of the "intrenched ruling class" that it is difficult to see how the 
farmers could have forc~d through a convention bill against their 
united opposition. The conclusion is inescapable that there was a 
division on the question within the ranks of those in power. Though 
on the whole they opposed the convention, the tremendous influence 
of several of their number who favored it-particularly that of 
George-was sufficient to swing the balance to the agrarians. 
Several candidates were early in the field for the gubernatorial 
nomination in 1889, but by the time of the Democratic convention 
former Governor Stone was in a commanding position. Barksdale 
21Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1888, p. 148. 
22E'rcerpts from the debate in the Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 26, 1888; 
Vicksburg Herald, Feb. 2, 1888. 
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had withdrawn,2s as also had General W. S. Featherstone,2' and 
Stone was nominated on the first ballot. It was known that he would 
approve a convention bill if it were passed, but the Democratic 
platform did not commit the party to such a bill. Instead it recom-
mended that the calling of a convention be made an issue in the 
election of legislators that fall.25 
During the fall campaign, however, the convention question 
seems to have had little consideration. The Republicans again had 
a full ticket in the field, but like the Democrats they were not 
committed either way.26 
When the legislature met the following January, however, both 
the Farmers' Alliance and the state Grange memorialized it in favor 
of the convention.27 The legislature responded and passed a bill 
calling for a convention to meet in Jackson on August 12.28 
2sWhen Barksdale announced his withdrawal in late June, Lamar, now Secre-
tary of the Interior, issued a statement calling his withdrawal "a public calamity." 
Possibly this indicates a closing of the breach between Lamar and Barksdale. More 
1ikely it was a gesture to secure Barksdale's support for Lamar's candidate, Stone. 
Natchez Democrat, June 27, 1889. The Democrat suspected the withdrawal was a 
"political trick" putting Barksdale in the pOSition of a "dark horse" in case of a dead-
lock. 
B"Featherstone withdrew in protest against the action of several county conven-
tions which resolved that "no one but ... a member of the Farmers' Alliance would 
be a suitable ... governor." Ibid., July 12, 1889. 
25Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledge1', July 18, 26, 1889 . 
. 26Natchez Daily Democrat, July 2, 12, 17, 18, 26, 1889, Jan. 21, 1890. 
B7Mississippi, H01J8e Journal, 1890, p. 148; Natchez Daily Democrat, Jan. 21, 
1890; Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledge1', Jan. 30, 1890; Macon Beacon, Oct. 15, 1892. 
28Mississippi, H01J8e Journal, 1890, p. 300. 
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AFTER the passage of the convention bill, opposition to the 
. movement seemed to fade out. However, there were fewer 
votes cast in the election of delegates to the convention than in any 
election since the war. Under the constitution of 1868 practically 
all adult males, Negro and white, were qualified electors. Of the 
262,0001 qualified electors, only 40,000 votes were cast for the 
delegates from the state at large. In Hinds, the largest county in 
the state with 8,500 electors, only 540 votes were cast, and in Sharkey 
County which had 1,600 qualified electors, only four votes were 
cast.2 Of the 134 delegates chosen, 130 were Democrats, one a 
Republican, one a "National Republican," one a "Conservative," 
and one a Greenbacker. Fifty-two of the delegates were lawyers, 7 
classed themselves as "planters," while 42 gave their occupation as 
farmers. The one Republican, Isaiah T. Montgomery, a Negro from 
Bolivar, was seated after a contest with a Democrat. He was re-
ported to have promised support to Senator George's faction before 
he was voted admittance.8 
In the organization of the convention, S. S. Calhoon was chosen 
president over R. C. Patty by a majority of one vote. Though both 
were from black counties, Patty was leader of the Alliance in 
Noxubee, while Calhoon was a well-to-do lawyer and planter of 
Hinds.' Calhoon proceeded to appoint committees, the most im-
portant of which was that on Elective Franchise, Apportionment, 
and Elections. To this committee he named a majority of lawyers, 
as it was charged he did to all committees. 5 
ISee United States Census of 1890, I, 786. 
2Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledgef', Aug. 8, 14, 1890. 
8]oornal of the Constitutional Convention, 1890, pp. 704-708, 390; Jackson Daily 
Clarion-Ledgef', Aug. 14, 1890. 
'It is claimed by Wharton that Isaiah Montgomery's vote enabled the George 
faction to elect Calhoon and thus gain control of the organization of the convention 
(The Negro in Mississippi, 211). On the other hand, Monroe McClurg, twenty-five 
years after the event, stated that George told him that he (George) voted for Patty 
for preSident, rather than for his friend Calhoon, in order "to secure Patty's support 
for the understanding clause." Vicksburg Daily Hef'ald, Aug. 8, 1915. 
5]ournal of the Constitutional Convention, 1890, p. 21; Jackson Daily Clarion-
Ledgef', July 21, 1891. 
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Regardless of the various incentives for calling the convention, 
once that body assembled it was evident that a majority of its 
members was primarily concerned with devising some scheme to 
insure white supremacy. Had it not been for the hope of accom-
plishing this, the Clarion thought, the convention would not have 
assembled.6 "All understood and desired," said one delegate, "that 
some scheme would be evolved which would effectually remove 
from the sphere of politics in the State the ignorant and unpatriotic 
negro."' 
The schemes proposed for effecting Negro disfranchisement may 
be divided into two general categories. One urged educational quali-
fications for voters, while the other proposed a poll tax, payable 
some months in advance of an election, as a prerequisite of voting. 
Property qualifications were also urged, but advocates of this plan 
were not so numerous. 
Throughout the convention there was a bitter struggle between 
black and white counties, the former wanting educational or prop-
erty qualifications, the latter opposing them. The delegates from the 
white counties in general attacked the proposals because they feared 
they would disfranchise too many whites. T. S. Ford, a white county 
resident, perhaps best expressed the white county view. He argued 
against such qualifications as a threat to white unity. He feared that 
white men thus disfranchised might, if they later qualified, "re-
taliate." He argued against the substitution of a white problem. 
Judge J. J. Chrisman petulantly expressed the black county view 
when he said, "To avoid the disfranchisement of a lot of white 
ignoramuses we can't have an educational qualification, and to 
pander to the prejudices of those who have no property we cannot 
have a property qualification."S 
To eliminate the Negro vote without violating the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth amendments to the federal Constitution required some 
6Jackson Dally Clarlon-LedgB1', Oct. 24, 1889, Dec. 22, 1890; speech of Mayre 
Dabney, in Proceedings of the Reunion of the Survivors of the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1890 on the Twentieth AnnivB1'sary of the Adoption of the Constitution, 
held in the Senate ChambB1' of the Capitol at Jackson, Mississippi, NovembB1' 1st, 
1910 (Jackson, n. d.), 12; New Orleans Daily States, Aug. 13, 1890; Journal of the 
Constitutional Convention, 1890, especially President S. S. Calhoon's address, 10; 
ibid., 64; S. S. Calhoon, "Causes and Events that Led to the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1890," in Mississippi Historical Society, Publications, VI (1902). 110. 
7Dabney, in Reunion of Suroivors, 12. 
8Jawon Daily Clarlon-LedgB1', Sept. 17, 18, 1890. 
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skill. Furthermore, a provision of the act of Congress which read-
mitted Mississippi into the Union in 1870 had prohibited the state 
from later limiting the suffrage in any way beyond the provisions 
fixed in the state constitution of 1868. Under the liberal franchise 
provisions of that constitution, practically every male adult who had 
resided in the state six months and in the county one month prior 
to an election was entitled to vote.9 It was estimated that under this 
provision there were seventy thousand more qualified Negro voters 
than white.10 This problem was referred to the Judiciary Committee, 
of which Wiley P. Harris, George's law partner and an outstanding 
member of the Mississippi bar, was chairman. The committee report 
held that Congress had exceeded its power in attempting to regulate 
the franchise of the state. Mississippi, as a sovereign state, was em-
powered to fix such restrictions as she saw fit, prOvided "the regula-
tions which it prescribes shall apply alike to both races." A poll tax, 
property or educational qualification, longer residence, or a com-
bination of all these would be legal, reported the committee, if they 
were impartially applied to both races. 
In spite of this report A. J. Paxton proposed that "No negro, or 
person having as much as one-eighth negro blood, shall hold office 
in the state." Mayre Dabney offered a resolution requesting Con-
gress to subniit to the states an amendment repealing the Fifteenth 
Amendment. D. S. Johnson proposed that "No person who has not 
an occupation or profession shall be entitled to vote in any election." 
W. C. Wilkinson submitted a declaration of principles relative to the 
franchise, "Preferring a less representation in Congress or the Elec-
toral College" in lieu of federal consent to disfranchisement of the 
Negro.ll A more subtle project was that of Judge H. F. Simrall who 
urged the requirement of one year's residence in the precinct as a 
prerequisite for voting. He frankly explained that the reason for 
his proposal was "the disposition of young negroes . . . to change 
their homes and precincts every year."12 Judge J. A. P. Campbell, 
9Mississippi Constitution, 1868, Art. VII, Sec. 2; Mississippi, Laws, 1874, Sees. 
117, 118. 
10Statement of W. S. Eskridge before the convention, reported in Jackson Dally 
Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 18, 1890. This figure seems somewhat excessive. According 
to the United States census the Negro voting majority should have been in the neigh-
borhood of 42,000. See United States Censu.s of 1890, I, 786. 
1110fJrnal of the Constitutional Convention, 1890, pp. 65, 88-87, 118, 109-10, 191. 
12JacksoD Dally Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 18, 1890. 
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whose fertile brain brought forth a new plan almost weekly, sug-
gested the granting of a multiple vote to property owners on a basis 
of one vote for each forty acres of land owned.18 J. W. Fewell pro-
posed a qualified scheme of woman suffrage. He would give the 
vote to every woman who owned, or whose husband owned, real 
estate in the value of $300.14 
A few voices were raised in behalf of the Negro. Ethelbert 
Barksdale, although not a delegate, warned against discriminating 
against him,15 and Irvin Miller and W. T. Lacey, white county 
delegates, said Negroes gave no trouble in their districts. J. E. Gore, 
another white county delegate, "would not vote for any plan that 
would take from any citizen rights that he now enjoyed." He did 
not share the fears that "the black man would ever dominate the 
country."16 But there can be no doubt that many of the delegates 
were of the mind of a prominent editor who wrote that Mississip-
pians did not object to the Negro's voting "on account of ignorance 
but on account of color." He published and approved a statement 
of the Charleston (S. C.) News and Courier: "If every colored man 
in Mississippi were a graduate of Yale College the two races would 
remain just as widely separated as they are now in all political and 
social matters."l" 
The leaders of the black counties were eventually able to per-
suade the convention that educational and property qualifications, 
with the addition of a poll tax, would be the best means of eliminat-
ing the Negro vote. The white county delegates acquiesced, having 
been unable to unite on any program save that of reducing the repre-
sentation of the black counties in the legislature. Besides, they were 
not as ablv led as their opposition, and eventually they submitted to 
the latter's superior inHuence.18 
After more than two months' deliberation, the Committee on 
Elective Franchise, Apportionment, and Elections reported, and the 
convention adopted several prmisions which were to have a marked 
effect on the future political structure of the state. Section 241 pro-
181bld., Apr. 3, 1890. 
141bld., Aug. 28, 1890. 
151bid., March 20, 1890. 
161bld., Sept. 18, 1890. 
17Quoted, ibid., Oct. 18, 1890. 
18Wharton. The Negro In MiasiaQippi, 214. 
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vided for a residence requirement of two years in the state and one 
year in the election district. It further provided that a voter must 
be "duly registered"; that he be untainted by certain crimes; and 
that he must "produce to the officers holding the election satisfac-
tory evidence that he has paid" by February 1 of the year in which 
he sought to vote "all the taxes which may have been legally re-
quired of him, ... for the two preceding years." 
Section 243 provided that "A uniform poll tax of two dollars, 
to be used in aid of common schools, and for no other purpose," 
must be paid by all male inhabitants between the ages of twenty-
one and sixty. Men over sixty, as well as certain unfortunates-the 
deaf, dumb, or those who had lost a hand or a foot-were exempt 
from the poll tax. The board of supervisors of any county was em-
powered, at its discretion, to increase the poll tax in its county, 
but in no case was the tax to exceed three dollars for anyone year. 
No criminal proceedings were to be allowed to enforce the collection 
of the poll tax. Sections 249 and 251 prOvided for registration of all 
voters at least four months prior to the election at which they offered 
to vote. 
The "infamous section five"19 of the committee report be-
came Section 244 of the state constitution. It prOvided that after 
January 1, 1896,20 every voter must be able to read any section of 
the state constitution, or "be able to understand the same when read 
to him, or give a reasonable interpretation thereof." There was a 
"general understanding" that any white illiterate would be passed 
by the registrars while no Negro would be.21 
In brief the conditions of the franchise were: "mental capacity, 
age of majority; residence of two years in the state and one year in 
the election district . . .; freedom from a criminal record (crimes 
specified); non-delinquency in payment of [a poll] tax for two 
years; and ability to read or comprehend the Constitution."22 
There is some uncertainty as to the authorship of the several 
franchise clauses. The Clarion credited the poll tax to President 
19Natchez Daily Democrat, Oct. 4, 1890. 
20This was amended on the floor of the convention to read 1892. 
21Mississippi Constitution, 1890, Sees. 241, 243, 244, 249, 251; Wharton, The 
Negro in Mississippi, 215. 
22Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, the Heart of the South, 2 vols. (Chi-
cago and Jackson, 1925), n, 255. 
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Calhoon and the "understanding clause" to Senator George, as also 
did J. S. McNeily, a delegate to the convention.2S Another delegate, 
however, attributed the authorship of the "understanding clause" 
to Wiley P. Harris, and said that George merely used it to secure 
the support of the white county delegates to the rest of the franchise 
provision. James K. Vardaman believed that George was really out 
of sympathy with the understanding clause and only consented to 
it to forestall possible attacks on the constitution in the United States 
Senate.24. Still another eyewitness of the convention and a close 
associate of Harris states that Harris actually opposed the clause and 
only consented to it to mollify George.25 
George was the "dominating figure of the Convention and . . . 
the Constitution ... was largely his work."26 Without his presence, 
some of the delegates later admitted, the convention would have 
been a failure.27 Though a resident of a black county, he was chosen 
from the state at large and took a position between the extreme 
views of the two factions. He was opposed to all property qualifica-
tions and hoped to eliminate Negro voting without touching the 
illiterate whites. Whether or not George was the author of the fran-
chise clauses, he defended them from beginning to end, and pre-
vented by a point of order reconsideration of them after their 
adoption.28 
According to the proponents of the "understanding" provision 
it was not intended to be a disfranchising clause, but was designed 
to furnish a loophole to qualify illiterate whites who would otherwise 
be disfranchised by the literacy requirement. It was, of course, 
23McNeily, however, was writing many years after the convention. Vicksburg 
Dally Herald, Aug. 10, 1915. 
24Vardaman, too, expressed this opinion some seventeen years after the con-
vention. Jackson Issue, Feb. 22, 1908. 
25Statement of Alfred Holt Stone, Jackson, MisSissippi, to author, Sept. 2, 1945. 
For other opinions on the authorship of the clauses see: Jackson Dally Clarion-Ledger, 
Sept. 18, Oct. 25, 1890, Sept. 16, 1897, Aug. 12, 1915; Macon Beacon, Mar. 10, 
1894; JOhnston, "Suffrage and Reconstruction," loco cit., 229; James W. G8l'JlS', 
"Senatorial Career of J. Z. George," in Mississippi Historical SOCiety, Publications, 
VII (1903). 256. 
la8Garner. "Senatorial Career o£ J. Z. George," loco cit., 256. 
27Statements by J. S. McNeily and Monroe McClurg, Vicksburg Dally Herald, 
July 18, Aug. 8, 1915. 
la8Garner. "Senatorial Career of J. Z. George," loco cit., 256; Jackson Dally Clarion-
Ledger, Oct. 25, 1890. 
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urged by the white county delegates, and bitterly opposed by those 
from the black counties. Most black county papers denounced it as 
a "fraud."29 The Natchez Democrat called it "an absurdity ... a 
subterfuge •.. and a temptation to corruption." It pointed out the 
danger of having votes rejected for political reasons. If the provision 
should be honestly enforced, it said, it would disfranchise "a large 
majority of the voting population of the state, including a consider-
able number of white citizens." But that was not the intention nor 
the desire, it said, of those who favored it. It foresaw that the clause 
would make it easy to "suppress any necessary quantity of votes, and 
to let only such ballots go into the box as will serve the interests of 
a certain party."30 
The Democrat's point was well taken. The "understanding 
clause" did prOvide a sure and regularized means of disfranchising 
Negroes as well as illiterate whites, if the group in power chose to 
disfranchise them. Obviously the test could be as easily interpreted 
to admit illiterates, Negro or white, as to reject them. It merely de-
pended on whether the "machine" wished to admit or reject their 
votes. The clause would prevent the participation of a large Negro 
vote sponsored by an opposition group, but it could also prevent the 
votes of a considerable number of opposition whites. Certainly 
despite the constitutional restrictions, illiterate voters could be easily 
brought into the primaries by the faction in control. It would be 
almost impossible for an opposition to bring them in. 
The franchise provisions did not specifically exclude the Negro 
from the polls. "Every provision in the Mississippi Constitution," 
said Frank Johnston, "applies equally and without any discrimina-
tion whatever, to both the white and negro races."31 In theory this 
was true, but in practice it was not. The several suffrage require-
ments combined, while not discriminating against the Negro ex-
plicitly, did legislate against his "peculiar racial characteristics" and 
his limitations. In the words of the United States Supreme Court, 
the builders of the Mississippi franchise prOvisions "swept the hori-
29Port Gibson Reveille, Vicksburg Post, Lexington Advertiser, Aberdeen Weekly, 
Columbus Index, Natchez Banner, Natchez Democrat, Brandon Republican, Grenada 
Sentinel. Yazoo City Herald, Aberdeen E~mlner, Scooba Herald, quoted in Jack. 
son Dally Clarion.Ledger, Oct. 9, 1890. 
30Natcbez Daily Democrat, Sept. 23, Oct. 4, 1890. 
81Johnston, "Suffrage and Reconstruction," loco cit., 228. 
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zon of expediency to find a way around the Negro amendments to 
the Federal Constitution."32 Nevertheless the Supreme Court held 
that neither the poll tax nor the literacy clause violated the federal 
Constitution. 
For a time it was feared that the new requirements were having 
exactly the opposite effect on the Negroes from that desired. It was 
reported in December, 1890, that 230 Negro names had been added 
to the voting lists in the first district of Hinds County. 53 But when 
the new rolls were published in 1892, of the 76,742 voters only 8,615 
were Negroes.54 
From 1890 the legal Negro voter, and consequently the Repub-
lican party, has been a negligible factor in state-wide elections. The 
Republican party, which had polled more than 52,000 votes for 
Hayes in 1876 and more than 43,000 for Blaine as late as 1884, cast 
less than 1,500 votes for Harrison in 1892. In no election thereafter 
until 1920 did the party poll as many as 6,000 votes. Since 1920, 
because of the Woman's Suffrage Amendment, there has been a 
proportionate increase of the Republican vote, but it is still too slight 
to have any influence.35 
But for a dozen years after 1890 the Negro continued to be of 
considerable influence in black county elections. Some of the river 
counties maintained their fusion tickets and continued to send Ne-
groes to the state legislature until the turn of the century.36 A few 
Negroes participated in the Democratic primaries and in some in-
stances may have been a deciding factor in such primaries. But in 
these cases they were not voting for a Negro ticket. They were sim-
ply being exploited by factional groups of white men. 
If the Negro ceased to be a direct influence on politics after 1890, 
indirectly his influence has been incalculable. His mere presence 
has had an intangible but tremendous influence on the behavior of 
32Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213; J. S. McNeily, "History of the Measures 
Submitted to the Committee on Elective Franchise, Apportionment, and Elections 
in the Constitutional Convention of 1890," in Mississippi Historical Society, Publica-
tioflS, VI (1902), 137; Mabry, "Disfranchisement of the Negro in Mississippi," loco 
cit., 333; Vardaman's Weekly, Oct. 21, 1920. 
53Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 18, 1890. 
54Appleton's Cyclopedia, 1892, p. 472; Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 215. 
85Mississippi Official and Statistical Register 1924-1928 (New York, n.d.>, 
312-13. 
56Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 215. 
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Mississippi's white electorate. More tangible has been his influence 
on the composition of that electorate. It may be that the framers of 
the 1890 constitution were aiming only at the Negro, but their 
multiple-loaded franchise laws struck from the voting lists tens of 
thousands of white men. The Farmer's Democrat estimated in 1892 
that the new registration would find "no less than fifty-thousand 
white voters" disfranchised.37 The estimate was not far wrong. 
There had been approximately 120,000 qualified white voters in 
Mississippi in 1890.88 Mter the 1892 registration this figure slipped 
to slightly more than 68,000.39 True, all of the 120,000 qualified 
voters had not exercised their privilege of voting before 1890, yet 
there were more than 85,000 votes cast for Cleveland in the state in 
1888. Two years after the poll tax requirement went into effect, and 
the very year the educational requirement became effective, Cleve-
land polled only 40,237 votes in Mississippi. 40 
Instead of improving, this condition seemed to grow worse with 
the years. The press of the state repeatedly complained of the 
dwindling electorate, and the editors agreed that the cause was the 
poll tax. The Clarion in 1901 estimated the eligible white voters of 
Mississippi at 140,000 but thought that not more than 30,000 would 
pay their poll taxes for that year. It estimated the delinquent list in 
Hinds County alone at 5,000. The following year the sheriff's office 
in Hinds reported indications that a larger number of Hinds citizens 
than ever before had failed to pay the poll tax. The Clarion pleaded 
with delinquents to "walk around to the city hall and settle up," or 
the vote that year would be "the smallest ever recorded."41 
In 1896 the attorney-general ruled that the collection of the tax 
could be enforced by legal levy. Such an interpretation was dis-
couraged, however, when Senator George addressed a letter to the 
public explaining that the purpose of the tax was to limit the fran-
chise and that this object would be defeated by such action.42 
87Farmer's Democrat, quoted in Macon Beacon, Oct. 15, 1892. 
38United States Census of 1890, I, 786. 
89Appleton's Cyclopedia, 1892, p. 472. 
40Ibid. James B. Weaver, Populist candidate for President in 1892, received 
10,256 Mississippi votes. Ibid. Probably many of these were cast by Negroes. 
Whether this be true or not the conclusion is not essentially changed. Mississippt 
Official and Statistical Register 1912, pp. 113-14. 
41Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 26, Feb. 14, 1901, Jan. 30, 1902. 
4.2Ibid., June 18, 1896. 
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The reduced electorate seems to have been caused more by the 
poll tax than by the educational qualification. In an attempt to find 
out which of the two methods was working more effectively to dis-
franchise the Negro, Mayre Dabney in 1896 visited each county in 
the third congressional district, examining records in the circuit 
clerks' offices, the poll books, and tax lists. It was a rare occurrence, 
he was told, for any person, white or Negro, to be denied registration 
when he applied. One clerk said he had refused to register only one 
man on account of the literacy requirement. Others said they had re-
fused "very few for any cause"; and still others said they had never 
refused one ''because he could not read or write or could not under-
stand a clause of the Constitution when read to him." However, 
Dabney found that a very small per cent of the Negroes had paid 
their taxes. The Washington County records showed 1,280 white 
and 338 Negro registered voters, but 8,834 delinquent in poll tax 
payments.43 It was estimated that the ratio of whites to Negroes on 
the delinquent rolls was about one to eighteen. It must be borne in 
mind, however, that in these counties examined the ratio of white to 
Negro population was almost as unequal. Dabney concluded that 
the educational requirement was "of but little effect or value, and 
constituted but a small factor, if any at all, in precluding the Negro 
from voting."" These conclusions seem to be borne out by statistics. 
The avowed intent of the "understanding clause" was to permit illit-
erate whites to qualify despite their illiteracy. But in the first regis-
tation after the literacy clause went into effect only 1,307 whites and 
1,085 Negroes were registered under it.4S In the follOwing year only 
2,672 illiterates, both white and Negro, had registered under the 
understanding clause. It was thought that more Negroes than 
whites had taken advantage of it in most counties. This was attrib-
uted to the white man's reluctance to "advertise his incapacity."46 
Although the poll tax disfranchised nearly all Negroes, the "po-
litical apathy" which it seemed to create among the whites gave 
43Dabney, in Reunion of Sllroiv01's, 13-14. 
"Ibid., 14. 
4sAppleton's Cyclopedia, 1892, p. 472; Dunbar Rowland, Encyclopedia of Mi8si.s-
"ppt Hi8ttny, 2 vola. (Madison, Wis., 1907), I, 541. 
46R. H. Thompson, "Suffrage in Mississippi," in MissisSippi Historical SOCiety, 
PubUcatlons, I (1898), 43. 
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concern to some thinkers. It was feared that it would tend to form a 
"small voting class and ... government by an oligarchy."47 
That the poll tax requirement would have a discouraging effect 
on many white as well as Negro voters is not difficult to see. The 
cash income of many farm families in Mississippi is very low, in some 
years not more than a few hundred dollars. In 1899, for instance, the 
average income of all Mississippi farms was $411.48 Many farmers 
were tenants and got only a share of the income. From this share 
the storekeeper who had given credit for the year's supplies had to 
be paid before the tenant received any cash at all. Poll receipts for 
the two years previous are required before registration. Thus if a 
voter falls behind one year the cost becomes excessive. Besides, the 
tax must be paid on or before February 1 of the year in which the 
election is to be held. This, according to one critic of the system, was 
"like buying a ticket to a show nine months ahead of time, and be-
fore you know who is playing or really what the thing is all about. 
It is easy to forget to do."49 
There is conclusive evidence that politicians have paid poll taxes 
for voters, and it may be assumed in such cases that there was an 
understanding as to how the ballot should be marked. No evidence 
is available, however, as to the extent of this practice. 
It is evident, however, that voting in Mississippi has been greatly 
reduced since 1890 and that the agency which has been most effect-
ual in accomplishing this has been the poll tax. The complicated 
franchise requirements of the new constitution discouraged many 
voters from attempting to register. Failure to register barred them 
from both primary and general elections. But this ineligibility could 
be waived by party officials whose interests might be served thereby. 
The restricted franchise thus could be a weapon to defeat revolts 
against the party's discipline. 
The franchise clauses did not, however, seem to cause a decline 
in balloting on all occasions. On the contrary, an examination of the 
returns from some of the black counties in the Democratic primary 
of 1903 reveals startling excess of votes cast over eligible voters. The 
Democratic primary was by law that year restricted to white men. 
47Hamm, "Three Phases," loco cit., 294. 
48United States Census of 1900, V, cxxiii. 
49George S. Stoney, "Suffrage in the South, Part I, The Poll Tax," in SUrtley 
Graphic, XXIX (1940), 4, 8-9. 
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Yet Washington County, which three years before had only 1,728 
white men, cast 1,917 Democratic votes. This excess of voters over 
eligibles in Washington might be accounted for by an influx of 
voters there between 1900 when the census was taken and 1903 
when the primary was held. Yet the census figures for 1910 
showed only 2,032 white men in the county-115 more than the vote 
cast seven years before. 50 If there is doubt that election officials in 
Washington permitted illegal votes to be counted in the Democratic 
primary of 1903, there can be none that Yazoo officials did so. In the 
primary that year Yazoo reported 3,698 Democratic votes. Yet Yazoo 
had only 2,489 white men in 1900, and only 2,794 in 1910.51 
But these are rare instances of high voting percentages and must 
be attributed to dishonest election officials. Undoubtedly, and to a 
shocking degree, the ratio of voters to population has declined in 
Mississippi since 1890. The reduced electorate has had the result 
of enhancing the Mississippi voter's influence in Congress and in the 
Electoral College. Mississippi's 76,742 registered voters in 1892 
chose nine representatives to Congress and to the Electoral College, 
while Massachusetts' 335,747 voters chose only fifteen. In a sense, 
therefore, a Mississippi voter had almost three times as much influ-
ence in national affairs as had the Massachusetts voter. Furthermore 
there has seemed to be a tendency on the part of Mississippi and 
other poll tax states to keep their congressmen in office for longer 
periods than do non-poll tax states. Under the seniority rules of 
Congress this gives a preponderant number of important committee 
chairmanships to the congressmen and senators from the poll tax 
states, thus increasing the national influence of such states. 
A further effect of the poll tax was its influence on the age dis-
tribution of the Mississippi voters. The law exempted from the tax, 
in addition to the blind, the deaf, and the halt, all men over sixty 
years of age. While no records were kept of the ages of those who 
cast ballots, it would be strange indeed if the proportion of those 
above that age was not much larger than that of other age groups. 
There were other eHects of the poll tax on the white voter, but 
50For population statistics see United States Census of 1900, II, 190-91, Cerl81J8 
of 1910, II, 1044-59. For voting statistics see Mississippi Official and Statistical 
Register, 1908, p. 248. 
51Mississippl Official and Statistical Register, 1908, p. 248; United States Cet18UI 
of 1900, II, 190-91, Census of 1910, II, 1044-59. 
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they will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. That it greatly re-
duced the electorate, both white and Negro, is clearly established. 
That it "redeemed" the state from Negro rule and made it impossible 
for the Negro ever again to assert his influence, as is frequently 
claimed, is debatable. Writing in 1897, Judge J. A. P. Campbell, one 
of the delegates of the convention, said it was a fallacy "to ascribe 
the political quiet we have enjoyed since 1890 ... to anything done 
by the ... convention." The same conditions would have existed, he 
said, if the convention had not met. That the Negro had already 
"dropped out of politics" was shown, he said, "by the fact that there 
was only one negro in the ... convention." To impute to the con-
vention such a motive in imposing the franchise restrictions was, he 
thought, "to charge it with folly, no less than fraud." Taxes would be 
no barrier to Negro voting. When the Negro felt sufficient interest 
in politics he would "as surely pay his taxes" as he would "raise 
money for a circus." If he did not, "campaign funds would pay for 
him, if interest was felt in his vote."52 
It had been the expressed hope of the proponents of the restric- . 
tive franchise clauses that better government would result. A review 
of events in the years following the convention will raise serious 
doubts of the fulfillment of this hope. Writing of the deplorable 
conditions in Mississippi's government in 1898, the Nation, which 
had earlier hailed the franchise clauses as "a forward step,"53 was 
forced to ponder. Taxes, it said, were "higher than since the black 
vampires of radicalism." The administration, it charged, was re-
sponsible for the lack of public improvements; the issuance of 
$400,000 of interest-bearing bonds "in times of profound peace"; 
the appropriation of $200,000 to feed a depleted treasury and to 
pay current expenses; the imminent closing of state institutions for 
lack of funds, or the calling of an extra session of the legislature to 
keep them open; and the spending of thousands of dollars to inves-
tigate official drunkenness in high places. "This is certainly a pretty 
bad shOwing," it concluded, "for that 'Caucasian rule' from which 
so much was promised. "54 
Mississippi thus became the first of the southern states to solve 
52Speech of Judge J. A. Campbell at Jackson, Feb. 8, 1897, quoted in Jackson 
Daily Clarion-Ledge1', Feb. 11, 1897. 
5s"The Ballot in Mississippi," editorial in The Nation, LV (1892), 139. 
54Ibid.. LXVI (1898), 398. 
78 REVOLT OF THE REDNECKS 
the problem of legally disfranchising the Negro. The success of the 
"Mississippi Plan" was eagerly watched in neighboring states where 
potential Negro voters were proving embarrassing to white political 
leaders, and within a dozen years most states in the deep South had 
drawn restrictions of a similar nature around their Negro citizens. 
Another problem with which the Constitutional Convention of 
1890 had to deal was that of apportionment of the state legislature. 
The constitution of 1868 had apportioned legislators among the sev-
eral counties "according to the number of qualified electors," both 
white and Negro.55 The provision was not unfair under the condi-
tions which then prevailed. Black counties were much more heavily 
populated than white, and since the Negro at that time was a voter 
he was clearly entitled to this representation. But when the Negro 
vote was curbed after the revolution of 1875 a different condition 
existed. There were comparatively few white men in the black coun-
ties, yet these few whites continued to elect the same majority of 
legislators which their counties had enjoyed when the Negro was 
an independent voter. As time went on and the Negro's voting priv-
ileges were further curtailed, the white counties felt that the affairs 
of the state were being dominated by a small oligarchy in the black 
counties. The feeling was not unwarranted. According to the census 
of 1890 there were apprOximately 44,500 eligible white voters in the 
black counties and more than 71,000 in the white counties.1I8 Yet 
the black counties sent 68 representatives to the lower house of the 
legislature, while the white counties sent only 52.11'7 
The inequality was not confined to differences between white 
and black counties. Of two white counties, the one with fewer 
white voters might have a larger representation because of a larger 
nonvoting Negro minority. Similarly a black county might have 
larger representation than another black county because of a larger 
nonvoting Negro majority. This was true in the case of De Soto 
and Lowndes counties. De Soto had 1,640 eligible white voters 
and Lowndes 1,487. But Lowndes had 1,000 more eligible Negro 
55Mississippi Constitution, 1868, Art. IV, Sec. 34. As has already been pointed 
out, the apportionment provision of the constitution of 1868 enabled the black coun-
ties to control both the legislature and Democratic state conventions. 
56United States Census of 1890, I, 770-71. 
57Mississippi, House Journal, 1890, pp. 8-5. 
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voters than De Soto and was given three representatives to De Soto's 
twO.58 
The injustice did not stop with representation in the legislature. 
The same system was extended into the state Democratic nominating 
conventions, where each county was given twice the number of 
votes it had in the lower house of the legislature. Thus the black 
counties were able to control the state nominating conventions and 
to name the candidates in August who would win practically by 
default in November. Furthermore, the governor appointed all 
judges and many lesser officials. Thus there was some justification 
for the feeling in the white counties that they were in the grasp of a 
small oligarchy in the black counties. It was largely to eliminate 
this inequity, and not so much to eliminate the threat of "Negro su-
premacy" -which, indeed, had already been eliminated-that the 
white counties urged the calling of the convention. 
Apportionment was as bitterly debated in the convention as were 
the clauses restricting the franchise, for the black county delegates 
were as reluctant to give up their control as the white county dele-
gates were eager to wrest it from them. Many proposals were made, 
but that of Senator George prevailed and was adopted by the con-
vention. According to George, his plan was based on "voting popu-
lation" rather than on total population. 59 It purported to create a 
majority of white constituencies by increasing the number of repre-
sentatives in the legislature by thirteen and allotting the increase to 
the white counties. In addition, several legislative districts were 
carved out of white sections of black counties.60 Another provision 
created an electoral system of choosing the governor, each county 
being allotted electoral votes corresponding to its number of repre-
sentatives. The unit system was established, and the candidate who 
carried a county received the electoral vote of that county. To be 
elected, however, a candidate must receive both a majority of the 
popular vote and a majority of the electoral vote.61 In case no 
candidate should receive both, the election was to be decided by the 
House of Representatives, which was to choose between the two 
58United States Census of 1890, I, 770-71; Mississippi, H0U8e Journal, 1890, 
pp.3-5. 
59 Tohnston, "Suffrage and Reconstruction," loco cit., 237. 
6oMississippi, Journal of Constitutional Convention, 1890, pp. fr17-78. 
61Mississippi Constitution, 1890, Sec. 140. 
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candidates receiving the highest popular vote.62 The professed ob-
ject of this apportionment was the erection of "an impregnable 
barrier to any possible organization of the Negro majority, by ex-
traneous force or internal faction for political dominance."63 
George's plan was bitterly attacked by the press of the black 
counties.64. The Jackson Clarion outdid all others in its opposition. 
It called the legislative apportionment a «visionary, impracticable, 
arbitrary, unjust, and unequal scheme" and thought the electoral 
college plan «the very worst" of all possible ways of choosing a 
governor. The apportionment scheme was unnecessary, it said, 
because the fear of Negro domination was only «a phantasm, a 
dream." It chided the convention for proposing thus to reward the 
white counties, many of which in the past had been the seats of the 
strongest Independent movements. On the other hand, no black 
county had ever «been unfaithful in its allegiance to white rule." 
The Clarion found no validity in the proposition that it was neces-
sary to «lodge power in white counties to guarantee Democratic 
control" of future legislatures. Black counties were «as reliably 
Democratic as . . . the white counties" and would remain so "with 
or without any changes in the suffrage." The Clarion thought the 
scheme "was designed to advance the political fortunes of certain 
persons, who . . . were willing to sacrifice every other idea" for it.65 
So great was the opposition to the scheme in the Delta that there was 
actually talk of secession from the state. A supplemental report of 
the legislative committee of the convention provided that «the Legis-
lature may consent to the creation of another State or territory ... 
out of a portion of this State whenever the consent of the Congress 
of the United States shall be given thereto." But this clause was 
stricken out by the convention. 66 
Had apportionment been carried out in a fair and impartial man-
ner there would have been less room for criticism. It was pointed 
out at the time, however, that some of the white counties which re-
ceived additional representation did not have a population to war-
62Ibid., Sec. 141. 
63McNeily, "History of Measures," loco cit., 133-35. 
64Yazoo Sentinel, Brandon Republican, Natchez Democrat, Aberdeen Examiner, 
Greenville Democrat, Lexington Bulletin, Forest Register, Grenada Sentinel, and 
Water Valley Progress, quoted in Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger. July 10, 1890. 
65Tackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, July 10, Aug. 27, Sept. 2, 3, 16, 18, 1890. 
66Ibid., Oct. 2, 1890. 
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rant the increase, while others which did were passed over.67 It was 
feared that the plan would divide the white people of the state sec-
tionally. It was denounced because of the "politics in it" and "the 
demagoguery behind it." The Natchez Democrat charged that 
George had fostered the scheme to further his selfish political ambi-
tion. He had, it said, led the people of the state "into a contest, the 
white against the black counties." He had caused a break in the 
peace which the state had enjoyed and was driving a wedge of dis-
cord between the whites of the state.68 
The Birmingham (Ala.) Age-Herald thought it was strange 
"that a sensible man ... like Senator George" should lend his influ-
ence to the plan. "It is a gerrymander ... and will be productive of 
discontent and local jealousies." The Greenville Democrat thought 
George had not measured up to expectations "and has lost strength 
before the people by his advocacy of the Convention and failure to 
furnish a plan" that could overcome the difficulties. The Natchez 
Democrat, attributing the calling of the convention to George, 
failed to see in his conduct at the convention "anything which com-
mends itseH as the thought or work of a statesman." It thought 
George's motive in the apportionment was "due to the fact that [his] 
Senatorial term expires in 1893 and that perhaps on this account 
the apportionment scheme appears [to him] to be judicious." The 
Vicksburg Post thought the scheme the greatest "juggelry" which 
had ever been "placed in the organic law of a state."69 
Most delegates from the black counties were opposed to the 
plan.70 The black counties had a slight majority on the Committee 
on Elective Franchise, Apportionment, and Elections, however, and 
it was necessary to gain support from some of them in order to get 
the plan before the convention. Such support came from H. J. 
McLaurin of Sharkey, William G. Yerger of Washington, W. C. 
Richards of Lowndes, and Isaiah T. Montgomery of Bolivar. Mc-
67Ibid., Sept. 16, 18, 1890. 
68Natchez Daily Democrat, Sept. 21, 1890. 
69Binningham Age-Herald, Yazoo Sentinel, Shaw Utopian. Greenville Democrat, 
quoted in Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger. Sept. 25, 1890; Natchez Daily Democrat, 
Sept. 20, 1890; Vicksburg Post, Oct. 1, 1890. 
70Chrisman, Muldrow, Martin, Calhoon, Taylor, Featherstone, Alcorn, Campbell. 
Simrall, Magruder, Fewell, Witherspoon, Hooker, Odom, Sykes, Thompson, Win-
chester, McLean, Eskridge, Cutrer, Farish, Ward, Love, Coffey, McGehee, John-
son, and Noland all spoke against it. Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 25, 1890. 
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Laurin scoffed-at the "unnecessary sympathy" which delegates from 
black counties were expending upon themselves, and suggested that 
the black counties would be "able to take care of themselves" under 
the proposed apportionment. Yerger expressed surprise that any 
delegate of the black counties should object to the plan. He re-
garded it as "the bulwark of safety" for both white and black coun-
ties.71 
In a remarkable speech before the convention, Montgomery, the 
only Negro in the body, defended both the franchise clauses and the 
apportionment. He estimated that the franchise provision would 
disqualify more than 123,000 Negroes, but he was willing to sacrifice 
them "upon the burning altar of liberty" for the easing of the tension 
between the races. He believed that the apportionment plan would 
return a majority of fourteen legislators from white constituencies, 
but he was willing, he said, to make this sacrifice in the interest of 
better government.72 
Senator George said that the proposed apportionment plan would 
erect an impregnable barrier to any threat of Negro dominance. He 
argued that the prOvision was necessary because the federal courts 
might declare the franchise restrictions unconstitutional, and be-
cause a national Republican administration might enforce Negro 
voting at elections. The opinion seems to have been unanimous 
that the apportionment would meet such a challenge and that, under 
it, white supremacy would be guaranteed even though all Negro 
71lbld. 
72Ibld., Sept. 18, 1890; New Orleans State.t, Oct. 26, 1890. Montgomery had 
been a slave of JeHerson Davis' brother, and after emancipation he acquired some 
property and rose to a position of wealth and influence as a planter in Bolivar County. 
He was popular with the white leaders and had been admitted to the convention 
despite the fact that he was a Republican and his seat was contested by a white 
Democrat. He has been charged with being a traitor to his race, but a recent study 
credits him with good faith, despite the fact that he must have known that "all cal-
culations based on an honest application of the franchise provisions were meaning-
less." (Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 212.) Perhaps Montgomery in supporting 
the clauses which purported to disfranchise so many of his race and decrease their 
representation realized that the Negro was already disfranchised and that the con-
stitution, by reducing the number of eligible Negro voters, might permit an actual 
increase in Negro voting. It is poSSible, too, that he knew that the apportionment 
would not work out as most people seemed to think it would. For a white leader's 
opinion of Montgomery see letter of John Sharp Williams to President Wilson, Aug. 
4, 1920, Williams Papers. For Montgomery's admission to the convention see Journal, 
7-10. 
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men were permitted to vote.78 This was called by Mississippf s most 
prolific historian "the legal basis and bulwark of the design of white 
supremacy."7' 
Such authority is impressive, but an examination of the census 
does not justify such confidence. The apportionment was said to be 
based upon the "voting population" instead of the total population. 
If this "voting population" was comprised of all male adults, the 
claim that it in fact would have given a majority of legislators to 
districts with white majorities is questionable. 
On the contrary the census of 1890 shows that if all male adults 
in every legislative district in Mississippi had voted, and if they had 
divided on race lines, Negroes would have returned 69 representa-
tives and whites 64. In 1900, according to census figures, such a 
hypothetical vote would have returned the same number of whites 
and Negroes as in 1890, and in 1910 there would have been 71 Ne-
groes arid 66 whites. Not until 1920 would shifts of population and 
creation of new counties have given the whites a majority of the 
legislators. In that year an election by all male adults on race lines 
would have returned 77 whites and 68 Negroes.71S 
After 1890 there was, therefore, not only a gross inequality of 
legislative representation as compared to eligible white voting popu-
lation, but also to the actual number of votes cast in the several 
counties. That delegates from the white counties should have failed 
to see this is almost unbelievable. There is no evidence that they 
protested against the apportionment clause on such grounds. The 
only protest came from delegates from the black counties. True, the 
new apportionment would slightly decrease the representation of 
the black counties. But it would not and did not wrest govern-
mental control from the hands of the comparatively small number of 
whites in the black counties. Even when the state-wide primary 
78Statement by James L. Alcorn in Memphis Appeal-Avalanche, quoted in Jack-
son Dally Clarlon-Ledget', Nov. 27, 1890; statement of Isaiah T. Montgomery in New 
Orleans Sunday States, Oct. 26, 1890; McNeily, "History of Measures," loco eft., 
133-35; Rowland, Encyclopedia, I, 540-41; Johnston, "Suffrage and Reconstruction," 
loCo eft., 228; Alfred Holt Stone, "The Basis of White Political Control in MisSiSSippi," 
in Joumal of Mississippi Histon}, VI (1944),282. 
7'Rowland, Encyclopedia, I, 540-41. 
76For a detailed discussion of this point, see Albert D. Kirwan, "Apportionment in 
the Mississippi Constitution of 1890," in Joumal of Southet'n History, XIV (1948), 
284-46. 
84 REVOLT OF THE REDNECKS 
was established a dozen years later the black counties remained in 
control of the legislature. The apportionment provision has never 
had to meet the test for which it was professedly designed. Negro 
disfranchisement, illegally effected before 1890 and legally since, 
has been so complete as to spare the apportionment provision the 
failure which it must have faced prior to 1920 had the Negro voted 
as freely as the white man and on race lines. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE FARMERS REVOLT 
IF THE farmers of Mississippi thought to improve their lot by 
means of a new constitution they were not long in having their 
illusion dispelled. Their real aim in their struggle for political con-
trol had been an improvement of their economic plight. A readjust-
ment in the balance of political power, they thought, would effect 
a readjustment of economic power. They believed that their de-
pressed economic condition was not the result of natural causes of 
supply and demand in a free economy. Rather it was due to the 
monopolistic hold which banks, railroads, manufacturers, and 
"middlemen" had gained over the governmental processes.1 If they 
could but break this hold over government, they could effect an 
economic change to their own advantage. 
For years economic conditions in Mississippi had been going 
from bad to worse. Money among the people was getting scarcer, 
and property was depreciating with the decline in commodity prices. 
The free-silver doctrine had long ago won its struggle in Mississippi, 
and with the passing of Lamar from the political arena to the clois-
tered confines of the Supreme Court, scarcely a politician failed to 
pay lip service, at least, to the doctrine soon to become the supreme 
national issue. Mississippians advocated the issue as a means of 
obtaining relief from an economic pressure "which for many years 
had been growing increasingly more odious."2 The farmer suffered 
from a variety of evils. The price of cotton was low; the state taxa-
tion system placed the greatest burden of government finances on 
him; the poor educational system kept him and his children in ig-
norance; the railroads extorted excessive tariffs from him; and the 
national currency system, which was regulated by the banks, made 
it almost impossible for him to pay his debts.3 
One of the agencies through which the farmer expressed his class 
views was the Farmers' Alliance. An attempt was made in the late 
IMemorial of State Farmer's Alliance to legislature, in Mississippi, House Journal, 
1890, pp. 145-48. 
2James A. Barnes, "Gold Standard Democrats and the Party Conflict," in Missis-
Iipp'Valley Historical Reoiew, XVII (1930-1931),422. 
aSee Farmer's Alliance Memorial, in Mississippi, House Journal, 1890, pp. 145-48; 
Kendrick, "Agrarian Discontent," loco cit., 272. 
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1880's to effect a union of all state Alliances, but fear of southern 
radicalism had caused the northern Alliances to stand aloof. There-
upon the southern branch fonned a union with the Knights of Labor. 
In 1889 this hybrid group held a convention at Toledo. A platfonn 
was adopted advocating abolition of national banks, prohibition of 
speculation in futures on all agricultural and mechanical products, 
the free and unlimited coinage of silver, reclamation of excessive 
lands sold or granted to corporations, decrease of the tax burden on 
the masses, fractional paper currency, and government ownership 
and operation of transportation and communication facilities. 
The Mississippi Alliance men were not advocates of a third party. 
They were. Democrats and sought to effect the desired reforms by 
gaining control of the party. In their Alliance conventions they 
named candidates for state office and instructed their members to 
work for the nomination of those men in the Democratic state con-
vention. This produced irritation among other Democrats who con-
sidered such action dictation by a minority of the party. The Alliance 
denied the charge. It was, it said, only recommending, and promised 
to support whomever the party nominated.' 
The legislature elected in 1891 had to choose a successor to 
Senator George. The state Alliance was advocating the Sub-Treasury 
scheme, but George would not accept such a plan. He denounced it 
as "delusive and impracticable and ... beyond the legitimate func-
tions of the government." He stated frankly that he would not obey 
an instruction from the legislature, if it were sent him, to vote for 
such a bill./; Thereupon the Alliance put forward Barksdale in op-
pOSition to him, and the Sub-Treasury became the big issue of the 
campaign. A bitter canvass ensued in which even some of Barks-
dale's closest friends took the stump against him, so strongly did 
they resent what they considered a radical scheme. 
The first phase of the struggle was in the state Democratic con-
vention. Nomination by the convention was not, in the case of 
United States senators, tantamount to election. Senators were 
chosen by the legislature, and legislators were bound in theory not 
by the state convention but by conventions or preferential primaries 
in their respective counties. In many cases legislators were unin-
'Macon Beocon, Feb. 28. 1891. 
liGamer, "Senatorial Career of J. Z. George," loco cit., 257-58; Jackson Dally 
ClarioD-Ledger, Sept. 11, 1891. 
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structed as to senatorial candidates, in which instances they were 
free agents and in a position to exercise their own judgment in 
choosing among the several candidates. Nevertheless, nomination 
by the state convention gave prestige to a candidate and was eagerly 
sought. 
When the convention met "The atmosphere was heavily laden' 
with the usual rumors that this and that candidate had made a com-
bination against another." The amount of '1og rolling," said one ob-
server, would have done credit to a much larger and more important 
body. The George forces won control and not only nominated their 
man but also passed a strong resolution denouncing the Sub-Treas-
ury advocates as radicals. The Clarion, which was embarrassed in its 
opposition to the Sub-Treasury while supporting Barksdale, thought 
tariff reform, pensions, and free coinage should be the issues. It 
criticized the George faction for "offending a great army of men 
whose Democracy is unimpeachable" and predicted that the un-
necessary resolution would prove a Pandora's box to the party. It 
denounced the "assumed leaders" whose intolerance would read 
Barksdale out of the party because of his endorsement of Alliance 
principles. It predicted that unless the spirit of despotism and in-
tolerance of these leaders toward "erring members" was abated, "a 
division of the white people of the state at an early day may be con-
sidered an absolute certainty."6 
Rebuffed and insulted by the "egregious folly" of the convention, 
the Alliance men rolled up their sleeves and went to work. With 
George nominated by the convention their efforts now were con-
centrated on electing legislators pledged to vote for Barksdale. Their 
movement grew rapidly, and county after county which had been 
regarded as safe against the Sub-Treasury became the scene of party 
battles. George's Senate record was scrutinized, and he was criticized 
for voting for pension bills for Union veterans, for faVOring corporate 
over agrarian interests, and for being a hard-money man. The 
George faction was accused of bolting mass meetings which declared 
for Barksdale and of forming "little third parties of their own." They 
were accused of sending out hecklers to interrupt Barksdale's can-
vass speeches, and George himseH was charged with using oppro-
brious language directed at Barksdale. 
tlJackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, July 15, 16, 25, Aug. 11, 1891; Biloxi Herald, 
quoted ibid., July 21, 1891. 
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George had the support of Senator Walthall and Congressman 
H. D. Money, of the second district. Walthall, a conservative on 
economic questions, was temperate and gentlemanly as always. He 
scouted the "absurd ravings" of politicians who saw the struggle as a 
disruption of the party. He admitted that the farmers had cause for 
their movement, needed relief, and ought to have it instead of being 
mocked in their calamity. Nevertheless he supported George as the 
real friend of the farmer, and his tremendous popularity was used 
to George's advantage. Money's participation provoked violence. 
In a speech at Oxford, Barksdale charged that Money, while a 
member of Congress, had advocated chartering Collis P. Hunting-
ton's Texas Railway and had secured a $50,000 loan from Huntington 
as consideration for his support. Money, who was present, arose 
and interrupted Barksdale. He admitted receiving the money but 
said that "any man who charged that the loan was in consideration 
of support to the Huntington road was a liar." Barksdale became 
enraged and threw a law book which struck Money. Pandemonium 
ensued for a time. Guns were drawn and blows were struck, but 
peace was restored without serious casualty.7 
As the campaign progressed the bitterness of the farmers against 
George grew. His activities, old and new, were denounced. He was 
charged with having opposed the impeachment of Ames, the Radical 
governor, in 1876. Even his personal integrity was challenged. 
Enemies circulated a story that as chairman of the state Democratic 
executive committee in 1875 he had advised Jefferson County 
leaders to carry the county "at all hazards." When they did and 
sixteen of them were indicted for their activity, it was said that 
George notified them that he would defend them for fifty dollars 
each.8 It was charged that a corrupt ring in Jackson owned the state 
and that George was a member not only of it but of every other ring 
in the state. Critics linked him with the penitentiary lessees, whose 
nefarious activities were beginning to come in for general condem-
nation. So bitterly did the Clarion, the most influential journal of 
the state, attack George that a group of the Senator's friends entered 
into a compact to boycott the paper, and so notified the editor.9 
7Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, July 2, 6, 13, 14, 18, 24, Aug. 4, 8, 18, Sept. 3, 
12, Nov. 14, 1891. 
8Ibid., July 27, 31, Aug. 3, 1891. 
9Ibid., July 15, 17, 1891. 
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But the cards were stacked against the farmers. The state Demo-
cratic executive committee yielded to pressure and recommended 
a division of county election managers between supporters of George 
and of Barksdale. But George's henchman, Stone, sat in the gover-
nor's office and controlled the state board of election commissioners. 
The state board disregarded the recommendation of the executive 
committee and appointed George men exclUSively for the November 
election. The only recourse left by this treatment was for the Barks-
dale faction to appoint special committees at each voting place "to 
watch the polls and see that there is a free ballot and a fair count."lO 
Where county primaries were held they were conducted under 
rules prescribed by county executive committees which, according 
to Barksdale supporters, were dominated by the George machine. 
Numerous charges of fraud were made by the Barksdale faction. In 
Yalobusha County they declined to take part in the primary because 
of the arbitrary rules of the county committee, "clearly deSigned to 
prevent a fair expression of the will of the county." The farming 
element of the county, comprising two-thirds of the party, refused 
to submit «to the prejudiced and one-sided umpire on whose altar" 
the George faction had plotted to victimize them. They withdrew 
their candidate, but "the farce of the primary was played neverthe-
less, with less than a fourth of the registered voters. 11 
In the Claiborne County primary on July 4, E. H. Stiles and 
N. S. Walker, Barksdale candidates for the legislature, claimed 
majorities. The county committee, however, refused to declare them 
the party nominees and selected others in their stead. The Barksdale 
faction then called a mass meeting and passed resolutions declaring 
the committee's action "revolutionary, null, and void" and calling on 
all loyal Democrats to give "these gentlemen [Stiles and Walker] 
our cordial and hearty support."12 
Charges of even greater fraud were made in the general election. 
In October the Pontotoc courthouse was broken into and all thirty-
nine registration books were "stolen or concealed and probably 
burnt." Barksdale had carried the county by a large majority in the 
primary, and the election of Barksdale legislators was considered an 
lOIbid., Sept. 7, 1891. 
llIbid., Aug. 29, 1891. 
12Diary of G. W. Humphrey, in George Wilson Humphrey Papers, Mississippi 
Deparhnent of Archives and History. 
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assured fact. The Clarion called this «a monstrous crime, scarcely 
paralleled by any outrage of the sort in the worst days of reconstruc-
tion."lS In Okolona the office of Frank Burkitt's Chickasaw Mes-
senger was destroyed by fire. Burkitt charged that the conflagration 
was the outgrowth of "the bitter and unrelenting war made on me 
as an Alliance official and a supporter of Major Barksdale in the 
present canvass." "And some good people, who differ from me 
politically," he added, «share the opinion."l4 
The canvass was characterized as one of the meanest ever con-
ducted in the state. Barksdale, it was said, was more savagely as-
sailed than Ames had been in 1875. He was ridiculed, misrepre-
sented, and slandered from one side of the state to the other. His 
Democracy was questioned and his honor impugned. On the other 
hand, even the Clarion admitted that "some very silly things have 
been said of Senator George."l5 The election returns revealed that 
a majority of the legislators chosen were pledged to George. His 
election in January, when the new legislature was to meet, was 
therefore almost a foregone conclusion. 
It would be futile to attempt to determine which faction was 
more guilty of fraud and what the outcome would have been had 
there been "a free ballot and a fair count." Several facts, however, 
stand out. It was fairly demonstrated that the constitution of 1890 
had not transferred power from the «oligarchs" of the black counties 
to the farmers of the white districts. Admittedly Barksdale was the 
choice of the great mass of Mississippi farmers. He was put forward 
by the Alliance and given its unstinted support. He was backed by 
Frank Burkitt and Putnam Darden, the two foremost agrarian 
leaders of the state. The farmers comprised an overwhelming ma-
jority of the state's population, and it is difficult to believe that in a 
popular election Barksdale would have failed to receive a substantial 
majority. Yet, because of the system of legislative apportionment as 
fixed in the constitution of 1890, George's faction succeeded in 
electing a majority of the legislature. That constitution had not 
broken the hold of the black counties on the state government. The 
contest was simply a repeat performance of elections during the 
previous sixteen years. 
18Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 5, 10, 1891. 
14Ibid., Oct. 19, 1891. 
151bid., Oct. 16, 1891. 
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Nor did the new franchise clauses succeed in preventing Negro 
voting. It is unlikely that many Negro votes were cast. Yet the 
charge was made on both sides that Negroes were brought into the 
primaries. The same charge had been made in every election since 
1875, and there is no way of knowing whether more or fewer Ne-
groes actually voted in 1891 than in previous years. 
Equally reminiscent of the old days were incidents of violence-
brawls, burnings, burgling of courthouses and poll books. The 
Clarion thought the crimes perpetrated were "scarcely paralleled by 
any outrage ••• in the worst days of reconstruction." The conStitu-
tion, it had been said, would put an end to all such barbarities by 
eliminating the Negro from the electorate. The conclusion is in-
escapable that the Negro was not eliminated and that the framers 
of the franchise clauses had held in too high regard the self-restraint 
of the white man. 
Both George and Barksdale were eminent men and rendered 
efficient service to their state over a long period of time. The charge 
was frequently made during the canvass that Barksdale was leading 
an "opposition" movement and was actually heading a third party. 
The charge was groundless. Noone in the state was more loyal to 
the DteJlIlocratic party than Barksdale, and no one denounced more 
violently any attempt to form a third party. He split with many of 
his most loyal supporters the following year when he refused to lead 
them into the Populist party. His contest with George was an "op-
position" movement, but it was opposition merely to the leaders of 
the party. He tried to wrest the party from their control-a thing he 
had a perfect right to do without forfeiting his claim to regularity. 
When he failed he remained in the party and gave it his complete 
support throughout the rest of his career. George, too, remained 
steadfast in Democratic regularity. But his faction retained control 
until after his death so that his loyalty was never put to the test 
which Barksdale's was. 
The election was indicative of social unrest. The farmers had 
shown they could unite behind a leader in an effort to assert the 
authority which they thought their numbers warranted. But rules 
of the contest were so drawn that they could not win. Remedy lay 
in changing the rules, but it was to be a decade before this would 
be accomplished. Meanwhile, the farmers were to suffer division 
and retardation in the Populist movement. 
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Lamar misinterpreted the farmer's unrest. Writing as an old man 
no longer actively interested in Mississippi politics, he mourned the 
passing of the old conservative southern farmer who had used the 
franchise "without any motive of personal advantage or profit" to 
himself. To him it seemed that the franchise was now exercised by 
the farmers "to make it minister to their own recently awakened 
cupidity and lust for office."16 
Lamar must have forgotten his own struggle with Barksdale in 
the early 1880's. Or was that merely a struggle for power between 
ambitious individuals, with no social discontent at its core? But the 
economic status of the farmer had fallen even lower by 1891 than in 
Lamar's day. The price of cotton had dropped, and the power of the 
corporate interests was growing. To the farmer it seemed that his 
only salvation lay in political ascendancy. The movement was not 
peculiar to Mississippi. It was swelling at the same time in all parts 
of the country-North as well as South, East as well as West. If the 
movement in the South was marked by more bitterness and hatred 
than in other sections, perhaps it was due to presence of the Negro 
and to backwardness of educational facilities. But regardless of 
motive, it was clear to many besides Lamar that a change had come 
over the Mississippi farmer. He had become class conscious, and he 
saw in politics the only chance to improve himself and his class. He 
would not rest until he had gained control. 
The new legislature met in January, 1892. Despite the fact that 
it was known that a majority of that body was committed to George, 
Burkitt and the Alliance which he headed tried to effect "combina-
tions and schemes" to defeat George. "Every act of persuasive guile," 
said J. S. McNeily, "was used to have members violate instruc-
tions."17 But it was not to be. George was elected to succeed him-
self,18 and Burkitt and other dissatisfied Democrats left the party. 
16L. Q. C. Lamar to Walter Barker, 1891, in Mayes, Lamar. 552--53. 
17Vicksburg Daily Herald, Jan. 19, 1912. 
18Mississippi, House Journal, 1892, pp. 178-81. 
CHAPTER IX 
POPULISM 
THE ONE-PARTY system which prevailed in Mississippi after 
1876 vested the power of election in the party convention and 
control of the convention in the hands of comparatively few men. 
The dissatisfaction which this one-party system produced was 
closely linked with economic depression. In the period 1880-1890 
conditions were generally bad, but after the latter date they grew 
worse. In 1878 production of cotton in the South had equalled the 
mark set in 1860, and thereafter it steadily increased until by 1890 
the production of 1860 was doubled. This increase was reflected by 
a drop in price. At the same time production in other parts of the 
world was bringing outside competition. Until 1890 the price of 
cotton hovered around 11 cents. By 1892 the price had dropped to 
'm cents. From there it descended, with occasional small but tem-
porary increases, to 4.9 cents in 1898.1 Seven-cent cotton was con-
sidered below the cost of production, and farms had to be mortgaged 
to raise cash to pay the lien merchant. But banks were reluctant to 
lend money on even good lands, and interest rates were high. 
The farmer became convinced that he was the "forgotten man.'" 
To him it seemed that an enemy class-"Wall Street speculators 
who gambled on his crop futures; the railroad owners who evaded 
taxes, bought legislatures, and over-charged him with discriminate 
rates; the manufacturers, who taxed him with a high tariff; the 
trusts, that fleeced him with high prices; the middleman, who stole 
his profit" -had got control of the Democratic party-the party 
which had redeemed him from Negro-Republican rule.2 To seek 
salvation in the Republican party was as useless materially as it was 
unthinkable morally, for to the farmer it seemed that that party was 
even more abandoned to the power of the trusts than was his own. 
The result of all this discontent was the formation of the Populist 
party.s 
The membership and program of the Populist party were similar 
to those of the Farmers' Alliance. Its following was agrarian, par-
1Emory Q. Hawk, Economic History of the South (New York, 1934), 450-51. 
2C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel (New York, 1938), 132. 
3 Hawk, Economic History, 452; J. S. Williams to Grover Cleveland, Dec. 20, 
1892, Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress. 
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ticularly in the South where the urban workers had not become 
sufficiently large to become class conscious. In general it was made 
up of the mass of small farmers, both tenants and owners, although 
it contained a surprising number of large landowners. The large 
landowner might be an exploiter of his tenant, but the two fought 
side by side in the People's party, united "by the crushing oppression 
of capitalist flnance and industrialism."" Although a "radical" party, 
it was not revolutionary, and it accepted the capitalist System. 
The farmers believed that their old leaders had abandoned them 
and were "just as much the tools of plutocratic opinion" as were the 
Republican leaders. The agricultural interest, they ar~ed, was not 
regarded at heart by either of the old parties. "What they call 'vested 
rights' and 'business interests' will :6nally control them," said the 
Populists. The old parties were "Tools of the money power," "Cow-
ards when it comes to any real protection of the many against the 
organized robberies of the few." These and other phrases were 
dinned into the ears of Mississippi farmers by the leaders of the new 
party.6 Finally the farmers, "Oppressed, depressed, and suppressed," 
knowing something was wrong somewhere though they knew not 
preciselv where, "like drowning men, were willing to catch at 
straws."8 
The leader of the Mississippi Populists was Frank Burkitt, former 
Democratic a{!1'arian leader and editor of the Chickasaw M essenl!er. 
Both he and Barksdale had accepted the principles of the Ocala 
platform in 1891, but both sOUQ'ht at :6rst to effect reforms from 
within the Democratic party. With the defeat of Barksdale, Burkitt 
went into open revolt and began organizing the Populists to over-
throw what he called the "putrid, putrescent, putrifving political 
moribund carcass of bourbon democracv.'" The Mississippi Popu-
lists advocated abolition of national banks, the Sub-Treasury, 2 per 
cent federal loans direct to the farmer, an increase of currency to 
:6hy dollars per capita, prohibition of speculation in farm futures, 
free coinage of silver, forfeiture of unearned land grants to railways 
and a limiting of their landholdings, a tariff favoring the producer 
"Buck, Agrarian Crmaae. 188; Woodward. Tom Watson, 217-19. 
6Williams to Cleveland, Dec. 20, 1892, Cleveland Papers. 
8Ibld. 
'Chickasaw Messenger, quoted in Macon Beacon, Aug. 27,1892. 
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rather than the processor, a graduated income tax, reduction of gov-
ernment expenditures, regulation of railroads, and election of United 
States senators by direct vote.8 On this platform they nominated 
candidates for Congress in all districts in 1892 and sought to carry 
the state. They bitterly attacked the franchise clauses of the 1890 
constitution. They charged that "the Bourbon Democrats" had 
foisted those provisions on the people in an attempt to curtail the 
privilege of voting.9 
The Democrats answered the challenge with the old rallying cry 
of white supremacv. They accused the Populists of favoring Negro 
suffrage. As for the francbise restrictions, they charged that the 
1890 convention had been an Alliance movement from the begin-
ning; that the Alliance had held such a majority in the convention 
that no measure could be adopted without their concurrence: and 
that they had voted almost solidly for it. Now, they said, "a lot of 
contemptible demagogues" were trying to lead Alliance men out of 
the Democratic party for upholding the constitution. to 
To all the clamor which the Populists made for reform, the 
Democrats answered that there were some thin!!s more important 
than reforms in the economy. A Populist victory, they warned, would 
result in Negro supremacy and the de~adation of southern woman-
hood. Fear was expressed of a new Lodge Force Bill which would 
insure the election of Republican congressmen from all southern 
states. Then would follow heavy taxes, abolition of separate schools 
and churches for the races, and repeal of state laws against inter-
marriage. With this unspeakable eventuality painted in lurid colors, 
they called upon all white men to support the Democratic party. "If 
any White man ... can encourage such doctrines," said the Natchez 
Democrat, "he is unworthy of recognition despite his color." The 
Democrats charged that Burkitt was deceiving the people and that 
he really favored such Republican measures as the tariff and the 
Lodge Force Bill.ll When the Republican convention in Grenada 
County resolved not to put a ticket in the field, the decision was 
interpreted as evidence of a Republican-Populist alliance. "Of 
8Macon Beacon, Feb. 28, 1891. 
9Ibid., Oct. 15, 1892. 
lOlbid. 
llNatchez Democrat, quoted in Macon Beacon, Oct. 22, 1892. 
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course," said the Macon Beacon, "they will vote for the Populist 
[candidate] .... Mr. Burkitt has sold out his whole party."12 
The campaign, although uncertain until the end, resulted in a 
clean sweep for the Democrats. "Neither you nor any of the De-
mocracy of the North and East," wrote a successful Democratic 
candidate to President Cleveland, "have any idea of how close many 
of the Congressional districts . . . were. You cannot judge by the 
final result." The third district, he said, had been adjudged Populist 
or doubtful but "finally went Democratic by the largest vote in the 
State. When the tide once turned it turned overwhelmingly." But 
the question of turning at all had been a "horrible doubt." There 
was, he said, a state of dissatisfaction, "not with the avowed pur-
poses of Democracy," but with its "alleged insincerity and dreaded 
ineffiCiency. It was said, and the people believed, that even if we 
got in we would do nothing. "13 
The Populists were undismayed by the election results and began 
laying plans for the congressional election of 1894. All the bitter-
ness of Reconstruction days was revived. Families were split, feuds 
were started, and killings resulted.14 The Populists were strongest 
in white counties as a rule and weakest in the Delta. Chickasaw, 
one of their strongholds, had a slight majority of Negroes, but Web-
ster, Choctaw, Pontotoc, Attala, and Marion-other counties where 
they were strong-were white counties.15 Their program, however, 
was one which had appeal for the farmer, tenant as well as owner, 
Negro as well as white. There was danger, therefore, that the 
agrarian classes might unite and enlist the aid of the Negro vote. In 
such case it would have been extremely difficult to defeat them. 
One of the Populists' heavy guns was spiked in Mississippi by 
the early conversion of Mississippi Democrats to the free-silver doc-
trine. Senator Walthall's term did not expire until 1895, but the 
legislature of 1892 had elected him to a new term to begin at its 
expiration.16 In poor health in the winter of 1893-1894, he resigned 
the remainder of the current term, thus creating a year's vacancy 
12Macon Beacon, Oct. 29, 1892. 
18Williams to Cleveland, Dec. 20, 1892, Cleveland Papers. 
14Macon Beacon, Mar. 10, 24, 1894; clipping from Chicago Blade, in Charlton 
M. Clarke Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. 
16William D. McCain, "The Populist Party in Mississippi" (M. A. thesis, Univer-
sity of Mississippi, 1931), 24. 
16Mississippi, House Journal, 1892, pp. 180-81. 
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which had to be filled by the legislature of 1894. Governor Stone, 
Chief Justice Campbell, A. J. McLaurin, Congressmen C. E. Hooker, 
T. C. Catchings, and John Allen, and several others were eager for 
the temporary appointment. But it soon became clear that none 
but a free-silver man need apply. The Democratic legislators met in 
caucus and formulated four questions which all candidates for the 
office must answer. Two of these had to do with the silver question, 
the other two with the tariff and national banks. "Few other quali-
fications [than being a free-silverite] appear to be demanded," com-
plained a "gold-bug" paper. "The plum will doubtless go to him 
who shouts the loudest, longest, and strongest for the greatest 
amount of the white metal." The candidates were invited to 
address the caucus for thirty minutes. This created a spectacle 
which a "gold-bug" called "ludicrous as a circus," with all the candi-
dates trying to outdo one another in their advocacy of free silver. 
Stone and Catchings, both hard-money men, withdrew from the 
contest, and McLaurin, who probably shouted "loudest, longest, and 
strongest," won out over the others.1'1 
Reinforced by this strategy the Democrats prepared for the con-
gressional elections of 1894. Walthall, in temporary retirement and 
formerly identified with the gold-standard faction, urged preserva-
tion of party harmony and condemned the "gold-bug" Democrats 
who sought to read the free-silverites out of the party on the ground 
that they had not backed Cleveland. The entire Mississippi delega-
tion, including Walthall and George, had voted for free-silver legis-
lation even over the President's veto. Despite this, said Walthall. 
the Mississippians were loyal to Cleveland "in all but financial mat-
ters."l8 
The Populists nominated congressional candidates in all but the 
Delta district, where Catchings was the incumbent. This caused a 
"gold-bug" editor to remark on the incongruity of an anti-free-silver 
man from a free-silver state being the only unopposed candidate. 
Odder still, thought the "gold-bug," Catchings had more influence 
~'~.'. ;~i{Ojt;' .¥,t*4t~ 
l7Mississippi. House Journal, 1894, p. 376; Natchez Daily Democrat, Jan. 24, 
25, Feb. 14, 1894; Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 8, 15, 1894; Macon Beacon, 
Jan. 20, 27, Feb. 3, 1894. 
l8E. C. Walthall to editor, Clarion-Ledger, May 28, 1894, quoted in Jackson 
Dally Clarion-Ledger, May 31, 1894. 
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in the free-silver Congress than any of the free-silver representatives 
from Mississippi. 19 
The strategy of the Democrats proved successful. Although poll-
ing more than a third of all the votes, the Populists failed to elect a 
single congressman. They received substantial majorities in some 
white counties but were overwhehned in the black counties.20 
Still undismayed the Populists met in convention in the summer 
of 1895 and adopted a program reiterating the demands enunciated 
in the Ocala and Omaha platforms. Avoiding the silver question 
they condemned the state Democratic administration for «squan-
dering 2,700,000 acres of public school lands," and they urged a 
law to prohibit the acquisition of land by nonresidents. They con-
demned «ring-rule" and the "oligarchy" of officials who sought only 
to perpetuate themselves in office. Burkitt, in an address to the 
convention, charged that taxes were relatively higher than under 
Radical government and compared the venality of the administra-
tion with that of the Ames regime. He attacked the appointive 
power of the governor, which made the state «anything but a re-
public." He pledged that the party would provide free public schools 
for a term of four months to «all the children of the state without 
regard to race, color, or condition of life."21 
Burkitt was nominated for governor along with a full state ticket. 
Although the platform had taken a liberal attitude toward the Negro 
in general, it did not advocate Negro voting, nor did the ticket in-
clude a single Negro or Republican. All nominees were former 
Democrats. Even the «gold-bug" Natchez Democrat praised the 
quality of the men making up the ticket, although it warned that 
there might be an "understanding" between the Populists and Re-
publicans.22 The moderation of the Democrat was not copied by 
other Democratic papers. The Clarion derided Burkitt as a recent 
convert to Populism after he had been nestled by the Democracy. 
He had only left the party, it said, when "he saw his chances for 
promotion were not worth looking after." Day by day and week by 
19Macon Beacon, May 3, 1894; Charles E. Hooker to Col. G. W. Humphrey, 
Sept. 25, 1894, in George Wilson Humphrey Papers. 
2oMacon Beacon, Nov. 17, 1894; McCain, "The Populist party," 25. 
21Ibid., 31-40, 47-48; Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 1, 1895. 
22Natchez Daily Democrat, Aug. 2, 1895. 
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week its language became stronger in denunciation of Burkitt and 
the Populists.23 
The Democratic convention met the week after the Populist and 
copied many planks of its platform, including that on silver. It con-
demned third parties, however, as tending "to divide or weaken our 
[the white] party ... and dangerous to the welfare and happiness 
of both races."24 Before the convention met, the three chief candi-
dates were Senator McLaurin, H. C. McCabe, and James K. Varda-
man, editor of the Greenwood Enterprise. McCabe represented the 
gold wing of the party. McLaurin and Vardaman, while advocates 
of silver and other Populist proposals, were both bitter against the 
"third party." Vardaman withdrew his candidacy a month before the 
convention met, and McCabe the week before.25 This left McLaurin 
unopposed, and he was nominated by acclamation.26. 
There had been no dangerous opposition to Democratic state 
tickets since 1881. Democratic nomination for governor had been 
tantamount to election, and all serious campaigning had ceased after 
nominating conventions. Such was not the case in 1895. The Popu-
lists had polled more than a third of the state's ballots the year 
before, and it was feared that they had grown stronger since. Demo-
cratic orators were sent into all sections, but the supply never 
equalled the demand. McLaurin himself received pleas by the 
hundreds from distraught county chairmen urging him to come to 
save the day. The Negroes were courted by both sides and must 
have made capital of the confusion among the whites. "I am very 
uneasy about our county," wrote a local chairman to McLaurin. 
'We have been calculating on the negro vote which is inclined to the 
straight Democratic," he said, but a Democratic speaker had come 
in and delivered a bitter, anti-Negro tirade. "This has imperilled 
the negro vote," he wrote, and "our county is almost certain to go 
Populist this fall unless some vigorous work is done."27 
Coahoma County seemed lost to the Democrats when the county 
2sJackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 12, 19, Nov. 14, 1895. 
24Ibid., May 2, Aug. 8, 1895; McCain, "The Populist Party," 50-53. 
25Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 1, Dec. 6, 13, 1894, July 11, Aug. 8, 1895; 
Natchez Daily Democrat, June 2, 7, 8, 11, 28, Aug. 7, 1895. 
26Natchez Daily Democrat, Aug. 7, 1895; Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 
8,1895. 
27F. S. Ford to A. J. McLaurin, Sept. 19, 24, 1895, Letters of Governors, Series 
E.99. 
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executive committee refused to have county candidates nominated 
by a primary. Dissidents held a mass meeting, denounced the com-
mittee, and decided to form a fusion ticket with the Republicans of 
the county. The Republicans had nominated for sheriff W. A. Alcorn, 
"the bitterest and most uncompromising Radical in the state," and 
for circuit clerk a Negro named Chatters. These were the two offices 
which could be most effectively used for political purposes, and it 
was imperative that something be done to win the Negro vote and 
to prevent "Radicals" from getting control. There were at the time 
"not exceeding 150 eligible negro voters in the county" but if Alcorn 
and Chatters were elected, Negroes would, within a few years, it was 
feared, "outvote the whites ... four or five to one."28 
At Brandon, in Rankin County, the Democrats felt conHdent of 
success, but even there they wanted McLaurin to speak. He was 
needed at Monticello to "create some enthusiasm among our folk." 
If he could not come himseH, they begged that "some good ... 
populite killer" be sent. Burkitt had been there and the section was 
badly tainted with Populism. DeKalb was infested with the same 
virus. Populists there were "making more howl" than ever before, 
and in addition, many Democrats were "sore and disgruntled" at the 
effects of the late primaries. Burkitt had spoken three times in 
Prentiss County, and the Populists were shOwing considerable 
strength there. The Democrats were "having a fight" to carry Attala 
County, and McLaurin had to speak there. He could not fill a date 
atWesson and so Vardaman spoke for him; but he had his "gun well 
loaded" for the crowd at Meridian, where it took forty cows to feed 
the "ten square acres of people" in the audience. "The lies I have 
told this people about you," wrote one county chairman to Mc-
Laurin, "are legion."211 
The oratorical efforts of the campaign were not without some 
effect. Numerous letters attested to the writers' having seen the light 
only after listening to a campaign orator. A typical letter was that 
28W. H. Fitzgerald to McLaurin, Sept. 28, 1895, Ibid. 
211J. H. Caldwell to McLaurin, Oct. I, 1895; P. J. Jones to McLaurin, Oct. 2, 
1895; Joseph Dale to McLaurin, Oct. 3, 1895; D. A. Hopper to McLaurin, Oct. 5, 
1895; Sam P. Allen to McLaurin, Oct. 12, 1895; A. A. Armistead to McLaurin, Oct. 
12, 1895; James K. Vardaman to McLaurin, Oct. IS, 1895; A. M. Byrd to McLaurin, 
Oct. 15, 1895; W. S. Davis to McLaurin, Oct. 21, 1895; O. A. Luckett, Jr., to Mc-
Laurin, Oct. 26, 1895; Dr. M. J. Ferguson to McLaurin, Oct. 4, 1895; W. H. Hardy 
to McLaurin, Oct. 31, 1895, lbid. 
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of Joe Cook to McLaurin. «Four years ago," he wrote, «it would give 
me great pleasure to support anyone who would oppose you. I con-
tinued to feel that way until ... I ... heard the Hon. M. F. Smith .... 
I am now on your side."30 
The misgivings of the Democrats about the outcome proved 
unwarranted. Without their knowing it the tide had turned against 
the Populists. While the Populists carried. a county or two and 
elected a few legislators, Burkitt was defeated by more than 25,000 
votes in a total of 60,000.31 
The high tide of Populism had been reached, and the party was 
to dwindle quickly into insignificance. Although it had seemed for 
a time a serious threat to Democratic supremacy, the Populist party 
never adequately expressed the extent of the Mississippi farmer's 
disaffection from the Democratic party. Had it not been for the 
presence of the Negro the Populists might have swept the state in 
the early 1890's. But many Democrats who actually preferred Popu-
list principles feared to have two parties and thus divide the white 
vote. They insisted that reforms should be brought about within 
the Democratic party, and they preferred the lesser evil of «ring 
control" to the greater evil of "negro domination." The result was 
that after a brief upsurge the party subsided and, after Bryan dealt 
it the deathblow in Chicago, went into oblivion. In 1897 the Demo-
crats carried even Chickasaw County, the Populist stronghold and 
home of Burkitt.32 The Populist candidate for governor in 1899, 
R. K. Prewitt, polled only 6,000 votes in a total of 48,000.33 By 1900 
the Populist party was breathing its last in Mississippi. That year it 
cast only 1,644 votes.84 
The failure of the Populists was due to a multitude of causes. 
Most important was probably the race question. Other reasons were 
mismanagement, lack of enlightened leadership, the comparative 
conservatism of its program, returning prosperity, and the national 
split resulting from the nomination of Bryan. 
80Joe Cook to McLaurin, Mar. 29, 1899, ibid., Series E, BOA. 
81Jaclcson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 9, 1895; Vicksburg Herald, Nov. 10, 1895. 
82Greenwood Commonwealth, Dec. 3, 1897. 
3SMacon Beacon, Dec. 16, 1899. 
34Ibid., Nov. 24, 1900. 
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Although the party had practically expired in Mississippi by 1900, 
its influence was still felt in the growing hostility of rank and file 
Democrats to big business, particularly the lumber interests and in-
surance companies.35 Its most important contribution in Mississippi 
was "the training of the agricultural population to independent 
thought and action."36 
35McCain, "The Populist Party," 140-47. 
86Buck, Agrarian Crusade, 199-200. 
CHAPTER X 
McLAURINISM 
UNTIL 1895 a well-defined pattern was given to Mississippi 
politics by such issues as free silver and the farm revolt. By 
that date the silver men had triumphed. Practically all Mississippi 
politicians at least paid lip service to the white metal, although a 
few irreconcilables, such as Stone and Catchings, remained adamant. 
But even Walthall, who had been born a conservative on economic 
questions, and George who had become one with the years were 
converted. The farm revolt, given a sedative by the reaction to 
Populism, was to seethe beneath the surface for almost a decade, 
when it was to boil up and engulf the state in the election of 1903. 
Meanwhile, though preserving an outward calm, the state was to be 
tom by bitter factional struggles within the Democratic party. The 
issues were now personal ones. To be sure personal issues had been 
present in all other periods, but now the political scene was to be 
characterized by a dearth of other issues. The tale of Mississippi 
politics for the next eight years is essentially the story of ambitious 
men at grips for political power. 
The most sought after offices were the two United States sena-
torships. The incumbents in 1895 were J. Z. George and Edward 
C. Walthall. George had served since he was chosen to succeed 
Blanche K. Bruce, Negro, in the early 1880's; and Lamar when ap-
pointed to Cleveland's cabinet had succeeded in plaCing his friend 
Walthall in his seat. Both had been last elected in 1892, Walthall for 
a term which did not expire until 1901, George for one which expired 
in 1899. In the spring of 1895 George announced his intention of re-
tiring at the end of his term, and a wild scramble was started for his 
place. The most talked of candidates were Congressman H. D. 
Money from the fourth district and former Governor Robert Lowry. 
But Congressman "Private" Jolin Allen of the first district and 
Anselm J. McLaurin were known to have ambitions. McLaurin had 
just completed Walthall's unexpired term and was relinquishing the 
seat to Walthall who was again prepared to take up duties which 
he had reSigned because of ill health. In addition Congressman 
Hooker and W. V. Sullivan, a wealthy lawyer from Lafayette 
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County. were anxious to round out their careers with a term in the 
Senate. 
Irritated because George had not announced his retirement until 
after McLaurin announced for governor. McLaurin charged that 
George had timed the announcement so as to smooth the way for 
his friend Money.l It was too late for McLaurin to retire from the 
governor's race and wait for the Senate election. He continued the 
campaign against Burkitt. but at the same time plotted some kind of 
a coup which would land him in Washington. «Now something 
personal and private." wrote one of his lieutenants at the end of a 
letter. «C. B. Greaves. Senator from this county. pledges now, he has 
no candidate for United States Senator except Anse MeL." J. N. 
Lipscomb and another legislator had «also made the same promise." 
Another wrote McLaurin immediately after his election as governor, 
that he could be the next Senator and insisted that he «not refuse."2 
The game was an intricate one and had to be played deftly. Mc-
Laurin's strategy was to create a deadlock in the legislative caucus 
by uniting the opposition to Money, the strongest candidate, and 
then enter himseH as a compromise or «dark horse." But there was 
danger in this scheme. Yerger, one of the opposition candidates from 
the Delta. had strong second choice backing from both the Money 
and Allen factions. Charles Scott, a powerful Delta politician, was 
already in Jackson working for Yerger in the caucus. «If any of the 
Bolivar delegation waver," wrote McLaurin's lieutenant from that 
county, «wire me and I will come down .... Do not let Yerger run 
too high up on the scale as Money might throw him enough votes to 
elect him."3 
The task proved too difficult for McLaurin. He was unable to 
unite the opposition, and Money was chosen by the legislature on 
the twentieth ballot.4 The contest, although heated, was good na-
tured, and no ill feeling was engendered. A new opportunity pre-
sented itseH, however. when George's health broke and it became 
apparent that he could not live out his term. Six months before 
lDeer Creek Pilot, clipping in Letters of Governors, Series E, 99; J. Z. George 
to A. J. McLaurin, Nov. 16, 19, 1895, ibid., Series E, 110. 
2W. B. Jones to McLaurin, Sept. 6, 1895; James M. Dop to McLaurin, Nov. 28, 
1895, ibid., Series E, 99. 
sWalter Sillers to McLaurin, Jan. 11, 1896, ibid. 
4Mississippi, House Journal, 1896, pp. 144-45. 
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George's death, McLaurin was urged to come to terms with Allen, 
appoint him to fill the unexpired term, then back him for governor 
in 1899 in exchange for his support in the next senatorial race.5 The 
plan was too daring even for McLaurin, and when George died in 
August, 1897, McLaurin appointed Money to serve the remainder of 
the term.6 
But fate was to place still another opportunity in McLaurin's 
way. Within a few months after George's death it was known that 
Walthall could not long survive him. Sentiment was put aside while 
calculations were made as to the succession. Some counselors urged 
McLaurin to resign the governorship at once on Walthall's death and 
then have the lieutenant-governor appoint him to succeed Walthall. 
The Meridian Star, its editor promised, "will stand by yoU."7 But 
W. V. Sullivan had another plan. Two days before Walthall's death 
he wrote McLaurin that although "several now are figuring on his 
[Walthall's] place," McLaurin must take no action until Sullivan had 
a chance to talk to him. 8 
Sullivan's plan must have pleased McLaurin, for he appointed 
him to serve until the legislature's next meeting in January, 1900, at 
which time successors would be chosen to both the short, unexpired 
term and to the full term beginning in 1901. It was generally under-
stood that McLaurin and Sullivan had agreed that McLaurin should 
have the long term and Sullivan the short.9 
But Lowry's senatorial ambitions had not been appeased, and in 
the summer of 1899 he and Sullivan canvassed the state for the short 
term. Sensational charges of "debauchery" were made by each can-
didate. Sullivan connected the former governor with the abduction 
of a young girl for immoral purposes, and Lowry retorted in kind. 
"It seems," said the Greenwood Commonwealth, "that all that is 
necessary to elect a man to office in Mississippi, is to convict him of 
<drunkenness in office: smear his name with a filthy scandal, or prove 
5Sillers to McLaurin, Feb. 9, 1897, Letters of Governors, Series E, 110. 
6Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 13, 1898. 
7H. Sidney King to "Dear Anse," Apr. 22, 1898, L~tters of Governors, Series 
E, 111. 
8W. V. Sullivan to McLaurin, Apr. 19, 1898, ibid. 
9Sullivan later charged that McLaurin had actually promised to support him 
for both long and short terms and had broken faith with him. See Vicksburg Post, 
quoted in Natchez Democrat and Courier, July 6, 14, 1899; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 
5, 1900. 
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that he shamefully prostituted the functions of his office ... to pay 
a private debt. Most anything that unfits him for heaven seems to 
commend him for office holding."lO Credit given the charges against 
both candidates made the issue doubtful. In the legislative caucus, 
however, Sullivan was chosen by a vote of 88 to 72.11 That was 
"ample proof' to the Vicksburg Herald that the charges against 
Sullivan, at least, "were without foundation."12 
Meanwhile McLaurin had entered the campaign for the long 
term against "Private" John Allen. Allen, a roguish clown, had ac-
quired his nickname early in his political career. In the first decades 
after the end of Reconstruction there was a marked tendency among 
southern Democrats to choose for political preferment those who had 
held high military office in the Confederacy. Arrayed against one 
of these in joint debate, Allen had sat quietly while the former gen-
eral regaled his audience with an account of his military explOits. 
The climax of his narrative centered about the field of Shiloh. On 
the night before the attack, he said, he was seated in his tent review-
ing his plans for the morrow. Outside raged a fierce storm, and from 
time to time the general would lift the tent Hap to look out. All that 
met his eye was the figure of a lone sentry pacing to and fro. When 
it came Allen's tum to speak he said he had greatly enjoyed the 
general's story because it brought old memories back to him. He 
could vouch for the story for he had been the sentry whom the 
general had seen. He then mischievously urged all in the audience 
who had been generals to support his opponent. For himseH, he 
said, he would be content if only the privates would cast their votes 
for him. 
Allen pitched his campaign on the theme of opposition to 
McLaurin's record as governor. It was commonly charged that 
McLaurin had used his appointive and pardoning powers to build up 
his political following in the state. "McLaurinism" became synony-
mous among the opposition with "one man government." McLaurin 
was a strong personality and provoked unrestrained feelings on the 
part of his contemporaries. They either loved or hated him. Ambi-
tious for personal success, he was none too scrupulous as to how he 
lOGreenwood Commonwealth, Nov. 10, 1899. 
11Sullivan was then unanimously elected by the legislature. See Mississippi, 
House Journal, 1900, p. 91; Senate Journal, 1900, p. 85. 
12Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 5, 1900. 
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attained it. He seems to have bound his relatives and friends to him 
by bands of political patronage as well as affection, and he pursued 
his enemies not only with exclusion from patronage but with per-
sonal vindictiveness. Just what his political philosophy was, if he 
had any other than that of gaining and retaining office, is not clear. 
He probably had the affection and loyal support of the small farmers 
more than any governor up to his time, and he at least made a pre-
tense of catering to their wishes. He seems to have been opposed by 
certain of the corporate interests. 
The use of patronage to enhance political fortunes was a common 
practice in Mississippi. JudiciOUS appointments to a multitude of 
offices, great and petty, was of tremendous consequence to one's 
political fortunes. Such appointments were the basis upon which 
present control and future success rested. Persons with local pres-
tige could influence county conventions and were likely to be dele-
gates at state conventions. They must be humored in the matter of 
local patronage if their good will was to be retained. If, despite all 
efforts, the local celebrity refused his support to the administration, 
or if his support were unreliable, what more likely than that he be 
supplanted and another installed in his place as dispenser of local 
patronage? Perhaps McLaurin practiced favoritism more than 
others, perhaps his success in building a state organization intensely 
loyal to him made it seem so, or perhaps the absence of any great 
issue in the period left no other pOint of attack. At any rate he was 
denounced on this score more than any other governor, before or 
since. 
He was in constant receipt of numerous petitions and individual 
requests for jobs, offices, pardons, and commissions.13 Each had to 
be carefully weighed as to its effect. In addition, the local leaders 
were sometimes pressed to make recommendations which they 
really did not desire, and codes had to be worked out so as to dis-
tinguish such letters from their writers' real wishes. "Whenever I 
want specially any favor at your hands," wrote one lieutenant to 
McLaurin, "I will tell you in the letter that it will be doing me per-
sonal kindness to grant the favor asked." Of course, he added, he 
would never recommend an "unworthy person," but "1 make a great 
distinction in the degrees of worth."14 
13See Letters of Governors, Series E, 99, 110. 
14J. A. Orr to McLaurin, Sept. 14, 1895, ibid., Series E, 99. 
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Much interest was attached to appointment of "proper" county 
election commissioners. These officers were of such direct conse-
quence in carrying elections that they caused more concern than 
others of more prestige. The factional fight in Coahoma County in 
1895 showed signs of carrying over to the next election, and Mc-
Laurin's lieutenant there, anxious to see "fair play in the matter," 
solicited McLaurin's promise not to appoint new commissioners 
"until I can see you." As an afterthought he also wished to advise 
him on the appointment of a superintendent of education.15 From 
Vicksburg came complaints that two of the commissioners "are 
known to have in the past, assisted in fraud in elections between 
white people [sic] and democrats." The commissioners in De Soto, it 
was charged, were of notoriously bad morals. In Belen, it was said, 
they were chronic office hunters and gaming-table proprietors. In 
Alcorn County, which was "for free-silver 100-1," two "gold-bugs" 
had been appointed, and T. L. Lamb wanted to know why.16 
Nepotism was repeatedly charged against McLaurin, and the 
state jobs and sinecures held by his numerous brothers were notori-
ous. He was a man of great family loyalty, and too often he yielded 
to the pleas of some impecunious relative. The Spanish-American 
War gave him ample opportunity. A cousin of the governor wrote 
that he wanted "some good place to make money out of this war 
business. It don't come more than once in a lifetime." He did not 
care to fight, he said, but "if you see anything you think would suit 
me and you haven't promised it to anyone else-please help me to 
get it." Could the governor make him a quartermaster "or get me 
in with one-so I could get some of the money or stealings[?]"17 It 
is not known whether this favor was granted, but the assurance and 
frankness with which it was sought would indicate that the petitioner 
felt that it would be. 
The charge of drunkenness was frequently made against both 
the governor and his brother, Judge W. K. McLaurin of Vicksburg. 
Their weakness on this score was so frequently discussed in the anti-
McLaurin press that finally Representative Glover proposed a legis-
15J. Alcorn Glover to McLaurin, Nov. 9, 1895, ibid. 
16W. F. Fitzhugh and E. B. Robbins to McLaurin, May 21, 1895; A. M. N. 
to McLaurin, Aug. 31, 1896; L. V. Cook to McLaurin, Sept. 19, 1896; T. L. Lamb 
to McLaurin, Sept. 26, 1896, ibid., Series E, 110. 
17Charles McLaurin to A. J. McLaurin, June 18, 1898, Letters of Governors, 
Series E, 111. 
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lative investigation of the charges of "drunkenness in high places." 
The resolution, which listed eight specific instances of "disgraceful 
exhibitions" of the judge, exempted the governor because he had 
"publicly admitted his weakness" and asked forgiveness, and any 
investigation would only "bring shame upon the state."18 So great 
was the clamor over the judge that he was not reappointed at the 
expiration of his term. But the opposition press was not satisfied 
and though it unfair to limit the specific charges to only one official. 
"The public press has referred to others," said the Vicksburg 
Herald; "they, too, should be included."19 
Another charge leveled against McLaurin was that he had used 
the pardoning power to enhance his political ambitions. In the spring 
of 1899 he had pardoned a convicted murderer named Loftin, and 
the act had created some unfavorable comment.20 Hardly had the 
effect of it worn off when he issued a pardon for another convicted 
murderer, Ivo Miller. It was charged that the governor had prOInised 
a pardon to Miller even before his trial. McLaurin, after some 
delay, denied the charge of a previous agreement but did not "di-
rectly and positively" prove his case to everyone's satisfaction.21 
A struggle for control of the Yazoo Levee Board became an in-
cident of the campaign. Charles Scott, Murray Smith, Leroy Percy, 
and W. G. Yerger, members of the board, were opposed to Mc-
Laurin; and when a huge shortage in the board's accounts was dis-
covered, McLaurin used this occasion to oust the old board and 
appoint a new one. This led to a bitter factional fight within the 
Delta. Scott, Smith, Yerger, and Percy publicly charged that Mc-
Laurin had "desecrated" the office of governor for his personal and 
18Mississippi, H0tI88 Journal, 1898, p. 105. The Journal records that McLaurin 
publicly issued the following statement: "With deep sorrow and contrition I know 
that at times I have too much indulged an appetite for strong drink. Against this 
appetite I have striven and prayed to the Creator in the name of the Redeemer, 
who said to the poor woman: 'He that is without sin amongst you, let him cast 
the first stone at her:" If later reports are to be credited, it would seem that Mc-
Laurin's prayers were unanswered. 
19Greenwood Commonwealth, Jan. 14, 1898; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 18, 1898, 
Feb. 25, 1900. 
20A. M. Buchanan to McLaurin, May 24, 1899, Letters of Governors, Series 
E,115. . 
21Memphis Evening Scimitar, quoted in Natchez Democrat and Courier, May 
2, JUDe 15, 1899; Ibid., June 17, 1899; Columbus Dispatch, quoted in Vicksburg 
Herald, JUDe 2, 1899. 
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political advancement and that he had "McLaurinized" the state. 
They further charged that his brothers were paid lobbyists for cer-
tain corporate interests. McLaurin defended the right of his brothers 
to lobby, and he campaigned the state charging his opposition was 
organized and financed by «the old levee board ring" and by the 
Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Railroad.22 
The latter charge was the outgrowth of a controversy between 
the administration and the Illinois Central Railroad. In the years 
following the Civil War the legislature had exempted newly con-
structed roads from state taxation for a term of years. The Yazoo 
and Mississippi Valley had been built through the western counties 
during that period and came under the exemption. Subsequently it 
was purchased by the Illinois Central, and the McLaurin administra-
tion, claiming that this abrogated the terms of the agreement be-
tween the state and the Yazoo and Mississippi Valley, attempted 
to collect the back taxes of the latter road from the Illinois Central.23 
It was thus not unnatural that the railroad should oppose his eleva-
tion to the United States Senate. Reports came to McLaurin from 
a Delta town that"a gentleman who occupies a high position" with 
the railroad was influencing "the business men of this place to 
indorse Allen . . . if they expected any favors shown them in the 
future."24 
A somewhat larger issue than most others was the question of the 
building of a new capitol. For some years the old building had been 
deemed inadequate, and the legislature of 1896 had passed a bill for 
the erection of a new one. But the governor had vetoed it because 
the state's finances were not adequate for such a project. He was 
still unsympathetic with the idea the follOwing year, when a special 
session of the legislature had to be called to alleviate the state's 
financial distress. It was estimated that a new capitol would cost 
$750,000, and the state already faced a deficit for the year of 
$184,000. The special session revived the question, however, and the 
issue became confused. If the capitol were to be built, McLaurin 
would favor a plan submitted by an architect named Weathers. He 
was charged at the time with lobbying for the Weathers plan by 
22Natchez Democrat and Courier, Jan. 19, 20, 1899; Vicksburg Herald, June 16, 
1899. 
23Natchez Democrat and Courier, Jan. 24, 1899. 
24J. R. Pitts to McLaurin, May 16, 1899, Letters of Governors, Series E, 115. 
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setting up a "free dispensary of drinks in a certain upstairs room in 
the capitol city-giving out pass keys to thirsty members." The 
legislature adopted the Weathers plan, but McLaurin agaih vetoed 
the bill, and the building of a capitol became a political issue in the 
succeeding years.25 In March, 1899, an article by "Spectator" ap-
peared in a Jackson paper urging delay on the question of a new 
capitol and praising the stand taken by the governor. Two months 
later, the former editor of the paper said that the letter had been 
brought to him by the governor's secretary with the governor's re-
quest that it be published. Thereupon, "Private" John Allen claimed 
he recognized the handwriting of McLaurin in the letter. McLaurin 
denied he had written or knew anything of the letter, but this be-
came the opposition's big issue in the campaign. It branded as dis-
honorable the influenCing of legislation by the governor in writing a 
newspaper article in his own praise and under a nom de plume. 
The governor's friends called it "an insignificant point."26 
Probably as a counterattack McLaurin urged an investigation of 
the activities of the "School Book Trust" in the 1896 legislature. This 
seems to have caused a temporary panic in the councils of the oppo-
sition, and impeachment proceedings against the governor were 
discussed as a means of avoiding it. The 1898 legislature passed a 
resolution to investigate its predecessor, charging that that body 
had been "corrupted and debauched ... for the benefit of school 
book trusts." It further charged that the schoolbook amendment 
"was passed by corruption and fraud and that certain members of 
the Senate and House were beneficiaries thereof." The committee 
investigated, but found no evidence of fraud. 27 
Balked in this, the governor's strategy was reduced to a rather 
puerile attack on Allen's innocuous congressional record. It was 
charged that his fifteen years in Congress had not resulted in the 
passage of a single bill which he had originated. It was observed 
that Allen, in his campaign, never referred to his congressional 
25Mississippi, House Journal, 1898, p. 105; Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 
28, Apr. 29, 1897, Mar. 15, 1900; Macon Beacon, Mar. 6, 1897; Vicksburg Herald, 
quoted in Greenwood Commonwealth, June 3, 1897. 
26Vicksburg Herald, June 22, 1899; ibid., quoting Natchez Bulletin. 
27Mississippi, House Journal, 1898, pp. 38, 40, 44; William S. McAllister to Mc-
Laurin, Dec. 24, 1897, Letters of Governors, Series E, 111; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 6, 
22, 1898; Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 13, 1898. 
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career. Instead, the strategy adopted by Allen was to attack the 
record of the opposition, and also to tell anecdotes to amuse his 
listeners. 28 
By a clever bit of tactics McLaurin was able to divide his Delta 
opposition. It was known before Walthall's death that Leroy Percy 
was anxious to have his friend W. G. Yerger appointed to his unex-
pired term. On the other hand, McLaurin wanted to get rid of 
Thomas Catchings, the "gold-bug" congressman from the Delta 
district, and also to secure an uncontested delegation from the Delta 
counties to the next state convention. Friends of Percy and Yerger 
called on McLaurin's lieutenant, Walter Sillers, with a proposal. If 
Yerger were appointed, they and their friends would support Mc-
Laurin's candidate for governor, and Catchings would not run two 
years hence. Sillers, without giving them an answer, then looked up 
Percy. He proposed that "if Catchings' friends will withdraw him 
from the race for Congress and permit us to name his successor 
Governor McLaurin will appoint W. G. Yerger United States Sena-
tor. . . . They must also support our man for governor next time." 
Percy was willing to promise that Catchings would not run in the 
next election but believed that Catchings' campaign had gone too 
far for him to withdraw that year, and the deal did not materialize. 
But Sillers permitted the details of the proposal to leak out and 
showed that the original suggestion to sabotage Catchings had come 
from his friend Percy. This placed Percy in an exceedingly unfavor-
able light. Not only did it bring his loyalty to his friend in question, 
but it tended to convict him of a willingness to partake of the same 
"corrupt deals" for which he was so bitterly denouncing McLaurin. 
He defended himseH feebly. He said he was only "attempting to 
lessen the bitterness of the ... fight within the party in the Delta." 
He had reason to believe, he said, that Catchings "could not be 
induced to make the race for Congress again." Percy's county, 
Washington, had expressed no preference for governor in the next 
election. If Yerger were appOinted Senator, Percy would induce his 
friends to support "silver men" for congressmen and governor next 
time, provided, of course, "th~y would name good men, not Mc-
Laurinites."29 
28Pres Grooves to McLaurin, Apr. 20, 1899; William Griffin to McLaurin, Apr. 
1, 1899, Letters of Governors, Series E, 115. 
29Greenwood Commonwealth, May 26, June 2, 9, July 21, 1899; William Alex-
ander Percy, Lanterns on the Levee (New York, 1941),66. 
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When the deal fell through the McLaurin faction, without dis-
closing itseH as such, held a "convention" at Greenville and nomi-
nated for Congress Pat Henry of Vicksburg, a free-silver man. Al-
though Catchings later won, there were many bolters to Henry 
among the silver men of the Delta. So deep was the division in the 
opposition ranks there that by August Sillers could report to Mc-
Laurin that "We are fully organized in the Delta and your friends 
enthusiastic and confident. "80 
Meanwhile McLaurin's position was complicated by the uncer-
tainty of Congressman John Sharp Williams' position. Conflicting 
reports that he would or would not enter the Senate race kept coming 
in. It was surmised that the Allen crowd was promoting Williams' 
candidacy, since McLaurin was counting on heavy majorities in the 
eastern hill counties of Williams' district. But the Baptists there, 
who had been somewhat alienated by McLaurin's appointment of a 
Catholic as adjutant-general, were devoted to Williams. "You must 
do everything in your power at once," wrote one of McLaurin's ad-
visers, "to keep him [Williams] out of the race-Our people over 
here are perfect fools about him." Another suggested the appoint-
ment of a Baptist state superintendent of education. "It would 
strengthen you in the Eastern counties of Williams' district," he 
wrote, "besides neutralize the dissatisfaction of some of our Baptist 
brothers."81 
Despite McLaurin's best efforts Williams decided to run. Allen 
people, however, were not unanimous in the belief that Williams 
would prove merely a stalking-horse. The Vicksburg Herald, con-
vinced that Allen already had McLaurin whipped, feared that Wil-
liams might reap the fruits of Allen's labors and walk off with the 
prize himseH. It called attention to the "debt" which Mississippi 
owed Allen for having exposed "McLaurinism."82 
The first big rally of the campaign was held at Winona on March 
16, 1899. It was an all-day affair with five candidates for governor 
present, together with the three senatorial aspirants. Each candidate 
80SiIlers to McLaurin, Aug. 5, 1898, Letters of Governors, Series E, 115; Green-
wood Commonwealth, May 26, 1898, July 21, 1899. 
81Thomas F. Pettus to McLaurin, Aug. 1, 1898; Pres Evans to McLaurin, Sept. 11, 
1898; C. C. Miller to McLaurin, June 11, 1899, Letters of Governors, Series E, 
112, 115. 
82Vicksburg Herald, June 23, 1899; Yazoo Sentinel, June 15, 1899. 
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was given an hour in which to present his platform and twenty 
minutes rebuttal at the end. The platforms were much alike, 
with planks wide enough to hold as many followers as possible. All 
agreed on the Chicago platform (1896) and on all national issues. 
Mter general statements as to their aims if elected, each candidate 
launched an attack on his opponents. This consumed most of the 
time for the main addresses and all of that allowed for rebuttal. 
"The personal character which the debate at times assumed," ob-
served the Clarion, "is not calculated to give assurance that the cam-
paign will be conducted with that dignified tone which . . . should 
pervade a canvass for ... high office."33 
Mter this opening performance the campaign resolved itself 
into a series of joint speakings of the opponents throughout the state. 
Frequently the candidates traveled on the same train, were met at 
the station by their supporters with a band of musicians, and were 
conducted to different quarters where they were given final ~room­
ing by the local managers. At the appointed hour the candidates 
tore into one another with verbal beltings, then departed together 
on the next train.84 
The purpose of the canvass was not to get votes directly for the 
candidates but to get votes for legislators who were pledged to sup-
port one or the other of the senatorial candidates. A legislator might 
be pledged as a result of a county primary, a county convention, or 
in case he was uninstructed by his constituents, by private agree-
ment. 
Because of the unusual interest in selecting a successor to Senator 
George, the holding of a state-wide primary to select a senatorial 
candidate had been urged. The suggestion met with conflicting re-
actions from the various members of the different factions. It was 
generally agreed that McLaurin himself would profit by such a 
procedure. Williams, after belatedly entering the race, had with-
drawn, entered again, and dropped out finally in July. With him 
out, McLaurin had a much greater popular appeal with the masses 
than did Allen. But there were other factors to be considered. Local 
politicians, once in control, thought they could retain that control 
more easily by a county convention than by a primary. Where a 
33Jackson Weekly Clarion-Ledge?', Mar. 23, 30, 1899; Vicksburg Herald, June 
IS, 1899. 
84Natchez Daily Democrat, July 18, 1899. 
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candidate's followers were not in control locally, however, the pri-
mary would offer a better chance of upsetting the group in power 
than would a convention. Thus supporters of either Allen or Mc-
Laurin were inclined to oppose or favor a primary according to 
whether they had or did not have local control. As one local poli-
tician put it, "This move for primaries originates with the old ring 
that ... controlled politics in this section up to a few years ago, and 
they now seek the opportunity to do what we have frequently 
begged for, and just as frequently been denied." Another factor had 
to be considered in this connection, however. A state-wide primary 
to select a senatorial candidate would be decided by the total num-
ber of votes cast. This would greatly reduce the inHuence of the 
Delta counties, and they would, therefore, be inclined to oppose it. 
Weighing these factors McLaurin threw his inHuence for a conven-
tion, and the state Democratic executive committee so ordered.85 
Many of the county committees, however, ordered primaries for 
the nomination of legislators, and word was passed down by the 
senatorial candidates to vote for men committed to them.86 But 
uncertainty developed as to who were qualified to vote in such pri-
maries. Code Section 8269 restricted primary voting to those who 
were legally qualified to vote in a regular election. Since many 
whites were delinquent in their poll taxes they were not eligible to 
vote in regular elections. But it was argued that the intent of the 
framers of the constitution of 1890 was that all whites should vote 
in primaries. The Hinds County Democratic executive committee, 
controlled by McLaurin, announced that delinquents would be 
permitted to vote in the primary there, and this raised a stormy con-
troversy. The Greenwood Commonwealth warned that the vote of 
Hinds ;rught be contested in the state convention, and the Greenville 
Times called the committee's action "a blow at the fundamental 
principle underlying the franchise article of the constitution." The 
Clarion thought permitting of delinquents to vote was only a "trilling 
and immaterial disregard of the law." "The white men of Missis-
sippi ... must stand together," it said, "and no scheme based upon 
85S. C. Dulaney to McLaurin, Nov. 11, 1895; J. M. Montgomery to McLaurin, 
Apr. 8, 1899; J. F. Thomas to McLaurin, June 20, 1899, Letters of Governors, 
Series E, 99, 115; Macon Beacon, Apr. 15, 1899; Jackson Weekly Clarion-Ledger, 
Mar. 23, 30, 1899; Natchez Democrat and Courier, June 17, 1899. 
S6Vicksburg Herald, May 6, 1899. 
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taxpaying or other qualifications should separate them." Generally 
the Delta papers argued that only those who paid their poll taxes 
were eligible and called on the next state convention to make clear 
this requirement.8'1 
When McLaurin's candidates received large majorities in the 
Hinds primary the opposition attributed this more to "disqualified 
votes" than to McLaurin's endorsement. Also they charged him 
with making "trades" with candidates for county offices. "All kinds 
of trades, combinations, and agreements," said an anti-McLaurin 
paper, had been made in the Hinds primary. It predicted that 
"county politics will cut a considerable figure in the balloting for 
senator in this county [Warren]." When another anti-McLaurin 
paper called on the circuit clerk of Hinds to "thoroughly fumigate" 
his poll books, he wrote on their cover, "These books have been 
purged, fumigated, disinfected, regenerated, and made as pure and 
free from taint as some of the recently defeated candidates for office 
in Hinds County. So don't be afraid of them."88 
Hinds was not the only county where irregularities were charged. 
Two hundred Negroes were reported as having voted in the Carroll 
primary. Senator Money actually refused to vote there because of 
"the way the election was carried on." The Greenwood Common-
wealth, which at first professed disbelief in the charges in Carroll, 
investigated and reported them true. It "shamedly confessed" that 
"responsible citizens . . . saw . . . with their own eyes, negroes in 
Carrollton voting," and it attributed McLaurin's victory there to the 
Negro vote. It reminded Carrollton citizens that they had sent J. Z. 
George to the constitutional convention "to settle that question." He 
had given Mississippi, it said, white supremacy. How could the 
Carrolltonians be so ungrateful to his memory now? "Had it been 
[only] democratic negroes," said the Commonwealth, "it would not 
have been so bad, but republican negroes" also voted.89 
The superintendent of education in Jefferson City reported that 
votes had been cast for one of the candidates by men "who had been 
S'1lbid., June 2, 6, 11, 1899; Greenwood Commonwealth, June 2, 1899; Jackson 
Weekly Clarlon-Ledge1', June 8, 15, 22, 1899; Greenville Times, quoted in Vicksburg 
He1'ald, June 11, 1899; Vicksburg Dispatch, quoted in Macon Beacon, Aug. 12, 1899. 
88Greenwood Commonwealth, July 7, Nov. 3, 1899; Vicksburg He1'ald, July 1, 
1899. 
89Greenwood Commonwealth, July 14, 28, 1899; Vicksburg He1'ald, July 7, 16, 
18, 1899. 
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residents of other districts for two years and they [the election 
officials] knew it~" Writing some time after the election, the Vicks-
burg Post called the primary "perhaps the most unfair and the 
trickiest ever held in any state in the Union." It doubted if any of 
the officials chosen had "a really honest title to the offices which 
they are now holding as a result of those tricky primaries."40 
Many of the charges of corruption in the election of 1899 were 
true, and McLaurin himself, if not a direct participant, had knowl-
edge of the fraud. Writing from the home town of Lowry, who was 
opposed to McLaurin, one of the McLaurinites explained that be-
cause of the strength of Lowry there, "what work we did for the 
Senator [McLaurin] was done on the sly. You will understand the 
rest."41 Walter Sillers, McLaurin's Delta lieutenant, wrote that 
"Edwards and I have paid the taxes of over one hundred white men. 
In time of peace prepare for 'wah: "42 One who must have been 
a professional ballot box sruffer, willing to sell his "skill" to either 
faction, wrote directly to the governor before the primary: "I will 
carry any box for you but you must assist me in so dOing. . •. You 
understand what I mean you write me what you will be willing to 
pay to carry a box answer at once."48 The governor's answer, if he 
made any, is unknown. 
By late July results from county primaries showed that McLaurin 
was a certain winner, and when the legislature met in January he 
was chosen for the long term. It was at this time that his stablemate, 
Sullivan, was chosen over Lowry for the short term by the narrow 
margin of 88-72.44 This was the last time McLaurin was to be a 
candidate for office, but his influence was felt in all subsequent 
elections until his death and for some years thereafter. 
Obviously the professed aims of the constitution of 1890 had 
not been reached by the end of McLaurin's administration. Negroes 
had not been eliminated from the polls but were playing the same 
4oGreenwood Commonwealth, July 28, 1899; Vicksburg Post, quoted in Jackson 
Weekly Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 2, 1902; J. Rives Wade to McLaurin, July 26, 1899, 
Letters of Governors, Series E, 112. 
4.1Edward Henderson to Dear Wallace [McLaurin?], Aug. 25, 1899, Ibid., 
Series E, 116. 
42Sillers to McLaurin, Feb. 9, 1897, Ibid., Series E, 110. 
48W. H. Parker to McLaurin, May 1, 1899, ibid., Series E, 115. 
4'Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1900, p. 85; House Journal, 1900, pp. 91-92; 
Vicksburg Herald, July 23, 1899; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 11, 1893. 
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part, a decade after its proclamation, that they had played for the 
dozen or fifteen years before its adoption. Nor were issues brought 
forth and discussed between the white factions any more than they 
had been before 1890, if as much. In the election of 1899 all candi-
dates were in agreement on all questions of policy. The only issue 
seemed to be the personalities of the candidates. But McLaurin had 
sensed more than any other Mississippian of his time the growing 
political consciousness of the small farmer, and he had catered to 
him. It was this new factor which was soon to be seized upon by 
other leaders and played to its extremity in the struggle for political 
control 
The gubernatorial election in 1899 was to be the last in Missis-
sippi in which the candidate was nominated by a state convention. 
Many candidates were early in the field, but the most prominent 
were James K. Vardaman, just returned from military service in 
Cuba; A. H. Longino, McLaurin-appointed judge of the state su-
preme court; Judge Frank A. Critz of Oktibbeha; Judge Robert 
Powell of Lincoln; and W. A. Montgomery of Hinds. Although it 
was generally supposed that Longino had the backing of McLaurin, 
it was noted as "a singular fact" that all the candidateS disclaimed 
any connection with the McLaurins "in any shape."45 Vardaman's 
hostility to the governor and his "infamous assaults" on him in the 
Greenwood Commonwealth had culminated in McLaurin's refusal 
to commission him in the state militia. Vardaman had thereupon 
joined the United States Volunteers, had been commissioned a major, 
and had served actively in the Spanish-American War. The hostility 
between him and McLaurin on his return was unabated and re-
mained SO.48 
Vardaman's platform included a radical change in the educa-
tional system (which will be given in some detail in a later chapter), 
curtailment of governmental expenses, free silver, a revenue tariff, 
an elective judiciary, and support of "Bryanism." He said he in-
tended to make"a clean, honest, straightforward fight for the office" 
and would make no pledges to gain support of any faction. He op-
posed the "bartering or farming out" of patronage. He pledged the 
people of Mississippi that he would not use the office to build up a 
411Macon Beacon, Apr. 22,1899. . 
48W. A. White to McLaurin, Nov. 1, 1898, Letters of Governors, Series E, 112. 
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private or political fortune. "I am opposed," he said, "to jobbing and 
deals of all kinds."47 
Longino among other things advocated the building of a new 
capitol, a program which seemed inconsistent with his alleged alli-
ance with McLaurin. Critz, carrying water on both shoulders, advo-
cated the new capitol, collection of back taxes against railroads, an 
elective judiciary, and "correction of certain evils in the distribution 
of school funds."48 
The usual amount of preconvention trading was indulged in. 
The Hinds County convention endorsed Montgomery and permitted 
him to name the county's twenty-one delegates to the convention. 
The delegates were then instructed to cast Hinds' seven votes for 
Montgomery "first, last, and all the time, and to use all honorable 
means to secure his nomination so long as his name may be before 
the convention.",19 Nothing was said about their course in case Mont-
gomery's name should be withdrawn, which omission endowed 
Montgomery with seven votes to cast where he would. 
Warren County, which had no candidate for governor, endorsed 
a native son, T. S. Lawrence, for railroad commissioner and empow-
ered him to name Warren's delegates to the state convention. The 
obvious purpose of this was to give him dictatorial power over the 
delegation to trade for support of his candidacy. The Vicksburg 
H eraId, which claimed neutrality in the gubernatorial race, called 
this "not only a usurpation of authority but a wrong." Criticism pro-
voked the county committee to reverse itself and order a preferential 
primary for governor, permitting the candidate receiving a plurality 
to name the delegates. This provoked even g~ter criticism. 50 
Vardaman was reported to be in alliance with Critz to defeat 
Longino. The alliance was said to have the backing of "some of the 
shrewdest politicians in the state," among whom were Vardaman's 
cousin, Senator Money, and "Private" John Allen, still chafing at his 
own defeat by McLaurin.51 Their strategy seemed to be to prevent 
Longino's nomination on an early ballot and then to swing the con-
47Greenwood Commonwealth, Feb. 11, 1898, Jan. 6, 1899. 
48Magnolia Gazette, quoted in Macon Beacon, Apr. 29, 1899. 
49Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 27, 1899. 
50Vicksburg Herald, June 6, 24, 1899. 
51Monroe McClurg to McLaurin, Aug. 18, 1899, Letters of Governors, Series 
E, 115; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 23, 24, 1899. 
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vention to Vardaman as a second choice. The Vicksburg Herald, 
still claiming neutrality, thought Vardaman had created a "firm 
impression" during his short canvass. "He has grown," said Editor 
McNeily on the eve of the convention, "more than any other man in 
the state during the past month-his canvass has been clean and 
clear cut."52 Longino was charged with having "formed enough 
trades to give him the nomination on the first ballot." District At-
torney Pat Henry of Warren County was reported to have said he 
was backing Longino so that his friend W. K. McLaurin would be 
reappointed judge of the circuit. Longino denied having made such 
a promise, but this denial was called a "vague disavowal."53 
On the day the convention met, Longino, as the leading candi-
date, received a «rush" from leaders of various delegations wanting 
to make terms for some favorite candidate who was trying for some 
other place on the ticket. Longino refused, however, to consider any 
proposals until he was nominated. This was reported to have 
«brought all the candidates [for other offices] into the Longino 
column." They instructed their friends "to make no trades against 
Longino," and this left nothing for the opposition to take hold of. 
On the first ballot Longino received 128~ votes, within 5~ of the 
necessary majority. Balloting went on throughout the night. At 
midnight Powell withdrew, at dawn Montgomery. New caucuses 
were then called to see where these votes would go. At eleven-thirty, 
convinced that the game was up, Critz and Vardaman withdrew, 
leaving Longino as the only candidate. Vardaman's good-humored 
speech of withdrawal was reported to have «completely captured 
the convention."54 
Mter the nomination of Longino and the hearing of committee 
reports, the convention adjourned for the night, and «logrolling 
began for the places on the ... ticket" not yet filled. Next day there 
were «rumors of things being fixed," but hard contests developed 
for auditor, treasurer, and railroad commissioner for the northern 
district. When the convention adjourned for dinner, however, the 
ticket was complete. Taken as a whole, said the Natchez Democrat, 
52Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 22, 1899. 
5sGreenwood Commonwealth, Aug. 11, 1899; Vicksburg Herald, July 12, 14, 
1899. 
54Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 24, 1899; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 24, 1899; 
Macon Beacon, Aug. 26, 1899. 
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the convention was controlled by "the same influences that con-
trolled the election of McLaurin." It was generally understood, it 
said, "that the men who did most for McLaurin were to be the 
nominees ... and this was carried out." The victory meant, thought 
the Democrat, that McLaurin "will dominate the state for several 
years to come."55 
A discordant note was produced in the convention when Judge 
Coleman of Greenwood opposed a resolution endorsing the Mc-
Laurin administration. Leroy Percy backed Coleman and even 
offered a substitute to the Resolutions Committee's report charging 
McLaurin with nepotism, intoxication, and other shortcomings. His 
conduct had, said Percy's resolution, "tended to lessen the respect 
which the people of the state are wont to accord to their chief ex-
ecutive." Percy's substitute resolution was voted down and Mc-
Laurin was endorsed. 56 
The Clarion was pleased with the results of the convention. It 
thought it a matter for general rejoicing that of the thirteen nomina-
tions made at the convention seven were arrived at without the 
taking of a single ballot. 57 The Greenville Democrat, although not 
so well pleased as the Clarion, denied that Mississippi politics was 
"decaying," as was frequently charged. Conditions might be bad, 
but they were no different than they had been in the 1880's. "Mud 
throwing ... today is •.• the same," it said, "as during the campaign 
of 1885. . . . There is no more demagogism, no more shysters, no 
more small potatoes ... in Mississippi ... than usual."58 The Demo-
crat had a longer memory than some of its contemporaries. 
55Macon Beacon, Aug. 26, 1899; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 25, 1899. 
56Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 24, 181')9; Macon Beacon, Aug. 24, 1899. 
57Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 31, 1899. 
58Greenville Democrat, quoted in Macon Beacon, Feb. 25, 1900. 
CHAPTER XI 
THE PRIMARY LAW OF 1902 
UNTIL 1902 party nominations were almost completely under 
control of state and county executive committees. At times 
these committees made nominations with no pretense of submission 
to party membership. State and district officers were uniformly 
nominated by conventions. Sometimes county conventions nomi-
nated county officials, but there was no uniformity in this respect. 
In the late 1870's some of the counties began holding primaries for 
local offices, and the movement grew considerably during the next 
two decades. The decision of whether or not to hold a county pri-
mary was altogether in the hands of the county executive committee. 
Where county primaries were held, delegates to the county conven-
tion, as well as candidates for county offices, were generally nomi-
nated. The county convention, however, always chose the delegates 
from the county to the state convention. The latter body nominated 
all state elective officers.l 
Complaints against the convention system were of long standing. 
In Bolivar County in 1878 a convention had been ordered for the 
purpose of making a recommendation to the governor for the ap-
pointment of a chancery clerk. One of the four candidates com-
plained that when the other three found he had the greatest strength, 
"they formed a joint stock company of the office, agreed to divide 
the profits, and defeated me."2 A decade later the Natchez Demo-
crat, complaining of the declining quality of Mississippi's public 
men, attributed it to the "crowding out" of the "able men" by the 
convention system of nominating. 3 In 1894 it was claimed that 
Colonel Charles E. Hooker, the popular candidate, failed to receive 
the congressional nomination from the seventh district convention 
because of collusion and manipulation among the candidates. 4 
lEdmund F. Noel, "Mississippi Primary Election Laws," in Mississippi Historical 
Society, Publications, VIn (1904), 241; Vicksburg Herald, June 18, 1899; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, May 18, 1899. 
2Alex Yerger to J. M. Stone, Apr. 1, 1878; J. C. Herndon to Stone, Nov. 5, 1878, 
Letters of Governors, Series E, 143A. 
3Natchez Democrat, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Apr. 4, 1899. 
4Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 27, 1894. 
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The constitution of 1890 had provided that "The Legislature shall 
enact laws to secure fairness in party primary elections, conventions 
or other methods of naming candidates."5 This gave the legislature 
power to require all nominations to be made by primary, but for 
some years it did not exercise this power. Party nominations could 
still be made by convention if the constituted authorities so decreed. 
The matter of who should vote at beat meetings for delegates to 
county conventions was also determined by the party authorities. 
This led to uncertainty as to whether the authorities could not also 
decide who might vote in the primaries. 
The convention system survived the constitution of 1890, and 
complaints against it grew with the years. Primaries would give as 
little satisfaction to defeated candidates and their followers as had 
conventions, but the latter furnished a good target for those who 
wished to break the control of the group in power. Accordingly, 
the primary plan gained many advocates, and the time was looked 
forward to when conventions, those "stenches in the nostrils of the 
people," would be a thing of the past. "Nothing can be fairer than 
a primary election," said the Clarion, "and, as a rule, it is onlyop-
posed by those who imagine themselves stronger in a convention 
than before the people."6 Not infrequently at conventions, it was 
charged, the weakest candidate would bear off the prize. 7 The 
prime object of the convention, said the Macon Beacon, was "to 
ignore the will and wish of the majority, and to carry into effect the 
designs of the few who exercise control" over the parties. 8 
The primary movement gained a great impetus after 1895. Most 
of the press of the state seemed to favor it, and none of the papers 
had the temerity to oppose it. Edmund F. Noel became the leader 
of the movement and started a campaign for a state law requiring all 
nominations to be made through primaries. He branded conventions 
as "prolific with schemes" whereby the most popular candidates 
were often defeated by others who "developed little or no strength 
among the masses." Denial of participation in nominations "to all 
who can not make the sacrifice in time and money required to par-
5Sec.247. 
6Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 4, 11, 1894. 
7IbId., Oct. 18, 1894; ibid., Dec. 20, 1894, quoting Terry Headlight and Tunica 
Independent. 
8Macon Beacon, Feb. 22, 1902. 
124 REVOLT OF THE REDNECKS 
ticipate in the uncertain rangle-tangle of county mass meetings" was 
an imposition and was undemocratic.9 A state primary bill was in-
troduced in the 1896 legislature but failed of passage.10 
Opposition to party dictatorship apparently reached high tide in 
1900. The state executive committee that year ordered primary 
elections to select preSidential electors and delegates to the Demo-
cratic national convention but failed to provide for the choice of a 
new state executive committee. This failure created an uproar. The 
state press was almost unanimous in its condemnation of the com-
mittee and of its chairman, C. C. Miller. "Barring the carpet-bag 
period," said the Vicksburg Herald, "such a lesson in ring politics 
was never before administered to the voters of Mississippi." The 
Clarion called it "a glaring but intentional oversight" and suggested 
that the committee intended to perpetuate itseH in power «ad 
infinitum, so that it can pass upon party matters in 1903." When 
county committees revolted and refused to call primary elections, 
Governor Longino urged Chairman Miller to reconvene the state 
committee for it to reconsider its action.ll This Miller Hatly refused 
to do. 
Excitement ran high. The Clarion issued a call for a crusade. It 
was, said Editor R. H. Henry, "a fight between the people and the 
bosses, and the people, who are always right ... will win." The 
Vicksburg Herald proposed making capital against McLaurin over 
the dictatorial action of the committee. It pointed out that Miller 
was an intimate friend of the senator and had been brought forward 
by him for chairman of the state convention that had nominated 
McLaurin for governor in 1895.12 
With the party machinery threatening to break down, James K. 
Vardaman proposed to the county executive committees that they 
hold preliminary meetings and select delegates to a state mass con-
vention to meet in Jackson, June 5. The purpose of such a conven-
tion would be the nomination of preSidential electors, delegates to 
the national convention, and a new state executive committee. All of 
9Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 31, Feb. 7, Mar. 7, 1895, Aug. 24, Sept. 7, 1899. 
10Mississippi, House Journal, 1896, p. 824. 
llVicksburg Herald, May 1, 6, 15, 25, 1900; Jackson Weekly Clarion-Ledger, 
May 3, 10, 17, 24, 1900. 
12Jackson Weekly Clarion-Ledger, May 31, 1900; Vicksburg Herald, June 5, 
1900. 
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the nominees, he proposed, would be voted on at a specially called 
state-wide primary on June 21.13 
Twenty-nine counties sent delegates to the June 5 convention. 
Vardaman was chosen chairman, and the plan he had proposed was 
followed. The convention disclaimed any intention of bolting the 
party but passed resolutions denouncing the action of the executive 
committee and nominated its successor as well as presidential elec-
tors and national delegates.14 
A division now occurred in the party as a result of the revolt 
against the old executive committee. Governor Longino and Senator 
Money opposed the old committee, while Senator Sullivan and Sena-
tor-elect McLaurin defended it. 
A campaign was started to defeat in the special primary of June 
21 the ticket named by the convention. Some of the state press now 
came to the defense of the committee. The Meridian News, claim-
ing that the Hinds, Jackson, and Leflore delegates constituted a 
majority of the June convention, termed it a "rump" gathering. The 
Clarion denied this and pointed out that, in the past, state conven-
tions had always been called to name delegates to national conven-
tions and on such occasions had always chosen new executive com-
mittees. When the primary was held the convention ticket was suc-
cessful, and the new executive committee assumed office.15 
An even greater uproar was produced by the scandals growing 
out of the June 21 primary. Politicians in the Delta were reluctant to 
see power slipping from their hands, and hardly a county there 
escaped charges of fraud in the election. Election returns were sent 
in from Coahoma, but it was alleged, and upon investigation proved, 
that no election had been held there. The Coahoma Democratic 
executive committee itseH branded the returns as a "forgery." The 
"old gang" in Warren was reduced to almost equally desperate 
straits, and there were charges of ballot box stuffing. An examina-
tion of the ballots cast in the Red Bone district in Warren revealed 
that sixty-six men had voted exactly alike for sixteen delegates to 
the national convention. Forty-one had done so in the Oak Ridge 
18Jackson Weekly Clarion-Ledger, May 31, 1900. 
14Vicksburg Herald, June 8, 1900; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 7, 1900. 
15Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 14, 21, 28, July 5, 1900; Meridian News, Ripley 
Sentine~ Winona Times, Kosciusko Herald, Meridian Star, Greenwood Common-
wealth, Lexington Advertiser, Ellisville News, quoted, ibid., June 14, July 15, 1900; 
Vicksburg Herald, July 6, 1900. 
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district, and at Bovina and McGinity's Store an identical vote had 
been cast. This coincidence was said to be "too absurd for human 
credulity." It was also charged by "reputable citizens" of Vicksburg 
that the returns from that city "were three times as large as the vote 
actually cast.16 As a result of the Warren County scandals other 
counties started a move to get out of Warren's congressional and 
judicial districts. 1 'I 
Charges of fraud equally as gross were made in Issaquena, 
another Delta county. In the primary there 182 votes had been re-
ported. Since there were only 169 white registered voters in the 
county and only 84 votes had been cast the preceding year, fraud 
was conclusive. Of the 182 ballots, 178 had been cast for Senator 
Sullivan for national delegate and 4 for R. H. Hemy. The Clarion 
called this evidence of a "steal," but the Vicksburg Dispatch said it 
was merely "zeal. "18 
As a result of the revelation of fraud a strong reaction set in 
against the old state executive committee and against its followers 
in the Delta. The Yazoo Sentinel suggested raising a fund of 
$S,OOO to employ detectives to secure evidence so that the 
guilty individuals could be prosecuted. Even county conven-
tions in the home districts of C. C. Miller and "Anse" McLaurin 
condemned the fraud and called on the new state committee to 
investigate. But that group, for some reason, was not eager to do 
so. Mter repeated promptings it finally, in late October, appOinted 
an investigation committee. But it was on the eve of the presidential 
election, and interest in the matter had abated.19 An examination 
of the files of the press of the period fails to reveal that the commit-
tee ever reported. 
But reaction against "boss control" and the convention system of 
nominating did not abate. The "shams and frauds" of the 1900 pri-
mary had been too glaring. It had been conclusively shown that the 
votes returned to and counted by the old executive committee were 
16Friar's Point Coahomian, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 19, 1900; 
ibid., July 19, 26, Aug. 2, 9, 1900. 
17Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 26, Aug. 2, 1900, Mar. 7, 1901; Port Gibson 
Reveille, quoted, ibid., Aug. 2, 1900; Vicksburg Post, quoted, ibid., July 26, 1900; 
Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 2, 1900, Jan. 18, 20, 29, Feb. 1, 1902. 
18Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 26, 1900; ibid., quoting Vicksburg Dispatch. 
I9Yazoo Sentinel, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 20, 1900; ibid., Oct. 
4.25, 1900. 
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largely in excess of the votes actually cast.20 The feeling grew that 
political matters must be brought closer to the people and that every 
voter should have free opportunity to express his individual prefer-
ence. Such was impossible under the convention nominating system. 
Governor Longino in his message to the legislature in 1900 had 
urged a compulsory primary law. The white people of the state, he 
said, were "impatient and displeased with the dubious and devious 
methods of the party nominating machinery," which might differ in 
procedure "according to the interest and views of the party leaders 
in the different counties." The Senate, after some delay, passed 
such a law, but it reached the House too late for action before ad-
journment.21 
The frauds revealed in the election the following summer had 
emphasized the need of reform, and before the legislature met in 
1902 the press of the state was sending forth ringing appeals to that 
body to do something to rid the state of "the fraud and farce" of its 
elective process. There was nothing, said the Clarion, of greater im· 
portance to the state than this. The present "slip-shod" law had been 
"conceived in sin and born in iniquity." Under its provisions there 
had been created "more bad feelings, more bickerings, more resent-
ments, more swindlings and cheatings and ballot-box stuffings than 
were ever before known or heard of in the state."22 The Vicksburg 
Post agreed that a new primary law was "the most important mea-
sure" that could come before the legislature. According to the Post, 
the "trickery, frauds, and dishonesty practiced at primary elections 
in the state during the past few years, would disgrace even the 
notorious evil election practices attributed to the <machine' in Phila-
delphia, and Tammany in New York City."23 
Papers were advocating not only compulsory primaries for all 
nominations, but reform in the primary system itself. By fixing 
different primary dates in their respective counties, the executive 
committees were able to effect trades of candidates for district and 
state offices. This seems to have been only one of the offenses prac-
ticed, but advocates emphasized the necessity of holding primaries 
20Carthage Carthagenian, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 2, 1900; The 
Baptist, quoted, ibid., Sept. 6, 1900. 
21Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1900, pp. 92, 567-69; House Journal, 1900, p. 720. 
22Tackson Clarion-TJedger, Jan. 2, 1900. 
;l3Vicksburg Post, Dec. 12, 1901, 
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in all counties on the same day.24 It would tax "the range and scope 
of the most fertile and versatile imagination," said the Crystal 
Springs Meteor, "to picture a condition of greater political rottenness 
tha:n that which has grown out of the primary law of this state."25 
Responding to popular clamor, the governor again urged the 
legislature to act. Pointing out that the constitution required the 
legislature to enact laws to secure "fairness" in the nomination of 
party candidates, he observed that the "existing statutes on the sub-
ject" did not meet the requirement "or amount even to a respectable 
makeshift."26 
Insofar as reforming the machinery of the existing county pri-
maries was concerned, sectionalism was not a factor. Such reforms 
might be favored or opposed by different elements in the several 
counties, depending upon how such changes might affect their 
fortunes. Popular sentiment, however, was so overwhelmingly in 
favor of these reforms that opposition to local reform melted away. 
But elimination of the state nominating convention was a different 
matter. A state-wide primary would equalize the power of the white 
voters in all sections of the state. Control by the black counties 
would be eliminated, and supremacy of the white counties would be 
assured. Naturally the black counties opposed such a change. 
As was to be expected, therefore, opposition to a state-wide pri-
mary law centered in the Delta. On the day the legislature met a 
New Orleans reporter noted "a great element of friction" in the body, 
growing out, he thought, of fear "on the part of the Delta that that 
great tax-paying section" might be shorn of its power "by a primary 
election law which will give the white counties absolute control of 
all nominations."27 It was noted during debate on the measure that 
"all members of the Delta counties, with the exception of Mr. Camp-
bell, of Greenville," spoke against the bill.28 After the bill was passed 
it was observed that "the primary law is very obnoxious to the people 
of the Delta country."29 
The act was approved March 4, 1902. It provided that party 
nominations in Mississippi should thereafter be made by primary 
24Ibld.; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 2, 1902. 
25Crystal Springs Meteor, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 30, 1902. 
26Mississippi, House Journal, 1902, p. 48. 
27New Orleans Picayune, quoted in Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 4, 1902. 
28Ibid., Feb. 25, 1902. 
29Jackson Clarion-Ledger, May 29, 1902. 
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election on a date to be fixed by the state executive committee 
but not later than August 10. If no candidate received a majority 
in the first primary, a second was to be held three weeks later. The 
old electoral college system of nominating gubernatorial candidates 
was preserved by a provision that a candidate must poll a majority 
of the popular vote, or the highest popular vote and a majority of 
the electoral vote, so but this provision has never had any effect in 
practice. 
Party and election procedures were stipulated. Beginning in 
1904 each party was to be required to hold a state convention every 
four years to select a state executive committee, delegates to the 
national convention, and nominees for presidential electors. The old 
plan of representation was preserved in the state convention, each 
county being entitled to twice the representation which it had in 
the lower house of the legislature. Delegates to the county conven-
tion were to be chosen by ballot. They might be apportioned equally 
among the supervisors' districts or in proportion to the votes cast by 
the party in the districts in the preceding presidential election. The 
county executive committees were left as before; they consisted of 
Meen members each, chosen by the county convention, three from 
each supervisor's district. The county convention chose its com-
mitteemen for the congressional district and judicial district execu-
tive committees. Members from the state-at~large were eliminated 
from the state executive committee. The new law prOvided that each 
congressional district, acting separately in the state convention, 
should choose three of its citizens to serve on the state executive 
committee for four years.81 
Rules governing general elections were to apply to primaries, 
thus settling the uncertainty as to the ineligibility of poll-tax delin-
quents. No person was eligible to participate in primary elections 
unless he was a qualified elector, had been identified with the party 
for the two preceding years, and was not excluded from the primary 
by party regulations. No candidate's name was to be placed on the 
official ballot in general elections as a party nominee who was not 
nominated in pursuance of the provisions of the act.82 
80Mississippi, Laws, 1902, Chap. LXVI, Sees. 1, 5. 
81Ibid., Sees. 2, 3. 
82Ibid., Sees. 9, 16. 
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The county executive committees were to serve in primaries as 
did the county board of election commissioners in general elections. 
They were to appoint three managers for each election district. 
The managers were to "perform all the duties ... required of [man-
agers] at general elections" and were the judges of the qualifications 
of electors.33 The managers were to be distributed "as far as prac-
ticable between the supporters of the candidates for those offices 
about which there are the leading contests."34 Expenses of the pri-
mary were to be borne by the party, but these could be apportioned 
among the candidates.35 The poll books were to be revised by the 
county board of election commissioners before each primary, and 
no one was to be permitted to vote whose name was not on the books 
when they were turned over to the managers.88 
The county executive committee was to meet on the first or 
second day after the primary, canvass the returns, announce the 
names of nominees for county offices, tabulate and certify within 
thirty-six hours the vote by precincts for· state offices to the state 
executive committee of the party, and make proper certification to 
the senatorial or other district executive committees of the returns 
concerning them. The state and district executive committees were 
to meet a week from the day of the primary, canvass the returns sub-
mitted by the county committees, and announce the nominees and 
the names to be submitted to the second primary. A week after the 
second primary the former procedure was to be repeated. When the 
final vote was tabulated the state executive committee was to submit 
it to the secretary of state.37 
The primary law sheared most powers from the state executive 
committee and a few from the county committees. The state com-
mittee was restricted, practically, to receiving and compiling the pri-
mary vote submitted to it and to passing on questions of fraud. 
County committees were required to submit all nominations to popu-
lar vote but were given tremendous power over the local election 
machinery. As for the primary voter, however, he must pay his poll 
tax for the two years preceding the year of the primary, and not 
831bid., Sec. 1. 
84Mississippi, Laws, 1904, Sec. 8. This was not provided in the original law 
but was an amendment made two years later. 
85Mississippi, Laws, 1902, Chap. LXVI, Sec. 10. 
361bid., Sec. 22. 
371bid., Sees. 6, 11. 
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later than February 1 of that year. He must have registered not 
later than four months preceding the general election. He must be 
able to read or "understand" the constitution, must not have been 
convicted of certain felonies, arid must not be "excluded from voting 
by the regulations of the party" holding the primary.88 
The Democratic state executive committee met in Jackson on 
June 22, 1903, and adopted a resolution providing "that every white 
Democrat who will be entitled to vote at the general election in 
November, 1903, be permitted to vote at the primary election to be 
held by the order of this committee."39 This legally excluded all 
Negroes from the Democratic primary, and the rule was not changed 
by succeeding executive committees. Since nomination by the 
Democratic party in Mississippi was equivalent to election in all 
state-wide contests and to most local offices, debarment from the 
primary was in effect disfranchisement. Thus an additional hurdle 
was placed between the Negro and th~ franchise. For even if he 
could overcome the constitutional restrictions and unconstitutional 
intimidations and secure the right to vote at the general election, the 
election, for all practical purposes, had already been decided in the 
Democratic primary three months before. The effect of the poll tax 
from that time on has been to disfranchise the white man only. 
In this respect the primary law was a move away from democ-
racy. In another sense, however, the primary law was the most 
democratic measure which the voters of the state had yet obtained. 
Henceforth in election of state officials choice rested not with a 
small group acting through the medium of a state convention, but 
with the mass of voters in the state. If thousands of white men were 
barred from the franchise, yet those who could vote actually had a 
voice in the selection of officers. Furthermore the control of the 
black counties over the nominating process was effectively broken. 
In the state-wide primary every voter was equal because the winner 
was determined by the total popular vote in the entire state. Thus 
the white counties, where the great majority of votes had always 
been cast, could dominate. On the other hand, the primary law did 
not diminish the dominance of the black counties in the legislature. 
It may be asked why the black counties, if they had this control, 
permitted the passage of the primary law. The explanation is not 
38Ibld., Sec. 9. 
39Natchez Democrat, June 23, 1903; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 23, 1903. 
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simple. Undoubtedly they could have prevented it had they voted 
solidly against it. A majority of them opposed its passage, but they 
did not vote with complete unanimity. Popular resentment against 
the convention frauds of recent years was too strong, and some black 
county legislators joined those from the white counties in support 
of the bill. 
The p$ary law was to work some profound changes in Missis-
sippi politics. The technique of campaigning was revolutionized. 
Prior to its passa~e candidates for state offices did engage in exten-
sive canvasses throughout the state. But their appeal was made not 
to the mass of voters directly, but to a special group-to prospective 
legislators, county executive committeemen, and those who were 
likely to be chosen delegates to the state convention. It mattered 
little whether they impressed the mass of voters, although such 
popularity might have its advantages. If they could gain the ear of 
the small group who controlled affairs locally, there was little ef-
fective protest which the ordinary voter could make. He might 
stay away from the polls on election day; in which case the unpop-
ular nominee would win by default anyway. With the passage of 
the primary law the situation was changed. Support from local 
leaders was still important and was eagerly sought, since they were 
influential in the community. But their aid was not indispensable, 
while support of the masses was. Successful candidates in the future 
were to be those who could rally the masses to tnem. Since these 
masses were likely to respond to a different type of appeal from that 
to which the local leaders had been responsive, it was to be expected 
that programs would be presented to them strikingly different from 
the cut and dried aphorisms which had heretofore been the poli-
tician's stock in trade. 
It was soon to become apparent that the primary while removing 
some ills was to bring forth others. It was discovered that politicians 
had ways of getting around some of its provisions. For instance, the 
Warren County executive committee named two of its members to 
the congressional district executive committee. Since the latter body 
was empowered to review appeals from decisions of the county com-
mittee, this presented the ludicrous spectacle of the congressional 
district committeemen sitting in judgment over their own actions 
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done in their capacity as county committeemen.40 Furthermore, 
requiring all nominations to be made by primary resulted in a com-
plicated ballot. Within a few years after the law went into effect 
the Adam County election officials had to find accommodations on 
the ticket for 31 candidates for state offices, 3 for district offices, 
11 for county offices, and "a long raft of names" for justices of the 
peace and beat offices.41 Candidates who wanted their names on 
the ballot had to file petitions two weeks before the primary with 
the proper number of names subscribed and deposit the necessary 
fee. The committee was then hurried to prepare the ballot, appoint 
managers, see that they were paid, and tabulate results. Doubtless 
many a harrassed committeeman working late at night at his new 
chores had nostalgic memories of convention days when the machin-
ery was thoroughly lubricated weeks or even months before. 
The average fees assessed candidates were not excessive. A dif-
ferent scale was worked out for state, district, and county candidates. 
The Hinds executive committee in 1903 fixed assessments for state 
candidates at $1.50, county candidates at $2.50, and county district 
candidates at $2.00. Of course the state candidate had to pay a fee 
in every county. This varied from $1.50 in Hinds to $15.00 in Yazoo 
-the average was $2.50. The total assessment of a state candidate 
that year "between three and four hundred dollars."42 But this 
was a small part of the candidate's total expenses. State headquar-
ters had to be opened and maintained, and in many places local 
headquarters as well. 
The new technique required a state-wide organization. The 
initial step in forming such an organization was the selection of a 
state chairman. The chairman would then set up state headquarters. 
Headquarters would then carefully select a prominent citizen in each 
county to form county organizations. In counties where a candidate 
was unusually strong even precinct organizations might be formed 
to get out as large a vote as possible. Generally the county chairman 
would be well-to-do, or have contacts which would enable him to 
raise money by local subscription. Clerical help, stationery and 
stamps, calls for charitable donations, paid advertisements in the 
press, and traveling expenses, when added together, made the cost 
40Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 12, 1902. 
41Natchez Democrat, July 14, 1907. 
42Vicksburg Herald, July 1, 2, 1903; Macon Beacon, Feb. 28, 1903. 
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of a campaign large indeed. Mter withholding enough to defray 
local expenditures the county chairmen would forward subSCriptions 
to state headquarters. The size of county contributions varied, 
naturally, with the size and wealth of the county and with the 
strength of the candidate in each. In the early days of the primary 
it was estimated that they ranged between $100 and $500. In recent 
years, however, they are said to be larger. In 1903 it was estimated 
that the campaign would cost each state candidate a minimum of 
$10,000.48 
Mter the county organization was perfected, rallies were held in 
the courthouse with the best local speakers to whip up enthusiasm. 
The highlight of the county campaign was the appearance of the 
candidate himself. Generally he would attempt to speak at least 
once in each of the seventy-five or eighty counties. Frequently such 
occasions would be joint speakings between opposing candidates, 
and a holiday atmosphere would permeate the community. Farmers 
would Hock into town from the neighboring county, business would 
be at a standstill, and oratory, sometimes lasting eight or more hours, 
would reign supreme. Oratorical ability and personality in candi-
dates were important and unless some issue deeply stirred the people 
might be decisive. "Generally speaking," said one editor after a life-
time of political observing, "the men who can shake hands best, 
wear the broadest smile, know the most people, and tell the funniest 
stories, have the best chance to win in this state."44 Perhaps he was 
disillusioned, or perhaps he was looking to a near election where 
his candidate faced a dismal prospect, but there is no reason to 
doubt that such qualities as he described were valuable in politics. 
Mter the main actor made his appearance and departure, the 
local committee continued its tub thumping until the election. Then 
like the Arabs, and regardless of the outcome, it would fold its tents 
and disband. The county campaign committees were not permanent. 
A candidate might have one chairman one year and a different one 
the next. 
Such was the organization which the primary law brought about. 
Perhaps, in theory, it was not greatly different from that of the con-
vention period. But in practice the new organizations had to do 
48Vicksburg Herald. July I, 2, 1903; Macon Beacon, Feb. 28, 1903. 
44Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 17, 1910. 
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work of a different nature and greater volume than had the old. 
ReHecting on the inconsistency of a law "devised and perfected" 
to give every man a chance to express his choice and the "red tape 
business" and expense which would tend to restrict officeholding 
to the wealthy, one of the proponents of the law came seriously to 
question its wisdom. The poor man could afford neither the time 
nor the money which such a campaign would entail. Therefore the 
office-seeking class would be confined to "those who have money, or 
those who are already entrenched and use this lever to prolong their 
tenure." The critic could not defend the old system. It had become 
too odious to the masses "owing to the features that permitted the 
real wishes Q[ the voters to be set aside" and let men be nominated 
"who ordinarily would not be the choice of the people." Yet he 
could not but reHect that with all its evils "the system gave us good 
officials."45 
The reasoning was not bad, even if events were to disprove some 
of the conclusions. Poor men were to become successful candidates 
and yet die paupers. It was true that the old system had produced 
able men. Lamar, Stone, George, Walthall, and a host of lesser men 
would perhaps have been able to hold their own in any society. 
Furthermore they could claim gentility, and some of them were 
scholarly. But like all successful politicians, they had been respon-
sive to the wishes of the dominant group in their community; and 
that dominant group had not been the overwhelming majority of 
the state's electorate-the poor white farmers of the hill counties. 
With the primary law that class had come into its own. It gave them 
their opportunity, and they would have no more of the old system. 
A country editor issued a prophetic warning some months before 
the first primary. "There will be a state primary ... next year," he 
said, "and the old time convention manipulators will find that their 
fine ... hands have lost their cunning."46 
45Ibid., July 30, 1903. 
46Macon Beacon, Oct. 4, 1902. 
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NEW SECTIONAL ALIGNMENTS 
IN ADDITION to the time-worn conflict between Delta and hill 
country, new issues were developing which were to confound an 
already confused geographic-political division within the state. Since 
these new issues were to have considerable influence in the outcome 
of the first primary election it is necessary to trace their develop-
ment. 
The first uniform school system in Mississippi was established in 
1870 under Radical Republican rule.1 Each county and each city of 
five thousand population was made a school district, and free schools 
were to be maintained for a period of four months each year. Normal 
schools for training Negro teachers were established at Holly Springs 
and Tougaloo. Despite the burdensome taxation which this system 
brought to an impoverished land, the Democrats continued it after 
they came into power in 1876.2 Mississippi paid a larger proportion 
of her wealth to education than such eastern states as New York and 
Pennsylvania, but the rural predominance of her population together 
with the comparative paucity of taxable wealth within her borders 
made her per capita expenditure for education only a fraction of the 
national average.3 
The school funds consisted largely of license fees and fines. These 
funds were divided among the counties on a basis of total number 
of educable children, white and Negro, in each. This would have 
been fair enough save for the fact that a smaller percentage of Negro 
children attended school than did white children, and the facilities 
provided the Negroes were inferior to those prOvided the whites. In 
the first year after the Democrats regained control there were 
lMiss Elsie Timberlake tries to make a case for the pre-Civil War school system, 
but it is not a strong case. Timberlake, "Did the Reconstruction Regime Give 
Mississippi Her Public School?," in Mississippi Historical Society, Publications, XII 
(1902), 72-93. 
2Report of Superintendent of Education, 1876, in Letters of Governors, Series 
E, 129A; Edgar Gardner Murphy, Problems of the Present South (New York, 1904), 
42-46; Mississippi, compiled and written by the Federal Writers' Project of the Works 
Progress Administration (New York, 1938), 120-21. 
8Murphy, Problems of the South, 44. 
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164,000 white educable children in the state and 190,000 Negroes. 
Yet the average monthly attendance of the white children was 
65,000, while the average Negro attendance was 68,000. Both figures 
were shockingly low, but the Negro truancy was greater than the 
white. To make matters worse there were approximately half as 
many Negro as white teachers. Thus, while the average student load 
for a white teacher was twenty-nine, it was fifty-six for the Negro 
teacher.4 This simply meant that the black counties were spending 
a considerably larger proportion of state funds on their white chil-
dren than were the white counties. This fact seems to have gone 
unnoticed for a time, and the only controversy on the subject was 
between the counties with large urban populations and those largely 
rural. Since the towns paid a large proportion of the fines and 
license fees that went into the school fund, they urged the retention 
of all fines and fees in the counties where they were paid.5 Nothing 
carne of their pleas. 
Small as were the SUIllS spent for education, many thought that 
they were too large. There were many complaints until 1885 when 
the legislature undertook a retrenching program. Thereafter there 
were fewer complaints, but there seems to have been little improve-
ment in the state school system. Enrollment increased but the num-
ber of teachers did not. The average Negro teacher in 1899 taught 
sixty-three children, still twice as many as the white teacher. Had 
it not been for irregular daily attendance, his task would have been 
formidable indeed. City schools were showing considerable im-
provement in the length of the school term. Some of them, through 
local taxation, were able to keep open a total of 150 or more days a 
year. But only a small proportion of the children of the state lived 
in towns comprising separate school districts, and most of the county 
schools could barely last the four months required by law. Nor could 
the quality of education have improved much. For the state super-
intendent reported in 1903 that 90 per cent of Mississippi teachers 
had no professional training and that 75 per cent had no higher edu-
cational opportunities than the rural school afforded. 6 
4Report of Superintendent of Education, 1876, in Letters of Governors, Series 
E,129A. 
5Natchez Democrat, Jan. 24, 1877; Vicksburg Democrat-Commercial, Mar. S, 
1878. 
6Stuart G. Noble, Forty Years uf the Public Schools in Mississippi (New York, 
1918), 73-75, 82. 
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Despite such depressing statistics, there seems to have been a 
delusion on the part of some that the school system was creditable. 
The Macon Beacon in 1894, lauding the "progress" that was being 
made, pointed with pride to the $615,677 of school funds to be 
distributed among the schools that year. Although on a per capita 
basis this was only $1.11 per child, it was hoped that it would 
enable the county schools to remain open a minimum of four months 
in all counties, and even eight months in some.7 Illiteracy among 
native whites was 8 per cent in 1900, but it was believed that this as 
well as the number of Negro illiterates was being reduced. B 
Meanwhile there had arisen a movement in opposition to the ex-
penditure of the white man's money to educate the Negro. This 
seems to have had no sectional basis. In the constitutional conven-
tion of 1890 a delegate from Attala, a white county, offered a reso-
lution prorating the school fund "among the children of white and 
colored races, according to the amount [of taxes] paid by each race." 
When the committee on education refused to adopt this provision, a 
delegate from Adams, a black county, submitted a minority report 
objecting to the "large sums" which it was proposed to spend on "a 
race which contributes but a small part of the moneys called for."9 
The Negroes did receive more funds than they paid in taxes, but, 
as has been shown, they did not share equally with the whites. This 
was due not only to the lower average attendance, but also to the 
fact that fewer Negroes than whites went beyond the lower grades, 
where the cost of education was much less than in the higher 
grades. 10 
The constitution of 1890 provided that the poll tax receipts 
should be used to augment the common school fund. It further 
prOvided that the common school fund was to continue to be pro-
rated among the counties on the basis of the total number of edu-
cable children.u It did not, however, make it clear whether only 
the state fund was to be distributed on the basis of the number of 
educable children-the poll tax being retained in the county where 
7Macon Beacon, June 30, 1894. 
BMurphy, Problems of the South, 46. 
9]ournal of the Constitutional Convention, 1890, pp. 132, 190-91. 
10Holland Thompson, "The New South, Economic and Social," in Studies in 
Southern History and Politics (New York, 1914), 313. 
llMississippi Constitution, 1890, Sec. 206. 
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paid-or whether the poll tax and state fund combined were to be 
divided on the basis of the number of educable children. The latter 
method, however, was followed,12 
This method of distribution favored the black counties. Poll tax 
receipts accounted for a considerable share of the total school fund. 
Since black counties paid few polls they paid little toward the sup-
port of schools in proportion to their wealth.13 But the black coun-
ties were heavily populated and therefore received relatively large 
amounts from the state fund. This enabled them to maintain a 
longer term and pay higher salaries to their teachers. There was 
also discrimination in the salaries paid white and Negro teachers in 
the black counties. During the decade of the 1890's the average 
annual salary for white teachers in black counties was $288, and $112 
for Negroes. In many instances, however, the salary of the Negro 
teachers in black counties was higher than that of white teachers in 
white counties, although as a rule the Negro teacher was not as well 
trained.14 Washington County, where the Negroes outnumbered the 
whites more than eight to one, maintained schools for seven months 
in 1893 and paid its teachers an average monthly salary of $37. In 
the same year Jones and Smith counties, both having a seven to one 
majority of whites over Negroes, were able to maintain terms of 
little more than three months and paid their teachers an average 
monthly salary of $16.15 
By the latter years of the decade the white counties became 
aware of this inequity, and they began clamoring for a constitutional 
amendment which would leave the poll tax receipts in the counties 
where they were collected. This was opposed, of course, by repre-
sentatives of the black counties, who argued that the division of poll 
tax receipts among the counties was the consideration which had 
won black county consent to the legislative apportionment of 1890.16 
One black county editor, however, admitted that the scheme of dis-
tribution was manifestly inequitable and unjust. He pointed out that 
12Noble, Forty Years, 91. 
13According to Noble three-fourths of all school funds came from poll-tax 
receipts, license fees, and fines, and about 14 per cent from local taxation. Forty 
Years, 77-81. 
14Ibid., 77-81, 93. 
15Report of State Superintendent of Education, 1893, quoted, ibid., 92. 
16Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 19, 1898; Natchez Democrat, Feb. 2, 1898; Macon 
Beacon, Jan. 6, Feb. 10, 1900. 
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his country, Noxubee, had only 4,800 children attending school but 
collected funds for 15,800, almost 12,000 of whom were Negroes. 
The attendance was about a fourth of the educable children, but 
the funds received enabled Noxubee to maintain a 5~-month term, 
and to pay its white teachers an average monthly salary of $40.04, 
and Negro teachers $19.67. "This is about the way it runs," said 
Editor Ferris, "in all the counties where the population, by race, is 
similarly proportioned."17 
. In his inaugural message in 1900 Governor Longino pointed out 
the unfairness to white counties of the existing scheme. The 
black counties, he said, were able to provide much better schools 
than the white counties because they used the funds allotted to them 
for their Negro children who did not attend school for the benefit 
of whites who did. He urged division of the funds among counties 
on a basis of actual school attendance. He called upon the legislature 
to submit such an amendment to the state constitution to the voters 
at the next election.18 
The white counties thought this "the best part" of the governor's 
message, "more important than the new capitol" which Longino also 
advocated. It was not well received in the Delta, however, and the 
legislators from the section opposed the resolution almost unani-
mously.19 
The amendment resolution, however, passed the legislature. For 
ratification a majority of those voting on the amendment as well as 
a majority of the total number of votes cast in the election was 
necessary. Ratification was fought quite bitterly by the Delta, where 
not one Negro in five hundred paid a poll tax. At the same time it 
was estimated that of the whites who would go to the polls in the 
state, not 10 per cent understood the meaning of the issue.20 Never-
theless, in the general election the amendment received 42,981 votes 
as against only 7,522. This was also a majority of the votes cast in 
the general election, and the amendment therefore became part of 
the constitution. Only Adams, Lowndes, N oxubee, Tunica, Warren, 
17Macon Beacon, Nov. 18, 1899. 
18Mississippi, H()U8e Journal, 1900, pp. 100-101. 
19Macon Beacon, Jan. 20, July 28, 1900; Vicksburg Herald, Feb. 11, 1900. 
20Macon Beacon, Sept. 29, 1900. 
, 
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Washington, and Yazoo counties gave adverse votes.21 All of these 
were black counties, and all but Noxubee were in the Delta. 
Meanwhile a movement had been growing in south Mississippi 
for a number of years for a reapportionment of legislative represen-
tatives. Population there had increased notably in the decade after 
the constitution of 1890 was adopted, largely as a result of the de-
velopment of the lumbering industry. It was overwhelmingly a white 
population, and there was a feeling within the section that it was 
being discriminated against to the advantage of the black counties 
in the west and the mixture of black and white counties in the north-
east and central parts of the state. Agitation for reapportionment 
was growing in the south, and there was danger that that section 
might gain the support of individual counties in other sections which 
thought that they too were not adequately represented. This was a 
threat to black county predominance and, combined with the school 
fund controversy, placed the white counties of the north in an ad-
vantageous position. They might join with the western counties in 
opposing a reappointment in consideration for black county sup-
port for the school fund amendment. Accordingly, in the same elec-
tion at which the school fund amendment was ratified, Section 256 
of the constitution-that which fixed the apportionment-was also 
amended. This amendment divided the state into three sections-
west, northeast, and southeast. The legislature was to retain the 
power to reapportion after each decennial census, but none of the 
sections was ever to have more than forty-four representatives. Thus, 
any additional representatives which a county received must be 
drawn from other counties in the same section.22 This did not affect 
the white-black county ratio of representation in any respect. It 
simply made it impossible for the southern counties to attain legis-
lative parity with those of the other sections. 
Thus the feeling of sectionalism in the state was being compli-
cated by the emergence of a third section-the southeast-having its 
own peculiar interests. Heretofore the rivalry had been largely one 
of white versus black counties, with the latter having dominant po-
litical influence. But the emergence of south Mississippi with a large 
and growing population, combined with the innovation of the state-
21Biennlal Report of the Secretary of State to the Legislature, October 1, 1899-
October 1,1901 (Jackson, 1901); Macon Beacon, Nov. 24. 1900. 
22Report of Secretary of State, 1899-1901. 
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wide primary, was to break that stranglehold. There had never been 
a time when the white counties of the east could not outvote the 
black counties of the west in any popular election restricted to 
whites. The trouble was that until the institution of the state pri-
mary there had been no opportunity for them to do so. Also, in legis-
lative matters the western counties, when supported by the few 
black counties in the east, had been able to attain their will. Now a 
combination of the two eastern sections could exact concessions from 
the west. The passage of the school fund resolution by the legisla-
ture indicated this.23 At the same time it could not be expected that 
the interests of the two white sections would always coincide. This 
was the case in regard to the apportionment amendment which was 
passed by a coalition of northeast with west. 
A third factor that was to influence the political trend in the 
next decade was the exposure of scandal in the state's :fiscal affairs. 
The legislature of 1900, responding to Governor Longino's request, 
had passed a bill for the construction of a new capitol.24 Suddenly, 
in the late fall the governor swore out a warrant against an Indiana 
contractor, J. E. Gibson, charging him with an attempt to get the 
construction contract through bribing state officials. Gibson at :first 
denied the charge but later pleaded guilty and paid a :fine of a 
thousand dollars. The :first reaction to the exposure had been one of 
enthusiastic praise for the governor's stand, but shortly sentiment 
began to be expressed that some kind of a "deaI" had been made 
and that the governor was trying to make too much political capital 
of his righteousness. Even the Clarion, which was and continued to 
be an admirer of the governor, expressed doubt as to whether all 
the facts had been revealed. The same sentiment was expressed by 
many other papers, although an equal number continued to extol the 
governor's stand.25 
2SNineteen black county representatives jOined with fifty-two white county 
representatives to pass the school-fund amendment resolution in the House. Of the· 
thirty-one representatives who voted against the resolution, all were from black 
counties. See Mississippi, House Journal, 1900, pp. 466-67. 
24Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1900, pp. 296-335. 
25Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 26, 31, 1891; Meridian Star, Summit Sentinel, Terry 
Highlight, Holmes County Progress, Port Gibson Rooeille, and Raymond Gazette 
were critical of LonginO. See quotations in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 29, 1901. 
Hazelhurst Courier, McComb Enterprise, and Aberdeen Weekly supported him. Ibid. 
See also Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 29, 1900, Jan. 29, 1901, Mar. 17, 1910. 
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The following year a more shocking incident occurred. A short-
age of $100,000 of state funds was discovered in State Treasurer J. R. 
Stower's office. Upon investigation it was found that the money had 
been "lent" to a Memphis banker, John Armistead, who in tum lent it 
to the Memphis Street Railway Company. Stowers, Armistead, F. T. 
Raiford, chief clerk in the treasurer's office, and Phil A. Rush, a 
capitol commissioner, were indicted. Raiford turned state's evidence, 
pleaded guilty to the charge of embezzlement, and involved the 
others in the conspiracy with him. Stowers was tried and convicted. 
Rush was released after a mistrial, and the governor of Tennessee 
refused to grant extradition on Armistead.26 Longino was charged 
with trying to protect the confederates but denied the charge. 
Six months after the Stowers scandal, a forgery was discovered 
in the office of the new treasurer, C. W. Carlisle. A bill which had 
passed the legislature and been enrolled had had three words added 
to it while it was in custody of the treasurer's office. The addition 
created a liability of thousands of dollars against the state in favor 
of heirs of the Weineman estate. Everyone connected with the 
treasurer's office denied committing the forgery and the guilty 
person was never ascertained.27 
Exposure of these frauds, one coming so close upon the other, 
caused a reaction against the old crowd of politicians who had been 
running the state. Criticism did not centralize on any particular 
figure. McLaurin was recognized as the political «boss" of the state, 
but no one linked him directly with the crimes. Likewise Longino 
was linked in most minds with the McLaurin "machine," and it was 
members of his administration about whom the charges centered. 
But Longino enjoyed an excellent reputation for honesty, and no 
one charged him with direct complicity in the frauds, although it 
was believed by some that he was not as diligent as he might be in 
pursuing the wicked. Rather the reaction was against an intangible 
"old crowd," who it was thought had run the state too long and to 
their own personal advantage. It was argued that new blood was 
needed. The people were ready for a new leader with a new pro-
gram. 
26Vicksburg Herald, July 2, 10, 1902; Macon Beacon, July 12, 19, 1902; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, July 10, 1902. 
27Vicksburg Herald, Feb. 26, 1903; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 25, 28, 1903. 
CHAPTER XIII 
THE FIRST PRIMARY ELECTION 
THE NEW leader was James K. Vardaman, editor of the Green-
wood Commonwealth. He was no newcomer to state politics, 
having served two terms in the state legislature and having twice 
attempted to win the Democratic nomination for governor. Both 
times he had failed-once defeated by McLaurin himself, the second 
time by Longino with McLaurin's backing.1 These defeats, how-
ever, were at the hands of the convention bosses. He had never had 
a chance to carry his cause to the people. The passage of the pri-
mary law in 1902 gave him this chance. 
Vardaman always claimed to be "a scholar of George" and a 
"friend of the people."2 He had belonged to the Barksdale-Burkitt 
wing of the party in the late 1880's and early 1890's. He was a 
champion of the farmer against the "predatory" corporate interests, 
but like Barksdale he refused to leave the party to gain his ends. He 
had always advocated, however, the reforms embodied in the Popu-
list program. Money interests, he believed, ruled the world for their 
own selfish ends. Banks and railroads he saw as locusts, devouring 
the farmer by their usurious rates and exorbitant tariffs. He would 
curb the one by a reduction of the interest rate. For the other he 
advocated commissions, both state and federal, co-operating in the 
regulation of all railroad activities. The only alternative he saw to 
such regulation was government ownership. "When competition is 
no more," he said, "then the strong arm of the government will be 
invoked, and government ownership will follow." Such ownership 
would not come in a vindictive spirit, but "in a spirit of self preser-
vation." Throughout the world "the wealth producers are growing 
restless and weary carrying the burden of the nations." Wealth, on 
the other hand, was "conscienceless and insatiate. It never gets 
enough ... and knows not the correcting pangs of remorse." Trusts, 
if left unhindered, would themselves be "the evangelist[s] who will 
ultimately convert the world to communism."3 
lWalter SiIlers to A. J. McLaurin, Feb. 9, 1897, Letters of Governors, Series E, 
110. 
2Greenwood Commonwealth, Mar. 17, 1899. 
8Ibid., Feb. 18, 1898, Mar. 17, 1899. 
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There was nothing new about this program in Mississippi. It had 
been advocated by Barksdale, Burkitt, and many of the Indepen-
dents. But Vardaman, with his "majestic stature, his massive head, 
his long black hair, his deep brown intelligent eyes,"4 and immacu-
late white suit, must have somehow given it a different ring. 
There was, however, something new in Vardaman's program-
his blunt attack on the Negro problem. Studying the deplorable con-
dition of Mississippi's school system, he came to the simple and 
logical conclusion that there were too many people to educate and 
not enough money to go around. Under the law as it stood, the bulk 
of the school funds, he reasoned, went to the thickly settled Delta 
counties. Those counties had "plenty of schools-well paid teachers." 
In the sparsely settled hill counties where the whites predominated, 
there were "only a few schools-poorly paid teachers." The result of 
this, he thought, was that the Negro children were getting educated 
while the whites were not. At the same time, he said, the Negroes 
were paying less than 5 per cent of school funds. This led him to 
advocate division of the funds, not according to school attendance, 
but on the more extreme basis of division between the races accord-
ing to the amounts paid by each. "I am making my campaign almost 
entirely on that issue," he announced in 1899.6 
If the Negro were situated in a land of his own where government 
would devolve upon him, Vardaman said he would favor compulsory 
education. Situated as he was, however, he could see nothing but 
harm resulting from it.6 No white man in Mississippi, he asserted 
in 1897, was willing for the Negro to reach a higher social, economic, 
or political plane than he then enjoyed. The state was ostensibly 
paying haH a million dollars a year for the Negro's education in 
order to fit him for the "higher duties of citizenship." But, said 
Vardaman, when several millions would have been spent, the Negro 
taught to read and write, and he should then offer to vote, he would 
not be permitted to do so. "His vote will be either cast aside or 
Sambo will vote as directed by the white folks." "There is no use 
multiplying words about it," he said, "the negro . . . will not be 
4Henry V. Watkins, Address, May 17, 1936, presenting to Mississippi Hall of 
Fame a portrait of James K. Vardaman, Mississippi Department of Archives and 
History. 
6Greenwood Commonwealth, June 30, 1899. 
6Ibid., July 25, 1897. 
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permitted to rise above the station which he now fills." The ques-
tion of Negroes voting was not solely a question of fitness, "but 
rather a matter of race prejudice-as deep-seated and ineradicable 
as the Anglo-Saxon genius for self-government." Prejudice, he 
thought, increased in proportion to the Negro's education. Under 
such conditions, would all the money which was being spent on the 
Negro's education improve him, "make him a better, happier, and 
more llseful citizen?" On the contrary, it would only make him 
dissatisfied. Therefore, he argued, "we cannot avoid the conclusion" 
that all the money spent for Negro education is "a positive unkind-
ness" to him. "It simply renders him unfit for the work which the 
white man has prescribed, and which he will be forced to perform."7 
The Negro was receiving only a small portion of the money that 
was going to the black counties for his education. Everyone knew 
it and, after Vardaman raised the issue, many defended the practice. 
Nor did such education as he was getting seem to improve the Ne-
gro's economic and social status. As one editor wrote in 1890, "if 
every colored man in Mississippi were a graduate of Yale college, the 
two races would remain just as widely separated as they are now 
in all political and social matters."8 This probably expressed the 
attitude of a vast majority of the white men in Mississippi. 
But Vardaman did not stop with this calm and comparatively 
mild statement of his position. He launched into an impassioned 
attack upon the entire black race. The Negro, he said, was a curse 
to the country and had cost it more than "all the wars it has waged, 
added to the min wrought by Hood and fire." He was an industrial 
stumbling block, a political ulcer, a social scab, " a lazy, lying, lustful 
animal which no conceivable amount of training can transform into 
a tolerable citizen." His nature, said Vardaman, was unlike the 
white man's but "resembles the hog's." He exaggerated the Negro's 
lust for white women and said the only way to curb it was by coun-
terviolence. The statute punishing rape by death, he said, was 
"impuissant" without a ""six-shooter." He would not be deterred if 
lynch law occasionally resulted in the punishment of an innocent 
Negro. "We would be justified," he said, ""in slaughtering every 
Ethiop on the earth to preserve unsullied the honor of one Caucasian 
7Ibid., July 1, 1897. 
8Charleston News and Courier, quoted in Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 
18, 1890, 
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home." After all, the Negro was a predatory animal. "We do not 
stop when we see a wolf," he said, "to find if it will kill sheep before 
disposing of it, but assume that it will." He admitted that this was 
cruel. But, he said, "I am ... writing . . . to present the cold truth 
however cruel it may be."9 
Vardaman admitted that there were some good Negroes. It would 
be unfortunate if in ridding the land of the bad Negroes the good 
should suffer. But "the good are few, the bad are many, and it 
is impossible to tell what ones are ... dangerous to the honor of the 
dominant race until the damage is done." Vardaman denied that 
there was anything personal or vindictive in his attitude toward the 
Negro. There was no one, he said, who had kindlier feelings for the 
Negro than he. He wished him well and wanted to see him prosper 
and grow better. He was simply opposed to "doing that which dis-
satifies him and then killing him if he undertakes to enjoy the pre-
rogatives of citizenship." The only way for the Negro to prosper 
was "to avoid politics and maintain the relation which he now occu-
pies to the white folks." Vardaman admitted that the Negro's posi-
tion was full of pathos and that he was the victim of circumstances 
over which he had no control. He was here because of the white 
man's cupidity and had the right to expect "such treatment as will 
best promote his moral and material interest."lO 
Such were the views of Vardaman on the race question. In all 
his political career he did not deviate from them. For three decades 
he campaigned for political office in Mississippi, and in every speech 
in every campaign he played upon the same theme. Much has been 
said in condemnation of him. It was merited, for doubtless his im-
passioned appeals emphasized, if they did not increase, the tension 
and bitter feeling that existed between the Negro and those whites 
at the bottom of the economic and social orders. Something, how-
ever, might be said in amelioration, if not in defense, of Vardaman's 
views. As might be expected from the Negro's depressed condition, 
he was responsible for an overwhelming majority of crimes in Mis-
sissippi, and the number of criminals had more than tripled in the 
past two decades. Moreover, this increase was in crime against the 
9Greenwood Commonwealth, July 15, 25, 27, Aug. 26, 1897, Mar. 29, Dec. 6, 
1901. 
1I)Ibid., Mar. 29, Dec. 6, 1901. 
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person. Negro crime against property was on the decline.ll Further-
more, no white man in public life in Mississippi proposed doing any-
thing constructive for the Negro. All were as determined as Varda·· 
man that he should remain in his lowly place. 
As the election of 1903 approached, the various leaders began 
aligning themselves with the different candidates. Governor Longino 
announced that he would contest the re-election of H. D. Money to 
the United States Senate. A coolness had developed between 
Longino and McLaurin in the early years of Longino's administra-
tion, but as the election approached there were convincing signs of 
"hatchet-burying" between them.12 There were four candidates for 
governor-Vardaman, Frank A. Critz, A. Fuller Fox, and Edmund F. 
Noel, author of the primary law. The combinations which they were 
attempting to make with the senatorial candidates, Longino and 
Money, were complicating the system of alliances. Several months 
before the primary one editor announced that there was "no align-
ment on the gubernatorial and senatorial question, and none is 
possible under present circumstances." Too many supporters of the 
gubernatorial candidates were divided in their choice for senator 
and vice versa. This editor could see nothing but a "mixup and 
blending of incongruous and inharmonious elements, a uniting of 
forces in many instances on common ground that has caused sur-
prise."18 
Vardaman and Money were cousins and had always been politi-
cal allies. Congressman J. S. Doxey was a Vardaman supporter, but 
he disliked Money, and besides he was friendly to McLaurin who 
was backing Longino. Congressman John Sharp Williams disap-
proved of Vardaman's "radical" views, but he had to support Money 
because he "is the most competent and best informed Mississippian 
in the public service today." Longino would have preferred Fox 
among the gubernatorial candidates, but McLaurin had made com-
mitments to Critz.14. 
Some of the newspapers were in like predicament. The Vicks-
burg Herald was a champion of railroads and objected to any form 
llNoble, Forty YeaTS, 124-25. 
12Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 2, June 3, 1901, May 15, 1902. 
18Ibld •• Apr. 2, 1903. 
14Ibid., Mar. 30, 1903; Natchez Democrat, July 5, 9, 1903; Vicksburg Herald, 
July 3, Aug. 16, 1903. 
THE FIRST PRIMARY ELECTION 149 
of regulatory legislation. Yet, it said, it had to support Vardaman 
"for his unquestioned political integrity, and the manly candor of his 
position on all public questions." The Herald was also an inveterate 
enemy of the McLaurin machine, and its backing of Vardaman was 
likely due as much to ''his antagonism to the shabby hybrid state 
political machine" as to his "political integrity" and his "manly can-
dor." Even Vardaman's "unsound views on the negro" did not lose 
him Editor McNelly's strong support. Vardaman was also supported 
by other McLaurin opponents, including "Private" John Allen and 
the old Delta crowd-Charles Scott, Leroy Percy, and Murray 
Smith. None of these, it was said by a neutral editor, subscribed to 
his platform. They were merely trying to hit at McLaurin and 
Longino, who were supporting Critz.15 
Such was the confusion in the alignment of Mississippi political 
leaders on the eve of ' the first state-wide primary. Despite the num-
ber of prominent men who for one reason or another were support-
ing Money and Vardaman, the preponderance of influence seemed 
to be with Longino and Critz. They had the backing of the Mc-
Laurin "machine," and that organization had rolled smoothly over 
all opposition for almost a decade. As to how much the primary 
was to change the former influences, few seemed to suspect. Neither 
McLaurin nor Vardaman had been enthusiastic advocates of a pri-
mary in 1895 or in 1899.16 Even now the Vicksburg Herald, perhaps 
Vardaman's most enthusiastic supporter, was dubious as to its merits. 
It predicted that after a few years it would be discarded and re-
placed by the old nominating convention. Five months later, after 
both its candidates had won, it was converted. "As a tutelage in the 
exercise of the right and the trust of self-government," it said, "the 
primary is unequalled."17 
In the spring of 1903 the farmers of the state, busy with the 
spring plOwing, were reported to be paying little attention to the 
campaign. Candidates in some counties were unable to gain audi-
ences in their house-to-house canvasses.1S But with the swinging of 
the big guns into action they awoke from their lethargy. Vardaman 
15Vicksburg Herald, spring and summer of 1903, especially June 6; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 27. 1903. 
16New Orleans Times-Picayune, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 10, 
1895; ibid., June 5, 1899. 
17Vicksburg Herold, Aug. 28, 1903. Jan. 20. 1904. 
1SMacon Beacon. Mar. 21. 1903. 
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was again making the race question and the school funds the issues. 
He argued that the current method of dividing school funds was 
working an injustice on the mass of white children in the state for 
the benefit of a few. Such of the funds as were spent for Negro edu-
cation he considered worse than useless. "We spent $150,000 [in 
1890] disfranchising the negro," he said, "and $6,000,000 since to 
bring him back to the polls." Negro education would thus tend to 
defeat the purposes of the constitutional convention of 1890, the 
franchise clauses of which all white Mississipians still extolled.19 
Vardaman's argument was attacked by all the other guberna-
torial candidates. Noel lumped the poll tax with the ad valorem tax 
and showed that the black counties paid more into the state treasury 
than they received while some of the white counties received more 
than they paid. This was due to higher assessments in general in 
the black counties, and this was not denied. But it still did 
not dispose of Vardaman's argument. Nor did Noel attempt to. 
Proper schools for white children in black counties could be main-
tained, he said, only "by so dividing the money ... as to give very 
little of it to the negro schools, through low salaries and numerous 
pupils to a teacher." He did not explain how counties without large 
Negro populations could maintain "proper schools." He scoffed at 
Vardaman's contention that too much was being squandered on 
Negro education to the neglect of white children. "White officials," 
he said, "chosen by white people, regulate the number and size of 
the districts for negro schools . . . and . . . they can give the negro 
only such a part of their school fund as may be just and right."20 
Much the same stand on the race question was taken by Critz and 
Fox. Fox claimed to have "a rational intellectual platform on the 
Negro educational issue." He attacked Vardaman's plan as likely 
to destroy the good relationship of the races established by the 
wisdom of Senator George. "Under the present system," he said, "we 
[select] their teachers, [make] our own contracts with them, [and 
prescribe] the textbooks studied." Under such conditions talk of 
education as raising a threat to white supremacy was absurd. Fox 
won the approval of many conservatives. He was backed by many 
19Speech at Winona, Apr. 6, 1903, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger. Apr. 9, 
1903; Macon Beacon, Jan. 31, 1903. 
2oMacon Beacon. Feb. 14, 1903; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Apr. 9, 1903. 
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of the influential political personalities of the state and by the lead-
ing daily paper, the Clarion. A wave of racial hatred arising out of 
an incident at Indianola in the Delta, however, inundated his "ra-
. tional" policy, and shortly thereafter he withdrew from the contest.21 
Critz, who inherited most of Fox's following, had as little feeling 
for the Negro's plight as did the others, including Vardaman. He 
sympathized with Vardaman's plan for abolishing Negro education 
but thought it was both unnecessary and unconstitutional. Besides, it 
would drive hundreds of Negro laborers from the state. He favored, 
he said, repeal of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments 
to the federal Constitution, but he feared that if Negro schools were 
not preserved, the federal government might require that Negroes be 
admitted to white schools. On the corporation question, both Noel 
and Critz favored "inducements" and a "liberal policy" toward cor-
porate interests, while Vardaman opposed any such policy.22 
Critz was accused by Vardaman's supporters of using large sums 
of money in the campaign. Critz emphatically denied the charge, 
but the Meridian Press, which was supporting him, admitted that 
Critz was paying his canvassers $125 a month. The Press defended 
this as the "pay as you go plan" and thought it much superior to the 
"deferred payment plan," wherein offices were promised.23 
The charge was frequently made that Vardaman was not gen-
uinely sincere in his stand on the Negro question. His former legiS-
lative record was exhumed and examined to discover inconsistencies. 
It was shown that as chairman of the Appropriations Committee of 
the House of Representatives in 1892 he had reported favorably and 
voted for the appropriation for the Negro Agriculture and Mechani-
cal CoIlege.24 Again in 1894 as speaker he had voted for the appro-
priation and had also voted for the appropriation for the Negro State 
Normal School at Holly Springs.25 Because of his pOSition as chair-
man of the Appropriations Committee and later as speaker he had 
had unusual influence in shaping legislation and appropriating 
money. Because he had not blocked such appropriations it was 
21Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Apr. 2, 30, 1903. 
22Ibid., Apr. 9, 30, 1903. 
23Vicksburg Herald, June 14, 18, 1903; ibid., quoting Meridian Press; Natchez 
Democrat, July 9, 1903; ibid., quoting New Orleans States. 
24Mississippi, House TournaI, 1892, p. 758; Natchez Democrat, June 30, 1903. 
25Mississippi, House Journal, 1894, pp. 247, 345; Natchez Democrat, June 30, 
1903. 
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charged that he was now «exploiting a bubble ... to attract that 
class of voters . • . who are ready to adopt any ism which satisfies 
their petty prejudices against the weaker class."26 
Thus the question of Vardaman's intellectual and political hon-
esty was raised early in his career. In succeeding campaigns it was 
to be raised again and again. Vardaman was accused by his enemies 
of demagogy. He denied it. One might reach any conclusion on the 
question according to one's inclination. Certainly nothing can be 
said in defense of Vardaman's vicious diatribes against the Negro. 
But if there is question as to Vardaman's sincerity, there can be 
none as to his opponents'. Critz, Noel, and Fox by their own admis-
sions had no concern with eHorts to improve the Negro's condition. 
Admitting sympathy in principle with Vardaman's objective, they 
argued for a pretense of Negro education on the ground of expedi-
ency. They feared federal intervention if discrimination were openly 
and flagrantly practiced. That and danger of disrupting the labor 
market formed the burden of their protest against Vardaman's 
scheme. 
Had Vardaman restrained himself in the campaign to a calm and 
dispassionate discussion of the «folly" of Negro education he might 
well have escaped the charge of demagoguery. Such a position, while 
not an enlightened or liberal one, might well, under the circum-
stances, be stamped with sincerity. But he did not so restrain himself. 
Carried away by the force of his own oratory, or shrewdly calculat-
ing the eHect of his words on his audience, one knows not which, he 
launched into a defense of lynching. «If I were the sheriH," he said, 
«and a negro fiend fell into my hands, I would run him out of the 
county. If I were governor and were asked for troops to protect 
him I would send them. But if I were a private citizen I would head 
the mob to string the brute Up."27 The Vicksburg Herald, which a 
few months before had termed Vardaman's position on the Negro 
question «unsound" and was to do so again within a few years, 
praised his «courage" for making the statement and dared Noel and 
Critz to challenge it.28 Neither of them did. 
Vardaman could no find language too strong nor too indelicate 
to use in condemning President Theodore Roosevelt's appointment 
26Natchez Democrat, June 30, 1903. 
27Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 30, 1903; Vicksburg Herald, June 30, 1903. 
28Vicksburg Herald, June 30, 1903. 
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of Negro officeholders in Mississippi. One particular incident pro-
voked such an outburst. "It is said that men follow the bent of their 
genius," he said, "and that prenatal influences are often potent in 
shaping thoughts and ideas of after life. Probably old lady Roosevelt, 
during the period of gestation, was frightened by a dog and that 
fact may account for the qualities of the male pup which are so 
prominent in Teddy." He did not wish, he said, to do either an in-
justice, "but I am disposed to apologize to the dog for mentioning 
it."29 The anti-Vardaman press professed to be shocked by the re-
mark. The Natchez Democrat thought it "beyond the pale of human 
conception" that anyone could vote for Vardaman after reading it. 
The Jackson Evening News played up the southern origin of Roose-
velt's mother and apologized to the country for the insult. The 
Meridian News thought the remark "inexcusable," which it was.80 
The urban press was almost unanimous in its condemnation of 
Vardaman's program. Its opposition had the same utilitarian flavor 
expressed by Critz and Noel. The Biloxi Herald regarded Vardaman 
as "the most dangerous man that ever aspired to the governorship of 
MisSissippi." It was unwise, the editor thought, to excite irrational 
prejudice against the Negro farm laborer. "Anything that disturbs 
this labor disturbs values and begets stagnation."31 "Every white 
farmer knows," said the Hazelhurst Courier, "that negro labor is 
the best that can be had." Vardaman's agitation, it feared, was cal-
culated to disorganize this labor "who are [now] docile and con-
tented." Then the farms in both the hills and the Delta would be 
abandoned and land values would drop and taxation would begin to 
increase.32 
Vardaman's opponents derided his warning that the state was 
threatened with "mongrelization." "What home is threatened," 
asked the Natchez Democrat, "with social equality with the negro? 
Let every voter ask himseH, is the negro obtaining social equality at 
his home?" All this "hubbub" was "something conjured up by its 
29Affidavits charged that the quotation was published in Vardaman's paper, the 
Greenwood Commonwealth, Jan. 10, 1903. See Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 27, 
1903. 
8oJackson Evening News, July 27, 1903; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 1, 1903; and 
ibid., quoting Meridian Press. 
31Biloxi Herald, quoted in Natchez Democrat, June 16, 1903. 
32HazeIhurst Courier, quoted, ibid., May 17, 1903. 
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agitator upon which to ride into office."33 Bishop Charles B. Gallo-
way, an eminent Methodist, joined in the attack. He canvassed the 
state in an effort to discredit Vardaman. "With every executive, 
judicial and legislative office of the state in the hands of the white 
people," he said, "and with suffrage qualifications that have prac-
tically eliminated the negro from political affairs, the old slogan 
[of Negro domination] is the emptiest of cant."34 
There were reports that several papers which had begun the 
campaign supporting Vardaman and Money were "cooling off" 
because of the racial issue. By late June the Hattiesburg Progress 
had turned completely over and was predicting defeat for both 
Money and Vardaman. The Pl'Ogress attributed this to "Vardaman's 
negro issue" which had pulled him down, and 'fie has pulled down 
Mr. Money along with him." The Vicksburg American and the Jack-
son News were also reported to have left Vardaman-Money ranks.35 
If the editors were leaving Vardaman, the people did not seem to 
, be doing so. Great and enthusiastic crowds were Hocking to hear 
him speak. This was admitted by his enemies, but it did not seem to 
give them much concern. The crowds were made up, they said, of 
poor whites who were "disqualified [from voting] by the same clause 
which disqualifies the negro."36 Let the rabble howl its head off. 
Only votes would count in the end. 
The Vicksburg Herald was one of the few urban papers to sup-
port Vardaman throughout the campaign. Its editor, J. S. McNeily, 
himself a member of the franchise committee of the 1890 convention, 
said the plan of dividing school funds between the races according 
to the amounts each paid barely escaped adoption in the convention. 
ACcording to him, S. S. Calhoon, W. T. Martin, Anselm McLaurin, 
and many other conservatives voted for it. The Herald denied that 
recent outrages against Negroes were caused by Vardaman's incen-
diary speeches. Rather were they due to Governor Longino's failure 
to take action to check them. It quoted from a Chicago paper show-
ing that Mississippi had had six Negro lynchings during Longino's 
33Natchez Democrat, July 14, 1903. 
84Charles B. Galloway, Great Men and Great Movements (Nashville, 1914), 127. 
35Natchez Democrat, May 14, June 16, 20, 1903; ibid., quoting Meridian Press, 
Hazelhurst Courier, Biloxi Herald, and Hattiesburg Progress. 
36Natchez Democrat, July 2, 1903; ibid., quoting Biloxi Herald. 
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administration, none of which evoked one word of condemnation 
from the governor.37 
Under the new primary law a candidate who obtained a plurality 
of votes in any county was entitled to the electoral vote of that 
county. If he could get a majority of electoral votes, even by a 
plurality of popular votes, he would win the nomination. Thus, with 
three or more candidates in the field, it was theoretically possible 
for a candidate to win the nomination without receiving a majority 
vote in any county. The possibility of this was foreseen by the 
candidates and figured in their plans. Critz and Noel feared that 
Vardaman might win the nomination in this way, and they made an 
arrangement to prevent it. Vardaman's committee in Hinds County 
got hold of and published a letter from Critz's headquarters urging 
Critz supporters in Hinds to throw their votes to Noel there in order 
to keep Vardaman from carrying the county's electoral vote' by 
plurality. 38 
Although Vardaman received a plurality of the total state vote, 
he did not have a majority of either popular or electoral votes, and 
a second primary was necessary. Noel, the low man of the three, 
was eliminated.39 
The racial issue was carried into the senatorial campaign. 
Longino was endorsed by most of the Negro politicians of the state, 
and he also had, as governor, more pleasant relations with President 
Roosevelt than his opponents deemed proper. His brother-in-law, 
Edgar S. Wilson, was a Republican, and Roosevelt had appOinted 
him referee in bankruptcy for Mississippi. During Longino's admin-
istration a controversy arose over the postoffice at Indianola, a 
small settlement in the Delta. Roosevelt had appointed a Negress 
postmistress there, and the residents had boycotted the office, refus-
ing to accept their mail from her. Finally the federal government had 
closed the office, and the residents were put to the inconvenience of 
journeying a dozen or so miles to a neighboring village for their mail. 
As a result of all this, Longino and McLaurin were charged with 
87Vicksburg Herald, June 27, July 1, 31, 1903; ibid., quoting Chicago Inter-
Ocean. 
38Vicksburg Herald, July 30, 1903; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 1, 1903; Macon 
Beacon, Aug. 8, 1903. 
39Biennial Report of the Secretary of State to the Legislature, October 1, 1901 
to October 1, 1908 (Nashville, 1904), 119-20. 
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attempting to found a white man's Republican party, based on Negro 
suffrage. Longino was accused of appointing Negroes to office, and 
a circular charged that he had Negro blood in his veins. Longino 
ignored the latter charge but admitted appointing certain Negroes 
notaries public. He explained, however, that in all cases they were 
recommended by "representative citizens" and that he did not find 
out they were Negroes until after he had made the appointments. 
He refused to admit that the racial question was an issue and said 
he would not appeal to race prejudice to obtain office. The Negro'S 
status, he said, had been settled by the constitution, the constitution 
had been sustained by the courts, and the Negro had acquiesced in 
the settlement.40 
Longino did not abide by his promise to avoid appeals to race 
prejudice but later, in a speech at Natchez, taunted Senator Money 
with having voted for confirmation of Negro appointees in Missi-
sippi. He quoted a press report of a Senate speech in which Money 
was alleged to have said that he had never voted against the nomina-
tion of anybody, white or black, for any office in any state. Money 
denied having made the statement and a week later produced the 
C ongressionaZ Record for the date in question. The Record quoted 
him as saying that "if every colored man in the South twenty-one 
years of age had been graduated from the finest university in Europe 
or America he would not be fit for the obligation or duties of Amer-
ican citizenship."41 
The old charge which Barksdale had made against Money a 
dozen years before was revived. He was accused of having accepted, 
while chairman of the House Committee on Post Offices and Post-
Roads, a gift of $60,000 from the Pan-Electric Telephone Company 
to "persuade" Congress to invalidate the Bell patent. Money again 
admitted receiving the "loan" but denied that it was a bribe.42 The 
Money faction countered with the charge that judges appointed by 
McLaurin and Longino were openly campaigning for Longino and 
Critz and cited this as evidence of the need for an elective judiciary. 
40Vicksburg Golden Rule, Jan. 27, 1900; Vicksburg Herald, July 22, 30, 1903; 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Apr. 16, 25, 1901, Apr. 16, May 21, July 16, 1903. 
41Natchez Democrat, June 24, 30, 1903. 
42Vicksburg Herald, July 22, 1903; Hattiesburg Progress, quoted in Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, July 30, 1903. 
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The present system, it said, was dragging the bench down into the 
lowest depths of political corruption.43 
Longino lauded his administration for building and paying for 
the new $1,000,000 state capitol and in addition for retiring $400,000 
of state bonds.44 
A pusillanimous effort was made to raise class feeling against 
Money. He had had a controversy with a streetcar conductor in 
Washington over the payment of his fare, and Longino's friends 
used this as proof that ''his sympathy is not with the laboring peo-
ple." They called upon all workers to oppose him because of his 
caning of the "poor street car conductor, who was simply doing his 
duty-collecting the fare from the rich and poor alike. "46 
In answer to the opposition's charges of ring control, the Mc-
Laurin-Longino faction exposed alleged plans of the Money-Varda~ 
man crowd. Money was Vardaman's cousin and the father-in-law 
of Congressman Hill, who was supporting them both. Hill's law 
partner, Session, was a candidate for district-attorney. ''With Money 
re-elected to the ... Senate, Hill in Congress, Session district-
attorney, and Vardaman Governor," said the Delta Democrat, "there 
would be an oligarchy 'to beat the band'." But this was not all. 
Vardaman and Money planned, it said, "that Hill is to succeed 
Vardaman as Governor and that Vardaman is to succeed Money as 
Senator and that Session is to succeed Hill in Congress."46 
Money received a majority of the votes cast for senator in the 
first primary47 and thus did not have to enter the second primary. 
Those who had expected the primary to prevent trading in the 
old convention style were disappointed. "It is a matter of record," 
said the Natchez Democrat, "that constableships and other minor 
offices had been traded for governorship and senatorial votes." The 
Democrat did not condemn the practice, for it had "been done 
openly and above board."48 
In the second gubernatorial canvass, that between Vardaman and 
Critz, the air was filled with "rumors ... of combinations and deals 
43Vicksburg Herald, spring and summer, 1903; Sea Coast Beacon, quoted, ibid., 
July 14, 1903. 
44Macon Beacon, July 18, Aug. 1, 1903. 
45McComb City Enterprise, quoted in Natchez Democrat, July 2, 1903. 
46Delta Democrat, quoted in Natchez Democrat, June 9, 1903. 
4.7Report of Secretary of State, 1901-1908, pp. 119-20. 
48Natchez Democrat, Aug. 7, 1903. 
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of all sorts and kinds." There was a sensational rumor, shortly after 
the first primary, that Noel's forces had gone over to Vardaman 
"horse, foot, and dragoon," but this was denied by Noel and dis-
credited by Critz. "My vote shall go," said Noel, "to the candidate 
who best represents conservatism and who would be least willing to 
tear down the racial safeguards of our present constitution." Varda-
man's plurality over Critz in the first primary had been only four 
thousand and was almost twenty thousand short of a majority. If 
Noel could swing three-fourths of his follOwing to Critz, Vardaman 
would be defeated. The Critz forces were confident that this could 
be done.49 
Vardaman's hopes rested on the chance that Noel and Longino, 
who had been defeated by Money, could not swing their supporters 
to Critz. On the other hand, the Critz people claimed that Vardaman 
was the issue in the first primary and had then polled all his possible 
votes. Their candidate had Longino's and McLaurin's support in 
the first primary, and they proposed to keep it. McLaurin had again 
announced for Critz, but Longino was maintaining an unexplained 
silence. Still, Critz's backers were confident he would come around 
and with Noel's forces, which were really voting against Vardaman 
rather than for Noel in the first primary, throw the balance in 
Critz's favor.50 
One daily paper, the Vicksburg Herald, and most of the weeklies 
backed Vardaman. The Natchez Democrat, Greenville Democrat, 
Meridian Press, Vicksburg American, Holly Springs South, and West 
Point Leader supported Critz. The Clarion, which found it difficult 
to choose between Noel and Critz after its own candidate, Fox, had 
withdrawn from the first canvass, now took off its wraps and went 
to work for Critz. 51 
According to the Clarion it was a struggle between the radical 
and conservative elements of the state. It made urgent appeals to 
Noel's following to back Critz solidly. In the first primary the anti-
Vardaman forces had been divided. If they now united, as the in-
49Ibid., Aug. 4, 9, 11, 12, 16, 1903; Macon Beacon, Aug. 15, 1903; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, June 25, Aug. 13, 20, 1903; ibid., June 25, 1903, quoting Meridian 
Press and Yazoo City Herald. 
50Natchez Democrat, Aug. 4, 11, 16, 1903; Macon Beacon, Aug. 13, 1903; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 20, 1903. 
61Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 13, 20, 1903. 
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exorable logic of the situation called for them to do, the conserva-
tive cause would triumph. Editor R. H. Henry urged every friend 
and advocate of safe, conservative government to bestir himself. 
"See that the voters are organized in every county, district, and elec-
tion precinct," he said, «and that on election day they cast their 
ballots for Judge Critz." Critz, he said, stood for the conservative 
business element of the state. Unlike Vardaman, he was a gallant 
old Confederate soldier and would make a model governor.52 
The Vardaman press denied that the struggle was one between 
conservatism and radicalism. "No fallacy could be more palpable," 
said the Vicksburg Herald, "than that conservatism is for Critz, while 
radicalism is for Vardaman." It pOinted out that Vardaman had the 
support of wealthy planters such as Charles Scott in Bolivar County 
and Leroy Percy in Washington and that Vardaman had carried both 
those conservative counties in the first primary. It condemned the 
inconsistency of Critz's position on the Negro, who was already 
eliminated from Mississippi politics. "Judge Critz," it said, "is no 
more disposed to change this state of affairs than would be Major 
Vardaman."53 
The Clarion answered with a denunciation of the extreme and 
increasing appeals to race prejudice made by Vardaman. It ex-
pressed fear that Negroes would move out of the state, leaving the 
Delta plantations and the lumber districts of south Mississippi with-
out an adequate labor supply. Like its candidate, it urged no change 
in the Negro's status. On the contrary it exulted over the fact that 
the Negro was so repressed that Vardaman's program was unneces-
sary. The Negro, it said, was practically excluded from the ballot 
box and the jury box; he was separated from the whites at hotels, 
theaters, and all public conveyances; and he was given only "a small 
proportion of the school funds, less than what he pays himself, and 
even this is administered by the whites."54 Not one word of disap-
proval had the Clarion or any other anti-Vardaman paper for such 
conditions. Instead of joining issue with Vardaman and demanding 
more money for Negro education, they contented themselves with 
calling Vardaman "demagogue" because he argued that spending 
52Ibid., Aug. 13, 20, 1903; ibid., quoting New Orleans Times-Democrat. 
58Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 14, 15, 1903; ibid., quoting Memphis Commercial 
Appeal. 
54Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 20, 1903. 
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money for Negro education in Mississippi was useless and harmful. 
Certain Negro leaders added fuel to Vardaman's fire by foolishly 
addressing circulars to members of their race urging them to "call 
on some white friend, in a nice and polite way, and ask him to vote 
for Judge Critz." The Vicksburg Herald rather incongruously 
branded this as an attempt at intimidation of the white voter by the 
Negro. Word was spread that Negroes were for Critz and had 
agreed that "now is the time for us to act." This was viewed by the 
Natchez Democrat as a very smooth scheme of Vardaman's to gamer 
more votes. "What act is the negro expected to perform," it asked, 
"in an election for the nomination of the Democratic candidate for 
Governor?" A report also was spread by the Vardaman camp that 
President Roosevelt, who was not popular in Mississippi, had said he 
would give a year's salary to defeat "that man Vardaman down in 
Mississippi."55 "~i.~ 
On the eve of the election the Clarion suddenly realized that 
many extraneous issues had been lugged into the campaign that had 
no business there. "The negro, Roosevelt, his southern appointees, 
imaginery rings, etc., have been called upon to do service, and they 
have been used to great advantage." A half-dozen years later it felt 
that these "extraneous issues" were the deciding factor in the result. 
They stirred up feeling, it said, "appealing ... to the passion, preju-
dice, and ignorance of man."56 
The election was a victory for Vardaman. It was generally 
agreed by the opposition that his election was due to the revival of 
the white supremacy question. Critz thought that it was, although 
he denied that such an issue actually existed between him and Var-
daman. "Everybody knows," he said, "that I believe in the divine 
right of the white man to rule, to do all the voting, and to hold all 
the offices, both state and federal."57 Others thought that "things 
supposed to have been said and done by President Roosevelt" had 
influenced the result.58 
What does seem obvious is that the primary itself was the new 
factor in Mississippi politics and in this election. Previous nomina-
tions had been won by wirepulling within the party hierarchy. Can-
55Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 25, 1903; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 20, 25, 1903. 
56Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 3, 1903, Mar. 17, 1910. 
57Ibid., Sept. 10, 1903. 
58Review of Reviews, editorial, XXVIII (1903),403. 
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didates had, as a rule, to follow the dictates of the party chieftains, 
and the best manipulator generally won. Vardaman seems not to 
have been adept at that art. He had failed twice to win the nomina-
tion from the convention, and it was almost assured that he would 
have lost it under such a system in 1903. But it was a different story 
when he got before an audience of ordinary men. His magnetism 
and his oratory drew them to his support. While his opponents 
were addressing their hundreds, he was speaking to thousands at 
county fairs and church festivals. Even in the opposition stronghold, 
Jackson, his audiences were said to be greater than the combined 
audiences of his opponents. It may have been that the racial issue 
drew some of his hearers, but more likely they came because he 
made them feel that he was one of them. He was simply a better 
actor and gave a better show than his adversaries. 
One other factor in the election was indicated by the returns. 
The Populist party had been strongest in the rural areas and weakest 
in the cities. In the election of 1903, and in all later ones in which he 
was a candidate, Vardaman's strongest support came from the 
country districts. Moreover, he carried most of the counties where 
the Populists had been strongest a decade before.159 The fact that 
the Populists instead of being hostile to Negro suHrage had en-
couraged it makes it difficult to explain Vardaman's election as a 
result merely of the anti-Negro portion of his platform. Perhaps 
his social reform program had as much to do with it. 
159McCain, "The Populist Party," 144-47. 
CHAPTER XIV 
SOCIAL REFORM 
WRITING on the eve of the election some anti-Vardaman papers 
admitted that they had overplayed the racial feature of Var-
daman's program. «Whether Critz or Vardaman attains suzerainty 
today," said the Port Gibson Reveille, «the negroes of Mississippi are 
perfectly safe and assured of good government and protection." 
The sentiment was echoed by the Vardaman press a few days later. 
"The victory," they said, " ... conveys no menace to any class or 
color of good citizens. Now that the election clamor is over no 
more will be heard of this."l 
In his inaugural Vardaman's views on the Negro received less 
attention than many had expected after the radical tone of his cam-
paign utterances. Admitting that "little can be done to relieve the 
present most undesirable conditions . . . while the Constitution re-
mains as it is," he recommended that a constitutional amendment be 
submitted to the people vesting all control of education in the legis-
lature. But the problem would "ultimately be settled and settled 
justly, protecting alike the interests of the negro and the white 
man." Forty years experience, he said, had proved that the Negro 
was unsuited for the same type of education the white man received. 
Literate Negroes were criminally inclined, and it was folly for the 
whites to tax themselves to create criminals.2 
But a majority of the legislature was not in sympathy with 
Vardamans and refused to act on his suggestion. When it recon-
vened in 1906 he repeated his former request. "It is your function," 
he told them, "to put a stop to the worse than wasting a half million 
dollars annually-money taken from the toiling white men and 
women of MisSisSippi-and devoted to the vain purpose of trying 
to make something of the negro which the Great Architect . . . 
failed to prOvide for in the original plan of creation." Since the 
supply of money was not unlimited, he said, every dollar invested 
for Negro education, under the present system, was an "indefensible 
lPort Gibson Reveille, quoted in Vicksburg Herald, Sept. 1, 1903. 
2Mississippi, House Journal, 1904, pp. 151-53. 
SA. S. Coody, Biographical Sketches of James Kimble Vardaman (Jackson, 1922), 
23. 
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and unwarranted prodigality of cash. It is a crime against the white 
man who furnishes the dollar, and a disadvantage to the negro up-
on whom it is spent."4 
Vardaman was not content with the restriction placed on Negro 
voting by the 1890 constitution and urged outright repeal of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the federal Constitution. 
The Negro, he said, was congenitally unqualified to exercise this 
responsible duty. He was physically, mentally, morally, racially, 
and eternally inferior to the white man. There was nothing in the 
history of his race, "nothing in his individual character, nothing in 
his achievements of the past nor his promise of the future" which 
would entitle him "to stand, side by side with the white man at the 
ballot box."5 
It was charged that Vardaman's incendiary utterances were 
responsible for outbreaks of violence against the Negroes. During 
the 1903 campaign two Negroes were burned at the stake in Sun-
flower County, and Vardaman was accused of being an accessory, 
through his speeches, to the horrible deed. The Vardaman press 
condemned the atrocity and, after the election, pointed to the fact 
that the county went heavily against Vardaman and that he had 
little influence there. Vardaman, it said, was responsible only in 
the sense that every citizen of Mississippi was responsible.6 
Mer his inauguration Vardaman continued his attacks on the 
"criminal tendencies" of the Negro. In an address to the peace 
officers of the state in 1905 he warned them of impending trouble. 
The great number of "criminal negroes" who were drifting into the 
cities, he said, "seeking a way to live without honest toil," had be-
come a "menace to the safety of the white man's home."1 Never 
before had the whites been confronted with such a problem. 
Despite Vardaman's tirades against the Negro there is no evi-
dence that lynching increased during his administration. He had 
given a "quaSi-defense" of lynching during the campaign, and later 
called it "the natural product of unnatural conditions."8 Yet, dur-
ing his first year as governor, he called out the militia, at a cost of 
'MisSissippi, House Journal, 1906, pp. 23-25. 
5lbid., 26-27. 
6Vicksburg Herald, Feb. 17, 1904. 
1Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 16, 1905. 
8Jackson IsStle, Nov. 14, 1908. 
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$250,000, ordered special trains, took personal command, and 
rushed to Washington County to protect two Negroes threatened 
with mob action. It was later admitted by the Natchez Democrat 
that at the time "almost every white man in the state indulged the 
hope that the mobs would do their work."9 His action in this case 
drew the unstinted praise of the national press.lO 
Aside from one instance of alleged brutality toward a trusty 
convict servant, which Vardaman denied, no charges of animus 
toward individual Negroes were made against Vardaman. A friend-
ly writer reported that he noted not a whit of difference in the 
governor's attitude toward "the negro and an influential white 
man." "All negroes who know him," he added, "admire him 
devotedly. . . . His colored servants are intensely loyal to him."ll 
Vardaman vetoed an appropriation of $2,200 for the Negro school 
at Holly Springs,12 but in general it seems that little was done to 
change the status of the Mississippi Negro during his administra-
tion. 
Of much greater importance was his social reform program. In 
his first message to the legislature he recommended higher pay for 
judges; equalization of tax assessments; establishment of state 
depositories for state funds; abolition of the penitentiary Board of 
Control and entrustment of the management of the penitentiary 
to a separate department under one man; abolition of the "school 
book trust"; and the sale of the governor's mansion, the governor 
to furnish his own home.lS The legislature responded but luke-
warmly to most of these reforms and adjourned without accom-
plishing anything "radical." It was still dominated by the black 
counties and was not a "reform" legislature. Vardaman apparently 
did not exert much pressure upon it. Measures were passed easing 
restrictions on insurance companies and permitting a merger of 
the Mobile and Ohio with the Southern Railroad, but Vardaman 
vetoed both of these. Throughout the first session of the legislature 
9Vicksburg Herald, Mar. I, 1904; National Cyclopedia, XIII, 495; Natchez 
Democrat, July 4, 1911. 
lONew York Times, Brooklyn Eagle, Chicago Tribune, and others, quoted in 
Vicksburg Herald, Mar. I, 1904. 
llGarrard Harris, "A Defense of Governor Vardaman," in Harper's Weekly, XLIX 
(1905), 238. 
IllMississippi. House lournal, 1904, pp. 840-48. 
18IbId., 142-55. 
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the Vicksburg Herald, Vardaman's conservative backer, exulted 
over the fact that the governor had failed to exhibit much radi-
calism, which was as it had predicted.14. 
For some time it had been charged that the American Book 
Company had a monopoly of the schoolbook business. Selection of 
books had been left to the state superintendent of education, and 
changes were frequent. Responding to the governor's request, the 
legislature of 1904 created a state textbook commission with power 
to contract for books by competitive bid. The commission went 
to work immediately, and within a year the control of the American 
Book Company was broken. It had sold 80 per cent of the school 
books in Mississippi in 1903, but in 1905 it drew only 20 per cent 
of the contracts. Moreover the new books were considerably 
cheaper and were adopted for a five-year period, whereas former 
adoptions had been subject to change annually. Commenting on 
the work of the commission, the Clarion, an anti-administration 
paper, admitted that there had been "no suspicion here, no intima-
tion of crooked business." "Of course," it added, "the firms that 
lost out heavily are badly disappointed and their representatives ... 
have been beefing considerably."15 
During Vardaman's administration Frank Burkitt, who had re-
turned to the Democratic fold, was leading a fight in the legislature 
for more funds for common schools and less for higher education. 
Vardaman, while not openly siding with Burkitt, seems to have 
sympathized with his view.16 Burkitt submitted figures shOwing 
that per capita cost at the state agricultural college and at the state 
university was from four to eight times as great as in the state's 
private colleges and forty times greater than the common school 
per capita. The common schools, he said, were the poor man's only 
university. The sons of the rich were the only ones who were able 
to take advantage of the higher educational facilities, and it was 
unjust to tax the poor to support them. Moreover, he said, the 
agricultural college was failing to improve Mississippi agriculture. 
According to him, only 95 graduates of the college at Starkville 
were actively engaged in agriculture, and 41 of those were em-
14Vicksburg Herald, Jan.~Mar .• 1904, Jan. 3, 4. 1906; Mississippi. HOUle 1ouf'1l4l. 
1906. pp. 45-50. 
15Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 15. 1905. 
16See Biennial Message in Mississippi, HOUle 1ouf'1l4l. 1906. p. M. 
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ployed at the college.17 In Vardaman's last legislature Burkitt 
secured the adoption of a rider to the appropriation bill reducing 
the salary of the president of the college from $5,000 to $3,500. The 
trustees ignored the rider as unconstitutional. This action by the 
trustees drew Vardaman's condemnation, and he predicted that the 
next legislature would greatly reduce the college's appropriation.1S 
In his 1906 message to the legislature Vardaman again pointed 
out the inequity of the tax system. He urged taxation of money, 
notes, and similar forms of property. Railroads, factories, telegraph 
and telephone lines, he thought, should be taxed upon their "real 
value ... just as the farmer's home is taxed." He also urged creation 
of the office of bank examiner to insure proper care of depOSitors' 
interests.19 At this session a bill was passed permitting corporations 
to own ten million dollars worth of real estate. The existing law 
restricted them to one tenth of this, and the new bill had been 
passed at the behest of companies who were engaged in exploiting 
the timber forests of south Mississippi. Vardaman vetoed the bill. 
In his veto message he said that the greatest need of Mississippi 
was more landlords and fewer tenants. He would like to see "the 
great delta plantations cut up into small farms and owned by white 
men who "till the soil." He had no objection, he said, to large 
lumber mill investments, but he did object to their owning the 
land. That, he said, would result in a monopoly not only of lumber 
but of land after the lumber was cut. "If the Legislature had under-
taken in de:6nite terms to create a lumber trust," he said, he could 
not conceive of a more effective method than this measure. Its 
result would be "to close the door of opportunity and hope in the 
face of the struggling youth of the state, and make of them toilers 
of the favored rich." He urged that land remain in the hands of 
the farmers and that they sell only the lumber rights to the corpora-
tions.20 
Vardaman took a humanitarian attitude toward the state's wards. 
In an age when the insane and feeble-minded were still callously 
regarded by many, his pleas for their better care were quite un-
usual. Although unable to get from the legislature sufficient funds 
17Jackson I8sue, Mar. 7, 1908. 
18Mississippi, House Journal, 1908, pp. 700-701; Jackson I8sue, May 2, 1908. 
19Mississippi, House Journal, 1906, pp. 27-28, 35. 
20Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1906, p. 1091. 
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to carry out the building program which he urged, he instituted 
refonns in the treatment of inmates at the state asylum. In the 
words of one of his admirers, "He found the asylum a mad house 
and converted it into an institution for the treatment of the men-
tally sick."21 In his 1908 message he urged greatly increased ap-
propriations to institutions for the insane, the blind, and the deaf 
and dumb. When the leg~ature failed to meet the request he 
attributed its inaction to "a disposition to magnify the importance 
and value of the dollar and minimize the value of a human soul." 
In this message he also called attention to the ravages of tuber-
culosis among the poor of the state and recommended building a 
tuberculosis hospital. He also recommended building a school for 
the benefit of the state's feeble-minded children.22 Not for several 
years were such recommendations to be carried into execution, but 
Vardaman was the first politician vividly to call attention to the 
needs of the unfortunates. 
The most striking of Vardaman's refonns pertained to the peni-
tentiary. In ante-bellum days crime had been no great social prob-
lem. Slaves, comprising considerably more than half the state's 
population, were under their masters' supervision and rarely had 
to be dealt with by the courts. With the freeing of the slaves and 
the growth of towns in the postwar period, there was a great in-
crease in petty thievery and violence, and means had to be found 
to deal with it. The state penitentiary was far from adequate for 
the growing number of convicts, and an act of 1876 authorized the 
Penitentiary Board to lease the convicts as laborers to individuals. 
The lessee was to furnish the convicts with food, clothing, and 
medicines and to pay the state for them at the monthly rate of $1.10 
a person.23 Under this act the firm of French and Jobes acted as a 
general broker, leasing all the state's convicts and subleasing them 
to others at increased rates. Within a year they had 321 convicts 
stationed on ten plantations in Washington, Coahoma, Issaquena, 
and Bolivar counties.24 Ten years later French and Jobes had been 
succeeded by Hamilton and Hoskins, and then by Hamilton and 
Company, who continued to lease convicts from the state and sub-
21Watkins, Address, May 17, 1936, p. 14, in Mississippi Deparbnent of Archives 
and History. 
22Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1908, pp. 29, 47-49, 50, 53. 
28Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1876, p. 602; House Journal, 1876, p. 613. 
24Jackson Weekly Clarion, Jan. 3, 1877. 
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lease them to plantation owners and railroad contractors. Vast 
sums of money were made out of these leases, but it is doubtful if 
the state always received its pittance. In 1887 it was charged and 
proved that Hamilton and Company was indebted to the state some 
$80,000, although Attorney-General T. C. Catchings had certified 
that they had paid all their dues. When Governor Lowry, too, 
denied that the lessee owed the state fW the convicts, he, Catchings, 
and Hamilton were charged by the Chickasaw Messenger with 
conspiracy to defraud the state.25 
Compared to the treatment accorded these convicts, an over-
whelming majority of whom were Negroes, slavery was a mild and 
humane institution. Even in cases where no personal affection 
existed between the master and his slave, the latter had been a 
valuable chattel whose welfare coincided with the owner's interest. 
The death or incapacity of the slave resulted in considerable loss 
to the master. Under the convict-lease system no such conditions 
existed. The fact that the convict was a pariah precluded any likeli-
hood of personal affection between him and the lessee. The absence 
of any property interest in the convict discouraged the lessee's in-
terest in his welfare. If he were sick or disabled, he was replaced by 
a healthy substitute. Were he to die, there seemed an inexhaustible 
supply always available. Under such a system economy would call 
for the greatest exaction of labor from the convict in return for 
the least expenditure for his welfare, and such seems to have been 
the practice. 
In the summer of 1887 the grand jury of Hinds County inspected 
the penitentiary hospital in Jackson. It found there twenty-six 
inmates lately returned from farms and railroads, some with con-
sumption, some with their backs cut in "great wales, scars, and 
blisters." Some had frostbitten hands and feet, and all had "the 
stamp of manhood almost blotted out of their faces." The jury was 
convinced that the convicts had been more cruelly treated than 
"a nation of savages ought to permit." "They are lying there dying," 
said the report, "some of them on bare boards, so poor and 
emaciated that their bones almost come through their skin." The 
jurymen reported seeing live vermin crawling over their faces and 
said the little bedding and clothing furnished them was in tatters 
and stiff with filth. The report closed with a condemnation of a 
25Chickasaw Messenger, July 7, 14, 1887; Jackson Weekly Clarion, July 16. 1887. 
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system which "takes a poor creature's liberty and [turns] him over 
to one whose interest it is to coin his blood into money."26 
The exposure by the Hinds jury caused a temporary revulsion 
against the leaSing system. The Chickasaw Messenger called it "a 
stain upon our manhood, a blot upon our civilization, and a stigma 
upon the Christianity we profess." Convicts, it reported, were 
"tortured out of all semblance to human beings; their sufferings 
are such that the realities of a brimstone Inferno would be a wel-
come relief." Humanity, said the Natchez Democrat, demanded a 
change. "There is a barbarism existing among us, as dark and shame-
ful as ever disgraced a civilized people."27 Statistics compiled for 
the years 1881-1885 showed an annual mortality rate among 
Mississippi convicts of more than 11 per cent. For the same period 
in New Hampshire, Ohio, Iowa, and Illinois it was slightly over 
1 per cent.28 At some periods the rate in Mississippi rose above 17 
per cent and rarely dropped below 10 per cent. "This brutal sys-
tem," concluded a historian of the subject, "left its trail of dishonor 
and of death which could only find a parallel in some of the persecu-
tions of the Middle Ages."29 
Reaction against the system resulted in the prohibition of further 
leases by the constitution of 1890.80 A new system was soon evolved, 
however, to circumvent the constitutional ban. Under this system 
the state Penitentiary Board leased lands from individuals and 
worked them with convict labor The plantation owner was left, 
however, in direct violation of the constitution, to manage the 
leased lands, and in practice the scheme was the same as the former 
one. The big difference was in the amount of the state's profit. 
The new contracts prOvided for an equal division of profits between 
state and landowner. In 1896 one black county editor reported the 
new system no longer an "experiment," but on the contrary 
26Report of Hinds County grand jury, quoted in Macon Beacon, July 16, 1887; 
Chickasaw Messenger, July 14, 1887; Jackson Weekly Clarion, July 12, 1887. See 
also Report of the House Committee to Investigate the State Penitentiary, in Missis-
sippi, H0fJ88 Journal, 1888, Appendix. 
27Chickasaw Messenger, Mar. 10, July 14, 21, Oct. 20, 1887; Natchez Democrat, 
Jan. 17, 1889. 
28Chickasaw Messenger, Oct. 20, 1887. 
29J. H. Jones, "History of the Measures Submitted to the Committee on Peni-
tentiary in the Constitutional Convention of 1890," in Mississippi Historical Society, 
Publicatiofl8, II (1899), 112. 
80Mississippi Constitution, 1890, Art. X, Sees. 223-226. 
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"eminently successful." There were nearly a thousand convicts 
working on state-leased plantations, and the net profit to the state 
that year was more than $56,000. Two years later the state's share 
was reported at more than $150,000.31 
As might be expected, competition soon developed among 
plantation owners for use of convicts on their lands, and political 
influence was used to win awards. "I want you to give Capt. 
Jenkins a talk for me before the Board of Control contracts to work 
the prisoners next year," wrote Governor McLaurin's brother to 
him. He wanted "about 250 of them" to work "our place on shares." 
Jenkins, he said, wanted the state to lease the land for cash and 
keep all the profits, but "I think it best for the state to work land on 
shares." He urged the governor to say nothing of the request "un-
til I see you or until Walter or Sidney [other brothers of the gover-
nor] explains what I want." In order to avoid criticism he agreed 
to ecfix them in [the] name of another party."S2 
H the state's profits increased under the new system, it is doubt-
ful if the convicts' living conditions improved. Too frequently they 
were set to clearing malaria-infested swamps. A medical examiner 
visiting one of the Delta prison camps in 1896 reported finding 
seventeen emaciated consumptives who had been confined in the 
rude camp for weeks with malarial fever. The camp surroundings 
were, he reported, unsanitary and filthy.3s 
In 1902 criticism of the new system resulted in a legislative in-
vestigation. The report of the committee scored the handling of 
the penitentiary business by the Board of Control. This body was 
made up of the governor, the attorney-general, and the three rail-
road commissioners. The legislators reported the penitentiary books 
in such shape that it was impossible to ascertain with any degree 
of accuracy the results of the Board's operations. Some accounts 
were credited with sums ecfor labor of convicts," with no record of 
the number of convicts, the nature of the work, or with whom con-
tracted. The books also, the report charged, failed to show pay-
ments for a very large proportion of the convicts' labor on the 
81Macon Beacon, Feb. 15, 1896; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 27, 1897, Feb. S, 
1898. 
82H. J. McLaurin to A. J. McLaurin, Nov. 4, 1895, Letters of Governors, Series 
E,99. 
83Report of R. D. Farish, M. D., to Penitentiary Board of Control, May 23, 1896. 
Letters of Governors, Series E, 110. 
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various farms to which they were leased.34 The evils complained 
of, said the Vicksburg Herald, ran back to the end of the Stone 
administration. The Herald thought the new revelations, however, 
"the worst [scandal] in the history of the state." The practical con-
clusiveness of the report was apparent since all members of the 
committee had signed it. "To all appearances," the newspaper said, 
"the award of convicts has been pretty deep in Delta politics." There 
were some significant changes of farm leases prior to the 1899 and 
1900 campaigns-CCchanges that caused no little talk when followed 
by election incidents and results that were thought to have been 
thus influenced." The Herald suggested that convict awards were 
"poisoned and perverted to promote the fortunes of faction leaders." 
One of the wardens, grilled by the committee, admitted that politics 
was involved in the making of leases.35 
The Clarion, an administration paper, admitted that loose man-
agement and unbusinesslike methods were used and that it was 
impossible to learn from the books what the Board's transactions 
had been. "Large tracts of land," it said, "have been cleared by 
convict labor for various parties with whom the board ... had no ... 
contracts whatever, and in whose lands the state had no interest 
whatever." The cashbook, supposed to contain all cash transactions 
from 1896 to 1902, had only 110 pages. The Herald charged that 
more than $400,000 had been stolen from the state during Mc-
Laurin's term as governor.a6 When Longino came to his defense, 
he too was criticized. 
Although the committee had made a unanimous report, the leg-
islature refused to adopt it.37 The 1904 legislature was still domi-
nated by the McLaurin-Longino element, and it refused to act on 
Vardaman's recommendation that the Board of Control be abolished 
and that an entirely new system of penitentiary management be 
instituted. 
When the 1906 legislature convened Vardaman was in the midst 
of a legal suit with the Board of Control, all of whom, excepting 
84Report of joint legislative investigation committee, in Mississippi, H0U86 Tournai, 
1902, pp. 58-67. 
85Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 9, 15, 22, 1902. See also committee report in Missis-
sippi, H0U86 TournaI, 1902, pp. 64-65. 
86Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 16, Feb. 6, 20, 1902; Vicksburg Herald, July 7, 
1907. 
87Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 6, 1902; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 6, 1904. 
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himseH, were members of the McLaurin faction. The Board, over 
his protest, had leased State Senator H. J. McLaurin's Sandy Bayou 
plantation. When the attorney-general refused to file an injunction 
against the Board's execution of the contract, Vardaman brought 
suit himseH. The lower court upheld Vardaman, but the state 
supreme court reversed the decision and dismissed the injunction. 
S. S. Calhoon and Jeff Truly, both McLaurin appointees to the 
court, gave the majority opinion, while A. H. Whitfield, Vardaman's 
appointee, dissented.88 
Vardaman devoted a large part of his legislative message to the 
evils of the penitentiary system. He reviewed its history and rang 
the changes on all the evils that had grown out of it. He cited the 
folly of the state's neglecting its own valuable lands while contract-
ing with a state senator to work his Delta plantation on shares. He 
used the report of the legislative investigating committee of 1902 
to show instances where the state had in some cases paid in ad-
vance six dollars an acre a year; and in others had made money 
while dividing its profits with Delta plantation owners. "If the 
state can make money working a private individuafs land and giving 
that ... individual haH of the [profit], it can ... make more money 
working its own land and keeping the entire product," he said. 
He scored H. J. McLaurin, whose "fertile land, hypnotic power, 
political pull, and long enjoyment of a robust share of the revenue 
arising from convict labor, seems to have clothed him with the 
modem brand of divine right to the perpetuation of that special 
privilege."89 
Vardaman seemed not as concerned with the economics of the 
system, however, as with its inhumanity. Money had been made in 
the past, it was true, but it had been "money coined out of the 
blood and tears of the Unfortunate convicts." The prime purpose 
of the penitentiary, he said, had been overlooked by the Board of 
Control. Instead of being conducted for the benefit of the con-
victs-"a kind of moral hospital, where the moral cripples could be 
treated" -the question of money-making for the favored few had 
been the chief end. "I am more interested," he said, "in the salva-
tion of men than 1 am in hoarding gold." What if the convict was 
88Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 14, 21, 1905, Jan . .25, Mar. 8, 1906; Vicksburg 
Herald, Jan. 3, 31, 1906. 
89Mississippi, House Journal, 1906, pp. 17-19. 
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a "low-bred, vulgar creature, congenitally corrupt, inured to phy-
sical and moral filth, brutal and inhuman treatment?" So much 
greater his need of "kindly treatment, a decent bed to sleep on, and 
sanitary surrounding." He was there to be improved and not de-
graded. Vardaman saw man as "the creature of heredity and en-
vironment." Man's acts, he said, were "often the result of influence 
set in motion by the unconscious deeds of some forgotten ancestor." 
He urged that this should be borne in mind and a more charitable 
attitude taken toward the moral derelicts.4.0 
Vardaman did not think that the state's responsibility to the 
convict ended with improving conditions in the penitentiary. He 
pointed out the difficult and hopeless prospect which a released 
convict faced. "The brand is upon him, and the back of the world's 
hand is against him, even God's providence seems estranged." He 
urged setting aside portions of the products of the convict's toil, 
over and above the cost of conviction and keeping and maintaining 
him, for the use of his family or other dependents. If he had no 
dependents, Vardaman urged that the surplus be returned to the 
convict after he served his term. This might be the means of "giv-
ing him a start upward and of enabling him to become a useful 
citizen." Disclaiming sentimentalism or the seeking of Utopia for 
the convict, Vardaman insisted that "No man should be permitted 
to control or manage a convict, who is not an upright, honorable, 
intelligent and just man. . . . It is no place for the cheap, dingy 
demagogue and political striker. Partisan politics should be ab-
solutely eliminated from penitentiary management." He recalled 
that the manifest purpose of every warden in the past decade had 
been "to serve himself or a few partisan or political friends." Too 
often the office had been given as a reward for political activity. As 
a result, incapable and brutal men, placed in charge of convicts, 
had perpetrated acts "rivalling in brutality and fiendishness, the 
atrocities of ... Torquemada." At the same time "votes were con-
trolled in conventions and nominations made with the sole end in 
view of leasing some political dictator's delta plantation:'4.l 
Meanwhile a joint committee of the legislature had been at work 
investigating once more the penitentiary conditions. Their report 
drove home the need for the reforms which Vardaman was advocat-
4.0Ibid., 19-20. 
4.1Ibid.. 20-22. 
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ing. The committee found shocking conditions at the state's Oakley 
Farm. E. E. Jackson, the sergeant in charge, was operating an ad-
joining farm of his own with the labor of the convicts. These con-
victs were supposed to be ill and had been sent to Oakley to re-
cuperate. Through the connivance of the farm doctor, the con-
victs were retained after they were well and were worked by 
Jackson. When members of the Board defended Jackson it was 
shown that they, together with Anselm McLaurin, had received 
costly gifts from him. Although only thirty "patients" were at the 
farm, 12,740 morphine tablets and a barrel of whiskey were con-
sumed every forty days at Oakley. In the huge shack used as an 
incurable ward where a dozen Negroes were in a dying condition, 
all window glass was broken out and the patients were exposed to 
the wintry weather.42 
At the state's Rankin County farm the committee found con-
ditions even worse than at Oakley. It was a "nest of cruelty and 
graft." A drunken guard had recently "forced a convict trusty to 
cruelly murder a prisoner." Wagonloads of supplies were weekly 
sent from the farm to a neighboring hotel owned by a relative of 
Sergeant Puckett, the warden of the farm, and Puckett's horses were 
fed on the farm provender. "For neither pork, beef, vegetables or 
horse feed did the state ever receive a cent."43 
Spurred on by these revelations the legislature passed a bill 
eliminating the Board of Control and creating an elective commis-
sion of three, with a superintendent appointed by the governor. 
The legislature also prohibited the leasing of private lands for work-
ing the state convicts.44 
Vardaman's appeals and the report of the legislative committees 
had succeeded in stirring the conscience of the people. Able admin-
istrators were chosen by Vardaman and his successors-men who 
seemed to see the penal institution as a hospital for the morally 
sick. Never again were Mississippi's convicts to be subjected to the 
pre-1906 conditions. The state farm system was given a laudatory 
report by a legislative committee in 1912.45 Two years later a 
42Report of legislative investigating committee, in Mississippi, House Journal, 
1906, pp. 615-28, 916-18, 1328-29. For minority report of E. D. Cavette, see ibid., 
638-44. 
431bid., 916-18. 
"Mississippi, Laws, 1906, Chap. CXXXVII; Code, 1906, pp. 1012-13 
45Quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 8, 1912. 
SOCIAL REFORM 175 
Memphis paper reported the state's profits from its convict farms 
as $313,087 for the 1913-1914 season. Not only was the new system 
proving profitable financially, but the convicts were being trained 
in scientific methods of farming. "Here," said the Memphis editor, 
"is a school within itseU."'6 
Within a decade after the reform the system had won general 
praise. A GuU Coast editor, after a tour of inspection of the state 
farms in 1916, wrote a glowing account of the happy circumstances 
attending them. He praised Vardaman for his «wisdom and 
humanity" in eliminating the leasing system and substituting the 
working of the state's prisoners on state farms. The 1,700 convicts 
were humanely cared for, and the state was reaping big financial 
returns. Ten years before, he said, the Parchman farm had been 
an unbroken wilderness in SunHower County. Now its nearly 18,000 
acres were valued at $1,500,000. The other state farms in Rankin, 
Hinds, and Holmes counties had been old plantations worn by 
excessive cultivation when the state purchased them. They had 
all been wonderfully improved and were worth several times what 
the state paid for thein. Net profits for the year 1915 were 
$300,000,47 and the next year they were estimated at double that 
amount.'8 
In summarizing Vardaman's administration it would be well to 
review both the legislation which was sponsored by him and that 
which he opposed. He urged and obtained the enactment of laws 
(1) ending the leasing of convicts and improving their conditions; 
(2) increasing common-school appropriations almost 20 per cent 
and teachers' salaries almost 30 per cent; (3) creating a state text-
book commission which broke the monopoly of the American 
Book Company; and (4) regulating insurance companies, railroads, 
utilities, banks, manufacturers, and trusts. He opposed and vetoed 
measures (1) permitting corporations to hold $10,000,000 worth of 
real estate; (2) permitting a merger of the Southern Railroap with 
the Mobile and Ohio; and (3) permitting fire insurance companies 
to form a central bureau which would have resulted in monopolistic 
practices. In addition he advocated, but did not obtain at the time, 
(1) a reduction of the legal interest rate from 10 per cent to 8 per 
46Memphis Scimitar, quoted. ibid., June 23, 1914. 
47Pass Christian Coast Beacon, July 22, 1916. 
'8Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 16, 1916. 
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cent; (2) the creation of a state highway commission; (3) aid to 
cripples and unfortunates; (4) laws governing child labor; and (5) 
the building of a state school for the deaf and dumb.49 
A northern journalist touring Mississippi in 1908 to study the 
Negro's condition there reported that he heard "no one accuse 
[Vardaman] of corruption in any department of his administration." 
Some of the "best people," he said, were bitter in their opposition 
to him, but "on the whole, they said he had directed the business 
of the state with judgment." His own conclusion was that Vardaman 
had given the state the best administration it had ever had. 50 An 
admirer of Vardaman thought his administration was characterized 
by progressiveness and "great development in the state, a higher 
recognition of the rights of the individual, and greater service to the 
common man." It was also accompanied, he said, "by peace, honesty, 
and an increase of all those things which contribute to the happiness 
of the larger number of the people."51 An examination of the con-
temporary press failed to discover any dissent from this estimation. 
In his last message to the legislature Vardaman renewed his 
former request to submit to the voters a constitutional amendment 
on the school fund distribution. He also urged again a reapportion-
ment of legislative representation; an elective judiCiary; a child 
labor law; the establishment of state depositories; broader powers 
for the railroad commissioners; a further reduction in the interest 
rate; various public building improvements; and the establishment 
of a state charity hospital, an old women's home, an institute for 
feeble-minded children, and a normal school for teacher training.52 
The conservative editor of the Vicksburg Herald called the message 
a "Remarkable Document" and told Vardaman that "The whole 
state said to him, 'Well done, Thou good and faithful servant' ."58 
49Mississippi, House Journal, 1904, pp. 142-56; ibid., 1906, pp. 13-39, 45-50, 
1306-308; ibid., 1908, pp. 79-81; Mississippi, Laws, 1904, Chaps. ill-XVII, LXXIX, 
LXXX, LXXXI, LXXXVI, CIV, CVill, CXI, CLXXXlI; Laws, 1906, Chaps. IV-XI, 
CVII, CXXXVII, CXL; Heber A. Ladner, "James Kimble Vardaman, Governor of 
Mississippi, 1904-1908," in Journal qf Mississippi History, IT (1940), 185-95; Ray 
Stannard Baker, "The Negro in Politics," in American MagaZine, LXVI (1908), 
172-73. 
50Baker, "The Negro in Politics," lac. cit., 172-73. 
51Watkins, Address, May 17, 1936, pp. 14-15, in MisSissippi Deparbnent of 
Archives and History. 
52Mississippi Senate Journal, 1908, pp. 11-56. 
58Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 10, 1908. 
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John Sharp Williams, just elected to the United States Senate after 
a bitter struggle with Vardaman, praised his erstwhile opponent 
for "his good record as governor ."54 
With Vardaman's retirement from office the New Orleans Times--
Democrat devoted a full-column editorial to a review of his admin-
istration. That administration had, it said, been distinguished by 
"honesty and unswerving devotion to the best interests of the state." 
Abuses had been corrected, evils eliminated, "greater liberality 
toward educational and other public institutions • . . consistently 
urged." Mob demonstrations had been sternly suppressed, and no 
governor had been "more prompt to invoke the military power of 
the state for the protection of imperilled prisoners, black or white."55 
54Ibid., Jan. 14, 1908. 
55New Orleans Times-Democrat, quoted, ibid., Jan. 23, 1908. 
CHAPTER XV 
THE ELECTION OF 1907 
EARLY in Vardaman's administration Senator Money announced 
that he would not be a candidate for re-election in 1907, and 
speculation began at once as to his successor. Congressman John 
Sharp Williams had had senatorial ambitions for some time, and it 
was assumed that he would run. On the other hand, Vardaman 
was young, ambitious, and had won a remarkable victory over the 
McLaurin forces in 1903. The constitution would not permit his 
succeeding himself as governor. What more likely than that he 
should aspire to Money's seat? Disturbed over this prospect the 
Yazoo City Herald, admirer of both Vardaman and Williams, urged 
early in 1905 that one of them-it did not care which-take Money's 
seat in 1907 and the other run against McLaurin in 1912.1 
The Clarion, never an admirer of Vardaman, replied that Mc-
Laurin was, and had been for years, «the strongest man in public 
life ... in Mississippi" and could have another nomination in 1912 
if he wanted it, «with or without opposition."2 
In any contest in which he was a candidate Vardaman would 
have the opposition of McLaurin. Enmity between them was of 
long standing, and Vardaman had intensified it in his fight for peni-
tentiary reform. In his 1906 message to the legislature he had re-
flected on the personal integrity of all former penitentiary wardens. 
McLaurin's late brother, Walter, was one of these, and Anse swore 
undying vengeance on Vardaman.s The McLaurins, said the 
Clarion, «do not like Vardaman at best and now ... they will esteem 
it a ... brotherly duty, to bring together every influence possible at 
their command to rebuke the man who has put a stigma upon him 
whose lips are sealed in death."4 In such circumstances it might 
have been wiser for Vardaman to wait until 1912 and oppose Mc-
Laurin himself. In that event he might have counted on Williams' 
support or at least his neutrality. But that was five years off, and 
many changes could occur in the political scene with Vardaman in 
lYazoo City Herald, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 16, 1905. 
2Ibid., Mar. 16, Apr. 6, 1905. 
SBrookhaven Leader, quoted, ibid., Jan. 18, 1906. 
4Ibid., Jan. 11, 1906. 
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temporary retirement. Weighing all factors he decided to run 
against Williams. 
The two men, though of different social backgrounds, were on 
the best of terms. Williams was an aristocratic Delta planter, while 
Vardaman was the son of a poor farmer who had migrated to Texas 
before the Civil War in search of economic opportunity, and back to 
Mississippi after the war when he failed to find it. Since 1897 Var-
daman had been an admirer of Williams and had predicted that he 
would "one day rank with the great Senators of America."5 Wil-
liams had supported Vardaman in the 1903 election and during his 
administration had praised him highly.o 
Despite the intensity of the campaign that developed, nothing 
occurred to mar the pleasant relation between them, and the two 
men were warm personal friends at its conclusion. Neither side re-
sorted to scurrilous character assaults. It was well known that 
Vardaman was a "teetotaler" and that Williams was "fond of his 
toddy." Yet Vardaman's committee refused to circulate the "ma-
licious falsehood" that Williams was drunk while speaking at Her-
manville and Clinton. On the other hand, Williams' committee 
refused to approve a vicious attack made on Vardaman by Frederick 
Palmer in Collier's Weekly. Five days before the primary the two 
committees agreed not to bring out new campaign material, and 
they called upon their friends to observe the agreement. The object 
of this was to avoid any last-minute surprises which the opposition 
would have no opportunity to answer. There was no complaint that 
this agreement was violated, and on the whole the campaign was 
reported as being "freer of acrimony and personality than any other 
senatorial fight in Mississippi within the past two decades."7 Wil-
liams refused to extend any financial assistance to newspapers for 
their support, because it was "improper,"S and there is no evidence 
that Vardaman did either. 
It would be wrong, however, to assume that the campaign was 
a gentle and mild affair. While aVOiding personalities each candi-
5Greenwood Commonwealth, May 27, 1897; J. K. Vardaman to Charles C. Elliott, 
Sept. 25, 1903, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 18, 1907. 
O"There is not a state in the Union," Williams was quoted as saying, "better 
governed [than MissisSippi], not a state that has a more upright, honorable and 
conscientious executive." Natchez Democrat, June 16, 1904. 
7IbId.. July 23, 27. 1907; Vicksburg Herald, July 27. 1907. 
sJ. S. Williams to H. B. Wilson, June 10, 1907, Williams Papers. 
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date turned the full force of his oratory on the professional deficien-
cies of the other. Tom Watson, the Georgia Populist, wrote letters 
to the Mississippi press saying that Williams' election would mean 
that "the corporations would have just one more doodle-bug in the 
United States Senate."9 When Williams retorted that Vardaman's 
backers were "the old Populite" following, 10 Vardaman charged that 
Williams was supported by the trusts. 
The two candidates engaged in a bitter controversy over govern-
ment ownership of railroads, which Vardaman favored and Wil-
liams opposed.ll Williams tried to confine the campaign to this and 
other national questions such as trust regulation and the tariff, but 
Vardaman refused to be thus hedged in. In a speech at Macon in 
June he discussed imperialism, the tariff, and government owner-
ship. Then he touched on the race question, and it was noted that 
his remarks "struck a responsive chord in the hearts of his hearers, 
and he was loudly and continuously applauded."12 From then on 
Vardaman knew no restraint. Luridly and graphically he related 
instances of white women being raped by Negroes.1s He was an 
extremely emotional man, and he and his listeners seemed to have 
been caught in a vicious whirlpool. His oratory stirred them, and 
their response seemed to inspire him to fiercer attacks. He called 
attention of the voters to the fact that Negroes outnumbered Mis-
sissippi whites by a quarter of a million; that Negro men outnum-
bered white men by 50,000; that the average vote cast in state elec-
tions was less than 60,000; and that thus there was danger of Negro 
political supremacy. He pointed again to the 125,000 Negro chil-
dren of school age in the state and to the nearly haH-million dollars 
which the state was annually appropriating to their education. He 
urged the modification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the re-
peal of the Fifteenth as the only real safeguard for white suprem-
acy in Mississippi. The Negroes, he charged, would regard his 
defeat as a victory for them. In a speech at Columbus in July he 
9George C. Osborn, "John Sharp Williams Becomes a United States Senator," in 
Journal of Southern HfBtory. VI (1940). 2S8-S4. 
10Williams to H. C. Majure. June 10. 1907, Williams Papers. 
llJackson Weekly Clarion-Ledger. Feb. 7, 14. 28. 1907. 
12Macon Beacon, June 22,1907. 
18New Orleans Times-Picayune and Jackson Evening News, quoted in Natchez 
Democrat. July 5, 1907. Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 11, 1907. 
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said that the Declaration of Independence did not apply to "wild 
animals and niggers."14 
The opposition press again shouted "Demagogue" and chided 
Vardaman with having failed to do anything about the school funds 
when he was governor although that had been the main plank of 
his 1903 platform. "Mr. Vardaman didn't divide the school funds," 
said the Dixie Press, "nor did he make a persistent effort to do so. 
. .. What was the cause of his favoring the division of . . . school 
funds? Don't know, but it looks like it was done merely to catch 
votes."15 Vardaman defended himself against this charge by citing 
his appeals to the legislature and attributed the latter's refusal to 
act to the McLaurinite majority in that body.16 
Williams objected to injecting the race question into national 
politics. He agreed on the advisability of repealing the Reconstruc-
tion amendments if it could be done. "If the Fifteenth Amendment 
could be repealed," he said, "I would be as willing to do it as 
Governor Vardaman." Such, however, was impOSSible. On the con-
trary, any attempt to do so would only result in "The enforcement 
of the Fourteenth [and Fifteenth?] Amendment[s] and a stringent 
and drastic enforcement of [anti-] peonage [laws] to the detriment 
of Southern planting interests."17 Thus it would seem that Williams' 
objection to Vardaman's program was, like Critz's and Noefs, not 
inspired by humanitarian interest in the Negro, but by expediency 
and by his fear that it would react "to the detriment of Southern 
planting interests." At the same time Williams,like Critz and Noel, 
was not anti-Negro in a positive sense as was Vardaman. Such anti-
Negro statements as Williams, Noel, and Critz uttered seemed 
drawn from them as a defense against Vardaman's earlier and more 
vicious statements. To that extent their guilt may be less than his. 
Williams, if reluctantly, made some capital of the racial issue. 
He predicted that government ownership of railroads would result 
in Negroes receiving important positions. He denied that he had 
14Macon Beacon, July 6, 1907; Natchez Democrat, July 5, 1907; Jackson Clarion-
Ledger, July 11, 1907, Mar. 17, 1910. 
15West Point Dixie Press, quoted in Jackson Evening News, May 1, 1907. 
16Natchez Democrat, July 12, 1907. 
17Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 11, 1907; Williams to Capt. Thomas Evans, June 
10, 1907; Williams to Majure, June 10, 1907; Williams to J. F. Gray, Jan. 10, 1907; 
Williams to J. E. Warnock, Feb. 9, 1907; Williams to L. T. Carpenter, June 10, 1907. 
Williams Papers. 
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ever advocated an industrial training school for Negroes. "I think 
that is about the worst thing that could be given them," he said. 
"I mean," he added, " ... the worst to the interest of white people. 
It brings them into competition with white mechanics and artisans." 
When the Vardaman faction spread a report that Williams had dis-
charged his white servant because she refused to eat with the Negro 
servants, he published the fact that he had discharged her ''because 
she would eat" with them. IS 
There were other charges and countercharges made during the 
campaign, but they seem to have been of minor importance. Some 
Vardaman people were urging the election of their candidate so as 
to keep both him and Williams in the public service. To counteract 
this Williams declared that he would interpret the election of Var-
daman as a repudiation of himseH and would retire from Congress. 
He was willing, he said, to let the Jeffersonian maxim "Is he com-
petent; is he faithful; is he honest?" be the measure of the candi-
dates. He would run on his congressional record and said he 
had opposed "every pretense of special privilege and of class 
legislation."19 
Two months before the election Williams was disturbed over the 
fact that he did not have "much of an organization." Vardaman, on 
the other hand, had "a self-constituted organization composed of 
recipients of appointments to judgeships, trustees and militia 'gew-
gaws'." Besides, Agricultural Commissioner Henry E. Blakeslee 
had managed it so that Vardaman was "uniformly invited to address 
the Farmers Union and I have never received a single invitation." 
Williams urged his followers to work among the farmers to offset 
this disadvantage while he went off to address the railroad workers 
at McComb City. Before doing so he sent an urgent request to his 
secretary to locate and forward to him his "card of membership in 
the Isthmian Canal Locomotive Engineers Union."20 Williams was 
attacked for having voted in Congress for a pension for General 
Nelson A. Miles, the Union officer who had been Jefferson Davis' 
keeper and who had placed shackles on him while in prison.91 
18Jackson Clarion-Ledgef'. Feb. 12. 1907; Williams to Charles E. Hooker. Jr., 
June 10, 1907; Williams to R. A. Barnett, May 27. 1907. Williams Papers. 
19Williams to Thomas Spight, May 27, 1907; Williams to S. J. Creekmore, Feb. 
12, 1907; Williams to John B. Taylor, Feb. 14, 1907, (bid. 
1I0Williams to John Y. Murray. May 8, 1907; Williams to N. T. Currie, June 10, 
1907; Williams to Robert Bowman, Jr .• May 27, 1907, Ibid. 
11Jackson Clarkm-Ledgef'. June 27, 1907. 
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Throughout the campaign Williams repeatedly challenged Var-
daman to joint debates, which Vardaman as often declined. Varda-
man seems to have been inept in the hurly-burly of debates requir-
ing quick retorts, preferring rather to let his oratory soar in un-
restricted generalities. Finally, however, he was persuaded to 
accept a challenge, and the two candidates faced each other at 
Meridian on July 4 for their only joint speaking of the campaign. 
More than fifteen thousand turned out to hear and see the two most 
popular men in the state. Vardaman again urged repeal of the 
Fifteenth Amendment and modification of the Fourteenth. Wil-
liams scoffed at this. Taking a copy of the federal Constitution and 
a pencil he tendered them to Vardaman and urged him to delete 
and add what he would. Vardaman ignored the challenge. Wil-
liams then bombarded Vardaman's position with ridicule. There 
was, he said, no issue between them on the race question. Vardaman 
knew as well as he, he said, that there was no possibility of amend-
ment. Nor was it necessary, for the "white man ruled and ruled by 
law."22 
Both state and national press echoed this latter sentiment. 
Pointing to the fact that less than two thousand Mississippi Negroes 
voted in the last presidential election, the Jackson News thought it 
"shilly-shally nonsense" to assert that they were interested in poli-
tics. The Macon Beacon said Vardaman was holding out only a 
chimerical hope to the people and that even if his plan were prac-
tical, he was poorly fitted to accomplish it. If repeal of the Recon-
struction amendments should come, said the Washington (D. C.) 
Post, it would be as a concession by the North to men of Williams' 
type, rather than by demand of men like Vardaman. His radicalism 
was more likely to provoke passage of the Crumpacker Resolution 
decreasing the representation of southern states in Congress. "The 
fifteenth amendment is inoperative in Mississippi," said the Post. 
"The North knows it and acquiesces in it, but let Vardaman go to 
the Senate . . . and he will likely precipitate an issue that will do 
Mississippi little good. His eloquence tells [only] with the rednecks 
and hill billies."23 
Vardaman seems to have gained the displeasure of two inHuen-
22Natchez Democrat, July 5, 1907; Jackson Clarion-Ledge1', July 5, 1907. 
23Jackson Sunday News, May 5, 1907; Macon Beacon, July 6, 13, 27, 1907; 
Washington Post, quoted, ibid., July 27, 1907. 
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tial elements, the preachers and the ladies. In his Meridian speech 
he stated that the Jackson News could not tell the truth about him 
«with the assistance of a Methodist Conference and Baptist Associa-
tion." The News shrieked against this «gratuitous insult that the 
Governor has handed to both these great denominations," and the 
cry was taken up by others. Also his «spectacular and vulgar argu-
ment with the negro as his premise" was said to be «out of place in a 
dignified white man's race for the Senate." It was charged that he 
was making speeches «no lady can afford to listen to." When Wil-
liams spoke at Natchez the ladies were «most cordially invited" to 
attend. They did so in large numbers and heard «not one word fall 
from the lips of the gifted speaker that could offend the most sen-
sitive" of their sex.24. 
The primary was held on August 1. So close was the contest 
that not until eight days later was the result known. Finally, on 
August 9, after canvassing the returns, the State Democratic Execu-
tive Committee announced that Williams had won by 648 votes. 
Curiously, each candidate failed to carry his home county. The hill 
counties stood by Vardaman, although Williams took several of 
them. The Delta went largely for Williams. South Mississippi was 
divided.25 It was estimated by Williams and admitted by Vardaman 
supporters that more than fifteen thousand of Vardaman's votes had 
come from Populists. Williams urged that something be done to 
insure that future nominations be made by «bona fide Democrats."26 
''The reign of the demagogues is over," shouted the anti-
Vardaman press with the news of Williams' victory. «Natural ability 
has won over egotism and assurance, and ... Mississippi has again 
returned to sanity and reason." Passion and prejudice would no 
longer control the state. But the most bitter of all anti-Vardaman 
papers, the Jackson News, saw ominous portents in the closeness of 
the race. «To have run Williams nearly an even race in this indi-
cates," it said, "that Governor Vardaman is a man of positive po-
litical strength in Mississippi." It saw future trouble. The Vicksburg 
24Jackson Daily NewB, July 5, 1907; Ibid., quoting others; Sunflower TOCBin, 
quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 25, 1907; Natchez Democrat, July 12, 14, 
16, 1907. 
25Biennial Report of the Secretary of State to the Legislature, October 1, 1905-
October 1, 1907 (Nashville, 1908); Macon Beacon, Aug. 10, 1907. 
26Macon Beacon, Aug. 10, 1907; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 13, 1907; Coody. 
lames K. Vardaman, 42. 
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Herald, Vardaman's staunchest supporter in 1903, remained neutral 
throughout the campaign. When Williams' victory was announced 
it retained its impartiality by praising both candidates. Williams 
would make an "eminent successor" to his illustrious predecessors. 
But Vardaman deserved a hand "for the lofty and manly manner" 
in which he "bows to the majority will."27 
The gubernatorial election in 1907 was overshadowed by the 
senatorial race. Candidates for governor were Charles Scott of 
Bolivar, Earl Brewer of Coahoma, Jeff Truly of Jefferson, E. F. Noel 
of Holmes, E. N. Thomas of Washington, and T. W. Sisson of 
Montgomery. Scott at the outset seemed to have the advantage. He 
was a wealthy Delta planter and had the backing of the Vicksburg 
Herald, the Natchez Democrat, and Jackson News, three of the 
most influential of the daily papers. Attempts were made by other 
candidates to have him disqualified because he had, years before, 
sent a challenge to a duel, but nothing came of the move.28 
Scott, an old enemy of McLaurin, charged that the clan's in-
fluence had entered both Truly and Brewer against him in an effort 
to re-establish their supremacy in state politics. The backers of 
Truly and Brewer, he said, were "pretending to be at outs with each 
other" but were really in a combine to defeat him. According to 
Scott, Anse and five of the brothers were backing Truly, the real 
candidate of the clan, while the other two brothers were backing 
Brewer. But Brewer, he said, was only in the campaign to draw 
votes from him. The McLaurins charged that Scott "belongs to the 
Y. and M. V. Railroad" and that that was the only reason the Vicks-
burg Herald was backing him.29 
Scott's program called for a reduction of the interest rate so as 
to relieve borrOwing farmers and to invite outside capital to invest 
in state industry. He also advocated the encouragement of Italian 
immigration into the state to help relieve the planter's dependence 
on Negro labor. This latter plan was jumped upon by Truly and his 
McLaurin backing who appealed to the nationalistic prejudice 
against Italians. Truly, however, was charged with playing a dif-
ferent tune in regiOns such as Natchez and Vicksburg where there 
27Macon Beacon, Aug. 3, 1907; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 1, 1907; Jackson 
Daily News, Aug. 3, 1907; Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 9, 1907. 
28Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Apr. 4, 1907; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 2, 3, 1906, June 
4, 1907; ibid., Jan. 3, 1906, quoting Jackson News; Natchez Democrat, July 30, 1907. 
29Vicksburg Herald, June 4, 1907; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 25, 1907. 
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was already a considerable Italian element. But in eastern Mis-
sissippi where there was none he played up the "Mafia" crimes and 
said that Scott was proposing "to Hood the state with black hand 
and criminal Italians."so 
Truly, in addition to attacking the Delta planter's Italian im-
migration scheme, also attacked the school fund distribution which, 
he charged, borrowing a page from Vardaman, benefited the black 
counties at the expense of the white. The Jackson Clarion, which 
was backing Noel, admitted that this was true, but only in so far as 
the poll tax was concerned. In the general fund, it said, Warren, 
Washington, Jefferson, Claiborne, Bolivar, and Adams paid in 
$65,000 more than they drew out, while Benton, Calhoun, Choctaw, 
COvington, Itawamba, Lawrence, Neshoba, Perry, Smith, Tisho-
mingo, Webster, and Winston, "all poor hill counties," paid in only 
$3,700 more than they drew.S1 
Noel, a wealthy lawyer, played up his youthful poverty and 
charged that Brewer, who was running on an anti-corporation plat-
form. was really tainted with railroad support. Noel advocated 
heavier taxes on railroads and a more equitable apportionment of 
legislators.s2 
Brewer, too, advocated a more equitable distribution of the 
school funds, but his main attack was against the railroads. Rail-
roads, he claimed, were taking an active part in the campaign and 
were actually subSidizing the opposition press. This was vehemently 
denied by the Macon Beacon, one of Brewer's critics, which pointed 
out that some of his most ardent supporters, J. N. Flowers, James 
H. Neville, C. C. Miller, George Q. May, and R. J. Powell, were 
prominent railroad attorneys. It dismissed his tirade against the 
railroads as blind but expressed some concern lest his school pro-
gram would catch many votes. His method of division, it pointed 
out, would reduce Noxubee's share by $10,000 while increasing 
neighboring Kemper's by that amount.SS The reason for all this 
clamor for reform in both legislative apportionment and in school 
fund distribution was, thought the Beacon, that south Mississippi 
80Vicksburg Herald, July 24, 1907; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 25, 1907. 
81Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 28, 1907. 
82Ibid., Mar. 24, Aug. 22, 1907. 
8SIbid., Sept. 18, 1906, Mar. 21, Aug. 22, 1907; Macon Beacon, July 6, Aug. 17, 
1907. For Editor Ferris' views eight years before see Macon Beacon, Nov. 18, 1899, 
Sept. 29. 1900. 
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was on the warpath and was demanding her rights. A Bght was 
sure to develop in the next legislature on those issues, and the gov-
ernor would have commanding influence. "ll ever Noxubee County 
was interested in the governorship of Mississippi, now is the time."8' 
Scott's strength faded as the campaign progressed, and in the 
Brst primary he ran third behind Brewer and Noel.35 The runoff 
primary between the two leaders was ordered for the last of August, 
and the two candidates launched themselves into the final cam-
paign. Each charged that the other was the favorite of the railroads 
and corporations, but Noel was more specific and named a large 
list of corporate lawyers who were backing Brewer.80 Vardaman 
supported Noel. It was later charged that the consideration for 
this support was Noel's promise that "he would not be a candidate 
for the United States Senate in 1911." Vardaman's influence, it was 
said, "was very subtly exerted, but it was sufficient nevertheless to 
defeat Brewer, who without it, very likely would have been 
elected."87 
In a joint debate between the candidates at Jackson on August 
17, Noel charged that Brewer was the candidate of the "saloon ele-
ment." Brewer retorted that Noel had a saloonkeeper as his cam-
paign manager in Quitman County. Pandemonium then broke loose. 
Both speakers were jeered and neither was permitted to be heard. 
When they finally gave up in despair, the audience resolved itself 
into a whooping mob of political partisans. It was, said the Natchez 
Democrat, "worse than a bull-Bght."88 
The runoff between Noel and Brewer was almost as close as the 
Williams-Vardaman contest in the first primary. Again there was 
uncertainty until the executive committee canvassed the returns. 
On August 29 the committee announced that Noel had won by 
2,002 votes.89 
There seems to have been an effort to see that the election of 
1907 was conducted more fairly than had been customary in the 
past. Early in May the candidates in Lincoln County pledged them-
selves not to use money or liquor in the primary. They resolved 
84Macon Beacon, Aug. 17, 1907. 
35Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 25, 1907; Report of Secretary of State, 1905-1907. 
30Natchez Democrat, Aug. 16, 1907. 
87Magnolia Gazette, Aug. 15, 1917. 
88Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 22, 1907; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 20, 1907. 
89Natchez Democrat, Aug. 30, 1907; Report of Secretary of State, 1905-1907. 
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further that they would not "lend" money when approached by 
voters. "All of us know," said their joint statement, "that in past 
years there has been some money and a good deal of liquor used." 
It was reported that the saloon faction, alarmed by the activities of 
prohibitionists, endeavored to register Negroes in local-option elec-
tions. But county registrars uniformly, it was said, refused to permit 
this.4.0 
Despite such efforts, many candidates complained of irregulari-
ties in both the mst and second primaries. Vardaman's followers 
charged that the Williams faction was trying to secure the regis-
tration of Negroes so as to help defeat Vardaman, but this was 
vehemently denied by Williams. "Somebody, somewhere," he said, 
"may have been trying to register some negroes," but "anybody who 
says that a negro had been registered at my instance or knowledge 
••• is a liar .••• I am n.o more in favor of voting negroes than 
Governor Vardaman."4.1 Charles Scott later charged and produced 
affidavits shOwing that "wholesale registration [of voters] had been 
made in Pontotoc County to the number of 500 or more in direct 
violation of law." Some of these, he said, were made by "telephone 
and telegraph messages to the clerk, ... some by proxy, and some 
of them in person on the day before election."4.1 
The use of the Australian ballot made bribery difficult, but it 
seems to have been practiced nevertheless. Printers of ballots, said 
one editor, "are frequently so unscrupulous as to give out tickets in 
advance." These advance tickets, he explained, could then be taken 
and filled out by "heelers." The filled-out ticket would be given to 
the voter with instructions that he "drop it into the box, and bring 
back ... the ticket which is given him by the commissioners at the 
box." This procedure was reported to be a common method em-
ployed to defeat the aims of the primary law. Then, too, said the 
same editor, it seemed impossible to prevent sore spots in close 
elections. It was most natural for many disqualified voters to at-
tempt to vote. Indeed many of them were "good men" who were 
disqualified for failure to pay taxes on time and "from other acci-
dents." Many delinquents, especially in the rural areas, were freely 
permitted to vote. Many others simply "slip through unchallenged." 
4.oJackson Evening News, May 2, 7, 1907. 
4.1Wi1liams to Hunter Sharp Walker, June 10, 1907, Williams Papers. 
4.2Vicksburg Herald, June 28, 1911. 
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The remarkable size of the vote in 1907 led to the suspicion that 
«there is something rotten in the State of Denmark." More than 
118,000 votes had been cast for the two senatorial candidates, which 
was considerably larger than the registration list. No official pro-
tests were made, however, and the Vicksburg Herald thought that 
the irregularities were practiced by all factions. It later surmised 
that knowledge of the part his followers had played kept Vardaman 
from demanding a recount.4S 
It was found too that the primary failed to eliminate the trading 
of candidates which had been one of the chief objections to the 
convention. In Jackson, it was said, «governors and United States 
Senators ... were traded for constables of the peace." The Clarion, 
tlt least, was convinced of the truth of the charge. It was alleged 
that Vardaman supporters in the northern counties «traded Scott 
right and left to get votes for ... Vardaman," despite the fact that 
Vardaman more than a year before had pledged his support to Scott. 
These trades, it was charged, had swung the balance and placed 
Brewer instead of Scott in the runoff with Noe1.44 
Listening to all the complaints of swindling, cheating, lying, and 
trading that were the aftermath of the campaign, the Clarion con-
cluded that the primary law should be repealed and replaced by the 
old convention system. "It is believed," said Editor R. H. Henry, 
that "more evils occurred in the late primaries than in all the con-
ventions ever held in the state."45 
The charge mayor may not have been true, but it was not the 
complaint of a disappointed supporter. The Clarion had backed 
both Williams and Noel to the hilt, and both had triumphed. Yet 
even in the moment of victory it seemed to Henry that the rules 
whereby that victory had been won were not conducive to good 
government. There was some truth in Henry's observations. The 
primary had not eliminated all the evils which had accompanied 
the convention system. Skilled politicians were to develop tech-
niques of manipulation which sometimes might control primaries 
just as conventions had been controlled. But control of the primary 
by a favored few was more difficult of attainment. The mass of 
48Ibid., July 31, Aug. 7, 1907, June 28, 1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledge1', Aug. 10, 
1907. 
44Jackson Clarion-Ledge1', Oct. 10, 1907; Jackson Daily News, Aug. 5, 1907. 
45Jackson Clarion-Ledge1', Aug. 9, Sept. 12, 1907. 
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voters was too unwieldy and too unpredictable to be led and cajoled 
as the handful of convention delegates had been. More important 
still, the primary furnished the voters an invincible weapon with 
which to break the power of political bosses. The voters might not 
avail themselves of this weapon on all occasions. But it was there 
within their grasp whenever they should be stirred to reach for it. 
CHAPTER XVI 
THE SECRET CAUCUS 
VARDAMAN accepted his defeat at the hands of Williams in good grace, and after his retirement from office in January, 
1908, continued to make his home in Jackson, where he began pub-
lication of a newspaper called the Issue. Meanwhile Noel had been 
inaugurated governor, and Williams had taken his seat in the United 
States Senate as a colleague of Anse McLaurin. At Christmas time 
in 1909, McLaurin died suddenly at his home in Brandon, and the 
legislature soon to assemble would have the unexpected duty of 
choosing his successor. 
United States senators were still chosen by the legislature, but 
since the introduction of the primary in Mississippi, candidates for 
that office were nominated in the same manner as all others. It thus 
was the duty of the Democratic legislature to choose the candidate 
who had been nominated by the party primary. McLaurin's term 
was not to expire until 1912, and accordingly the primary to name 
his successor would not have been held until 1911. His death, there-
fore, gave the legislature free choice in naming his successor, and a 
contest was precipitated which was to have tremendous conse-
quences on the politics of the state. 
Pending election by the legislature, Governor Noel was urged to 
appoint Vardaman. This would have committed the administra-
tion's support to Vardaman in the election and would have enhanced 
his prestige-perhaps enough to have insured his subsequent elec-
tion. Despite the fact that Vardaman had supported him in the 
1907 primary after Scott's defeat, Noel declined to appoint anyone, 
and the legislature convened with the office vacant. 
The legislature of 1910 has been characterized by a friendly 
critic as not an "impressive" body of men. "Its members were not 
venal," he said, "but most of them were timid and third-rate."l A 
number of applicants appeared before the joint caucus and an-
nounced their candidacy. Prominent among them, in addition to 
Vardaman, were Leroy Percy of Washington County, C. H. Alex-
ander, a wealthy lawyer of Jackson, Congressman Adam Byrd, F. A. 
Critz, Vardaman's opponent in the 1903 primary, State Senator W. 
D. Anderson, Representative J. C. Kyle, and Speaker H. M. Streit 
lPercy, Lanterns on the Levee, 145. 
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of Meridian. All were allowed an opportunity to address the caucus. 
Vardaman reiterated his race views, favored an income tax, urged 
more stringent trust regulation, and favored state-wide and national 
prohibition. All the other candidates denounced Vardaman's racial 
program, and it soon became suspect that there was some sort of 
union among them directed at preventing Vardaman's nomination. 
Within a short time a host of followers of the several candidates had 
hurried up to Jackson to work in the interest of their favorite. It 
was conceded that Vardaman would have at least fifty-four votes 
from the outset. Eighty-five were needed for nomination by the 
caucus, and at least thirty members were uncommitted. It was 
thought that Governor Noel's influence would have a marked effect 
on the outcome, and it soon became obvious that his influence would 
not be used in Vardaman's behalf. 2 
Vardaman and Percy had been political allies back in the days 
when both were trying to break the grip of the McLaurin clan. "Mr. 
Percy is unquestionably a man of the highest order of talent," Var-
daman had said in those days, "-he is a consummate lawyer and an 
advocate of great force and eloquence." On the other hand, Percy 
had given Vardaman his bleSSing in 1903-racial program and all-
as had many others who were now to leave him. But they had 
broken when, in 1905, Vardaman had refused to appoint Percy's 
man to the Upper Levee Board.s 
A sketch of Vardaman has been given by Percfs son who was 
active for his father both in the caucus and in the primary the fol-
lowing year. It was written years later, after both Percy and Varda-
man had shuffied off the scene, but it is interesting as a picture of 
Vardaman by one of his most inveterate enemies. He describes 
Vardaman as 
a kindly, vain demagogue unable to think, and given to emotions he con-
sidered noble. He was a handsome, flamboyant figure of a man, im-
maculately overdressed, wearing his black hair long to the shoulders, 
and crowned with a wide cowboy's hat .•.. He had made a good 
governor ••• and he craved public office because the spot-light was his 
passion and because, eternally in need of money, he abhorred work .... 
2Natchez Democrat, Jan. 2, 5, 1910; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 13, 1910; 
Magnolia Gazette, Aug. 15, 1917; Watkins, Address, May 17. 1936. p. 17. in 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History. 
8Greenwood Commonwealth, May 20, 1897; Greenville Times, May 18. 1903; 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 14, 1905. 
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For political platform he advertised his love of the common people .... 
He did love the common man after a fashion, as well he might. . .. He 
stood for the poor white against the "nigger" -those were his qualifica-
tions as a statesman.4. 
Vardaman, he said, stood for all his father considered "vulgar 
and dangerous," although he does not say when his father started 
thinking thus. Yet, he continued, "Father rather liked Vardaman-
he was such a splendid ham actor, his inability to reason was so con-
tagious, it was so impossible to determine where his idealism ended 
and his demagoguery began." Besides, Vardaman had "a charm and 
a gift for the vivid, reckless phrase." He was not "a moral idiot of 
genius ... [but] merely an exhibitionist playing with fire."5 
At the outset the question arose of whether the caucus should 
be by open or secret ballot. Senator Leftwich, a leader of the Percy 
faction, moved for a secret ballot, and it was carried over the Var-
daman opposition by a vote of 101 to 69. The reason for the vote of 
the majority, according to a Vardaman backer, was that «there are 
quite a number of representatives who wish to oppose Mr. Varda-
man and don't want their constituents to have knowledge of the 
fact." The «Secret Caucus," as it became known, was not actually 
closed to spectators. Attempts were made to clear the chamber of 
all but legislators, but the hall leading to the chamber was so 
jammed with men and women that efforts were given up and the 
crowds remained. All newspaper men were admitted and the gal-
leries were open to all. Only the voting was secret.6 This feature 
of the caucus was much denounced then and later by Vardaman 
and his supporters. It was pointed out, on the other hand, that 
precedent had established the secret ballot. J. Z. George had been 
nominated by secret ballot in the caucus of the 1880 legislature. So 
had McLaurin in 1894 and Money in 1896. Speaker H. M. Streit, 
who had been present at the caucus of 1894, reported that its pro-
ceedings were identical with that of 1910.7 
Conditions were not the same in the two caucuses, however, as 
the Vicksburg Post pointed out. In 1894 there was no combination 
4.William A. Percy, Lanterns on the Levee (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), 
143-44. 
5Ibid., 144. 
6Indianola Enterprise, quoted in Jackson Issue, Feb. 19, 1910; Natchez D8'mOCf'at, 
Jan. 8, 1910; Macon Beacon, July 1, 1910. 
7Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 6, 1910; Natchez Democrat, July 5, 1916. 
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to defeat any particular candidate. The object of that caucus had 
been to consolidate the Democratic legislators in support of one 
candidate, so that the thirty Populist members could not act as a 
balance between the factions supporting Lowry or McLaurin. In 
1910 there was no Populist party and the caucus was the same as 
the legislature. The only purpose of the secret ballot at the latter 
date was, said the Post, to prevent constituents from knowing how 
legislators voted.s 
The suspicions of the Vardaman forces about an alliance against 
their candidate were soon confirmed. The Natchez Democrat, back-
ing Percy, said that it was the field against Vardaman, and that "all 
the McLaurin influence is opposed" to him too. The Vicksburg 
Herald, which had supported Vardaman in 1903 but was now sup-
porting Percy, also admitted that there was a combination against 
Vardaman and that the alliance was due to the race issue. Admit-
ting that Vardaman had been a good governor, it now held that his 
position on the race question was dangerous. The Herald made no 
explanation of its conversion to this belief. As the caucus developed 
into a deadlock, it compared Vardaman's plight to that of Barksdale 
in 1892 and called on Vardaman to withdraw as Barksdale had done 
and "take his medicine like a man."9 
Vardaman received 71 votes on the first ballot to 99 distributed 
among the other candidates. For the next six weeks of the caucus, 
his vote varied between 65 and 78, generally about 70. It was known 
that he had a sufficient number of votes pledged to him as second 
choice to insure his election should several of the opposition candi-
dates withdraw. The strategy of the coalition, therefore, was to 
keep all candidates in the race until those second-choice votes could 
be won from Vardaman, then to center all its strength on one candi-
date. Vardaman's hope lay in discouraging candidates early so that 
they would withdraw, thus enabling him to gain a majority as second 
choice of the withdrawing candidates' supporters.10 
By mid-January there were rumors afloat of the use of undue 
influence to obtain votes. It was reported that certain legislators 
had received letters promising aid for future political aspirations in 
exchange for their votes and warning of political ruin for them if 
sVicksburg Post, quoted in Jackson Issue, Sept. 2, 1910. 
9Natchez Democrat, Jan. 7, 1910; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 16, 30, 1910. 
lONatchez Democrat. Feb. 23. 1910. 
THE SECRET CAUCUS 195 
they did not accede. Vardaman charged that his vetoes while gov-
ernor had aligned against him "Every railroad attorney, the repre-
sentatives of the lumber trust, the whiskey trust, and every other 
trust that does business in Mississippi." He charged further that 
their agents were engaged in bribing and debauching the legislators 
in their effort to defeat him. Percy issued a statement denying this 
and calling on Vardaman to name names.ll This Vardaman did 
not do. 
Illegal use of patronage was also charged. In the midst of the 
caucus Attorney-General Stirling resigned and no successor was 
announced. Vardaman asserted that this empty office and others 
were being used by Noel to effect his defeat. "Legislators have been 
approached," he said, "with the proposition that if they 'would vote 
against Vardaman, ... some of their friends would be appointed 
attorney-general, and others given the district attorneyship'."12 Noel 
was accused, "and with apparent good reason," according to the 
Vicksburg Post, "of prostituting his appointive power by promising 
judgeships to members of the Legislature as a reward for their 
treason to the people of the State." While the caucus was in session 
a bill was passed creating the office of county attorney. "These 
[seventy-nine] places," said a Vardaman supporter, "were used to 
induce members of the Legislature to withdraw their support from 
Vardaman," and ultimately all were "given to men who voted or 
worked against Vardaman," some of whom, he added, "had started 
out as his friends." It was even alleged that President Taft had been 
persuaded to hold up the appointment of a federal district attorney 
for Mississippi so that the office might go to some legislator who 
voted against Vardaman.1s 
How many, if any, of these charges were true there is no way of 
knOwing. That they were believed almost universally by Varda-
man's supporters and by some of Percy's backers is amply evident. 
Within a week of the opening of the caucus one editor re-
ported that in his section thousands of supporters had been won 
by Vardaman because they thought "an attempt is being made to 
crush him politically by the combined strength of the ring poli-
llJackson Issue, Jan. 27, 1910; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 18, Feb. 2, 3, 1910; 
Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 27, Feb. 1, 2, 1910; Natchez Democrat, Feb. 2, 1910. 
12Jackson Issue, Feb. 19, 1910. 
18Vicksburg Post, Aug. 16, 1917; Coody, lames K. Vardaman. 49; Magnolia 
Gazette, Aug. 15, 1917. . 
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ticians, the leading corporation lawyers, interested newspapers, and 
others."14. 
Reports early began to circulate that at Percy headquarters in 
the Edwards House liquor was being freely dispensed to debauch 
legislators and to influence votes. A sensation was produced, how-
ever, when Representative Walter W. Robertson, of Copiah, a Var-
daman supporter, issued a statement that he had been "pOisoned 
with whiskey" in Vardaman's headquarters. Since Vardaman was 
a militant prohibitionist, this statement from one of his own fol-
lowers would hurt him badly. Mter the caucus ended, Robertson 
repudiated the statement in such a way as to reflect on the Percy 
faction. In a signed statement he charged that he was put "in a 
certain state of mind when I was not myself' by the Percy faction in 
their headquarters and induced to sign the prepared statement. 
He denied having knowledge of the content of the statement he had 
been induced to sign and stated that "great pressure was brought to 
bear on me in several ways to get me to desert Governor Varda-
man."lIi Another state senator charged in a Signed statement that 
"whiskey, women, gubernatorial patronage, the influence of the 
Republican administration, money and an unholy alliance or com-
bination" had been used by the opposition in an attempt to defeat 
Vardaman.16 
Save for the Robertson statement which was later repudiated, 
there were no charges at the time of the use of whiskey by the Var-
daman party. Perhaps they were not as well supplied as their op-
ponents, but it was later revealed that they too had been more 
than generous in their hospitality to thirsty legislators. In the words 
of Speaker Streit, "The game of politics seems to have been played 
to a:finish and as in all games some outclassed others."17 
Mter six long weeks of balloting without a decision, the caucus 
voted to drop the low man on each ballot. Support for the resolu-
tion came from the coalition, and it was opposed by the Vardaman 
party. Apparently the strategy of the coalition had been perfected, 
or at least they were confident that it had. On February 23, on the 
fifty-eighth ballot, after all other candidates had been withdrawn, 
14.Yazoo Sentinel, quoted in Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 14, 1910. 
15Brookhaven Leader, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 3, 1910; Natchez 
Democrat, Feb. 2, 1910; Jackson Issue, June 9, 1910. 
16Statement by Theodore G. Bilbo, in Jackson Issue, July 22, 1910. 
17Macon Beacon, July 21, 1911. 
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Percy received 87 votes to Vardaman's 82. The Natchez Democrat 
conceded that Vardaman had made a remarkable fight, that the 
"brains of the state had been arrayed against him," and that his 
followers had stuck to him "closer than brothers."18 
The Vardaman press did not take his defeat gracefully. The 
Aberdeen Weekly, while praising Percy's qualifications, observed 
that he was not the choice of the people. The Columbus Dispatch 
said that Vardaman's defeat was brought about by "a hundred men, 
representing their conflicting ambitions, the corporations of the 
state, the administration of the state, the money of the state." The 
Laurel Ledger thought it "scarcely necessary to discuss ... the mul-
tiplicity of influences that culminated in [Vardaman's] defeat," and 
the Democrat-Star thought the caucus the "most disgraceful politi-
cal farce [ever] enacted at our state capital."19 
Immediately after the caucus Vardaman's followers held a mass 
meeting in Jackson and made plans for the 1911 primary when their 
leader would oppose Percy before the people for the full term of 
the Senate seat. Vardaman, speaking on that occasion, disclaimed 
any ill will toward Percy and wished him well. "Much has been 
said about corrupt methods-the use of money, whiskey, and the 
promise of office. . .. Whether or not there is truth in the charge I 
cannot say. But I am slow to believe that a white Mississippian 
would betray the people for money." A week later, however, he 
charged that his defeat had been brought about by the lumber and 
whiskey interests and insinuated that bribery had secured Percy's 
election.2o Similar charges were rampant throughout the state, and 
the legislature was urged to investigate. When it hesitated, Judge 
Sam Cook charged the Hinds grand jury with investigation of the 
rumors. 
On March 28 the grand jury returned an indictment against 
L. C. Dulaney, a planter and levee contractor of Issaquena County, 
charging that he had paid Senator Theodore G. Bilbo of Pearl River 
County $645 to obtain his vote for Percy. The senate thereupon or-
dered an investigation of the bribery charges. Meanwhile the legis-
18Jackson Daily News, June 8, 1911; Natchez Democrat, Feb. 23, 1910; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 24, 1910. 
19Quoted in Jackson Issue, Mar. 5, 12, 1910; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 17, 
26, 1910. 
2oJackson Issue, Feb. 26, Mar. 5, 1910; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 3, 8, 1910. 
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lature instructed its Joint Committee on Contingent Funds to in-
vestigate Vardaman's accounts while he was govemor.21 
Thus, in addition to the grand jury investigation, there were 
two legislative investigations-one by the Joint Committee on Con-
tingent Funds investigating Vardaman's official accounts, the other 
a senate Committee of the Whole, investigating the bribery charges. 
«The fair name of the grand old state," moaned the Clarion, «is 
being dragged through the slime and mire."22 
The contingent fund investigation dropped out of sight for a 
time, and attention was centered on the senate bribery investiga-
tion. «Nothing else is thought of or talked about in Jackson now," 
reported the Clarion. «It is the one absorbing theme, and is dis-
cussed on the streets, in the business houses, in offices, in workshops, 
in homes, around the hotels, at the capital, everywhere." Never, it 
said, had there been a greater sensation; never had people been so 
stirred; never had worse feeling been shown. And Jackson, it added, 
was merely the barometer of the state. "Whatever goes on here is 
echoed throughout the length and breadth of Mississippi." Violent 
trouble was expected at the capitol, where the senate was conduct-
ing its investigation behind closed doors. "ll a search had been 
made," said one reporter, "dozens of guns could have been extracted 
from the hip-pockets of legislators, political lieutenants, and other 
persons who thronged the lobbies."23 
Since a motion to expel Bilbo was pending, the senate investiga-
tion amounted to a trial. Two senators were appointed to prosecute 
and two to defend him. He testified that, disturbed by rumors of 
bribery, he suggested to some of his colleagues early in the caucus 
that a trap be laid to catch the guilty. Getting little encouragement 
from them he had then called a meeting of Vardaman's leaders in 
Agricultural Commissioner Blakeslee's office and suggested a plan 
whereby he and Representative J. O. Cowart act as detectives. They 
would, he proposed, accept a bribe, if offered, and then turn over 
the money and expose the bribers. Present at the meeting, in addi-
tion to himself and Cowart, were: J. Swep Taylor, a prominent Jack-
son businessman and later mayor of the city; T. P. Barr, a prominent 
Jackson merchant; Judge Wiley Potter; Ben Ward, editor of the 
21Mississippi, House /OfJf'fIal, 1910, pp. 1472-1502; Senate /OfJf'fIa~ 1910. p. 996; 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 3, 8. 20. 23, 24, 1910. 
22Jackson Clarion-Ledger. Mar. 31, 1910; Natchez Democrat. Mar. 29. 1910. 
28Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 31. 1910; Natchez Democrat. Mar. 29. 1910. 
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Union Advocate; and several others. There was some disagreement 
among witnesses over who the others were-there was even un-
certajnty whether or not Vardaman was present. All present 
agreed that Bilbo should pursue his plan, but Potter advised against 
exposing any bribery detected until after the election. "The lines," 
Bilbo quoted him as saying, "were drawn pretty tight and the 
friends of the other candidates would say it was a political trick 
[and it] would result in harm to Mr. Vardaman."24. The others had 
then agreed with Potter, he said, and the final decision was against 
revealing the fraud during the caucus. It was believed that such a 
revelation would create "a great turmoil in the legislature, but ... 
would do Vardaman no good."25 
After this meeting, Bilbo stated, he was approached in the in-
terest of Percy by two women, Mrs. C. J. Neil, a fellow boarder with 
him at the Lemon Hotel, and Mrs. Ruby Hall, wife of the proprietor 
of the Lemon. They told him, he said, that money was being paid 
for Percy votes, and urged him to accept some of it. Subsequently 
Mrs. Neil introduced him to Dulaney. After several meetings with 
Dulaney, he said, it was agreed that he was to receive $500 if he 
would switch his vote from Vardaman to Percy, and $500 additional 
if Percy was elected. He planned, he said, to accept the money be-
fore witnesses. To that end he had had the assistant chief of police 
of Jackson arrange a rendezvous at the assignation house of Mary 
Stamps, a mulatto, in south Jackson. Several witnesses were to be 
concealed to observe the transaction. The stage was set and the wit-
neSSf!S gathered, but at the last minute the plans fell through.26 
Matters then cooled for a while, said Bilbo, but later Dulaney 
approached him again and a new series of meetings occurred in Du-
laney's room in the Edwards House. At one of these meetings, he 
said, Dulaney had given him $150, and at another time $145. He 
had taken the money and shown it to S. B. Culpepper, president of 
Clark Memorial College, who was staying with him temporarily 
at the Lemon. The day after the election of Percy, he said, he had 
again called on Dulaney and was given $350 more. He had taken 
$500 of the money to his wife in Poplarville, he said, and kept the 
other $145 with him because he might need it. He had then re-
24.Investigation by the Senate of the State of Mississippi of the Charges of Bribery 
in the Election of a United States Senator (Nashville, 1910), 29-36. 
25Ibid., BO, 83, 99. 
26Ibid., 80-99. 
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turned to Jackson, and when the grand jury met several weeks later, 
he went before it, told all he knew, and turned over the money. 
Bilbo's testimony was corroborated in substance, if not in all 
details, by numerous other witnesses. Swep Taylor, Ben F. Ward, 
Judge Potter, T. P. Barr, and Cowart all testified to the meeting in 
Blakeslee's office where the plans were first laid. Potter disagreed 
on one detail. He said the sentiment at the meeting was unanimous 
for exposure of the bribery, if discovered, during the caucus. He 
had merely insisted, he said, that before any exposure was made 
definite evidence be secured implicating some responsible member 
of the opposition. Barr and others agreed with Bilbo that Potter 
had expressed the fear that exposure during the caucus would ad-
versely affect Vardaman.27 Culpepper testified that Bilbo had 
shown him $150 on one occasion and $145 on another and had told 
him that it came from the "Percy people" and that he was going to 
expose them. Senators J. A. Bailey, C. E. Franklin, S. J. Owens, and 
Representative J. L. Seawright stated that Bilbo had told them 
early in the caucus of his intention of trapping bribers. Owens tes-
tified that Bilbo told him ten days before Percy's election that "My 
scheme has worked all right. I have got the evidence and in good 
time I am going to expose it." Later, while the grand jury was in 
session, Owens said, Bilbo showed him a roll of money and said he 
was going to tum it over to the grand jury. Representative A. C. 
Anderson, a teller at the caucus, stated that he saw Bilbo's ballot 
on the last vote and that it was marked for Vardaman. Assistant 
Chief of Police J. L. Raney corroborated the proposed tryst at Mary 
Stamps' place. Representative E. J. Pollard of DeSoto testified that 
Bilbo had told him the week before the grand jury met that he had 
"a bomb up [his] sleeve that [would] give them a jar."28 
Mrs. Hall had signed a statement to the effect that she had been 
given twenty dollars by Dulaney who told her to give it to Bilbo 
"to hold him in line." She later repudiated the statement and said 
she had been induced to sign it by District Attorney M. S. McNeill, 
a member of Vardaman's faction, on a promise that it would "keep 
her out of trouble." She testified that Bilbo had sought her out 
shortly before the grand jury met, told her he was in trouble, and 
asked her to lend him $280 for a short time. Later, she said, Bilbo 
27Ibid.,29-35, 120-34, 151-58,233-42. 
28Ibid., 100-13, 297, 299-300, 243-57. 
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had again approached her and offered her $1,000 if she would go 
again before the grand jury and «make a clean breast" of all she 
knew.29 The strategy of this testimony was two-edged. It pur-
ported to blacken Bilbo's character by insinuating both that if he 
had received a bribe he had spent it for his own use and that he 
had himself attempted to bribe a witness. 
District Attorney McNeill refused to turn over the stenographic 
notes of the grand jury hearings to the senate. He testified before 
them, however, as did also the stenographer, R. S. Streit, that Mrs. 
Hall had stated before the jury that she had been given twenty 
dollars by Dulaney to give to Bilbo. McNeill denied that he had used 
any unfair tactics to get her to so testify. Bilbo denied offering her 
$1,000 or any amount to testify.so 
Mrs. Neil's testimony corroborated Bilbo, although in giving it 
she blackened her own reputation. She gave her home as Chatta-
nooga, Tennessee, and her business as «keeping books and working 
in real estate and trying to buy Mississippi Legislators." She stated 
that she was commissioned by Dulaney to solicit prospects for 
bribery and that she was go-between for Dulaney in his dealings 
with Bilbo and Cowart. She first had been persuaded to work in 
Percy's interest, she said, by J. G. Bennett of the Jackson Daily 
News. He had told her that Percy was sure to win because his 
crowd «had the money." She then, she said, had been asked by 
Dulaney to «feel the Senators and the Representatives, and secure 
as many weak ones, and those that liked money or enjoyment," and 
to introduce them to him. She presented Bilbo to Dulaney and 
arranged a private interview for them in a room at the Lemon. 
After the meeting, she said, Dulaney told her «There is nothing in 
the damned little rascal. He won't talk to me." Bilbo had told her, 
she said, that «Dulaney must take me for a fool. I am not going to 
talk plain." She said that after a few days she became convinced 
that Bilbo was «doing a little detective work." Mrs. Neil also testi-
fied that she had introduced Representative Cowart to Dulaney and 
that Dulaney had later told her that he could not seem to come to 
terms with Cowart. She quoted Dulaney as saying that he did not 
know whether Cowart "wanted money or that judgeship."31 
29Ibld., SO-85. 
30Ibld., 193, 195-98, 200-201, 204-205. 
31Ibid., 259-62, 266, 275. 
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Before the caucus ended, Mrs. Neil said, she had gone to Vicks-
burg. From there she went to New Orleans at Mardi Gras time to 
sell a story of the caucus to a newspaper. While she was there and 
on her return trip to Jackson, she said, she was shadowed by men 
wearing red ribbons in their lapels. One of them, R. S. Seay, who 
was admittedly working in the interest of the Percy faction, tried 
to induce her to remain in New Orleans, and when she refused the 
others threatened her.s2 
Representative Cowart not only corroborated Bilbo's testimony 
but brought forth startling revelations of his own. He stated that 
Dulaney had offered him $1,000 to induce him to vote for Percy 
but that he had not agreed. Mter that, he said, R. N. Miller, Wood 
Magee, and Will A. Percy, Leroy's brother, had offered him, in the 
presence of "Private" John Allen, official positions to secure his 
vote for Percy. Magee, he said, had tendered him a circuit judge-
ship. When this did not seem to move him, Miller and Will Percy 
had held out to him a United States judgeship or a foreign con-
sulate. They had also offered, he said, if he would move to some 
town on the Y. and M. V. Railroad, to give him a "lucrative practice." 
They told him that "after Leroy was elected they could turn things 
bottom side upwards." Cowart said that he called on Governor 
Noel and attempted to tell him that illegal offers were being made 
in his name but that Noel had cut him short, telling him that he 
did not want to know anything about it as he had nothing to do 
with it. Miller admitted that he told Cowart ''his chances [for a 
judgeship] would be improved by voting for some other candidate 
who was not so hostile to the administration of Governor Noel 
as ... Vardaman was," but denied that he had actually tendered 
the offer as a bribe. Noel denied that Cowart had mentioned to 
him any matters concerning the attempted bribery. Cowart had 
charged that Will Percy was the representative of Secretary of War 
J. M. Dickinson who had prOmised, according to Cowart, federal 
patronage for Percy votes. Will Percy neither admitted nor denied 
this.ss 
Despite the sensations that were being revealed hourly, every-
one was awaiting impatiently the appearance of Dulaney as a wit-
ness. He was summoned and gave his testimony. He said that he 
82Ibid., 276-96. 
881bid., 207-23, 227-31, 397, 460-63, 470-71. 
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had always been a supporter of McLaurin but that after the 
Senator's death he had come to Jackson to support Percy or anyone 
else against Vardaman. His opposition was based on Vardaman's 
Negro policy which had caused the Negroes «to move away from 
our county ... by the hundreds into Arkansas .... It was detrimental 
to the interests of all of us where the negro labor was a factor." 
He denied that he had attempted to bribe anyone. He said that 
Mrs. Neil had sought him out once and told him that she could 
deliver nine votes for $2,000, but that he had repulsed her and had 
not seen or talked to her since. He said his only contacts with Bilbo 
had been several visits which Bilbo had made to his room. Bilbo, 
he said, would come to his room, have several drinks, and then 
depart, carrying out with him each time a bottle of whiskey. Once 
Bilbo had tried in vain to borrow $50 from him, he said. He 
branded Bilbo's statement that he had received $645 from him as «a 
most infamous, filthy lie," and he denied offering Cowart $1,000 for 
his vote.84 Dulaney admitted giving Mrs. Hall $50 for entertaining 
friends of Percy. 
Meanwhile the press of the state was giving the investigation 
full coverage. The Macon Beacon bemoaned the scandal, although 
it placed no credence in Bilbo's story. Percy's «high character and 
invincible integrity," it thought, ". . . put him above pollution by 
such a scandal," while "Everything [Bilbo] has done has been the 
act of a liar and a corrupt man." The Coast Beacon thought the 
investigation a waste of time. If there was any consideration ex-
tended or accepted, it said, neither the giver nor the receiver was 
"going to admit it, so the white wash brush may be applied at once." 
The Beacon agreed with "Private" John Allen that "There seems to 
have been several legislators running around Jackson holding out 
their hands seeking to be bribed." It urged that since none of 
those charged with accepting the bribes had voted for Percy, the in-
vestigation be dropped.85 The Issue pertly remarked that the only 
Negro exodus from Dulaney's county during Vardaman's governor-
ship "was the movement of about fifty or sixty convicts from his 
plantation, from whose toil for a number of years he had reaped a 
liberal profit."88 
84Ibid., 301-20. 
85Macon Beacon, Apr. 1, 8, 1910; Coast Beacon, quoted in Jackson Clarion-
Ledger, Mar. 31, 1910. 
88Jack:son lsroe, Apr. 16, 1910. 
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Despite Bilbo's explanation of his delay in revealing the alleged 
bribery, the press made much of the fact that he had waited several 
weeks after he claimed receiving the money before he had divulged 
the bribery. The Natchez Democrat thought this looked "exceed-
ingly yellow." It pointed out that if he had exposed the bribery when 
he charged it occurred, it would have resulted in Vardaman's elec-
tion. Thus, it said, Bilbo, "if his story is true, is a coward and a 
traitor to Vardaman." The two Jackson papers and the Vicksburg 
Herald agreed with the Democrat. The Clarion said Bilbo's story 
was "unreasonable and improbable and . . . is hatched up in order 
to becloud . . . the investigation into the contingent fund . . . and 
to give Vardaman an advantage in the Senate race next summer." If 
Bilbo had been "touched" as he claimed, "he certainly did Varda-
man a very great injustice in sitting dowIi like a clam and see[ing] 
him go to slaughter, when by a word he could have elected him." 
"Was there ever before," asked Editor Henry, "anything like it on 
this earth, the heavens above, or the water below?" The Herald 
thought Bilbo's failure to reveal the alleged bribery during the 
caucus "stamps the charge as libel and an after thought."37 
But the Issue said it was a question of "damned if you do and 
damned if you don't." If Bilbo had made the exposure during the 
caucus, the same people who were now criticizing him for not doing 
so would have denounced him for perpetrating "a political trick" 
to elect Vardaman.s8 His further delay after the caucus was over, 
Bilbo said, was inspired by the fear that if the opposition got wind 
of the evidence before the jury was ready to act, they might succeed 
in preventing the indictment. "I knew," he said, "what would take 
place when the facts were out." Since the exposure, Jackson had 
been filled with "an effort to defeat the indictment and overcome 
it." That, he said, was the purpose "in keeping this thing a secret."S9 
In the investigation Bilbo's character and reputation were 
minutely examined. Witnesses from Bilbo's neighborhood in south 
Mississippi were produced by both sides, one group attacking Bilbo's 
character, the other defending it. Bilbo was able to show that some 
of the opposition witnesses were in the employ of the Gulf and 
87Macon Beacon, Apr. 8, 1910; Natchez Democrat, Mar. 29, 30, 31, 1910; 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 31, 1910; Vicksburg Herald, Mar. 29, 1910. 
88Jackson Issue, Apr. 9, 1910. 
119Senate Investigation, SO, 83, 99. 
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Ship Island Railroad. This corporation was openly hostile to Varda-
man and had been denounced by him as «always in [politics] ... 
for its own interest as against the interests of the taxpayers."40 One 
witness, Walter A. White, an attorney from Biloxi, testified that he 
had heard that a legislative bill redistricting judicial circuits in 
Harrison County had been defeated by Bilbo's influence. He in-
. vestigated and learned of rumors of Bilbo's accepting bribes. He 
and Judge James Neville, chief counsel of the Gulf and Ship Island, 
attempted to set a trap for Bilbo by bribing him to support a dummy 
bill. They had engaged R. M. Moseley as their agent, and Moseley 
testified that Bilbo had promised to support the bill for $300. The 
plot, however, was not carried to execution. Bilbo denied the charge 
and was able to discredit it when he presented as a witness the man 
who had introduced Moseley to him on the occasion in question. 
This witness testified that Moseley was so drunk at the time that in 
his judgment he would not know what had transpired.41 Other 
witnesses impeaching Bilbo were presented, but he was able to show 
in most cases that they were not impartialf2 
An attempt was made to discredit Bilbo's story when it was re-
vealed that three of the bank notes which he turned over to the 
grand jury had been issued by the National Bank of Poplarville. 
Bilbo explained this by the statement that his wife had deposited 
the money in the bank for safekeeping without requesting that the 
identical bills be preservedf9 
The testimony did not seem to change any opinions. As the 
Clarion pointed out, the contest was political rather than judicial. 
<"The Vardaman folks," it said, «are of the opinion that Bilbo is tell-
ing the truth . . . while the opposition . . . are of the opposite way 
of thinking."" The Sea Coast Echo remarked on the peculiar situa-
tion of "a majority of the legislature exhausting every means to 
break down the evidence of one of its own members given before 
a grand jury that returned a true bill against an alleged briber." 
It pointed out that the alleged briber was not a member of the 
legislature, yet that body was «making his cause the cause of the 
state ... thrOwing every shield around and about the accused and 
40Ibld., 354, 367, 385-87; Jackson Issue, Feb. 22, 1908. 
41Senate Investigation, 375-78, 348-62, 406; Natchez DemoCf'at, Apr. 9, 10, 1910. 
42Senate Investigation, 435-37, 443-45, 452-54, 476-78, 480. 
49Ibid., 437-38. 
"Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Apr. 14, 1910. 
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stooping to the lowest depths to discredit its own member." The 
Yazoo Sentinel said the senate should, instead of attempting to im-
peach Bilbo, "tender him a vote of thanks for uncovering the rot-
tenest piece of politics that has ever disgraced the name of 
Mississippi." The Columbus Dispatch, too, believed Bilbo's story, 
and the Vicksburg Post charged that the investigation was designed 
to discredit him as a witness in the Dulaney tria1.45 
At least one member of the opposition believed that Vardaman 
was beaten by unfair means. Writing several years later a cousin 
of John Sharp Williams revealed his belief that "from what I saw 
and knew ... improper influences were used to defeat him."'!! 
After the testimony was all in, the resolution to expel Bilbo was 
voted on. It received 28 votes to 15 against it, failing by one vote 
of the necessary two-thirds majority. Senators Anderson and Left-
wich, the two prosecutors, then offered a resolution characterizing 
as "utterly unexplained and absolutely incredible" Bilbo's claim to 
have acted in good faith while failing to disclose "until weeks after 
the nomination had been made and a Senator elected" the informa-
tion "alleged to have been obtained by him." It further resolved, 
because of these "unexplained inconsistencies and inherent im-
probabilities" in his testimony, as well as in his "established bad 
character and lack of credibility," that the senate condemn the 
charge "and the statement of the role played" by Bilbo as a 
"trumped up falsehood utterly unworthy of belief." It resolved 
further that Bilbo was "unfit to sit with honest upright men in a 
respectable legislative body" and called on him to resign. A dozen 
or more of Bilbo's supporters walked out before the vote, and the 
resolution carried 25 to 1. The senate then adopted, 28 to 0, a reso-
lution stating that, in their belief, the conduct of every candidate in 
the senatorial contest had been "dignified, honorable, and upright," 
that no vote in the caucus was procured "by any improper means 
or corrupt influence," and that Percy's election was "free from 
any fraud or corruption."47 
The Natchez Democrat called Bilbo's "escape" from expulsion 
45Quoted in Jackson Issue, Apr. 9, 16, 1910. 
4!!Garrard Harris to Williams, Jan. 25, 1916, Williams Papers. 
47Senate Investigation, 7-9. The House passed a similar resolution. See Missis-
sippi, House Journal, 1910, p. 1528. See also House minority report, ibid., 1527-28, 
charging that "undue influence," "liquor," and "Executive influence" were used to 
effect Percy's election. 
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due "entirely to partisanship and sympathy," and the Clarion 
agreed. "It now remains," said the latter, "for Bilbo to resign, sup-
press himseH, withdraw to the shades of private life, to which he 
will forever hereafter be retired."48 But Bilbo did not resign. In-
stead he issued a militant statement branding the senate investi-
gation as a "whitewash." It was, he said, "a bitter and disgraceful 
fight with the friends of the common people and clean government 
on the one side and the mercenary politicians and corporate in-
terests on the other." The "interests," he said, when they failed to 
prevent Dulaney's indictment, "threw the whole affair into the state 
senate . . . for the professed purpose of investigation, but . . . the 
scheme was to secure the state's evidence, whitewash the guilty 
parties, defeat justice, confound the public as to the real facts, ex-
pel or condemn me and to recommend themselves powerfully." 
The corporations of south Mississippi, he said, had had him marked 
ever since he entered public life because he had "dared to oppose 
them in the interest of the people." They had "scoured south Mis-
sissippi as with a fine tooth comb" to discredit him. The same 
twenty-eight senators who voted to expel him, he said, were in-
terested only in damning him and would have voted the same way 
before the investigation as they did afterward. The investigation 
he termed a "star chamber proceeding." Anderson and Leftwich, 
"who were supposed to represent the senate," were in daily con-
ference with Dulaney and the Percy brothers and their attorneys. 
"People of Mississippi," he concluded, "the fight between the classes 
and the masses, between the corporate influences and the people is 
on, and it will be a fight to the finish."49 
The trial of Dulaney on the indictment was delayed by a change 
of venue to Yazoo County. This change brought charges from the 
Vardaman press that the court was faVOring the defense. The Percy 
press was distressed at this attitude and blamed it on Vardaman, 
who, it said, had "done more to lower the tone of politics in Mis-
sissippi ... than any other [man] in the state's history."5o The 
trial was held in November and December and charges of partiality 
were made by both factions. The J ackson News was shocked when 
the prosecuting attorney withdrew an embarraSSing question he 
48Natchez Democrat, Apr. 23, 1910; Jackson Clarlon-Ledge1', Apr. 21, 1910. 
49Jackson Clarlon-Ledge1', Apr. 28, 1910; Jackson Issue, Apr. 30, 1910. 
50Columbus Dispatch, quoted in Macon Beacon, Dec. 9, 1910. 
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had propounded to Bilbo. It charged the prosecution with <'taking 
more care of Bilbo, looking after his interests with more energy ... 
than any other feature of the case." Every move made, it alleged, 
had been with the view to bolstering up his testimony and protect-
ing him from counsel for the defense. The sensational story, it said, 
told by <Cthe miserable little moral pervert, Theodore G. Bilbo," was 
a cowardly political frame-up cchellishly conceived by the followers 
of Vardaman to bolster his waning political fortunes." The News 
scouted the idea that Bilbo left the trial before its conclusion be-
cause he feared he might meet with personal violence from Dulaney. 
The latter had said, according to Editor Fred Sullens, that he 
would not ccsoil his hands on the dirty pUp."51 
The jury acquitted Dulaney. It then issued a sworn statement 
to the public certifying that its verdict was unanimous and on the 
nrst ballot, and ccwas based upon the fact that each of us . . . be-
lieved Mr. Bilbo's statement to be untrue ... and his charge to be 
a <frame-up' and pure fabrication." This statement was made, the 
jurymen said, so the public might know that ccwe were not misled 
in any respect, nor Mr. Dulaney acquitted on any so called <legal 
technicality', but upon the testimony as given by all the witnesses 
under oath." The jurors were polled as to their political affiliation, 
and six stated they had favored Vardaman for senator, four Percy, 
and two Alexander. Said E. S. Barksdale, one of the Vardaman 
men: ccI was ready to bring in a verdict of not guilty when Bilbo 
had concluded his testimony." Another, W. B. Vaughan, said, <Cit 
did not take me long to make up my mind after I heard Bilbo 
testify." A third, J. J. Inge, said, CCI think the entire jury was of one 
mind after hearing Bilbo's testimony."52 
When the trial resulted in a repudiation of Bilbo the Clarion 
thought this should result in Vardaman's defeat in 1911. ccBilbo is 
Vardaman property," it said, <nis by right of discovery, by virtue of 
the celebrated frame-up, the purpose of which was to destroy an 
honorable Senator . . . ruin a private citizen, and bring disgrace 
on the state."53 Nor did the Jackson News see any further place 
for Bilbo in the Vardaman camp. ccHe has destroyed his usefulness 
51Jackson Daily News, Nov. 23, 27, Dec. 2, 3, 1910. 
52Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 5, 1911; Macon Beacon, July 28, 1911; Jackson 
Daily News, Dec. 3, 4, 1910. 
IIBJackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 8, 1910. 
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to The Ambitious One," it said after the trial. It suggested that the 
best thing to do with him was "to confine the malodorous creature 
in a small room with a dozen polecats until they stink each other 
to death."IS~ 
Sentiment was not so unanimous, however, throughout the state. 
The Osyka Herald, while having "not the least patience with Bilbo 
or men of his stripe," was convinced that "Dulaney gave him money 
and whiskey to influence his vote." The Ripley Sentinel discounted 
the claim that six of the jurors were Vardaman men. Perhaps, it 
said, "they were converted to his standard while on the job." The 
Issue charged that "Messrs. Percy and Williams ... , the governor 
... with all ... his ... power, the administration at Washington, 
an unlimited amount of money ... and the most sagacious, resource-
ful criminal lawyers in the state" were all employed to secure the 
acquittal. It had, it said, expected nothing else.1SS 
But the effects of the Secret Caucus were not to end with the 
acquittal of Dulaney. Nor was Bilbo destined to be stunk to death 
by polecats. The reverberations of the sensational struggle were 
to be felt in every political contest for a decade, and Bilbo was to 
rise to power and even supplant the "White ChieY' himseH on the 
prestige which came to him as a result of the part he played. Lines 
were to be drawn more tightly and with more vindictiveness than 
ever before in the history of the state, and scarcely a man in politics 
but believed that he owed his success or his defeat to his stand on 
the question. 
Whether Dulaney was guilty or whether, as he said, it was a 
charge trumped up by Bilbo, it is impossible to say. Bilbo told a 
convincing story, was corroborated by credible witnesses, and sup-
plied other abundant proof to substantiate his charges. On the other 
hand, Dulaney denied the charge, and a jury of twelve men, six 
of whom claimed to be Vardaman followers, believed him. So 
far as our story is concerned it matters little whether Dulaney was 
guilty or not. The important thing was the bitterness which the 
incident created among the people of the state. The malice, ignor-
Ii~Jackson Daily News, Dec. 4, 1910. 
ISISJackson Issue, Dec. 9, 1910; ibid., Dec. 16, quoting Osyka Herald, Ripley 
Sentinel, Coahoma Monitor, Newton Record, Enterprise Journal, Crystal Springs 
Meteor, Carron County News, and Columbus Dispatch; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 
P4lC. 15, 1910; ~acon Beacon, Dec. 16, 1910, 
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ance, and thoughtlessness with which the factions carried on their 
fight convinced many good people that a great wrong had been 
perpetrated. The result was a great political upheaval and the 
bringing of the revolution, started by Vardaman in 1903, to com-
plete fruition. 
CHAPTER XVIII 
THE ELECTION OF 1911 
IMMEDIATELY after the senate bribery investigation Percy pro-
posed that he and Vardaman enter a joint canvass for a primary 
election to be held in November, 1910. If the election went against 
him, Percy said, he would resign when the legislature met in 1911. 
Vardaman accepted the proposal in principle but suggested several 
changes. The primary, he thought, should be held in August in-
stead of November, Percy should resign "immediately" in case of an 
adverse vote, Governor Noel's agreement to appoint the winner 
should be obtained, and the loser should promise to support the 
winner in the regular 1911 primary for the full term. Percy insisted 
that the primary not be held before November and refused to ask 
Noel to appoint the winner. Vardaman then agreed to Percy's 
stipulations, and the Democratic state executive committee ordered 
the primary. The attorney-general, however, ruled that such an 
agreed primary would be illegal, and Noel let it be known that he 
would not appoint Vardaman even though he won the primary and 
Percy resigned. Thereupon the scheme was dropped, and each side 
accused the other of bad faith. Vardaman charged that Percy and 
Noel were in collusion, and the state executive committee charged 
that the affair had fallen through because Vardaman had not agreed 
to the terms prescribed by the committee. The Percy press charged 
that Vardaman had shown a "yellow streak" and that he had flatly 
declined to meet Percy in joint debate. l 
With the proposed 1910 primary in the discard, Vardaman, 
Percy, and C. H. Alexander announced their candidacies for the 
full term in the primary to be held in August, 1911. Though that 
date was fifteen months off, canvassing began with political rallies 
in the spring of 1910 and continued through the spring and summer 
of the following year. At the same time Bilbo, aligning himself 
with Vardaman, announced his candidacy for lieutenant-governor.1l 
lJackson Clarion-Ledger, Apr. 21, 28, May 12, 1910; Macon Beacon, Apr. 22, 
Aug. 19, 1910; Natchez Democrat, Apr. 16, 17, 19, May 1, 7, Aug. 23, 1910; Jackson 
Dally News, May 7, 1910; W. A. Percy to J. K. Vardaman, Apr. 15, 1910; Vardaman 
to Percy, Apr. 15, 1910, published in Jackson Issue, Apr. 16, 1910; ibid., Apr. 30, 
1910. 
IlNatchez Democrat, May 7, Aug. 23, 1910; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 7, 1910, 
Jan. 26, 1911. 
212 REVOLT OF THE REDNECXS 
Indications of a bitter and vindictive campaign were early seen 
by the Greenville Democrat. With Vardaman and his "partisan 
press" upholding Bilbo and "cussing out" the governor, legislature, 
and executive committee, the Democrat thought a campaign "on 
what is termed a 'high plane'" an impossibility. In a speech at God-
bold Wells on July 4, 1910, Percy, heckled by an audience with 
shouts of "Hurrah for Vardaman!" "Hurrah for Bilbo!" "Hurrah for 
Mary Stamps!" became angered and called them "cattle" and "red-
necks." These names were adopted by the Vardaman follOwing, 
and wherever Vardaman went to speak: he was greeted by crowds 
of men wearing red neckties and was carried in wagons drawn by 
oxen. This accentuated the class division in the struggle.s 
Vardaman charged that Percy had been unfairly elected by the 
caucus. Percy challenged Vardaman to meet him in open debate, 
but this Vardaman would not do. "If you can substantiate that 
charge," said Percy, " ... then that legislature should be branded 
with disapproval and the man who sought to profit by that corrup-
tion should be driven in shame out of public life." On the other 
hand, if Vardaman could not substantiate it, then he stood "con-
victed of having slandered the legislature ... for political profit, and 
[was] unworthy of any honors at the hands of the people." The 
feeling between the two men had become personal. When they 
met in public "Neither showed the slightest sign of recognition. 
They passed each other without a nod.'" 
Most of the "old line" politicians in the state were backing Percy 
or Alexander. McLaurin's three surviving brothers, his only son, 
and the remnants of his organization were aligned with his old 
enemy, Percy, against his greater enemy, Vardaman. Sidney Mc-
Laurin thought this called for an explanation, and he gave it. Ad-
mitting that bad blood had existed at one time between his brother 
and Percy, Sidney said that at the time of Anse's death they were 
personally and politically on the best of terms. On the other hand, 
Vardaman's opposition to McLaurin had been "bitter, vindictive, 
and malicious, from the time he first thought Senator McLaurin 
was in his way politically."5 John Sharp Williams was backing 
8Greenville Democrat and Raymond Gazette, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 
June 2, 9, 1910; Ibid., June 16, July 7, Aug. 18, 1910; Vicksburg Post, July 6, 1910. 
4-Vicksburg Herald, June I, 1911; Jackson Dally News, June 10, 1911. 
5Sidney L. McLaurin to Editor, Brandon News, June 22, 1911, published in 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 29, 1911. 
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Percy, whom he termed "one of the most intelligent, brainy, and 
efficient men in the United States-and a gentleman every inch of 
him." He later said that he staked his own political future in back-
ing Percy, because it was "plain at the time" that, "owing to some 
local conditions," Percy would be defeated.6 Governor Noel, of 
course, was actively canvassing for Percy. The daily press of the 
state, with the lone exception of the Vicksburg Post, was backing 
either .Percy or Alexander, or both. '1 
By May, 1911, political news was crowding all other off the 
front pages of the papers. A dispatch from Wesson to a New 
Orleans paper said that not even the closing down of the great mills 
there "has caused business in Wesson to suffer so much as the 
present senatorial campaign." From early moming until late at 
night men "spend their time on the streets and in the stores, post 
office, depot, and livery stables, discussing who is going to be United 
States Senator." Business, it said, "has been lost sight of."8 
Although the Secret Caucus and class divisions were to be the 
decisive issues in the campaign, every attempt was made to win 
support on other issues. Vardaman and Bilbo had long been ad-
vocates of school fund reform and a reapportionment of legislative 
representatives for the benefit of south Mississippi.9 To counter-
act these issues, Noel, himseH a «liberal" at heart, advocated legis-
lative reapportionment which would «give each county its proper 
voice in ... lawmaking"; modernization of the tax system to make 
burdens <Dome by the different counties just . . . and equitable"; 
and modification of the school tax to let counties able to bear their 
own burden do so and to use state funds only «for counties unable 
to educate properly their own children."lO 
All three candidates claimed they were being opposed by the 
trusts. Ross Collins, a Vardaman supporter and candidate for at-
torney-general, charged that his opponent, S. S. Hudson, running 
for re-election, had accepted money from the Hines Lumber Com-
pany to have an antitrust indictment against it quashed. Hines was 
a Chicago concern and both Vardaman and Bilbo were bitter in 
6J. S. Williams to President Woodrow Wilson, Nov. 17, 1916, Apr. 24. 1917, 
Williams Papers. 
'1Natchez Democrat, July 4, 1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 20, 1911. 
8New Orleans Times-Democrat, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, May 25, 1911. 
9Senate Investigation, 92; Jackson I88U6, Feb. 1, 1908. 
loJackson Clarion-Ledger, July 6, 1911. 
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their denunciation of it. Allegedly it was sponsor of the landholding 
bill which Vardaman had vetoed as governor. Vardaman charged 
that Hines was interested in electing a legislature which would pass 
and a governor who would approve a new bill. "He [Hines] does 
not own quite all the timber lands in South Mississippi yet," said 
Vardaman, "he wants them all." Vardaman also declared against 
a protective tariff on lumber, which Percy had not done.ll 
In his message to the legislature in 1908 Vardaman had urged 
extensive powers for the railroad commission enabling it to fix 
rates, supervise roadbeds and rolling stock, prevent dividends on 
watered stock, and prohibit overworking of conductors, engineers, 
and telegraph operators. He had vetoed the merger of the South-
ern and the Mobile and Ohio railroads, which, he said, had gained 
him the undying enmity of those two lines. In 1911 he was urging 
stricter enforcement of railroad regulation as the only alternative 
to government ownership.llI 
As the campaign progressed classes were arrayed against masses, 
and country against town. The contest between capital and labor, 
said Vardaman, was inevitable. The labOring man "was not given 
an equal chance ••• under our .•• unjust and partial laws. .. "If labor 
would survive it must organize for its oWn protection and see to 
it that men are sent to the legislature and to congress who will enact 
laws that vouchsafe to every citizen an equal chance in the race 
of life." He said the contest was for supremacy "between the man 
whose toil produces the wealth of the country, and the favored 
few who reap the profit of that toil." He did not, he said, favor 
persecution of corporations. He believed they should enjoy the 
same rights and opportunities accorded to individuals, but no more. 
Capital, he said, should be taxed at the same rate as labor. Vardaman 
was commended and Percy condemned by the Mississippi Labor 
lournaL18 . 
The Percy and Alexander supporters cried out against these 
"populistic, socialistic ..• and anarchistic utterances," and said they 
left Vardaman·s "democracy under the very gravest suspicions." 
llJackson IBSfIB and Aberdeen Emmlner, quoted in Macon Beacon. July 15, 
1910; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 20, 1911; Jackson lswe, June 16, 1911. 
llIMississippi, House lournal, 1908, pp. 50-52; ibid., 1906, pp. 45-50. 
18Jackson IBSfIB, May 27, 1910, May 5, 1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 8, 
1911. 
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The conservative and thoughtful people in the state, they said, 
would consider his election a great tragedy. They denounced his 
appeals "to ignorance and prejudice" and taunted him because a 
railroad attorney was campaigning for him. They condemned his 
«notorious profanity" and his use of whiskey and wine during the 
caucus "while loudly proclaiming loyalty to prohibition." They 
estimated that 98 per cent of the preachers of the state were op-
posed to Vardaman, and when the Reverend Stephen Archer up-
held from the pulpit Percy's <mgh character" he was praised by the 
anti-Vardaman press. l' 
The opposition charged that Vardaman had accepted and used 
a pass on the Gulf and Ship Island Railroad in violation of the 
law. Vardaman, admitting that his memory might be defective, 
denied any knowledge of ever having used a pass and called on his 
accusers to produce it. If they did, he promised to have a cut made 
of it and publish it in his paper. Thereupon Will Crump, Percy's 
campaign manager, produced pass number 864, issued by the Gulf 
and Ship Island to V ardaman. Vardaman kept his promise and 
printed a cut of the pass in his paper but denied that the pass was 
ever in his possession or used by him. It was, he said, issued as a 
compliment to trustees of the Old Soldiers' Home. The whole affair, 
he said, was merely an attempt by the railroad to destroy him.15 
Meanwhile the contingent fund committee of the Secret Caucus 
legislature had investigated Vardaman's accounts while governor 
and reported that they failed to find vouchers for expenditures 
amounting to $1,700. In addition they charged that he made 
private use of a campaign fund raised for Bryan in 1904 and did 
not return it until after he had left office; that his trips investigating 
state institutions were paid for twice-once by the institution he 
was inspecting and once out of the contingent fund; that he failed to 
account for approximately $1,000 which he claimed he spent for 
relief of Meridian cyclone sufferers; and that he had misappropriated 
funds raised to purchase a silver service for the new battleship, 
l'Jackson Clarion-Ledg61', July 27, 1911; Macon Beacon, July 28, 1911; Green-
ville Democrat and West Point Lead61', quoted, ibid., July 15, 22, 1910; Natchez 
Democrat, July 2, 1911; Southern Sentinel and Jackson Daily News, quoted in Macon 
Beacon, June 2, 1911. 
15Jackson Is81lB, Apr. 30, 1910, Feb. 24, 1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledg61', Mar. 2, 
1911. 
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Mississippi. In all, the alleged shortages amounted to $2,721.27.16 
At first Vardaman ignored the charges; then he denied them in a 
general manner rather than categOrically. The opposition press 
leaped to the attack. 
The Jackson Daily News said Vardaman's explanations were 
entirely unsatisfactory and called for more light on the subject. The 
Clarion had editorials almost daily on the shortages, and the Aber-
deen Examiner said Vardaman stood convicted of the charges since 
he failed to prosecute his accusers for libel. When C. M. Williamson, 
"one of the exceedingly few members of [the legal] profession in 
high standing who is supporting Vardaman," admitted that he had 
signed a note for Vardaman just a few days before the former gov· 
ernor turned the battleship fund over to the commissioners, the 
News called on Vardaman to disprove the allegations or "shut Up."17 
Vardaman replied that vouchers and accounts of all expendi-
tures were in his office when his term expired. The committee of 
the 1908 legislature had been invited to inspect them, he said, but 
apparently had failed to do so. He charged that later they had 
been removed from the files by his enemies in order to embarrass 
him. His statement was supported by Senator Clayton D. Potter, a 
member of the 1908 committee. According to Potter, Vardaman 
informed the committee before the expiration of his term that all 
vouchers and accounts were in his office ready for inspection. 
"Through an oversight," he said, "we failed to check over and 
approve same. The fault was ours, not his." All but $65 of the 
missing vouchers were for expenditures between 1904 and 1906. 
George Edwards, the current state treasurer, had been Vardaman's 
secretary during that period. He stated to the committee that the 
vouchers had been made and kept by him for all expenditures, and 
that all were in the file when he left Vardaman's service in 1906.18 
16Mississippi, House Journal, 1910, pp. 222-25, 595-99, 1455-72; Jackson Clarion-
Ledger, Mar. 10, 24, Apr. 19, 1910; Koscuisko Courier, quoted in Macon Beacon, 
July 21, 1911. 
17Natchez Democrat, May 2, 1911; Macon Beacon, July 8, 1910, June 2, 16, 
1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 18, Sept. 1, 8, 1910; Aberdeen Examiner, quoted 
in Macon Beacon, July 21, 1911; Jackson Daily News, May 4, 9, 1910, June 5, 1911; 
Vicksburg Herald, June 6, 11, 1911. 
18Testimony before Senate and House Joint Committee to investigate expendi-
tures of Contingent Fund, in Mississippi, House Journal, 1910, pp. 1472-1502. For 
Potter's report see ibid., 1455. Also see Vicksburg Post, Apr. 1,1910; Jackson lawe, 
May 7, 1910. 
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Noel denied that the vouchers had been removed by him, and 
the opposition renewed the attack. Finally the legislature employed 
an accountant, Charles J. Moore, to investigate the charges against 
Vardaman. Moore subpoenaed Vardaman to appear before him. 
Vardaman went, but refused to answer Moore's questions. "The 
papers, vouchers, and memoranda ... ," he said, ''have all been out 
of my hands for nearly four years, and in the hands of . . . my 
bitterest political enemies ... who are now, I think, resorting to this 
investigation solely for political purposes."19 Moore then sub-
poenaed Vardaman's private account from the Mississippi Bank 
and Trust Company. The bank refused to honor the summons and 
was fined fifty dollars for contempt. It then obtained an injunction 
against Moore restraining him from issuing another subpoena until 
after the election. Before that event the bank went into receiver-
ship-forced, it said, through "politics."20 
The issue was not settled then, nor was it ever to the satisfaction 
of everyone. Throughout the campaign opposition speakers and 
papers played on this tune as though it were the refrain of their 
campaign melody. ''When the people asked for facts he [Varda-
man] gave them poetry," said the Macon Beacon a few days before 
the election, "and when they asked to see the records, he replied 
with verbal tributes to their sovereignty."21 
Bilbo played a colorful, if undignified, part in the campaign and 
drew much of the fire of the opposition. The large crowds which 
he drew were dismissed by one editor as the result of idle curiosity. 
"He is attractive," said the editor, "in the same way that freaks of 
nature are regarded." The Clarion, too, directed much of its attack 
throughout the campaign at Bilbo, whom it termed a "discredited 
and repudiated man" with "no reputation to protect." He used, 
it said, '1anguage that would shock a fishwoman." They taxed 
their ingenuity for terms to express their contempt of him. Vardaman 
was condemned for associating with such "a thorough rascal" and 
for trying to win the senatorship with the aid of "the whelp Bilbo." 
The Daily News professed to be horrified when Vardaman referred 
to Bilbo as "that excellent gentleman." Bilbo was denounced as 
19Jackson Clarion-Ledger, May 26, 1910, May 11, 1911; Jackson Daily News, 
May 25, 1910; Jackson 18St1e, May 19, 1911. 
20Jackson Daily New8, July 10, 1911; Natchez Democrat, July 14. 15, 22, 1911. 
21Macon Beacon, June 2, 16, July 28, 1911; Vicksburg Herald, June 11, 1911. 
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"a seH-confessed bribe-taker," a "frequenter of lewd houses," and 
a "pimp." He was accused of having formerly introduced bills in 
the legislature injurious to certain interests and then accepting 
bribes to defeat them. He was even accused of having stolen money 
from a sleeping companion.22 But Bilbo was to pay the opposition 
back with interest and demonstrate that in the art of using in-
vective language he had no peer in Mississippi. 
Immediately after the senate investigation was completed in 
the spring of 1910 Bilbo had thrown himseH into the campaign. 
In May, in a speech in Pike County, he "worked on the passion and 
prejudice of his hearers to such an extent," it was reported, that he 
was frequently interrupted with shouts of "We are the low-brows, 
we are the red-necks, rah for Vardamanl" Two months later at 
Newton, refused permission to speak from the same platform with 
Alexander, he had a temporary platform erected hard by, and when 
Alexander began speaking so did Bilbo. Bilbo was caned and 
knocked down on the streets of Yazoo City by Major W. D. Gibbs 
after Bilbo had referred to him in a speech as "a renegade Con-
federate soldier."23 Some months later, speaking at Blue Mountain 
College, Bilbo called J. J. Henry, former penitentiary warden of 
ill repute,2. «a cross between a hyena and a mongrel." «He was," 
said Bilbo, «begotten in a nigger graveyard at midnight, suckled by 
a sow and educated by a fooL" Even some of the Vardaman press 
repudiated such scurrility. The New Orleans States said «Nothing 
like it has ever been heard before anywhere or in any political 
campaign on earth, and it wrote down the man guilty of its use 
as an unspeakable wretch, who should be barred from all associa-
tion with decent people." The Memphis Commercial Appeal, also 
a Vardaman supporter, called Bilbo's remarks ''hOrribly repulsive, 
disgusting and shocking." It was charged that five ladies left the 
audience while Bilbo was denounCing Henry, but the five ladies 
published a statement denying that that was the cause of their 
departure. They had left, they said, because of the late hour and 
22Macon Beacon, July 8, Aug. 5, 1910; Vicksburg Herald, Aug.S, 1910; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, July 7, Dec. 22, 29, 1910, Jan. 26, 1911; Jackson Daily News, May 
12,1910; Natchez Democrat, May 7, Aug. 23,1910. 
28Jackson Clarion-Ledger, May 25, June 2, Aug. 4, 1910. 
2.See Report of House Committee on Penitentiary, in Mississippi, HOUle /oumtil. 
1906, pp. 615-28. 
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the call of their "domestic duties," and "not because of anything 
Senator Bilbo said."25 
Henry swore personal vengeance on Bilbo. On July 6 he entered 
a train at Starkville on which Bilbo was a passenger, made his 
way to the coach where Bilbo was seated with Ross Collins, and 
beat him into insensibility with a pistol. It was thought at first 
that Bilbo was seriously wounded, but when his train arrived in 
Jackson he was able to walk from it. The brutal attack was de-
nounced by the Vardaman press, which predicted that it would 
result in a tremendous change of sentiment toward Bilbo and that 
he would be elected by a majority of tens of thousands of votes.26 
Bilbo's denunciation of Henry produced a slight split in the 
Vardaman-Bilbo lines. Judge Robert C. Blount and C. M. William-
son, two eminent members of the Mississippi bar who were sup-
porting Vardaman, openly repudiated Bilbo. This brought glee to 
the opposition press. Blount and Williamson were, said the Jackson 
News, "excellent gentlemen" and were supporting Vardaman only 
because of "some mistaken sense of gratitude" toward him. At least 
they were trying to preserve "some sell-respect." The News tried 
to widen the breach by charging that a vote for Vardaman was a 
vote for Bilbo. "Vardaman loves Bilbo," it said, "and Bilbo loves 
Vardaman." The two were in the same political boat, and it did not 
see how one could vote for one and not for the other.27 
The fury of the attack on Bilbo increased. State Senator 
Cunningham, debating with Bilbo at Iuka, charged that Bilbo had 
the reputation of a "crook" in the state senate; that he devoted his 
time to presenting nuisance bills which he would later kill for a 
bribe; that he kept a young girl in an asSignation house run by a 
Negro woman in Jackson; and that he had defrauded a client out 
of a legal judgment and, when sued by the client, gave him a check 
which was protested by the bank. He said that if Bilbo disputed 
the charges, he would make another appointment with him at a 
later date and at the same place and produce documentary evi-
25Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 13, 1911; New Orleans Daily States, quoted, Ibid.; 
Natchez Daily-Democrat, July 7, 1911, quoting Memphis Commercial Appeal; Jack-
son ISSfJe, July 7, 1911. 
26Jackson IsSfJ8, July 7, 1911. 
27Vicksburg Herald, June 6, 7, 1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 3, 1911; 
Jackson Daily News, June 7, 1911. 
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dence. Bilbo did dispute him, but there seems to have been no later 
meeting between them.28 
The most devastating verbal lashing which Bilbo received was 
from the tongue of Leroy Percy. He, like Alexander, had con-
sistently refused to speak from the same platform with Bilbo. Percy 
was scheduled to speak at Lauderdale Springs on July 4, and 
"two or three thrifty fellows," according to the Clarion, in order 
"to sell dinners, pop, soda water, etc.," invited Bilbo to appear, but 
did not inform Percy. When he arrived and found that Bilbo was 
to debate with him, Percy contemplated leaving, but was prevailed 
upon to remain and speak. Bilbo spoke first. His remarks were in-
terpreted by a hostile reporter as "on a par with his low, depraved 
nature, seasoned with coarse expressions, strained efforts at rude wit, 
saturated with profanity, ribald jests ... and slanderous remarks 
about his superiors."2G 
Percy's few local supporters had advised him that the crowd was 
in a threatening mood and that he had best not mention Vardaman 
or his henchmen in his speech, but confine his remarks to innocuous 
subjects, such as the tariff. According to his son, he agreed to do 
so. When he arose to speak his voice was drowned out by hisses 
and by shouts for Vardaman. All the while, Bilbo "sat smiling on 
the porch at his immediate left." When the crowd refused to sub-
side, Percy became enraged. "Burning-cold insults poured from his 
lips, he jeered them as cowards afraid to listen, and dared them to 
keep on." Finally, says his son, "He cowed them by sheer will-power 
and lashed them into silence by leaping invective." AbandOning 
then his earlier resolution, he launched into a scathing denunciation 
of Vardaman and all he stood for. so 
Finishing with Vardaman, he turned to Bilbo. He denounced 
him as "an informer who should be shunned by all decent and re-
spectable people, a miserable, contemptible creature, who, if his 
tale be true, should be doing service for the state." Bilbo was, he 
continued, "a low-Hung scullion, who disgraces the form of man," 
a "vile degenerate," and a "moral leper." If Bilbo was unfit "to sit 
with honest, upright men in a respectable legislative body," said 
28Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 15, 1910, May 25, 1911; ibid., July 13, 1911, 
quoting New Orleans Daily States. 
29Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 7, 1910, July 30, 1915. 
sOPercy, Lantetfll on the Leoee, 150-51. 
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Percy, he was also unfit to speak to an audience of decent, honest 
people from a platform with honest men. At the end of the senate 
investigation, he said, there was left standing on the stage, "a mark 
for the scorn and contempt of all honest men, only one figure, a 
character-less man, a sell-confessed liar, a sell-confessed bribe taker; 
and for his only ally, a poor, broken-down, shameless woman of the 
streets." It was not unusual for people to assemble, "out of idle 
curiosity," to view an unusual dwarf, a three-legged man, or a two-
headed call. Such exhibitions of physical monstrosities had no 
elevating effect; but the "exhibition of a moral monstrosity," such 
as was made in the person of Bilbo that day, "has a debasing and 
degrading effect." Percy predicted that if Vardaman attempted to 
foist upon the people of Mississippi "this creature, this bribe-taker, 
this liar, this consorter with lewd women and frequenter of assigna-
tion houses; this man whose sole claim to prominence, is the infamy 
to which he has attained," that long before the campaign was over 
Vardaman, "with pallid lips, will be praying to his God: Oh Godl 
deliver me from this body of death." Turning then from Bilbo to 
the audience, Percy said he felt like the man who, picking a yellow-
striped caterpillar out of the dust and swallowing it, said, "It is not 
my regular diet, I just wanted to see how strong my stomach was."31 
The anti-Vardaman press at the time hailed the Percy diatribe 
with glee. Scarcely one of them failed to publish his speech in full, 
with the portions castigating Bilbo italicized. Weeks and even 
months later they were quoting and requoting the pithy phrases he 
had used, and "the striped caterpillar" became a name commonly 
applied to Bilbo. A few years later at least one of them had come 
to doubt the wisdom of the attack. The debate caused, said the 
Clarion at that time, more bitter feeling than any event ever before 
produced in the state and set the whole country talking. "Some of 
the things said," it added, " ... some of the figures and comparisons 
used, will never be forgotten and are frequently referred to even to 
this very day." At the time, however, the Clarion with the rest 
applauded Percy. Simultaneously it condemned the Vardaman 
press for publishing "the most offensive and insulting articles about 
those with whom they happen to differ." It predicted that such a 
course, if not checked, would "sooner or later result in bloodshed."32 
31Ibid.; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 7, 1910; Vicksburg Herald, July 5, 1910. 
82Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 30, 1915, Sept. 22, 1910. 
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Rowdyism there was, but considering the example set for them 
by the "decent" and "respectable" press, the crowds were remark-
ably restrained in their violence. When John Allen, debating with 
Judge Blount at Winona, stated he was for Percy, the Vardaman 
supporters in the audience howled him down and refused to let him 
talk. Then Blount was served in like manner by the Percy sup-
porters, and the meeting broke up without either being heard. At 
Bentonia, in Yazoo County, a campaigner for Alexander was 
drowned out by shouts of "Hurrah for Vardamanl" Finally the 
sheriff arrested one heckler for disturbing the peace. The Vardaman 
supporters were enraged at this, and it was thought that violence 
was only avoided by a hasty adjournment to a barbecue dinner. 
After dinner Allen was permitted to speak, but was interrupted 
throughout by a Vardaman follower.8s 
The only recorded incident of spectator violence occurred at 
Rose Hill in Jasper County. Percy was speaking there when he was 
heckled by "four hoodlums." He offered to let them speak from 
the platform, but they preferred the places they held. When a 
deputy sheriff attempted to quiet them, a fight developed in which 
the deputy was seriously cut. The anti-Vardaman press made much 
of the fact that the officer was "stabbed in the back while perform-
ing his duty," and Percy charged that Vardaman himseH was "mor-
ally responsible," because he "incited his followers to violence."34 
Past records were dug up and brought into the campaIgn. Mter 
John Allen had become active in Percy's interest three Vardaman 
editors published charges that Allen, thirty-one years before, had 
broken into a mill and stolen a jug of whiskey and the only reason 
he had not been arrested was that he had skipped the country for a 
time and could not be found. For. this charge Allen had all three 
editors indicted for criminal libel. They were acquitted. 35 When 
Percy spoke at Marion in June, Vardaman's friends propounded a 
series of prepared questions to him. They asked if he had ever 
been fined for gambling; if he had ever represented as counsel the 
Negro Knights of Pythias against a white man's lodge; if he had 
B3IbUl., June 1, July 6, 27, 1911. 
84IbUl., July 20, 1911; Natchez Democrat, June 25, 28, 1911; Vicksburg Herald, 
June 25, 1911. 
85Corinth Corinthian, Aberdeen Weekly, and Meridian Dispatch, quoted in 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 29, 1911, and in Natchez Democrat, June 27. July 4, 
1911. 
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violated the Sabbath by hunting or fishing; if he had paid board 
bills of legislators during the Secret Caucus session; if he had ob-
tained votes from legislators by use of money, whiskey, and "women 
of faded reputation"; if he was presently subsidizing the Jackson 
Daily News; if he had made a "deal" with Alexander -during the 
Secret Caucus; if he had solicited corporate support; and if he was 
legal counsel for the whiskey interests. Percy, in answer, admitted 
having once paid a fine for card-playing on Sunday, of having shot 
birds on Sunday, and of having represented the Pythians but denied 
all other charges.s6 
The charge of press subsidization was frequently made against 
Percy. It was indignantly denied by his editor friends, but at least 
one Vardaman editor seemed to discount the denial. He privately 
offered to change his allegiance for a consideration. "If you want 
the support of this paper during this campaign," he wrote Percy's 
manager, "and are willing to stand for the amount of my loss from 
the Vardaman followers discontinuing their subscriptions, you may 
have it."81 
It was as difficult to find substantial charges against Vardaman's 
private life as it was that of Percy, but the attempt was made. 
Finally a farmer was found who claimed Vardaman owed him $27 
for a cow purchased fifteen years before; a tinner was found who 
claimed he had done $195 worth of work on Vardaman's house 
twenty years before and never been paid; and a representative of a 
lyceum bureau was unearthed who charged that Vardaman had 
collected and failed to turn over to the bureau its share of receipts 
amounting to $200 for a lecture tour he had made. The farmer's 
claim for the cow was given some authenticity when Vardaman's 
friends chipped in $27 and sent it to him. There is no record that 
the tinner or the lyceum man were ever the richer for their con-
tribution to the Percy cause.38 The anti-Vardaman press did not 
accuse Vardaman of dishonesty in regard to these debts. Rather 
they cited them as instances proving his ineptness as a manager of 
S6Macon Beacon. June 23. 1911. 
s1IbId.; Louis C. Barber to William Crump. Aug. 20. 1910. published in Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger. Aug 20. 1910. 
s8William N. McCaula. J. D. Gunther. and R. A. Carson to Editor. Vicksburg 
Herald. published in Jackson Clarion-Ledger. June 13. 15. 1911; Macon Beacon, 
June 23, 1911. 
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business affairs. And this was the case in regard to the alleged con-
tingent fund shortage, too. 
It was notorious that Vardaman was penniless, and it was a 
common saying by friend and foe that he never had sufficient funds 
or provisions laid up to take care of his family's basic needs for 
thirty days. His campaign expenses seem to have been defrayed by 
petty contributions from thousands of admirers. His only paid ad-
vertisements were pleas from his campaign committees urging his 
followers to send in contributions of twenty-five or fifty cents, or 
any amount they could afford. His imprOvidence was extolled as a 
virtue by his supporters and denounced as a vice by his antagonists. 
The latter cited his "failure" both as a lawyer and as an editor. He 
was charged with having dissipated a $50,000 estate which had been 
entrusted to his management. His enemies said that when he left 
Greenwood to take office as governor, "he left nothing save debts . 
. . . The house was sold to satisfy a mortgage, and the circuit clerk's 
record showed over $2,500 in judgments pending against him-and 
they are still unsatisfied." Nor had his condition improved since. 
"In the city of Jackson today," said a hostile editor during the cam-
paign, " ... James K. Vardaman has the lowest possible rating on the 
books of the Retail Merchant's Association."39 
These and other trivialities and irrelevancies were brought out, 
and they must have played a considerable part in the result, if not 
always in the way they were deSigned. But the big issue was the 
race question, and most attention was paid to it. Vardaman's ad-
vocacy of repeal of the Reconstruction amendments was defended 
because, he said, the question had become national and only Con-
gress could correct the situation. Many Negroes, he said, had quali-
fied for voting and more would "if they are stirred up." The situa-
tion prior to 1890 would then be repeated, he said, and fraud and 
violence would be necessary to retain white supremacy.40 
Both Alexander and Percy pointed out that there was no threat 
to white supremacy, and that to urge the unsympathetic North to 
39Macon Beacon, June 23, 1911; Jackson Issue, files 1910-1911; Jackson Daily 
News, June 10, 1911. 
4oJackson Issue, June 2,1911. Vardaman's racial prejudice did not extend to Jews. 
Decrying persecution of Jews in Europe, he said there were "bad Jews" just as there 
were "bad Gentiles," but that, as a race, "there is no class of citizens that are more 
public spirited and more deserving of the good opinion of mankind," Ibid., Mar. Sf 
1911. 
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modify the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments might lead to 
greater strictures. They charged Vardaman with insincerity; that 
he had obtained the governorship by pledging to divide the school 
fund between the races according to the taxes paid by each, but 
that as governor he had not redeemed that pledge. The charge was 
unjust but was repeated by others. John Allen called Vardaman 
the "most irresponsible demagogue the State had ever known." The 
Macon Beacon said Vardaman had never, in any of his campaigns, 
run on a "fair, square, honest, and real principle." He had always 
dealt in false and specious issues. The bases of his appeal to the 
voters, it said, were "Some vast, vague, and indefinable good which 
he will accomplish by some vague and undefined means, Hattery and 
abuse and false cry of fraud." The Beacon admitted that Varda-
man had been a good governor but opposed him for fear his election 
would agitate the race question. 
The Vicksburg Herald shortly before had praised Vardaman's 
stand on the race question. "Those who go to hear [Vardaman] ex-
pecting 'hatred, hypocricy [sic], or demagogy:" said the Herald 
at that time, "will be disillusioned." Pointing out that Vardaman 
had made the state "a courageous, honest, conservative" executive, 
the Herald had also defended his racial position. "He never failed 
to speak out for the protection of the negro in his ... person and 
property. It was due to him that the grafting convict leasing system, 
under which the negro prisoners were cruelly abused ... was broken 
up root and branch." Ten months later the Herald condemned the 
same stand as "pettifogging" and the "brutal boast of a mission of 
encouraging race prejudice ... odious to reason and justice." "The 
only part the negro plays in our political affairs," said the Natchez 
Democrat, "is that of furnishing tricky, calculating politicians an 
opportunity of getting up and venting their alleged animosity 
against the race." "The agitation of the race question here, where 
we are all of one mind," said the Clarion, "can only be carried on 
... in order to get ... votes."41 
One feature of the campaign which the opposition press was 
unable to understand was the large and enthusiastic audiences 
41Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 5, July 7, 1910, Apr. 20, July 6, 16, 1911; Macon 
Beacon, July 8, 1910, June 23, 1911; Natchez Democrat, July 4, 1911; Vicksburg 
Herald, Sept. 29, 1909, July 17, 1910, Jan. 5, 1912; Jackson Issue, July 22, 1910; 
Aberdeen Examiner, quoted in Macon Beacon, July 28, 1911. 
226 REVOLT OF THE REDNECKS 
which Vardaman drew whenever he spoke. At first the Clarion 
questioned the authenticity of reports and suggested that the Var-
daman press photographers were <'blowing up" pictures of his 
crowds and «reducing" pictures of opposition crowds. A few months 
later it admitted that his Jackson rally was «a large affair." The 
Clarion was impressed as well as puzzled with the extraordinary 
hold which Vardaman had on his following. They seemed to be «for 
him against the world, the Hesh, and the devil, and would stand out 
in the cold, in the rain, or . . . even in a snowstorm, to hear him 
speak." His power was the less explicable because he seemed to 
defy all conventions, and «while posing as a commoner, looks and 
acts the part of an aristocrat." There was nothing about Varda-
man, thought the Clarion, that would appear to attract the com-
mon man, «for he is always dressed like a dandy, and moves around 
with a stilted, imperious air." No other man could dress and do as 
he did and receive much consideration at the hands of the people. 
But his «airs, graces, and good looks" did not seem to injure him; 
rather they drew men to him. Studying his style and his platform 
technique, Editor Henry concluded that he was «an odd man, a 
dilettante who seems able to say what he pleases, abuse anybody he 
dislikes, curse out those who oppose him, and still hold his follow-
ing, to grapple them to him with hoops of steel." Yet, observed 
Henry, Vardaman was not always a firebrand. With all his show 
and mannerisms, <fie is always gracious and polite to those he likes, 
and is able to get down on a level with everyone, and make himseH 
agreeable." Ere long Henry himseH was almost captivated. «The 
attractive and picturesque ... Vardaman," he said, « ... as an orator 
. . . rather puts it over his distinguished competitors, neither of 
whom has his voice, his splendid gestures, or forensic tread." «He 
has winning ways," he added, «is a capital mixer, and knows how to 
please his followers."42 
Editor McNeily of the Vicksburg Herald, Vardaman's erstwhile 
friend and supporter, was similarly puzzled. Commenting on a dis-
patch telling of Vardaman's being carried on the shoulders of the 
people and of his hat being cut to ribbons and distributed among 
the crowd, McNeily was unable to account for such idolatry. «It 
neve"r occurred in MisSissippi," he complained, <'before this Varda-
man and Bilbo craze broke out." Commenting again on a state-
42Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 29, 1910, Mar. 2, Apr. 6, 1911. 
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ment of an admirer comparing Vardaman to Moses, Ahab, Jeremiah, 
and Christ as an agitator in the interest of the masses, McNeily ob-
served that "the ordinary hero-worshipper" would have been con-
tent to compare his "agitator" with Patrick Henry, John Hancock, 
Pym, or Hampden. "But they are not exalted enough for Varda-
man," he added. McNeily was even more perplexed at a letter 
which a Vardaman supporter in Pontotoc County wrote to a critical 
editor. "You had just as well," said the Vardaman enthusiast, "go to 
church anywhere in Pontotoc . . . get up in the pulpit and tell the 
people that Jesus Christ is a bastard as to say anything against . . . 
Vardaman to the people here." It was too much for McNeily. "His 
followers," he concluded, "look on him as sanctified-his proven 
and uncontradicted offenses against moral and civil law do not 
diminish their adulation."43 
Concern was expressed by Vardaman over the action of the state 
board of election commissioners in the appointment of county elec-
tion commissioners. As has been explained, these county commis-
sioners were empowered to purge the registration books. Alleging 
that Percy and Alexander were in a "combine" against him, Varda-
man argued that he should have as many of his party on each board 
as the other two combined. His plea was overruled and each can-
didate was given one representative on each county board. This 
gave the opposition, Vardaman complained, a majority in every 
county, and it was possible for them "to take every advantage of 
every pretext and technicality . . . to . . . strike from the registra-
tion rolls every known supporter of [mine] it is possible to elimi-
nate." It was even reported to Vardaman that one of the men high 
up in the counsels of the opposition had said that "if Vardaman 
gets the votes he will be counted out."44 
At the same time the opposition press started a campaign to 
purge the rolls. The Daily News, estimating that 50,000 whites de-
linquent in their poll tax payments had been participating in recent 
primaries, called on Governor Noel to enforce the law. The Clarion, 
estimating that the delinquents were between 40,000 and 60,000, 
admitted that in practice the requirement of presenting tax receipts 
43Vicksburg Herald, June 25, 27, 1911; ibid., quoting Pontotoc Advance and 
Jackson Issue. 
44Jackson Issue, May 5, 1911; Dr. G. W. Luster to J. K. Vardaman, May 8, 1911, 
published, ibid., May 12, 1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 1, 8, 1910, July 27, 
1911. 
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at primary polls was rarely complied with, but thought it should 
be.4.5 The Clarion also credited rumors that sheriffs in some counties 
were issuing antedated receipts for taxes paid after the February 1 
deadline to the partisans of their choice for senator. If the county 
commissioners all did their duty, said the Clarion, the list of voters 
would be cut in half.4.6 
Vardaman urged that every white Democratic voter in the state 
who was a bona fide resident be allowed to vote regardless of the 
poll tax requirement. He charged that the sudden zeal to enforce 
the requirement was aimed only at injuring him. The purpose of 
the law originally, he argued, was to eliminate Negroes from poli-
tics, and since the white primary did this there was no necessity for 
the provision, at least in the primary itself. He warned the country 
voters that the opposition was going after them because they were, 
as a rule, for him, and he urged them to register in time. When the 
county commissioners began their purge he attacked them savagely, 
charging them with specially construing the laws to cut off his 
votes. This charge was denied by his own member of the board in 
Adams County, but one of his followers in Jones threatened to lead 
an armed mob at his precinct to see "that all white Democrats are 
permitted to vote, whether on the poll books or not."4.7 
The Secret Caucus was even made the issue in the legislative 
campaigns. The Clarion argued that this was improper and un-
necessary. Months before the primary the Clarion had publicly 
expressed the fear that Vardaman would win the senatorial nomi-
nation, and it was, perhaps, bent on saving what it could from the 
wreckage which it antiCipated. The legislators, regardless of their 
individual preferences, it said, would be bound by the results of 
the senatorial primary and must elect the winning candidate. But 
Vardaman, not willing again to trust his election to the honor of the 
legislature, had candidates in every legislative district and urged his 
followers to vote for them. He even had a congressional candidate 
in each district.4.S 
45ThJs was a reversal of the Clarion's views of a few years before. See p. 221. 
46Jackson Dally News, May 1, 1910; Jackson Clarion-Ledg61', May 12, 1910, 
Jan. 26, Mar. 50, Apr. 13, 20, 27, 1911; Brookhaven Leader, quoted, ibid., Apr. 20, 
1911. 
47Jackson Issue, Feb. 24, Apr. 21, 1911; Vicksburg H61'ald, June 2, 1911; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledg61', July 27, 1911; Natchez Democrat, July 22, 23, 1911. 
4sJackson Issue, May 26, 1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledg61', Aug. 25, 1910, Mar. 50, 
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All the opposition, even Percy and Alexander, admitted that 
Vardaman would get a plurality, but not a majority, in the first pri-
mary. There was, therefore, some interest as to which of the op-
position candidates-Percy or Alexander-would run second and 
thus fight it out with Vardaman in the second primary. Many people 
believed that Alexander was merely the tail to Percy's kite and that 
if Percy should pull the string as he did in the caucus, Alexander 
would immediately drop out of the race. Vardaman played up this 
theme at first, much to Alexander's annoyance, who threatened to 
"make revelations that would tum Vardaman's headquarters inside 
out" unless such underhanded attacks on him ceased. Later Var-
daman predicted that Alexander would run ahead of Percy. It was 
suspected that this was part of Vardaman's strategy, that he felt 
Alexander would be easier to defeat in a runoff than Percy and ac-
cordingly was trying to build him up at Percy's expense.4.9 
On the eve of the election Alexander's headquarters predicted 
that their candidate would lead Percy in the first primary and have 
an easy victory over Vardaman in the second. The Clarion, though 
not very hopeful, expressed some pride in its favorite, Alexander. 
"He has," it said, "developed into a mixer ... and handshaker the 
equal of the lamented Anse McLaurin." The Vardaman forces ex-
pressed confidence throughout that their candidate would obtain a 
clear majority in the first primary.50 
The vote was the largest cast in Mississippi up to that time, and 
the result was an overwhelming Vardaman victory. His total was 
more than 76,000, while the combined vote of his two opponents 
was little more than 50,000. Percy's vote was almost 10,000 short of 
Alexander's. Vardaman also succeeded in placing an overwhelming 
majority of his followers in the legislature. He had been at work, 
too, to regain control of the various committees of the party, state 
and local, and succeeded in doing so. "Those fellows," regretfully 
wrote a Percy supporter, "can weild [sic] a very great power." 
Bilbo's vote was almost as large as Vardaman's.51 
4.9Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 1, July 6, 13, 1911; Macon Beacon. July 21, 1911. 
50JaOOon Clarion-Ledger. July 13. 20, 27, 1911. 
51Biennial Repmt of the Secretary at State to the Legislature at Mi8si8&1ppl from 
October I, 1909 to October I, 1911 (Nashville, 1911); Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 
Aug. 17, 1911; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 3, 5, 1911; Sargeant Prentiss Knut to Wil-
liams, May 8, July 22, 1915, Williams Papers. 
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Earl Brewer of Coahoma County was the only candidate for 
governor and had accordingly been declared the nominee of the 
party by the state Democratic executive committee a few weeks 
before. It was reported to be the first time in the history of the 
state that the gubernatorial nomination had been uncontested. 52 
The size of Vardaman's majority stunned the opposition papers. 
It was unbelievable that their favorites could have been so routed 
by "upstarts" like Vardaman and Bilbo. Pondering the result for 
more than two weeks, the Clarion concluded that the Secret Caucus 
had been the decisive factor in Vardaman's victory. The people, it 
thought, had "gotten the idea into their heads that ... the caucus 
was a most infamous affair, and no amount of argument or reason 
could remove that impression." It was unable to explain Bilbo's 
victory. The Natchez Democrat attributed the result to the sys-
tematic manner in which the "horny sons of toil" had been arrayed 
against men of wealth. This same conclusion was reached by an 
active Percy campaigner. He said he had often heard people say 
of Percy, <'he is an aristocrat," <'he is a man of great wealth, feels 
himself above you voters, does not need or care for your support or 
endorsement, etc., etc." The Daily News, admitting that Vardaman 
was "The People's Choice," contended that his selection did not 
represent «the best thought" of the state. «Wisdom, sanity and con-
servatism," it said, «have been swept aside, and passion, prejudice, 
and hysteria are triumphant." The New Orleans Picayune regret-
fully observed that Mississippians were "putting the foot down 
firmly on all that remains of the old aristocracy . . . and they are 
chOOSing their representatives among the new generation."53 
Immediately after the primary the candidates reported the sums 
they had spent on the campaign. Alexander listed an expenditure 
of $25,000; Percy $20,000; and Vardaman only $2,000. No charge 
was made that Vardaman had expended more than he reported. 
Thus the fear formerly expressed that a primary nomination could 
only be won after a huge expenditure of money found no support 
in this race. The two losing candidates spent together more than 
twenty-two times as much as the winner. Each of them had spent 
52Natchez Democrat, July 18, 1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 20, 1911. 
5sJackson Claf'iorrLedger, Aug. 17, 1911; ibid., Aug. 10, 1911, quoting New 
Orleans Picayune; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 5, 1911; Jackson Dally New., Aug. 2, 
1911; John P. Mayo to Williams, Sept. 27, 1915, Williams Papers. 
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almost a dollar, on the average, for each vote received. Vardaman's 
unit cost had been less than three cents. The election seems to have 
been particularly free from fraud. The only complaint of dishon-
esty came from Lincoln County where indictments for vote buying 
were returned against several of the "very best citizens."54 
A week after the election a gala celebration was held in Jackson 
by the Vardaman party. Crowds poured into the city from near and 
far, some in wagons, some riding mules, some on special excursion 
trains made up for the occasion. "The oldest inhabitant" was re-
ported as saying, "It was the greatest demonstration in years." The 
Clarion estimated that six thousand slept in the streets the night 
before the big celebration. A tremendous parade, starting at the 
Vardaman headquarters on Capitol Street opposite the Edwards 
House, wound its way through town to the capitol. Bilbo shared 
honors with Vardaman and rode with him in the parade. Men on 
horseback, clothed in white and with red neckties, rode beside them 
as a guard of honor. Arriving at the capitol Vardaman addressed 
the throngs that overflowed the grounds into the neighboring streets 
and perched in trees, in windows, and on housetops. He wanted, he 
said, the government "returned to you, the people of my state." He 
wanted the white people to rule, and he was going to Washington 
to see that they did, and to "strike at predatory wealth."55 
Either it was an impressive occasion, or else Editor Henry was 
again enchanted by the Vardaman personality. He praised the 
speech, and expressed regret that Vardaman during the campaign 
had "been more severely criticized, more terribly abused, and . . . 
more savagely persecuted, than any other man offering for public 
office in the history of Mississippi." He was not so captivated by 
Bilbo. That selection was, he thought, "the saddest thing in ... 
the election, the most· humilating event in the history of the state." 
It showed, he concluded, how completely Bilbo had fooled the 
people "with his fluent tongue and tale of woe."56 
54Natchez Democrat, Aug. 3, 1911; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 28, 1911. 
55Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 10, 1911. 
56Ibld. 
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OLD AND NEW FACTIONS 
A LTHOUGH routed in the election of 1911, the anti-Vardaman 
wing of the party did not give up the struggle. A few weeks 
after the election the Noel administration filed suit against Varda-
man to make him account for all contingent funds he handled while 
governor. Rankled by the repudiation of the people, Percy publicly 
invited Vardaman to join him in requesting an investigation of the 
Secret Caucus by the United States Senate. If Vardaman's charges 
were true, he said, he, Percy, should be in prison. If they were false, 
Vardaman was unworthy to serve in the Senate. Percy's motive in 
this move is not quite clear. Despite the vindication of Dulaney by 
the jury, it is doubtful if Percy hoped for a clean bill of health from 
such an investigation. So much was known of irregularities by both 
sides in that contest that perhaps he hoped, like Samson, to pull 
down the temple and to destroy Vardaman with himself. But Var-
daman brushed the invitation aside. The people of Mississippi had 
already investigated, he said, and returned their verdict. l 
Instead of contesting the suit filed against him, Vardaman se-
cured an injunction against Attorney-General Hudson staying pro-
ceedings. The Nashville Banner, admitting it knew nothing of the 
facts, thought it strange that Vardaman would fight charges of graft 
with "technicalities seeking avoidance and delay," instead of in-
sisting on a trial in chancery.2 But Vardaman's motive soon un-
folded itself. Within a few weeks the newly elected officials would 
come into office. While Governor-elect Brewer was not identified 
with Vardaman's faction, Attorney-General-elect Ross Collins was, 
as was also an overwhelming majority of the new legislature. 
The Vardaman strategy proved effective. Immediately after his 
induction, the new attorney-general offered to dismiss the suit if 
Vardaman would permit an examination of his bank account. Var-
daman agreed, and Collins entered a dismissal decree. This was 
called by the opposition "a clearance without trial and upon sup-
pression of evidence:'3 
lJackson Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 23, Dec. 14, 1911. 
2Nashville Banner, quoted in Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 9, 1912. 
BJackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 28, 1911, Mar. 2, 1912; Vicksburg Herald, Feb. 
18, 1912. 
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Meanwhil&--the new legislature' had convened, and Vardaman 
wrote Frank Burkitt, chairman of the joint committee on contingent 
funds, requesting a legislative investigation of the charges against 
him. He was, he said, the victim of much persecution and the target 
of all manner of obloquy and slander. The committee held exten-
sive hearings, calling before it Vardaman, former Governor Noel, 
the accountant, C. J. Moore, and Vardaman's two former secretaries. 
Its report completely vindicated Vardaman. It pointed out that 
both former secretaries, one of whom had also served as Noel's 
secretary, testified that they had taken vouchers for every expendi-
ture save ten dollars paid for postage stamps during Vardaman's 
administration. Evidence also showed that the metal case in which 
the vouchers were kept was not locked and that any person desiring 
to do so might have had access to them. Also it was learned that the 
legislative committee of 1906 had checked the contingent fund item 
by item for 1904 and 1905 and found it correct. That Accountant 
Moore had later found vouchers missing for those years proved, the 
report said, that "some of the vouchers examined by the committee 
on April 19, 1906, were afterwards lost, mislaid, or have been ab-
stracted." The committee thought it "rational to conclude that 
neither Vardaman nor any friend of his abstracted them from the 
file," and it "acquitted the Governor [Vardaman] of any and all 
charges concerning them."5 
Accountant Moore called the report a "whitewash," and the 
Vicksburg Herald called its authors "accessories after the fact" and 
a "packed jury." The Nashville Banner said Vardaman had ob-
tained a "political acquittal" by insisting on an investigation by a 
legislature which was composed overwhelmingly of his friends.6 
The report was adopted by the legislature and a resolution was 
offered to send a copy of it to John Sharp Williams with a request 
that he present it to the United States Senate. Thereupon the anti-
Vardaman group threatened to send a minority resolution condemn-
ing the report and charging that the investigation was not complete 
40f the eighty-seven legislators who had voted for Percy in the Secret Caucus, 
only five were in the new body. George Creel, "The Carnival of Corruption in Mis-
Sissippi," in Cosmopolitan Magazine, LI (1911), 735. 
5Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 9, 13, 1912; Natchez Democrat, Jan. 13, 1912; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 25, 1912. 
6Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 27, 1912; Natchez Democrat, Jan. 13, 16, 1912; 
Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 13, 16, 1912; ibid., Jan. 9, 1912, quoting Nashville Banner. 
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or thorough. The Vardamanites retaliated by threatening that if 
such action were taken, they would pass a resolution denouncing 
the methods by which Percy was elected by the legislature of 1910 
and demanding his resignation. Such a resolution, thought a neutral 
observer, would have passed by a majority of sixty-three in the 
house and fifteen in the senate. 
Governor Brewer was able to bring about a temporary peace, 
but before the end of the session open warfare had broken out be-
tween the factions. On March 5 the legislature passed, by a vote of 
66 to 39 in the house and 26 to 13 in the senate, the threatened reso-
lution demanding Percy's resignation. The minority offered a 
resolution requesting the United States Senate to investigate the 
charges of fraud and corruption incident to Percy's election in 1910. 
They felt confident that Vardaman would oppose it as likely to open 
up charges against him. Their object was to put the Vardaman 
majority on record as unalterably opposed to an investigation of its 
own charges. Their belief seemed justified, for the resolution was 
voted down.7 
Percy had stated after his election by the Secret Caucus that if 
it was shown in the primary that he did not enjoy the confidence of 
the people, he would resign without awaiting expiration of his term. 
After the primary it was reported that he intended doing so but 
that he was being urged by his friends to serve out the term. The 
passage of the resolution demanding his resignation revived "all the 
pent-up hatred, political animOSity, and factional bitterness" which 
had begun to die down, and Percy flatly refused. Even some of the 
Vardaman papers were doubtful of the propriety of the resolution. 
The Yazoo Sentinel thought it a mistake. The Crystal Springs 
Meteor thought, "in the interest of harmony and coalescing of the 
factions," the resolution should not have been presented.s Un-
doubtedly they were right. No useful purpose was served; Percy 
did not resign; no investigation of the Secret Caucus was made; 
and the whole affair served only to aggravate the bitter factional 
feeling. 
7New Orleans Picayune, quoted in Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 21, 1912; ibid., Mar. 6, 
1912; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 25, Mar. 14, 1912; Natchez Democrat, Jan. 23, 
Mar. 8, 1912. 
SIbid., Mar. 6, 8, 10, 1912; ibid., quoting Yazoo Sentinel and Crystal Springs 
Meteor; Vicksburg Herald, Mar. 6, 10, 1912. 
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The election of 1911 had left Vardaman in complete control of 
the political machinery of the state. The Democratic state executive 
committee, the mainspring of that machinery, was revised to accord 
with his wishes. Even T. G. Heard, the only member who had 
supported Vardaman, was dropped, according to the Macon Beacon, 
because he was a "man of substance and a man of affairs. Mr. Var-
daman wants men who have no stake in the state's welfare other 
than a political stake." Vardaman dominated the state convention 
called in May to enunciate a program and to choose delegates to 
the national convention. John Sharp Williams and others wished 
to commit the delegates to Woodrow Wilson, but Vardaman swung 
the convention to a declaration for Oscar W. Underwood. A plat-
form was adopted embodying all the planks which Vardaman had 
for years been advocating. These included: submission of an amend-
ment to the people for repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution; election of United States senators by direct 
vote; new legislative apportionment as a matter of justice to south 
MisSisSippi; and the building of good roads in the state.9 
In the legislature Vardaman's control was as complete. When a 
bill was proposed creating two separate court districts in Covington 
County, its senator pleaded with the senate not to "steam roller" his 
county. Claiming to be a strong Vardaman man himself, he said the 
Vardaman machine had voted for his bill preViously, but later cer-
tain senators told him they could not do so again because they had 
been "called" and "had to line up with the Vardaman machine or 
lose their scalps." "No one has thought," said the Vicksburg Herald, 
,c ••• of questioning the supremacy of Vardamanism in our state poli-
tics." Reviewing the work of the legislature after its adjournment, 
the Macon Beacon acknowledged that "Vardaman is now Boss of 
Mississippi." It was a familiar sight when the legislature was in 
session, it said, to see him "talking to some member as a teacher 
talks to a whipped boy or a master lectures a servant." His domina-
tion was complete. "He orders and commands and his henchmen 
obey."lo 
It was feared that the legislature elected in 1911 would be a 
"radical" one and would "overturn the existing order of things ... 
leaving a trackage of debris . . . behind it." When the new mem-
9Macon Beacon, May 16, 17, 1912; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, May 23, 1912. 
lOVicksburg Herald, Jan. 28, Mar. 13, 19, 1912; Macon Beacon, May 17, 1912. 
236 :REVOLT OF THE RED NECKS 
bers came up to Jackson in January, however, it was found that 
"they looked like any other." Measures of a "liberal" nature were 
passed, but nothing "radical." Bilbo, now lieutenant-governor, spon-
sored a bill requiring a privilege tax of twenty cents an acre on all 
firms . or corporations owning or holding more than 1,000 acres of 
land. He explained that the bill affected south Mississippi where 
the holding of timber lands for speculation was a recognized busi-
ness and was retarding development. The bill, amended to apply 
only to holdings in excess of 5,000 acres, was passed. In an effort 
to induce lower interest rates an act exempted money lent at 
6 per cent or less from taxation. Even the Vicksburg Herald, ad-
mitting that similar bills had been defeated eight years before by 
Longino's veto and four years before «by banker influence," called 
the measure "good sound business sense." Bills levying an income 
tax, outlawing poolrooms, and making landlords responSible for 
illegal use of their property were also passed. The south Mississippi 
delegation introduced a resolution calling for relief of their section 
from the constitutional restrictions placed on its number of repre-
sentatives. The delegates from the other sections, combining under 
the leadership of Frank Burkitt, repelled the attempt. By the end 
of the session the legislature was drawing praise from such con-
servative journals as the Vicksburg Herald and the Clarion. Instead 
of proving «revolutionary" it had actually been, said the Clarion, 
"a conservative force."l1 
But Governor Brewer's administration was not destined to serve 
out its term in peace and harmony. Antagonisms-new and old, 
personal, factional, and sectional-were at work, awaiting the 
spark that would ignite them into open hostility. In the spring 
of 1913 the Delta was clamoring for a special session of the legisla-
ture. The levee boards had already spent next year's anticipated 
revenue and $20,000 besides and were demanding that more funds 
be prOvided for levee work. South Mississippi, chagrined at its re-
buff the previous year, was threatening to "hold up" the Delta and 
not to give relief unless more representatives and school funds were 
allotted to it. Nor was all harmony within the Delta. Factionalism 
still divided that section, and Representative Ed Franklin of Sun-
llJackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 11, Feb. 8, 15, Mar. 14, 1912; Vicksburg Herald, 
Jan. 12, 28, Mar. 14, 19, 1912; Natchez Democrat, Feb. 8, Mar. 11, 1912; Macon 
Beacon, July 21, 28, 1912. 
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Hower was determined to offer a constitutional amendment, if the 
special session were called, taking the appointment of levee board 
members from the governor and having them elected by direct vote 
of the people.12 
Brewer, a Delta resident himseH, called a special session to meet 
June 10, but before that date a financial scandal had been unearthed 
in the office of the state prison board. Early in May, Lawrence 
Yerger, secretary of the board, confessed to embezzling $30,000 of 
the prison board's funds. The governor then decided to examine 
all affairs of the prison board, but a controversy arose between him 
and the trustees whether he or they should conduct the investi-
gation.13 
When the legislature met in special session to relieve the levee 
boards, the controversy was at its height. Now the legislature split 
-the house taking the side of the governor, the senate that of the 
trustees. The house authorized the governor to spend $10,000 in-
vestigating penitentiary affairs, but the senate refused to sanction 
the bill. Instead it passed the so-called "Norwood Resolution" pro-
viding for a joint legislative investigation of all departments of the 
state government. It was reported that the senate move was in-
spired by Bilbo, who wanted to embarrass the governor's peniten-
tiary investigation and to "whitewash" his friends, the trustees. This 
was vigorously denied by Bilbo. The house refused to concur in the 
"Norwood Resolution," adding an amendment excluding the prison 
from the legislative investigation. In the regular session the fol-
lowing January, however, the house concurred in a senate resolu-
tion for a legislative investigation of the penitentiary.14 
Brewer had suspected for some time that all was not well with 
the penitentiary management and had hired detectives to investi-
gate. He revealed that Boyce and Company, a Memphis exporter, 
had bought practically all the cotton from the state's prison farms 
for the past four years without competitive bidding. It was reported 
that Boyce's profit had been excessive, and Brewer charged that 
there was collusion between Boyce and Yerger. Boyce explained his 
12Macon Beacon, May 30, June 27, Dec. 12, 1913. 
13Jackson Clarlon-Ledgef', May 7, 18, 1913; Natchez Democrat, May 7, 1913; 
Macon Beacon, May 30, June 27, 1913. 
14Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1913, pp. 17, 30, 34, 36, 37, 865; Jackson Clarlon-
Ledgef', June 12, 1913; Natchez Democrat, June 15, 1913. 
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huge profits as well as his monopoly of the state's crop by the fact 
that he was a pioneer in shipping direct from the producer to the 
English spinning mills and could eliminate costs which others could 
not. Brewer had made a trip to England to investigate Boyce's 
dealings there and apparently was not satisfied that Boyce had re-
vealed all the advantages which he had over other buyers.15 He 
attempted to make Boyce produce his books, but he had to threaten 
to attach all his property in the state to get him to do so. When 
Boyce produced some books, Brewer said they were not genuine 
but were copies "recently made" which would not establish his 
real dealings with the state.16 
Yerger was indicted shortly after his confession. He refused to 
involve others, claiming that his was the only guilt. It was rumored 
that a "deal" had been made between him and Bilbo promising a 
pardon for him by the next governor if he would "take the rap." 
The only indictments which Brewer was able to secure for all his 
pains were for comparatively trivial offenses. C. C. Smith, president 
of the prison board, was charged with perpetration of a petty fraud 
in regard to a secondhand automobile which he sold to the board 
for a sum alleged to be several hundred dollars in excess of its 
value. He was sentenced to five years in prison, but Brewer com-
muted the sentence to a $500 fine when physicians testified that 
Smith's health would preclude his outliving the sentence. The 
Clarion, still anti-Vardaman and anti-Bilbo, called this commuta-
tion a "crime" and speculated on the "hue and cry" that would have 
been raised if Bilbo had, while acting as governor, pardoned 
Smith.17 The Macon Beacon, however, praised Brewer's "absolute 
courage," "unwavering firmness of character," and his "playing no 
favorites . . . despite the charges of some of the accused ones." 
He was, it said, wholly free from rancor or vindictiveness toward 
any person.18 
Indictments were also secured against W. B. Gowdy, a Jackson 
I5Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 19, 21, 24, 1913; Macon Beacon, May 30, 1913; 
Natchez Democrat, June 26, 1913. 
I6For statement of Boyce's denial see Report of jOint legislative investigating 
committee, in Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1914, pp. 1290-99; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 
June 19, 21, 27, 1913, Mar. 20, 24, 1914; Natchez Democrat, June 26, 1913. 
I7Natchez Democrat, June 26, 1913; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 27, July 10, 
17, 18, 1913, Mar. 7, 1914. 
18Macon Beacon, July 4, 11, 1913. 
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oilman, A. C. Davis, shipping clerk at the Parchman farm, and W. A. 
Montgomery, another trustee. Montgomery was fined $100 and re-
moved from the board because of negligence in performance of his 
duties. Davis and Gowdy were acquitted. Of the five men indicted, 
Davis and Smith were said to be Vardaman supporters, the other 
three anti-V ardaman.19 
Meanwhile the senate investigation was proceeding. The insane 
asylum at Jackson proved to be its most fertile field. As a result of 
its disclosures six indictments were returned against asylum of-
ficials, charging that the institution was run for the benefit of pri-
vate interests rather than for care of the inmates. W. S. Hamilton, 
a trustee, was indicted for being a stockholder in a firm doing busi-
ness with the asylum, but no crime could be proved against him and 
he was discharged. Of the other five only two were convicted; one 
of these was merely fined, but the other was sentenced to the peni-
tentiary. Of the six indicted, only one was said to be a Vardaman 
supporter, and even he had not been an active participant in 
Vardaman's campaigns.20 
It was obvious that the several investigations were the manifes-
tation of a new and bitter rivalry that had sprung up between 
Brewer and Bilbo. The Issue, which after the departure of Varda-
man for the Senate had passed into the control of Bilbo, had from 
the first discouraged the penitentiary investigation as a political 
maneuver on the part of the governor and had urged instead an 
investigation of Brewer. It was jOined by other papers identified 
in previous campaigns with Vardaman, some of which predicted 
that Brewer was laying plans to oppose Vardaman four years later.21 
Brewer was defended, in general, by the anti-Vardaman press and 
by a resolution of the house of representatives upholding his con-
duct of the prison investigation. This resolution was passed. by a 
vote of 49 to 39, indicating the division in that branch of the legis-
lature.22 Since Vardaman had an overwhelming majority there it 
19Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 27, July 10, 17, 18, 1913. 
20See Report of joint legislative investigating committee, in Mississippi, Senate 
Journal, 1914, pp. 211-15; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 19, 23, 24, Aug. 9, 1913, 
Feb. 6, 1914. 
21Jackson Issue, files summer 1913, especially Aug. 10; Hinds County Gazette, 
Yazoo Sentinel, and McComb City Journal, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 
3, 10, 12, 16, 31, 1913. 
22Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1914, p. 121; Natchez Democrat, Mar. 28, 1914. 
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would seem that he was not directly aligned in the battle being. 
waged between the governor and lieutenant-governor. 
The legislature elected with Vardaman in 1911 convened for its 
last session in January, 1914. It was reported that a «third house" 
embraCing "every calling and interest" swarmed through the lob-
bies, intent on looking to its own multifarious interests. Bankers 
were there opposing a bank guaranty bill; lumbermen were urging 
a law to permit laborers to work eleven hours under contract; office-
holders were fighting fee reduction bills; officials of state institutions 
were working for increased appropriations; «radical" prohibitionists 
were supporting the anti-liquor bill; "conservative" prohibitionists 
were opposing it; representatives of railroads and telegraph com-
panies were watching legislation inimical to their interests; and 
female suffragists were hoping to secure an amendment permitting 
women to vote. Bills of every nature and description were pre-
sented. «Our policy in sending our wisest statesmen to this great 
deliberative body," said one editor sarcastically, "safeguards us 
against the lack of regulation of anything which humanity is heir 
to." Another thought that what the state needed more than any-
thing else was a law to safeguard it from its legislature, to regulate 
it so that it would confine its activities to considering just as few 
bills as possible and so wording those that their provisions would be 
easy of enforcement.23 
The legislature adjourned March 28, haVing appropriated 
$922,000 more than any of its predecessors. The largest increase 
was for the common schools, a total of $3,318,100 being set aside for 
their support during the next two years.24 The conservative press 
did not protest against this large increase. Perhaps Vardaman had 
been able to awaken a social consciousness in the people, or perhaps 
the result was much better than had been anticipated. Even the 
Vicksburg Herald was not displeased. Said Editor McNeily, "Taken 
altogether . . . this legislature . . . has brought its session to a close 
with credit."25 The dire predictions of the wreckage which it would 
leave in its wake had not come to pass. 
23New Orleans Times-Democrat, quoted in Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 20, 1914; 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 26, 1914; Ibid., quoting Neshoba DemDCf'at. 
24Natchez Democrat, Mar. 29, 1914. 
25Vicksburg Herald, Mar. 29, 1914. 
CHAPTER XIX 
THE RISE OF BILBO 
THE CONTROVERSY between Brewer and Bilbo over the in-
vestigation of the penitentiary was but the opening salvo of a 
violent struggle to be fought between them in the courts, in the 
legislative halls, in the press, and at the polls. Their feud was to 
accentuate class antagonisms which had been dividing the state 
since the advent of Vardaman into high office a decade before. Fac-
tional and partisan politics were to be introduced into all public 
questions. The period was to be marked by an utter abandonment 
of restraint and a complete absence of dignity in the settlement of 
disputes. 
From the time of his exposure of the alleged bribery in the 
Secret Caucus Bilbo ~ad been a marked man in Mississippi politics 
-marked for destruction by his foes and for greater honors by his 
adherents. His character seems to have lacked some of the com-
plexity of Vardaman's-at least in the opinion of his enemies, who 
generally were the same as those who were opposed to Vardaman. 
But whereas they were free to confess that there was some idealism 
and statesmanship intermixed with Vardaman's "demagoguery," 
they failed to observe any of these elements in Bilbo's conduct. To 
them he was evil incarnate, and they were never able to understand 
the hold which he gained on the people of the state. 
Bilbo had gone to McComb City on May 31, 1910, to launch his 
campaign for lieutenant-governor. Fresh from the rough handling 
he had received from the Percy majority of the senate in the investi-
gation of his charges against Dulaney, he seems at first to have been 
uncertain how to proceed. Four thousand had turned out there to 
hear him, mainly to find out if he "were fool or knave or both." 
Bilbo started slowly and seemed embarrassed. Gradually he warmed 
to his subject. He found that when he denounced Noel or praised 
Vardaman the crowd responded enthusiastically, and he played that 
tune until he was exhausted. It was reported that the crowd "was 
thoroughly 'Bilboed'," and many leading county politicians present 
promised to back him for governor if he would run. "Mr. Bilbo has 
made," said an observer, "the greatest hit in this county ever made 
by [a] stranger within its borders."l 
lNew Orleans Picayune, quoted in Jackson Issue, June 3, 1910. 
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Discriminatory methods used by the opposition to suppress him 
proved ineffective. The circuit judge adjourned court at Corinth to 
permit Earl Brewer to open his campaign for governor, but he re-
fused to let Bilbo speak after him. Bilbo then spoke at the opera 
house and was greeted by an overflow crowd. "Many went there," 
it was reported, "antagonistic to him, but left believing he was sim-
ply telling the truth and the facts."2 Attempts of the opposition to 
drown him with invective only served as fuel to his fire. It was hard 
for the people to believe that any man could be such a monster as 
he was portrayed. The bitterness and extremity of opposition de-
nunciations caused the people to rise up about him and sweep 
everything before him. "Instead of building up opposition," said 
Vardaman, "they are arousing sympathy, and sowing a more elabo-
rate destruction for their own candidates."B 
But the opposition aggressively went on denounCing Bilbo. Nor 
did they ever show signs of stopping. Writing in 1941, one of them 
described him as "a pert little monster, glib and shameless, with a 
sort of cunning common to criminals which passes for intelligence." 
For years the opposition thought Bilbo was "fooling" the people, but 
one of them, at least, thought otherwise. The people loved him, he 
concluded, not because they were deceived in him, ·out because 
they understood him thoroughly; they said of him proudly, ·He's· a 
slick little bastard.' He was one of them and he had risen from 
obscurity to the fame of glittering infamy-it was as if they them-
selves had crashed the headlines.'" 
Whether that be true or not, certain it is that Bilbo's popularity 
among the people rose overnight so that it almost rivaled that of 
Vardaman. With the passing of the "Great White Chief" from state 
to national politics, Bilbo found an open door to leadership of the 
masses in state affairs. 
The climax of the Brewer-Bilbo feud came in the winter of 1913-
1914. Almost two years before, in February, 1912, a bill had been 
introduced in the legislature to create a new county in the Delta 
from portions of Washington, Yazoo, Leflore, Sunflower, Holmes, 
Sharkey, and Issaquena counties. Representatives from the Delta 
counties opposed the bill, and when rumors insinuated that money 
2Vicksburg Post, quoted in Jackson IBsue, July 22, 1910. 
BJackson Issue, Sept. 2, 1910. 
4Percy, Lanterns on the Levee, 148. 
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was being used to win support for the bill the subcommittee in 
charge gave an unfavorable report and the bill was killed. The 
committee was composed of Senators Bond, Nabors, Burrows, 
Donald, and Hobbs, and later it was shown that Bilbo had per-
suaded them to stop the bill because of the rumors afloat. 5 
The matter lay dormant for almost two years; then suddenly, on 
December 1, 1913, a grand jury in Warren County brought indict-
ments against Senator G. A. Hobbs and Lieutenant-Governor Bilbo. 
The first count of the indictment charged them with soliciting a 
bribe of $2,000 from Steve Castleman, a large property holder in 
Belzoni, the proposed seat of the proposed county, to procure pas-
sage of the bill in the next session of the legislature. The second 
count charged them with actually receiving $200 from Castleman as 
a bribe.7 Both Hobbs and Bilbo protested their innocence. Bilbo 
called it "political piracy." He said it was merely a plot on the part 
of Brewer to ruin him politically. Hobbs stated, and later testified, 
that Brewer had called him in a few days before the indictment 
and offered him immunity if he would confess and testify against 
Bilbo. Brewer called this statement "a lie out of the whole cloth," 
but he remained ominously silent as to everything else. "Let the 
facts [at the trial] speak for themselves," he said.6 
Even the anti-Bilbo press was taken too much by surprise to 
form judgments. The Clarion contented itseH with the obvious con-
clusion that "Either most unscrupulous men have been exalted to 
high position ... or false charges are being preferred against them." 
The Jackson Daily News regretted to see "even Hobbs and Bilbo in 
a trouble of this sort ... not because of the individuals themselves 
. . . , but because of the unenviable notoriety . . . to our common-
wealth." The Natchez Democrat wisely observed that Bilbo's ad-
herents would believe in his innocence "until the cows come home" 
and feared that unless his guilt could be established beyond any 
doubt he would "advance several pegs in the political life of the 
state."7 
5Speech of Judge Pat Henry, in Bilbo-Hobbs Trial, Jury Speeches in Full (Jack-
son, Miss., n.d.), 30-31; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 22, 1912; G. A. Hobbs, Bilbo, 
Brewer, and Bribery (n.p., 1917), 117-34; Macon Beacon, Dec. 12, 1913. 
6Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 2, 3, 1913; Macon Beacon, Dec. 12, 1915; Vicks-
burg Herald, Dec. 2, 1913; Natchez Democrat, Dec. 3, 4, 5, 1913; Jackson Daily 
News, Dec. 3, 1913. 
7Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 3, 1913; Jackson Daily News, Dec. 3, 1913; 
Natchez Democrat, Dec. 4, 1913, 
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The first move of the defense was to quash the indictment, 
charging that court officials in Warren had hand-picked the grand 
jury which indicted them. This motion was overruled. They then 
moved for a change of venue on the ground that the inflamed state 
of the public mind in Warren and the fact that Lieutenant-Governor 
Bilbo's integrity had been made an issue precluded a fair trial there. 
This, too, was overruled. One hostile editor observed that Warren 
was no exception to the other counties of the state. "In all of them 
there exists 'an inflamed condition of the public mind' and there are 
very few, if any, in which ... Bilbo's integrity has not been ques-
tioned."8 
It was suspected that the defense was using delaying tactics in 
an attempt to prolong the trial until the legislature should meet in 
January. It was pointed out that if this could be done Bilbo might 
tie up all judicial appointments and thus disorganize the criminal 
courts, or have a two-thirds majority in the legislature to impeach 
Brewer. In the latter event he would himself become governor and 
could appoint a judge to the Warren circuit who would dismiss the 
case.9 
When the venue motion was overruled the state moved for sepa-
rate trials of Hobbs and Bilbo and the trial of Hobbs proceeded. 
The state had attempted to employ as special prosecutor Judge Pat 
Henry of Vicksburg, the outstanding criminal lawyer of the state 
and a bitter opponent of both Vardaman and Bilbo. Strangely, 
Henry declined. He confounded the administration by becoming 
counsel for the defense and represented them ably. The trial, he 
said, was a "political game," and he wished to be "on the side of 
the people. "10 
The chief witness for the state was Castleman. He was, he 
stated, interested in procuring the new county because it would 
enhance the value of his property in Belzoni. In the spring of 1912, 
he said, after the legislature had adjourned without creating the 
new county, he had received a telephone call in Belzoni from Hobbs 
in Jackson. Hobbs, he said, refused to tell him his business over the 
phone, but urged him to meet him in Jackson where, he promised, 
8Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 8, 11, 1913; Natchez Democrat, Dec. 9, 10, 13, 
1913; Macon Beacon, Dec. 19, 1913. 
9Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 12, 14, 1913. 
10Henry's Speech, in Bilbo-Hobbs Trial, 22, 23. 
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he would offer a proposition which would interest him. At Vicks-
burg on the way to meet Hobbs, he ran into Brewer, whom he told 
about the mysterious call. Brewer urged him to proceed to his 
rendezvous, which he did. In Jackson, according to Castleman, 
Hobbs had proposed that for $2,000 he and Bilbo could secure the 
passage of his bill. He had, he said, replied noncommittally to 
Hobbs, and on the way back to Belzoni had again encountered 
Brewer, this time at Morehead. He told the governor of his meeting 
with Hobbs, and Brewer urged him to "string along" Hobbs and to 
"try to catch others" who were working with him. 
Castleman declared that he proceeded to blow hot, then cold, 
keeping Hobbs guessing as to his intentions. In the course of the 
next few months Hobbs made several trips from his home in Brook-
haven to meet Castleman-twice in Jackson and once in Belzoni. 
On each occasion, Castleman said, Hobbs had urged him to agree 
to the $2,000 payment. Meanwhile Brewer had employed Burns 
detectives from New Orleans to aid in the plot to catch Hobbs and 
the "others." Finally in October, 1912, Castleman succeeded in lur-
ing Hobbs to Vicksburg under the impression, it seems, that Bilbo 
would accompany Hobbs. He secured room 214 in the National 
Park Hotel there, and the detectives, hiding detectaphones in the 
room, waited in the room above and took notes of the conversation 
between Castleman and Hobbs. 
Hobbs seemed to suspect nothing, even when Castleman roared 
at him in a raucous voice. Castleman, who was insuring that the 
faulty detectaphones would record the conversation, explained to 
Hobbs that he could not lower his voice since he was accustomed to 
"hollowing at mules, cows, and pigs." Hobbs again agreed to secure 
the passage of the bill for the consideration and insisted that Bilbo 
"understands everything" and that he and Bilbo "controlled the 
legislature." Castleman later testified in court that he had previously 
given Hobbs $100 on account and that together they went from his 
room to the lobby where he cashed a draft for $100 and gave it 
to Hobbs there. Two subsequent meetings between Hobbs and 
Castleman were held at the Royal Hotel in Jackson. On both 0c-
casions the room was again wired with detectaphones in the hope 
that Bilbo would be present also, but he did not appear. 
Governor Brewer testified that he had employed the detectives 
after Castleman told him he had been approached by Hobbs. He 
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also testified that Hobbs had come to him a few days before the 
indictment, confessed his guilt, and pleaded for clemency. This 
was corroborated by Mattie Plunkett, the state librarian. She testi-
fied that Hobbs had come to her in a desperate mood, begged her to 
get an interview for him with the governor, and showed a pistol 
with which she thought he meant to kill the governor. She stated 
that she was present at the interview between Hobbs and Brewer 
and that Hobbs broke down and confessed his guilt. She also testi-
fied that the first call which Hobbs made to Castleman at Belzoni 
had been put through in her office at Hobbs' request. 
The stenographic notes of the detectives bore out the testimony 
of Castleman. The detectives also testified that Hobbs' voice was 
heard through the device saying that Bilbo was thoroughly ac-
quainted with the proposition and would assist on the bill. The 
sheriff of Hinds County testified that he heard Hobbs in the Royal 
Hotel in Jackson "whining and pleading" with Castleman for pay-
ment of the money. 
Hobbs himseH corroborated most of Castleman's testimony. He 
admitted meeting Castleman at Belzoni, Jackson, and Vicksburg, 
and urging him to pay $2,000 to secure passage of the county bill. 
His purpose, however, was "patriotic." Learning of rumors of 
bribery in the 1912 legislature, he, Bilbo, Swep Taylor, mayor of 
Jackson, and others had decided to turn "detectives" and catch the 
guilty. It was agreed among them, he said, that he should pursue 
Castleman, who rumor had it had offered Mrs. Turnage, post-
mistress of the legislature, $2,500 to secure passage of his bill. He 
denied that Castleman had actually paid him $200, or any amount. 
He said, further, that he had not solicited an interview with the 
governor. Miss Plunkett, he said, had asked him to see the governor 
and had told him that if he did not insist that she testify, she would 
get the governor to leave him alone. Miss Plunkett, said Hobbs, 
while posing as his friend, had actually "sprung the trap" for Brewer 
to destroy him. 
Hobbs' testimony was corroborated by Bilbo and Swep Taylor. 
Taylor testified that Hobbs had been selected by him and the others 
to trap Castleman. He stated that Mrs. Turnage had told him that 
Castleman had made the bribe offer to her, but this was denied 
by Mrs. Turnage. Much was made by the defense of the fact that, 
although two "detectaphone" meetings were held after the alleged 
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$200 had been paid, neither Castleman's nor Hobbs' voice had been 
recorded as mentioning the payments. Much was also made of the 
fact that Brewer testified that he had enough evidence to convict 
Hobbs in October, 1912, fourteen months before. This, they said, 
proved that Brewer was merely plotting to involve Bilbo. Pat 
Henry's presence among defense counsel gave much credence to 
this belief. 
The trial lasted throughout the month of December. The jury 
was locked up and kept from their homes even on Christmas Day. 
The case went to the jury at 9:00 P. M. on December 30, and the 
following morning at 10:00 it returned a verdict of not guilty.u 
Brewer and others expressed astonishment at Hobbs' acquittal. 
It seemed to them that the Vardaman-Bilbo faction was in a ma-
jority in almost every county in the state, and it would be impos-
sible to secure a conviction of any of them "where a jury verdict 
rules." The Natchez Democrat said the case was not tried on its 
merits and that "an extremely ugly state of affairs is working in-
calculable injury to the state." Since Castleman was never indicted 
or tried, the jury must have concluded, thought the Democrat, that 
both parties were "patriots" and stumbled into each other's arms. 
The Aberdeen Weekly, professing neutrality, thought there was too 
much smoke in the affair for there not to be some fire. Without 
naming names the Weekly contrasted "present leaders" with "old 
time patriots." The Memphis Commercial-Appeal, too, was forced 
to conclude that "those who are dead and gone were either terribly 
overrated or . . . the standards of the measurement of men have 
changed." Predictions were freely made that when the legislature 
convened shortly Bilbo would institute impeachment proceedings 
against Brewer.12 
Perhaps Bilbo would have done so if he could have controlled 
the house as he did the senate. Certainly he did what he could 
llThe above account is taken from Hobbs, Bilbo, Brewer, and Bribery; Bilbo-
Hobbs Trial, Jury Speeches in Full; the files of the Jackson Clarion-Ledger for 
December, 1913, especially Dec. 2, 4, 24, 28; files of Macon Beacon for December, 
1913, especially Dec. 5, 12; files of Jackson Daily News for December, 1913, espe-
cially Dec. 3, 28, 29, 30; files of Natchez Democrat for December, 1913, especially 
Dec. 13, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, Jan. 1, 1914. 
12Aberdeen Weekly, Jan. 9, 1914; Memphis Commercial Appeal, quoted in Jack-
son Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 2, 1914; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 1, 1914; Jackson Daily 
News, Dec. 29, 1913; Natchez Democrat, Jan. 1, 1914. 
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to embarrass the governor in the latter body. When the legislature 
convened Bilbo took the Hoor in the senate, called for peace, and 
urged the forgetting of factionalism in the interest of the state's 
business. 13 Despite this it soon became apparent that all anti-
administration bills were originating in the senate, and it was 
charged that Bilbo and Hobbs openly lobbied in the house for their 
passage. Together they fostered a bill, aimed at Brewer, making 
all vacant offices elective instead of appointive. It passed the senate 
but was defeated in the house. By early March there was no 
longer any doubt, said the Clarion, that politics was being played 
in the legislature and that the "schemes are being hatched in the 
Senate." The political lines between the governor and lieutenant-
governor were being drawn taut, and "The members of the Legis-
lature are lining up either on one side or the other." Soon a bitter 
exchange was indulged in by Brewer and Bilbo, each charging the 
other with bad faith and with injuring the state. The governor 
claimed that while the senate was pretending to carryon the peo-
ple's business, it was actually smothering it in committee rooms 
where appropriation bills were being held up. All of this, he said, 
was at the direction of Bilbo, who was in league with "crooks and 
grafters" who had been indicted or convicted of "pillaging" the 
state.14 
An impasse developed over an appropriation to pay expenses 
incurred by Brewer in his investigation of the penitentiary and of 
the Hobbs case. In the special session held in the summer of 1913 
the house had passed a resolution authOrizing the governor to spend 
$10,000 of his contingent fund for the penitentiary investigation. 
Brewer had done so. Bilbo now attempted to prevent an appropria-
tion for this item, but even his own senate would not follow him 
thus far and passed the bill by a narrow margin. He then attempted, 
with more success, to prevent payment to the Burns Detective 
Agency for its detectaphone work in the Hobbs case. The bill was 
hung up in committee in the senate, and a resolution was passed 
by that body requiring a two-thirds vote to consider a bill given 
an adverse committee report. For this he was denounced by Brewer 
as "the most crooked man who has ever done business in the State." 
18Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1914, pp. 4-5. 
14Ibid., 620-21, 725, 922, 1035, 1066; Natchez Democrat, Jan. 5, Mar. 6, 11, 
1914; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 1, 6, 1914. 
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When a resolution was oHered in the senate to bring the Burns 
appropriation from committee, it was defeated by a vote of 20 to 
13. The house then authorized the governor to pay the detectives 
out of money collected as a result of the penitentiary investigation, 
but the senate refused to consider this bill. IS 
As the session dragged on, with the senate frequently not sitting 
for lack of a quorum, it was charged that Bilbo was purposely pro-
longing the session so as to avoid his trial. Venue had been changed 
to Hinds County, and the spring term there would expire in early 
summer. While the legislature was in session, of course, Bilbo was 
immune. It was also rumored that certain senators, friends of Bilbo, 
had made an oHer to Brewer that his appropriations would be ap-
proved if he would nol-pros Bilbo's indictment. Bilbo denied 
emphatically that anybody was authorized by him to make a pro-
posal of any nature to Brewer, and a senate resolution called on 
Brewer to furnish it with the names of those who had made the 
oHer. In response Brewer named Senators J. M. Arnold of Hatties-
burg and Sidney McLaurin of Brandon. Both admitted the charge 
but stated that their activities were wholly in the interest of peace 
and had been made only after consultation with other senators and 
with Swep Taylor and J. M. McBeath, chairman of the Democratic 
state executive committee.16 
Meanwhile preparations were going forward for Bilbo's trial. 
Bilbo asked that the case be sent back to Warren County, charging 
that speCial Judge Teat would not give him a fair trial and that 
Brewer had stacked the jury panel. Teat had been aSSigned to the 
Hinds circuit when Bilbo had objected to being tried by the regular 
judge, E. L. Brien. Brewer denounced the charge of stacking the 
panel as "false as hell," and the Jackson News dismissed the charge 
against Teat as delaying tactics. Bilbo, it said, did not want a fair 
trial. It pointed to the numerous motions of the defense as evidence 
that it wanted to avoid the trial on technicalities, if possible. These, 
it said, were not "the acts of an innocent man . . . who wants to 
prove to the world that he is innocent." The News also charged that 
copies of qualified jurors in Hinds were surreptitiously prepared 
I5Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1914, pp. 888, 1187, 1324; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 
Mar. 1, 6, 10, 11, 15, 1914; Natchez DemoCf'at, Mar. 21, 24, 25, 1914. 
I6Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1914, pp. 853-56, 1376-83; Natchez DemoCf'at, 
Mar. 15, 19, 21, 27, 1914; Vicksburg Herald, Mar. 5, 17, 27, 1914; Jackson Clarion-
Ledger, Mar. 27, 1914. 
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and turned over to Bilbo so that he might poll them and disqualify 
those who were not his political supporters. It warned the people 
to refrain from expressing themselves on the merits of the case. 
At the same time the Hinds grand jury was investigating a charge 
of bribery in connection with the creation of Walthall County by 
the legislature in 1910. It was rumored that Bilbo had received 
a bribe of $1,500 from sponsors of the new county to push the bill 
through the legislature. Bilbo's supporters charged that this and 
other moves were deSigned to "railroad" Bilbo, and it was reported 
that plans were being made to bring a trainload of his followers 
from Pearl River County to see that he got a "fair trial."17 
Bilbo came to trial in mid-June. A sensation was created when 
the defense presented an affidavit of a member of the Warren grand 
jury which had indicted Hobbs and Bilbo. This affidavit stated 
that the jury had intended to indict Hobbs but not Bilbo and that 
Bilbo's indictment had come as a result of pressure by the district 
attorney. In a subsequent statement the juror claimed that the 
affidavit had been secured by Bilbo's attorneys through false repre-
sentation, but the affidavit's original effect was not entirely de-
stroyed. The state's case was further Crippled by the failure of Mattie 
Plunkett to appear. It was insinuated that Bilbo had caused her ab-
sence, but this was never proved. The most damaging evidence to 
Bilbo's reputation concerned a matter completely extraneous to the 
issue presented by the indictment. Ira W. Sample, a Chicago lawyer 
who had been Brewer's "guest" at the mansion for two years, testi-
fied that Hobbs had proposed that Sample should induce the Hines 
Lumber Company to settle a case which the state had against it. 
"The Attorney-general . . . runs that," Hobbs was alleged to have 
said, "and ... Bilbo controls the attorney-general. If an arrange-
ment can be made by which Mr. Hines is willing to pay for it, that 
suit can be dismissed." According to Sample, $35,000 was the 
price which Hobbs asked. Of this, $5,000 was to go to the attorney-
general, Ross Collins, and $20,000 to Hobbs and Bilbo. The re-
mainder was to be split among various other officials. Ross Collins 
testified that Bilbo had approached him suggesting such a settle-
ment.18 
I7Jackson Issue, quoted in Jackson Clarion-LedgB1', June 6, 13, 1914; Macon 
Beacon, July 3, 1914; Jackson Daily News, Apr. 5, 16, 20, June 19, 28, 1914. 
I8Jackson Clarion-LedgB1', July 7, 10, Sept. 5, 1914; Natchez DemoCf'at, June 27, 
July 7, 1914. 
THE RISE OF BILBO 251 
After twelve hours deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of 
not guilty. One juror later stated that on the first ballot seven 
voted for conviction but later changed. The anti-Bilbo press was 
undoubtedly prepared for this verdict, but professed shock never-
theless. The Natchez Democrat resignedly admitted that "Today it 
is almost impossible to convict a man of ... influence." It predicted 
that the people would render a different verdict at the polls the 
follOwing year, when Bilbo would be a candidate for governor. 
The News thought the verdict only illustrated the limitless pos-
sibilities for escape from justice when shrewd lawyers employed 
technical pleas. It blamed the state's attorney for not making a 
better case and admitted that the testimony did not connect Bilbo 
with the transaction in a conclusive manner. The Macon Beacon 
wanted to add to Solomon's three wonders the way of a petit jury 
with a criminal. "What will the end be?" it asked. "God alone 
knows," it replied. "Never before in the history of the State have 
Mississippians been put to such shame."19 
The trial indicated that even the courts were considered by 
the people to have been aligned in the factional fight, and their 
prestige suffered as a result. Before the trial the Hickory Middle 
Buster advocated electing Bilbo governor "even if he's guilty" and 
advised the people to "take him out of the pen" if sent there. 
Mter Bilbo's acquittal a jubilation meeting was held in Smith 
Park in Jackson. Senator Hal Sanders of Tallahatchie, speak-
ing on the occasion, was quoted as saying that if Bilbo had been 
convicted, "Tallahatchie County would have sent 750 men armed 
with muskets, rifles and revolvers" to rescue him from the law.20 
Before the trial had started the campaign for the gubernatorial 
nomination in 1915 had begun. From the start it was admitted by 
experienced observers that the nomination would come from the 
Vardaman ranks. "No man of ordinary sense," said the Clarion, 
"doubts Vardaman's ability to name the next Governor of Missis-
sippi if he so wills; and as a rule he is by no means modest in assert-
ing his power." It only hoped that Vardaman would name a man 
whose character was "above reproach."21 
19Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 10, 1914; Natchez Democrat, July 10, 1914; Jack-
son Daily News, July 10, 1914; Macon Beacon, July 17, 1914. 
20Hickory Middle Buster and New Orleans Times-Picayune, quoted in Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 16, 1913, July 14, 1914. 
21Ibld •• June 24. 1914. 
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Four candidates besides Bilbo were in the field: W. M. Reily of 
Natchez, P. S. Stovall and H. M. Quinn of Jackson, and J. R. Tally 
of Hattiesburg. It was obvious from the start that it was a case of 
the field against Bilbo. All kept challenging him to joint debates, 
and, departing from Vardaman's practice, he agreed to meet them 
one at a time. Shortly before the election, however, it was reported 
that no joint debates "worthy of the name" had taken place, al· 
though two of the candidates had made more than «600 speeches 
each."22 
Repeated attempts were made to effect a breach between V arda-
man and Bilbo. Judge Robert Powell claimed that Bilbo had told 
him in 1913 that he was considering forming a political alliance 
with Brewer to defeat Vardaman. The anti-Vardaman-Bilbo press 
played up the failure of Bilbo to expose the alleged bribery in the 
Secret Caucus in time to elect Vardaman then. This was cited by 
them as an example of Bilbo's «treachery" even to his own leader, 
Vardaman, and as justification for Vardaman's abandOning Bilbo 
now if he should choose to do so. Warnings were also issued to 
Vardaman that he had best scotch Bilbo now if he wanted to retain 
control of his own forces. If Bilbo should be elected governor in 
1915, suggested the Clarion, and, «with the shrewdness and ability 
he is known to possess in dealing with the public," become a popular 
governor, "he might ... become quite a formidable opponent of 
Senator Vardaman" in the senatorial election of 1918. The Natchez 
News repeatedly accused Bilbo of attempting to ''knife'' Vardaman 
and thought the only reason he did not make an open break was 
that he wanted the Vardaman votes. «But elect him," said the 
News, «and watch him take off the mask. ... He never has played 
fair and there is no indication he will now."28 
The plotters seemed to think their scheme was working. Judge 
Powell stated that Vardaman ''had never had any use for [Bilbo] 
since he claimed he had been bribed by Dulaney." The Vicksburg 
Herald alleged that the bribery charge was a ''hoax'' and was known 
as such by Vardaman, who profited from it. Nevertheless it thought 
that a rift had occurred between Bilbo and Vardaman and that the 
latter's followers were using this charge of "treachery" to defeat 
22Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 9, July 11, 1915. 
23Jackson Daily News, Dec. 28, 1913; Vicksburg Herald, Feb. I, 1914; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, Mar. I, 1914; Natchez News. Aug. I, 1914. 
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Bilbo's gubernatorial aspirations.24 It was made to appear that 
there was a vast gulf separating the idealism of the two men. «If 
Vardaman really stands for anything in Mississippi," said the Sena-
tobia Democrat, «Bilbo stands for the opposite, and merely because 
they have mutual enemies they should not be classed together." 
The same sentiment was expressed by the Clarion. 25 
Furthermore, good relations between Brewer and Vardaman 
were supposed to have been promoted by Brewer's commuting 
the sentence of C. C. Smith, the convicted penitentiary trustee. It 
was even thought that the pardon had come as a result of a request 
from Vardaman, and there were rumors of a «line-up" of Brewer 
and Vardaman against Bilbo. When Bilbo's law partner was de-
feated in a judicial primary by Judge Teat, who preSided at Bilbo's 
trial and against whom Bilbo campaigned vigorously, it was taken 
as an indication of a Vardaman-Bilbo split, and the Clarion gloated 
over Bilbo's «waning influence." Shortly thereafter, Brewer at-
tempted to persuade Vardaman openly to oppose Bilbo's candidacy. 
When Vardaman refused, Brewer became enraged and attacked him 
viciously. He charged that "Senator Vardaman knows as well as 
I do that Bilbo is a crook but . . . he fears that . . . Bilbo . . . will 
go right after his position in the Senate."26 
Despite Bilbo's close association with Vardaman he did not, 
during the campaign or later as governor, resort to the anti-Negro 
tirades which characterized Vardaman's political campaigns. His 
technique was of a different kind. He appealed to the voters as an 
exposer of oligarchic corruption and as a victim of oligarchic per-
secution. Like Vardaman he appealed to them on a broad program 
of governmental and social reform. 
A concerted campaign was waged by the anti-Bilbo press to 
discourage the farmers from voting in the election. Mississippi, it 
was said, had been suffering "from a surplus of politics and a scar-
city of grain crops." The farmers had been neglecting their work 
for politics long enough. «The people of Mississippi have about 
come to the conclusion," said the Clarion, "that there are other 
24Jackson Daily News, Dec. 28, 1913; Vicksburg Herald, Feb. 1, 1914. 
25Senatobia Democrat, Jan. 8, 1914, in Vardaman scrapbook, Mississippi Depart-
ment of Archives and History; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 21, 1914. 
26Macon Beacon, Mar. 13, 1914; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 20, 21, Oct. 4, 
6, 1914; Greenwood Enterprise, Sept. 18, 1914, and Senatobia Democrat, Oct. 1, 
1914, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
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things more profitable than the cultivation of the political crop." 
It promised that henceforth the papers would devote more space 
to agriculture and less to politics. With the primary less than a 
month off the farmer was advised to tend to his crops «and leave 
the politicians to hoe their own row."27 
There were large issues, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter, but they seem to have been obscured by petty bickerings 
and personalities. Reily had a Catholic wife, and this was an issue, 
but only a sub rosa one. It was charged that W. P. Holland, president 
of the Planter's Bank of Clarksdale, had contributed $500 to Bilbo's 
campaign. His object was supposed to be the controlling of the 
levee board, which handled a half million dollars annually and 
which the new governor would appoint. The Vicksburg Herald 
was fair enough to admit that if true it was doubtful if "the interest 
of the people will thereby be worsted or changed." Holland con-
trolled the board under the present administration, it said, and 
only wanted to continue to do so. Bilbo's backing by Frank Burkitt 
brought charges that he was aligned with the former Populists, 
which was probably true, and that he planned to revive the Popu-
list party, which was false. Bilbo promised to take «politics" out of 
the schools and named C. M. Hightower, president of the Agricul-
tural and Mechanical College and a Brewer appointee, as the first 
who would gO.28 
Brewer, interested only in defeating Bilbo, was vigorously 
campaigning for Reily. Congressman B. C. Humphreys and John 
Sharp Williams were secretly supporting Reily and applauded 
Brewer's work. Most of Brewer's speeches were attacks on Bilbo's 
record, from his attempt to hamstring the penitentiary investigation, 
through the Hobbs trial and his part in holding up legislative busi-
ness for his own interest, to his own trial for bribery. He charged 
him with having committed «numerous other frauds and crimes" 
which had never been exposed.29 He charged that Bilbo and state 
27Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 15, 1914, Apr. 6, May 21, June 1, July 10, 
1915; ibid., May 21, quoting Madison County Herald; Natchez Democrat, July 4, 
23, 1915; Green County Herald, July 10, 1915. 
28Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 25, 1914, June 19, 1915; ibid., quoting Grenada 
Sentinel; Macon Beacon, June 25, 1915; Jackson Daily News, Apr. 30, 1914. 
29Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Apr. 20, May 2, 1915; Greenwood Commonwealth, 
quoted in Macon Beacon, June 25, 1915; B. G. Humphreys to J. S. Williams, May 29, 
1915; Williams to Earl Brewer, June 2, 1915, Williams Papers. 
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l Bilbo, the People's Champion. 
IN EVER"{ period of the world's history whoever had the temerity to teach to 
the popillate the freedom of thought 
and speech in politics or the Christian 
virtueS following the free exercise of 
their own c.)Dscience in religious matters, 
has broua-h1. himself under condemnation 
of the arist(lcratic element of hi~ time; his 
character maligned and blackened by char-
acter assasE.ins. and often leading to his 
death by the assassin's knife or bullet. 
Socrates, the great Grecian philosopher, 
"hou~h belon~ng to the anitocratie ele-
.!nt when he began teaching the moral 
virtues and the immortality of Ute soul to 
the populace, the sophists, who were the 
aristocrats and ruling element, persecuted 
him and eventually secured a death sen-
tenee against him. and he was forced to 
drtnk the deadl) hyssop. Tiberius and 
Cains Grachus were assassinated because 
they were political champions of the Rom-
an plebians against the patricians. Julius 
Caesa~ excited the jealousy of the Roman 
senate becauee he was a popular idol of 
the people. and.they had him assassinated. 
Martin Luther opposed the sale of indulg-
ences and other corrupt practices in his 
church and w~ excommunicated, and 
only escaped death by the rivalry and jeal-
ousy of the ruling powers. John Calvin, 
Peter Waldo, the great French merchant 
prince, became .a social outcast and suf-
fered great persecution at the hands of the 
,"uUng classes because he opposed corrupt 
practices in the church and taught the 
Christian virtues to the populace. John 
Calvin offended the ruling classes by his 
austere religious views, and was forced to 
expatriate himself, and remained an exile 
in Switzerland the remainder of his life. 
The early colonists of America sought 
a home among savages and wild beasts of 
the jungle that tMy might be permitted'1lo 
'Yonhip God as their conscience dictated. 
Roger Williams, assistant carate in the 
established church of England at Dover, 
Massachusetts, took the high ground that 
the civil authorities should not have juris-
diction in matters purely of conscience and 
he was ordered by the authorities to return 
tG England, but preferred to go alone 
among savages; hence he settled at Provi-
dence, R. 1. 
When Patrick Henry defended the pe0-
ple against the oppl'eSsive _ tobacco tax 
fixed by the established church· of Eng; 
land; he_was characterized 88 a dangerous 
demagogue. 
Sam Adams, Benjamin Franklin and 
Patrick Henry opposed the right of the 
home government to tax the colonies 
without representation, and advocated the 
ria'hts of men above those of kings, and, 
fol\. this, would bave been hung for sedi-
~" if the English auttrorities could have 
b ,d hands upon them. .. 
Thomas Jefferson was severely de-
nounced by his political enemies as & dem~ 
agogue and dangerous to American insti· 
futions, becauae he advocated a demo-
cratic government. 
Abraham LincOln was COlIIidered by the 
[fJg w. C 'Pillman. 
Southern people as the agent by which the 
institution of African s1o.very-was destroy-
ed, and ·he was assassinated. William 
Goebel, in his canvass for the offic.e cf 
Governor of Kentucky, antagonized a cor-
rupt political machine, backed by a strong 
corporate influence. which led to his being 
assassinated. The same combinatiQJl of 
influences brought about the death of E. 
W. Carmack of Tennessee. The rulers of 
the invisible empire have so far succeeded 
in keeping W. J. Bryan out·of the presi. 
dency; and if Thomas J e"fferson were alive 
in this day of corporate power and influ-
ence they would destroy him. There are 
very Jew American statesmen that have 
the courage to openly espouse the cause of 
the toiling masses against the classes. If 
one succeeds in running the gauntlet the 
agents of the invisible empire either buy 
him, as they did Joe Baily, or kill him, as 
they did E. W. Carmack. . 
Albert Cummins, of Iowa, and Rob--
ert Lafollette of Wisconsin, fought the 
big railroads and succeeded in break-
and Robert Lafollette of Wisconsin. fought 
the big railroads and succeeded in break-
ing into the U. S. Senate: but they are both 
pr:oteetionists, consequently are only half-
baked champions of the masses. Jeff Davis 
of Arka.nsas, fought his way into the U. 
S. Senate, but his enemies never lost his 
trail. There is not a chief executive 6f any 
State in the Union today, that has the 
temerity to stand out openly against the 
legislation favoring the classes that is 
now a part of the statute laws or is being 
spread upon the statute books of the differ-
ent states. Many of them succeed tn 
"fooling" the people with the kind of dope 
handed out by our own Earl Brew·er. 
James K. Vardaman is the only gover-
nor in the late history of Mississippi whose 
sympathies were with the masses, and 
stood out openly as their friend against 
the powers that be; atlil today the sleuths 
of this invisible power behind the throlle 
are shadowing his every footstep; lind if 
they could have succeeded in their ef-
forts to get him into a series of joint de-
bates in 1911, it would have been a miracle 
if he had eicaped the knife or bullet at the 
hands of some of the bravo's .that they 
would have placed at his heels. 
Bilbo, if possible, is more intensely 
hated by the. agencies of special interests 
than is Vardaman, because Bilbo laid bare 
their rotten political methods in the secret 
caucus, and since that time has been inde-
fatigable in makinr other exposures and 
in holding up to public gaze the various 
traps that have been laid to enlfnare him; 
but he has been too wary to be caught, 
which has intensified the malignancy of 
his enemies. 
Brewe.r's proposition of forming a coali-
tion with Bilbo was an ettort to corrupt 
and to buy bis splendid talent, which is al-
ti:~;stt~~ ~~litti~~v:n~~: ~lte~~u=&. 
But when Bilbo turned down this proposi-
tion, the governor began to scheme for his 
destruc\!-on and every failure to ensnare 
him has increased the activity -of the char-
acter assassin, and if he could be induced 
to engage in a series of joint debates he 
would never Jive to finish the campaign. 
His enemies will repeat a slanderous state-
ment which may be denied and proven to 
~~~b:'!~ ~ftli~~Wst%n:. e;g:ht~ 
same falsehood will be rejterated as though 
undeniable evidence of its correctness was 
too potent to be denied. It has required 
the greatest courage to stand out openly as 
a champion of the burdened tax payers as 
Bilbo has done. It bas required the high. 
est order of intelligence, backed bv a store 
house of konwledge and information, to 
defend his position against the shrewd at-
torneys who are the paid agents of the 
community of interests which seek to ex-
ploit the people and the fruits of their toil' 
and it has required great astuteness of 
mind to correctly understand and check-
mate every move of his enemies in their 
efforts to destroy his usefulness. As Lieu-
tenant Governor and presiding officer of 
t~e senate he stands without a peer in tbe 
hlStory of the State; his rulings were just 
and fair to those who opposed him. his 
great talent in constructive statesmanship 
always stood out brightly in the interest 
of the great body of the people, which fact 
is borne out by the Senate Journal; and 
were it not so, his enemies would not be 
pushed to the extremity of peddling false-
hoods against him. He favored the anti-
land corporation law which wil[ save the 
State from the curse of absentee landlord-
ism. He favored the elective judiciary, 
and to him is due largely the credit that 
it is a part of our statute laws. He fav-
ored the reduction of the contract rate in-
terest, which saves to the poor man many 
thousands of dollars each year. 
He favored the guaranteeing of bank 
deposits, and the enactment of this law is 
due in a great measure to his constructive 
ability as a legislator and his power as an 
advocate. He favored a more equal ad-justment of the burdens of taxation on the 
rich and the poor and succeeded in requir-
ing, by statute. that tlte.large land holding 
corporations pay taxes on their holding 
which bad before been merely nominaL In 
fact, every act of. his official life, so far 
as my association has been or my knowl-
edge extends, has been as the unswerving 
friend· of the common people; and during 
his labors in their interests he has had to 
wend his way through the snares that 
would have caught less wary feet in their 
toils. 
These are some of the reasons why the 
people of the State of Mississippi are de-
vpted to Bilbo and why they are going to 
elect him by an avalanche of ballots on 
the 3rd day of August, that will send such 
a shock up the spinal columns of his ad-
versaries that they will be aft'ected with 
temporary paresis, and, for a time, will 
paralize the oorrupt machinery that is 
now operatina' against him. The people 
love him for the enemies he has made, 
using his magnificent talent in their be-
half. Calumhy and the assassin have been 
the im!Jtruments used by the favored 
classes against every friend and advocate 
of the. masses, as against the classes, in 
every period of the world's history, wheth-
er he be priest or statesman, and the only 
thing th~t saves Bilbo from destruction. 
either by slander or by assassination, is 
the bulwark of public sentiment in the 
minds and hearts of an inIightened elec-
torate, who have learned some things in 
duplicity and demagogy from the pres-
ent adminiStration. 
In the interest of true democracy and 
the perpetuation of our democratic insti-
tutions let every man who loves his home 
d=~ :r~.ran!i ~~!.bb.~';:' ~ 
way, .that he'. golllg to vote for Bilbo. 
Campaign propaganda for Theodore C. Bilbo, taken from the supplement 
to the Winston County Journal, July 23, 1915. 
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Senator Lee Russell, who was campaigning for lieutenant-governor 
on Bilbo's slate, had formed "a cabal ... for securing political ad-
vantage for a faction through a dirty intrigue." "Never before 
in the State," said he, "was political depravity so open and bold and 
defiant in asserting itsell." The Macon Beacon, professing to believe 
all Brewer's charges, was horrified at the '10w moral tone" to which 
Mississippi politics had descended when men like Bilbo and Russell 
could aspire to office by appeals to "the uninformed class of people 
who are ignorant of the facts." "Sell-confession of immorality-of 
bribery, and lying about it-no longer seems," it said, " ... to deter 
a man from offering for high office or to prevent voters from flocking 
to his standard."80 
It is difficult to understand why Bilbo's opponents kept calling 
him "a sell-confessed bribe taker." Whether or not Bilbo was a 
"bribe taker" was certainly an issue in Mississippi politics. But never 
at any time did he confess that he was. He admitted receiving 
money from Dulaney during the Secret Caucus of 1910. He charged 
that Dulaney had given him the money to influence his vote, but 
he denied that his vote had been so influenced and, on the con-
trary, claimed that his only purpose in accepting it had been to 
trap and expose Dulaney. Since intent is a necessary ingredient 
in such a crime, the mere fact that he accepted money, without 
intending to be influenced by it, could not constitute bribery. To 
charge that he "confessed" to have been bribed, when his whole 
political career thus far had been based on repeated and categorical 
denials of it, was a gross misrepresentation of fact. 
Of course Bilbo and Russell paid Brewer back in kind, some-
times with interest. In a joint debate between Russell and Brewer 
at Wesson on July 14, Russell charged that Brewer had stolen a 
pending bill from the legislative hopper. Again Brewer let his 
temper get out of control and threatened to cut Russell's throat 
"from ear to ear" if he ever repeated the accusation. Bilbo pub-
licized the fact that Brewer had been sued by the husband of 
Adele Blood, the actress, for alienation of his wife's affections.81 
The opposition to Bilbo received two strong stimulants during 
the last months of the campaign. In May, in a speech at Pontotoc, 
30Macon Beacon, July 30, 1915. 
31 Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 19, 1914, July 20, 1915; Natchez Democrat, 
July 17, 1915; Jackson Daily News, July 15, 1915. 
256 REVOLT OF THE REDNECKS 
Vardaman denounced "bribetakers." This was universally in-
terpreted as a blow at Bilbo. It "was a bitter pill for Bilbo's friends," 
said the Jones County News, and could only mean that Vardaman 
wanted his friends to vote "against Bilbo and the corporate align-
ments he has made." Vardaman subsequently denied that he had 
aimed the remark at Bilbo and claimed that he was "neutral" in 
the governor's race since all five candidates were his friends. B2 
Two months later John W. Armstrong, a former Vardaman sup-
porter, exploded a bomb. In a letter to B. F. Jones of Hernando he 
stated that during the Secret Caucus he was approached by Bilbo 
who told him that "the other side" was offering to pay his room and 
board bill and give him "money to spend" if he would help them. 
Bilbo, he said, told him that he "controlled seven votes" and that if 
Armstrong could get him $100 he would "stay put." According to 
Armstrong, he related the incident to Vardaman and his advisers 
so that Vardaman "would not become entangled with Bilbo." Dr. 
Ben F. Ward, Vardaman's political mentor, admitted that Arm-
strong at the time had told him of the incident, but that he did 
not then, nor did he now, believe Armstrong. Vaughan Watkins, 
Vardaman's campaign manager in 1911, admitted writing a check 
at the time for $100, marking it "For God Knows What," and giving 
it to Armstrong who told him it was for Bilbo. Bilbo denounced 
Armstrong as a'1iar," and charged that he was expelled from the 
Elks Club and the Country Club at Jackson for cheating at cards. 
Armstrong denied this and submitted affidavits to prove otherwise. 
The Jackson News had no doubt Armstrong's story was true, but 
said it had been revealed too late to do any good. Had.it come five 
years before, it said, "it would have changed the entire course of 
MiSSiSSippi's political history." Nor did the News think that was 
the only money used by the Vardaman crowd in the Secret Caucus. 
"It took a large bunch of greenbacks to keep that crowd together," 
it said, "and they were distributed freely whenever and wherever 
needed."88 
Whether Vardaman credited the story is not definitely known, 
but obviously it was not news to him. He issued no statement, 
82Vicksburg Herald, May 19, 1915; ibid., quoting Jones County News. 
sBMacon Beacon, July 28, 1915; Vicksburg Herald, July 28, 28, 1915; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, July 26, 1915; Jones County News, July 29, 1915; Jackson Daily 
News, July 25, 1915. 
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announcing merely that he was coming home to vote. This was in-
terpreted as indicating that Bilbo had his support.84 
On the eve of the election the Natchez Democrat called on the 
voters to "repel the invasion" of an "arrogant political ring." The 
election, it said, was "a battle to rescue the fair name of Mississippi 
from the slums of political rottenness." Reports were spread of the 
circulation through the state of a "Bilbo line-up ticket" as a sugges-
tion to voters. Bilbo denied that he had any commitments to other 
candidates and stated that the ticket was a trick of his opponents 
to gain for him the enmity of those candidates left off the list.8s 
A record vote of 140,000 was cast. Of these Bilbo received 
74,573, a majority of nearly 9,000 over all his opponents, and more 
than 25,000 in excess of his nearest rival, Reily. He carried all but 
three white counties, but received less than 35 per cent of the 
vote in the Delta counties.8a There was evidence of some ballot-
box stuffing, particularly in Pontotoc. There it was shown that the 
vote far exceeded the registration; that Bilbo received 700 more 
votes there than were counted for all candidates in 1911, and 730 
more than Lee Russell, winning candidate for lieutenant-governor 
who was allied with him. Editor Fred Sullens asked for an investi-
gation, but this was refused by the state executive committee and 
Bilbo was declared the nominee. 
Subsequently it was alleged and proved by each side that 
Negroes were voted in the primary. In Harrison County at the 
McHenry precinct, it was shown that thirty-five Negro mill hands 
were voted by one faction. Similar charges were made and proved 
concerning Pike, Lamar, Lincoln, and Pearl River counties. In these 
counties there were factional struggles for local control, and it was 
not thought that the gubernatorial candidates were involved in the 
irregularities, although they may have profited or been injured by 
them.87 
Fred Sullens' chagrin knew no bounds after it became mown 
that Bilbo was nominated. He petulantly maintained that Bilbo 
84Vicksburg Herald, July 28, 1915. 
85Natchez Democrat, Aug. 1, 1915; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 1, 2, 3, 1915. 
8aBlennial Report of the Secretary of State to the Legislature, July 1, 1915-]uly 
1, 1915 (Memphis, 1915). 
87Natchez Democrat, Aug. 11, 1915; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 5, 6, 7, 1915; 
Jackson Daily News, Aug. 6, 1915; Macon Beacon, Feb. 18, 1916. 
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would be governor for "but little more than one half the people of 
Mississippi." The robe of office, he said, could not hide "the bar sin-
ister across his forehead." It was "an unhappy day for Mississippi" 
and there were to be "more unhappy days ahead." "He stands for 
nothing that is high or constructive, he represents nothing save 
passion, prejudice, and hatred, he advocates nothing that is worthy." 
His nomination had only transpired, Sullens said, because "a ma-
jority of the voters, fooled, deluded, blinded, lost to all reason, have 
said ... that they would rather wallow in filth than walk on clean 
ground." He suggested substituting "a carrion crow" for the eagle 
on the state seal and removing the eagle from the dome of the 
capitol and replacing it with "a puking buzzard." Bilbo was and 
would remain "a self-accused bribe taker, a self-confessed grafter, a 
foul tongued slanderer, an unmitigated liar and contemptible 
crook."38 
The Macon Beacon agreed with Sullens on everything except his 
explanation of why the people voted for Bilbo. It did not think 
they preferred "to wallow in filth." Rather it thought they "dis-
believed the statements of facts made by the News, the Beacon, 
by Governor Brewer, and by that contained in the [senate] resolu-
tion of April 15, 1910." The Newton Record, too, thought that 
Bilbo's large vote was a reaction to Brewer's vigorous campaign 
against him. The Vicksburg Herald agreed, observing that "Brewer's 
petroleum was . . . feeding instead of extinguishing the baleful 
Bilbo Hame." The Clarion simply gave up trying to explain "the 
freakish caprice of the voter." Frequently, it said, the slightest 
thing would influence his action, and at other times it was im-
possible to change his views. It thought the voter, as a rule, acted 
on his own initiative when he entered the voting booth. "Away 
from the crowd and the appeals of the candidates, he makes up his 
mind to vote for somebody, vote against somebody, or not to vote 
for this or that man for reasons of his own."39 While more complex, . 
this guess was probably as good as the others. 
88Jackson Daily News, Aug. 8, 1915. 
89Macon Beacon, Aug. 13, 1915; Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 8, 1915; ibi4., quoting 
Newton Record; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 8, 1915. 
CHAPTER XX 
REFORM - AND SCANDAL 
THE LEGISLATURE which met in January, 1916, contained 
only forty veterans of the previous session. A contest for the 
speakership developed between Oscar Johnston of Coahoma, 
Joseph E. Norwood of Pike, and M. S. Conner of Covington. Bilbo 
was known to be opposed to Johnston and a warm friend of Conner's 
father. Johnston was from the Delta but seemed to lack the united 
support of that section. Affairs of the Yazoo Delta Levee Board 
had provoked a factional quarrel that was said to be responsible 
for Johnston's poor shOwing in the election of a speaker. Conner 
was chosen on the fourth .ballot. He was the youngest man ever to 
hold the office, and his attaining the distinction was said to be due 
to "the powers that be." Norwood was made chairman of the im-
portant judiciary committee.1 
Brewer refused to attend the inaugural exercises because Bilbo 
objected to his speaking. He issued a farewell statement, however, 
which did more to clarify the issues between him and Bilbo than 
all his campaign oratory. He explained the hostility between them 
as owing to sectional interests. Bilbo, he said, favored a constitu-
tional convention, and he did not. The purpose of such a convention 
would be to effect a reduction of taxes in south Mississippi and an 
increase in other sections and to increase legislative representation 
in south Mississippi at the expense of north and west Mississippi. 2 
In his message to the legislature Bilbo advocated a constitu-
tional convention to revise legislative apportionment; a revision of 
tax laws to equalize assessments in the several counties; a pardon-
ing board to relieve the governor of the arduous duty of examining 
clemency appeals; the establishment of a state highway department 
to build and unify a system of state roads; the building of a hospital 
for the treatment of pellagra; and the issuing of $1,200,000 in bonds 
for permanent .improvements in the state hospitals.s Not content 
IJackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 5, 7, 10, 1916; Natchez News Democrat, Jan. 5, 
6,9,1916. 
2Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1916, pp. 149-51; Natchez Dem(Jcrat, Jan. 19, 1916j 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 19, 1916. 
BMississippi, Senate Journal, 1916, pp. 106-32. 
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with advocating these measures, Bilbo openly lobbied for them. 
It was frequently reported that he was spending a good deal of 
time on the Hoors of both houses "mingling with the members and 
urging the passage" of bills he recommended.' 
It soon became apparent that there was disunity between the 
senate, which was said to be under Bilbo's influence, and the house, 
controlled by the antiadministration forces. The senate seemed to 
favor greater spending for weHare agencies, while the house was 
intent on cutting expenditures. Nevertheless the legislature passed 
many bills Bilbo favored, and also passed several he opposed over 
his veto-four in one evening. Upon one occasion he went on the 
Hoor of the house and spoke in defense of his veto of a measure only 
to have it overridden by a vote of 82-33.5 
When the legislature showed no disposition to call a convention, 
Bilbo sent letters to outstanding citizens asking their opinions and 
published answers of those who favored a convention. The needs 
most commonly stressed in these answers were: more equitable dis-
tribution of school funds, more representation for southern coun-
ties, and equalization of assessments of real estate values. Some of 
these, for instance the school-fund distribution and the tax-equaliza-
tion scheme, might appeal to counties in sections other than south 
Mississippi, but the legislative apportionment would restrict the 
influence of all north and west Mississippi, both Delta and the Hills. 
No convention bill was passed.6 
Before the legislature adjourned it was reported that Bilbo had 
lost all control over it. This was not displeasing to the conservative 
press, which praised the legislature as <1iberal, yet conservative." 
Although petty jealousy, "peanut politics," and other evils had 
seemed to thrive in the legislature, it did, they said, "accomplish 
much for the good of the state" and had "protected the interests 
of the people." The biennial appropriation was more than 
$9,000,000, an excess of $300,000 over the 1914 appropriation. 7 
The legislature had, nevertheless, gone along with Bilbo on 
'Natchez News Democrat, Mar. 14, 1916; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 31, 1916. 
5Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 31, 1916; Natchez News Democrat, Feb. 11, Mar. 
14, 1916. 
6Macon Beacon, Feb. 18, Mar. 24, 1916; Vicksburg Herald, Feb. 20, 1916. 
7Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Mar. 31, Apr. 9, 1916; Natchez Democrat, Apr. 11, 
1916. 
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several important measures; among these was the tax-equalization 
scheme. Bilbo had advocated this during the campaign more 
vigorously than any other issue, and the legislature embodied his 
program in the Kyle Law. To understand its significance it will 
be necessary to review briefly some of the state's fiscal history. 
Mississippi had emerged from the Reconstruction period un-
burdened by the huge debt which most of the southern states were 
carrying. The experience of the Planter's Bank bonds in the 184<Y s, 
when the state had pledged its credit to enhance the market value 
of the bank's bonds only to repudiate them when the bank failed, 
seemed to have made a lasting impression on the people of the 
state. Forthwith, a provision was written into the fundamental law 
forbidding the state to pledge its credit in any private or corporate 
venture, and this feature had been incorporated in the constitutions 
of 1868 and 1890. Consequently, when "Radical" rule was over-
thrown in 1876, the state's indebtedness was only $830,750, with a 
carrying charge of $45,000. B But unwise policies increased this debt 
in the next decades. Taxing power was vested in both legislature 
and county boards of supervisors. The legislature could fix the tax 
rate, but it was left to each of the seventy-odd boards of supervisors 
to assess the value of property in its county. Moreover, the board of 
supervisors was empowered to levy separate taxes in its county for 
local administration. Thus a sort of game developed among the 
counties to see which could, by lowering its property valuations, 
pay least taxes into the state treasury. At the same time the county 
could take care of its local needs by raising the county levy.9 
The viciousness of this scheme was obvious, but no one seemed 
to know what to do about it. As the state levy went up, property 
assessments went down, and the state deficit grew. In addition, 
several extraordinary occurrences had added to the state's embar-
rassment. In 1890 the state treasurer had embezzled over $315,000, 
a sum far in excess of any peculation charged against any official of 
the Reconstruction regime. To take care of this the legislature 
authorized the sale of $400,000 of 4 per cent bonds at 95 per cent 
BMississippi Constitution, 1868. Sec. 5; Ibid .• 1890. Sec. 258; Charles M. Brough. 
"History of Taxation in Mississippi," in Mississippi Historical Society. PublicaUoJII, 
II (1899), 124. 
9See Governor Bilbo's message to legislature. in MissisSippi. Senate Journal, 1916, 
pp.106-11. 
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of their face value. Governor Stone objected to selling state bonds 
at less than par, and none was sold. The state was thus Simply "in 
arrears," and warrants had to be issued to carryon the ordinary 
business of the state. The expense of the constitutional convention 
that year added another $60,000 to the state's debt. Prior to 1892 
only about $400,000 per year was paid out of the treasury for the 
support of the common schools. The constitution of 1890, how-
ever, required a school term of at least four months in every county 
and school district. This would require an outlay of over $900,000 
annually. In 1892 a fire at the lunatic asylum necessitated an ex-
penditure of $125,000 for repairs. Failure to collect the poll tax and 
the inroads of local prohibition, which were cutting down liquor 
licenses, added to the distress. Governor Stone in 1894 reported 
over $425,000 of disbursements in excess of receipts for the fiscal 
. year, and in 1896 the deficit was almost $390,000. The state levy 
had been increased from 2lh mills in 1876 to 6 mills in 1896.10 
Despite this, the treasury was bare, and state warrants were selling 
at a discount. 
When McLaurin became governor in January, 1896, he ap-
proved a bill authorizing $400,000 of 5 per cent bonds to meet the 
running expenses of the government. But this only added to the 
debt. It put off the day of reckOning but made no preparation for 
meeting that day. By 1897, despite increased tax levies of almost 
300 per cent, the state debt had grown to $1,106,000, and the deficit 
that year was another $400,000.11 Some of the conservative papers 
were advocating a reduction in the school appropriation as the only 
alternative to increased taxes which would be "too heavy a burden 
upon the people. "12 
Year after year the deficit was passed, like a hot iron, from one 
legislature to the next; and year after year the county boards fixed 
their assessments, deliberately lowering them to deprive the state 
of revenue. Throughout the period the Delta counties seem to have 
been the worst offenders in this respect. They were incomparably 
the richest counties of the state, but it was frequently complained 
10Mississippi, House Journal, 1894, p. 18; ibid., 1896, p. 18; Brough, "History 
of Taxation," loco cit., 113-24; Macon Beacon, Jan. 23, 1897; Rowland, History of 
Mississippi, II, 352. 
11Mississippi, House Journal, 1897, p. 8; Brough, "History of Taxation," loco cit., 
124; Macon Beacon, Jan. 23, 1897. 
12Natchez Democrat, quoted in Macon Beacon, Jan. 23, 1897. 
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that they were not paying their share. "Can anyone explain why," 
a Jackson editor asked in 1894, "Copiah, a piney woods county, 
should be the second county in tax paying ... property in the state 
... ahead of all the river and prairie counties?" How was it, he 
wanted to know, that little piney woods Lincoln should stand tenth 
on the list, "ahead of all the river counties except Adams, Warren, 
and Washington," each of which had a large city. "Tell us why," 
he continued, "Jones, the typical piney woods county, should be 
ahead of Carroll, Chickasaw, Clay, Grenada, Jefferson, Lafayette, 
Leflore, Monroe, Montgomery, Oktibbeha, et al." "It would ap-
pear," he sarcastically concluded, "that the piney woods is the best 
part of the state."18 
By 1916 finances were in a chaotic state. The state debt had 
grown to $2,500,000, and the state levy was raised to nine mills. 
Still the low valuation placed on lands by county boards rendered 
the increase useless. A legislator complained that this was particu-
larly prevalent in "the rich Delta counties," where the planters ob-
jected to paying their "just proportion of the State's obligations." 
In one county there, he said, three-fourths of the land was valued at 
one dollar an acre.14, 
The purpose of the Kyle Law was to remedy this injustice, as 
well as to bring order out of chaos. The law created a central board 
of equalization, with power to revise assessments of any county 
which it felt did not correspond to actual property values. It was 
rather an arbitrary power and provoked considerable protest. It had 
been a general custom of county supervisors to fix assessments at 50 
per cent of the estimated value of property. Since the new state 
board had no base from which to start, it fixed the assessment at 
100 per cent of estimated values. This was coupled with a promise 
that the next legislature would reduce the tax levy to two mills. 
This brought howls of protest from the Delta where low assessments 
on realty were coupled with leniency toward corporations.15 
Within a year of its creation the commission accomplished radi-
cal revisions in assessed valuation. Railroad and public service cor-
18Natchez News Democrat, Jan. 11, 1916; Vicksburg Herald, Feb. 12, 1916; 
Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 8, 1894. 
14Natchez News Democrat, Jan. 11, 1916; Vicksburg Herald, Feb. 12, 1916, 
Jan. 14, 1922; Macon Beacon, July 27, Sept. 27, 1917, Jan. 18, 1918. 
15Mississippi,LaW8, 1916, Chap. XCVIII. 95-100; Macon Beacon, July 27, 1917. 
Jan. 18. 1918; Jackson Clarion-Ledger. Sept. 27. 1917. 
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poration assessments were increased $40,000,000.16 Assessments in 
sixty-five of the poor counties were generally reduced. On the other 
hand, assessments in Bolivar, Coahoma, and Washington, three of 
the richest counties, were increased 463.7 per cent, 433.5 per cent, 
and 234 per cent respectively.17 Pearl River County, where Bilbo 
lived, also paid more under the new scheme than it had under the 
old, as did several other south Mississippi counties.1S This would 
indicate that the new system was not being used merely as a puni-
tive measure against counties which were opposed to the adminis-
tration. Bilbo was strong in his home county and had carried the 
southern counties whose assessments were increased. 
Naturally the commission came in for much criticism. The 
Clarion reported that complaints were coming in "from all parts of 
the state." Never, it said, had taxes been so high. "Every county in 
the state feels that it has been outraged if not raped by the Tax 
Commission." It predicted that the Kyle Law would be repealed by 
the next legislature.19 
To meet the objections of taxpayers, Bilbo called the legislature 
into special session in September, 1917. He pointed out that tax 
receipts under the new valuations would not only bring in excess 
revenues, but would be an undue hardship. He urged reduction of 
the levy. The legislature complied and adopted a four-mill levy. 
This proved insufficient to balance the increased appropriations of 
the 1918 legislature, and a new deficit appeared.20 Subsequently, 
when the levy was once more raised to six mills, the budget was 
balanced, and the value of the equalization board made manifest. 
Writing in 1930, the outstanding authority on the subject called it 
"the very cornerstone" of MisSissippi's fiscal machinery.21 
It had been predicted by Bilbo's enemies that he would use his 
appointive power, reckless of qualifications, to build up his political 
16Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 27, Dec. 13, 1917. 
17Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1918, pp. 37-38; M. C. Rhodes, History of Taxation 
In Mississippi, 1798-1929 (Nashville, 1930), 98. 
18Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1918, p. 38; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 11, 1918. 
19Jackson Daily News, Nov. 16, 1917; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 25, 28, 
Dec. 12, 13, 1917, Jan. 12, 13, 1918. 
20Mississippi, Laws, 1917, Chap. XXII, Sec. 1, p. 13; Mississippi, House Journal, 
1917, pp. 28-30; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 11, 1918, Jan. 14, 1922; Macon Beacon, 
Mar. 1, 1918. 
2'lRhodes, History of Taxation, 94-97. 
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following in the state. His record on this score is confused, as some 
of his appointments drew blame and others praise from his enemies. 
The first few months of his term he was severely criticized for 
"showing a disposition to act the boss." He ousted many officials of 
the various state institutions, frequently over the protest of trustees, 
and refused to recognize an opinion of the state supreme court in 
regard to the term of office of the state factory inspector. The 
Clarion called him the most "interfering, bossy governor the state 
has ever had." Six months after his inauguration the Clarion was 
convinced that the state was "so permeated with politics that noth-
ing goes except by political preference." A man's qualifications, it 
thought, counted for naught "unless his politics are on straight, and 
if his politics are of the right stamp his qualifications can be over-
looked." Bilbo was charged with forcing levee board members and 
institutional trustees to swear to appoint his henchmen to places of 
profit which they controlled.22 
Yet at almost the same time another enemy, in a confidential 
letter, was expressing "astonishment that Governor Bilbo is making 
so many good appointments." It almost seemed to him that Bilbo 
had "seen a light, and turned from ways of sin into righteousness." 
Another bitter enemy lauded the appointment of Professor P. P. 
Gamer as commissioner of agriculture. Gamer, said the Beacon, 
was "the best fitted man" and the ''best appointment possible."28 
Other features of Bilbo's administration drew praise from his 
enemies. When he succeeded in negotiating a state loan of more 
than $1,300,000 on favorable terms, the Beacon published a lauda-
tory article headed "Governor Bilbo Good Financier."24 Bilbo ap-
pointed a commission to investigate and recommend a remedy for 
illiteracy in Mississippi. The commission found more than 30,000 
white illiterates, of whom almost 12,000 were males of voting age. 
It at once started voluntary night schools for them, and these were 
regularly attended. This drew universal praise, as also did other 
educational improvements. Manual training and farm mechanics 
were introduced into the curricula of rural schools, and 2,000 white 
and 500 Negro teachers pledged themselves to prepare to teach 
22Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 1, 6, 15, 1916; Macon Beacon, June 9, 1916. 
23Lloyd L. Gilkey to J. S. Williams, May 6, 1916, Williams Papers; Macon 
Beacon, July 21, 1916. 
24Macon Beacon, Aug. 11, 1916. 
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those subjects. Even the Daily News praised the work being done 
for the betterment of Mississippi's school system and credited Bilbo 
for instituting the reforms.25 
In his message to the legislature in 1918 Bilbo staggered con-
servative editors by submitting a budget calling for appropriations 
totaling over $12,500,000. This represented an increase of almost 
$2,275,000 over the previous budget. Permanent improvements 
were to receive $1,765,000, and the remainder was to go in increased 
appropriations to schools and hospitals. SpeCific recommendations 
included: purchase of 5,000 acres of land for prison farms; a law 
empowering county school boards to employ superintendents in-
stead of requiring that they be elected; free textbooks for indigent 
children; a uniform warehouse receipts act to save farmers from 
"middleman" charges; sale of the governor's mansion and acquisi-
tion of one "more in harmony with democratic standards of sim-
plicity and unpretentious dignity"; enlargement of the state indus-
trial training school for delinquent children; larger appropriations 
for the state Board of Health; a million-dollar bond issue for the 
state's four colleges; and the building of four new state hospitals. 
The message also called for ratification of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment, a state constitutional amendment to equalize school funds 
among white children, compulsory vaccination of hogs to prevent 
cholera, and conservation of the state's dwindling timber re-
sources.26 
The message drew applause from the bitterest of Bilbo's ene-
mies. The Daily News called the proposed legislation "construc-
tive" and urged its adoption. It called particular attention to the 
good work which the Board of Health had been doing and urged 
particularly that the governor's school proposals be adopted. The 
Clarion, too, approved of much of the message and benignly noted 
that the governor had "broadened out more along financial lines 
than any man who has ever held public office in this state."27 
It must not be supposed that everything in Bilbo's administra-
tion met with such approval. Charges were made from time to time 
of various misfeasances on his part-the pardOning of a convict for 
25IbId., Aug. 18, Oct. 6, 1916; MissisSippi, Laws, 1916, Chap. ex, 148-49; 
Jackson Daily News, Nov. I, 1917. 
26Mississippi, Senate Journal, 1918, pp. 11-41. 
27Jackson Daily News, Jan. 8, 24, 1918; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 3, 8, 1918. 
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political reasons, the using of state funds for "junketing" trips about 
the country, and of scandalous relations between him and a female 
nurse at the Confederate Veteran's Home at Beauvoir.28 
The most sensational charge concerned affairs of the state insane 
hospital at Jackson. For some time before the legislature met in 
January, 1918, rumors had been circulating in Jackson of gross im-
morality in the conduct of attendants at the insane hospital. It was 
rumored that an unmarried nurse had just given birth to a child and 
that two women had been "spirited away" to prevent their talking. 
«High officials of government" were said to be involved. Bilbo had 
recently removed the superintendent of the hospital and had re-
placed him with a personal friend, Dr. R. M. Butler. Shortly after 
its convocation, the house, still containing an antiadministration 
majority, appointed a committee to investigate conditions there. 
Thereupon the Bilbo-controlled senate appointed a committee of 
its own to investigate. It was generally understood that the purpose 
of this committee was to «white wash" any charges brought by the 
house committee.29 
The house committee held closed hearings, but juicy bits of 
scandal leaked out and were published in the press after each day's 
hearing. Testimony was said to reveal that Butler had «taken no 
notice of immoral conditions surrounding the institution" and that 
Butler himself had <been too free and intimate with the young fe-
male nurses." The Clarion, shocked at the revelations, denounced the 
administration. «Let it be borne in mind," it said, "that those who 
are responsible ... are a part and parcel of the state administration; 
that they are the political allies, personal friends, and official crea-
tures of the Governor."so 
The house committee made its report on February 6. It revealed 
distressing conditions among the inmates. A defective hot-water 
system would not permit the patients to get even one bath a week. 
Their incapacity to take care of their natural physiological functions 
made this particularly revolting. The report further indicated that 
28Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 23, 1916; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 3, 1918, May 
2, June 12, 1919; Jackson Issue, Apr. 4, 1918. 
29Mississippi, House Journal, 1918, p. 87; Senate Journal, 1918, p. 142; Jackson 
Dally News, Jan. 13, 19, 1918; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Jan. 17, Feb. 3, 1918; Vicks-
burg Herald, Jan. 25, Un8. 
sOJackson Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 5, 7, 1918. 
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patients did not get sufficient food, while Dr. Butler used provisions 
intended for them for his own use. Sleeping rooms for the patients 
had no heat, and the patients had insufficient clothing and bed 
covering. The committee even reported cases of cruelty practiced 
on the patients by the attendants. Most of the report concerned the 
misconduct of the attendants. The immorality of the nurses, said 
the report, "was a scandal that had covered . . . Jackson . . . for 
more than twelve months." The place, it said, was commonly re-
ferred to by neighbors as "the assignation house." Female nurses, 
as well as male, drank whiskey on the premises and "were frequently 
drunk and profane." The female nurses "went into rooms of male 
nurses at night for immoral purposes." There were several cases of 
pregnancy of nurses, and at least one abortion had been performed 
there. The report called for the impeachment of Butler.31 
Throughout the investigation Bilbo remained steadfastly loyal to 
Butler. It was reported that he had refused to accept Butler's prof-
fered resignation, and had stated that if Butler resigned he would 
reappoint him. On the night after the legislative report Bilbo called 
a "secret caucus" at the executive mansion to consider means of 
Butler's salvation. His old stand-by, Swep Taylor, had parted com-
pany with him over the scandal, but Clayton Potter, George Butler, 
and James Cassidy, all prominent lawyers, were present. An attempt 
was made that night, it was reported, to get those members of the 
hospital staff unscathed by the report to endorse Butler, but it 
failed.32 
Although the anti-Bilbo press was making much of the affair,ss 
it had become clear to at least one of their number that "the inves-
tigation has assumed the aspect of a partisan political fight." The 
Natchez News Democrat was convinced that both sides were moved 
by political reasons rather than a desire to get to the bottom of the 
evils and correct them. "The public has learned during the past 
several years," it said, "that when partisan politics starts anything 
. . . exaggeration is the first requisite." It predicted that if Butler 
were impeached by the house he would not be convicted by the 
senate. Many were advocating impeachment of Bilbo as well as 
Butler. The Jackson Daily News opposed this because, it thought, 
31Mississippi, House Journal, 1918, pp. 435-42. 
32Jackson Clanon-Ledg61', Feb. 7, 8, 1918; Jackson Dally News, Feb. 7, 1918. 
aaSee quotations in Jackson Clanon-Ledg61', Feb. 10, 1918. 
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such action would furnish Bilbo with the necessary ammunition to 
insure his further political success. It pOinted out that he had been 
elected lieutenant-governor as a result of his cry of "persecution" 
in the Dulaney bribery affair and had been elected governor on the 
issue of his indictment in the Delta County bribery scandal. It 
urged leaving "his fate in tlIe hands of the Lord."34 
The house started impeachment proceedings against Butler. 
Thereupon he resigned and Bilbo appointed Dr. Mitchell of Ponto-
toc as his successor. In view of this Representative Howerton of Tate 
moved withdrawal of the impeachment. Johnson of Coahoma ob-
jected, pointing out that it was reported Bilbo had said he would 
reappoint Butler unless he were convicted on impeachment. He 
offered a resolution demanding a message from Bilbo promising 
never again to appoint Butler to a public office. During these pro-
ceedings Bilbo was sitting beside Speaker Conner, "prompting his 
leaders by sending tips to them." At the same time the senate no-
tified the house that it had received notice of Butler's resignation. 
But the house stood pat. The Howerton resolution was laid on the 
table by a vote of 80 to 9, and then the Johnson resolution was 
passed, 72 to 18. Bilbo then had his secretary bring to the house 
Butler's letter of resignation together with an official copy of 
Mitchell's appointment. But the house, now aroused to obstinance, 
still refused to pass the Howerton resolution, leaving to the senate 
the chore of dismissing the impeachment charges. The senate did 
SO.85 
Bilbo maintained that there was nothing wrong or immoral in 
his conduct "in connection with the political investigation at the 
asylum" and asserted that anyone who intimated otherwise "is a 
dirty, infamous, and slanderous liar." The "political conspirators," 
he said, "with a stacked committee, and the state resources at their 
command," worked day and night for months to establish something 
against him. In the end, however, they "had to admit their failure 
so to do."s6 
84Natchez News Democrat, Feb. 12, 1918; Jackson Daily News, quoted in Macon 
Beacon, Feb. 22, 1918. 
85Mississippi, House Journal, 1918, pp. 645-49; Senate Journal, 1918, p. 557; 
letter of Representative E. D. Cavette of Noxubee to Editor, Macon Beacon, pub-
lished in Beacon, Mar. 1, 1918. 
86Vicksburg Herald, July 30, 1919. 
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Thus ended the most scandalous of the many charges against 
Bilbo while he was governor. There was nothing in the nature of 
the affair that could redound to his political prestige. All he could 
do was defend himseH from the innuendoes that he himseH was a 
participant in the orgies that were alleged to have been held at the 
asylum. He could not assert, as he had in other affairs, that he was 
performing a patriotic duty, seeking to entrap those who would 
prostitute the interests of the people. Further, he was placed in a 
disadvantageous position by his staunch loyalty to Butler whose 
notorious misconduct seems to have been well established and gen-
erally believed. In the end Bilbo had been forced to surrender 
ignominously. «How the mighty have fallen," said the Beacon, when 
his message was sent to the house in accord with the Johnson reso-
lution.87 
Bilbo's last legislative message, in January, 1920, caned for a 
budget of over $20,000,000, almost double the previous one, neces-
sitating an increase in the state levy to seven and a haH mills. The 
largest increases went to education and to eleemosynary institu-
tions. Specifically the message called for enlargement of the Indus-
trial Training School at Columbus; establishment of a school for 
the crippled and feeble-minded; more liberal appropriations for the 
Board of Health; enlargement of all state charity hospitals and more 
liberal appropriations for them; creation of new hospitals in the 
eastern, northern, and Delta sections; a more liberal appropriation 
for the tuberculosis sanitorium, which had been compelled to tum 
away a thousand patients during the year; appropriations for the 
common schools large enough to insure better pay for teachers, and 
other improvements in the system; retention of the Board of Par-
dons and the State Tax Commission; laws to conserve timber and to 
provide reforestation; increased salaries for state officials; abolition 
of the Prison Board and the vesting of entire control in the super-
intendent; a law requiring candidates for office to file sworn state-
ments of campaign expenses two weeks before election; the estab-
lishment of a state electric light plant to service the public buildings 
at Jackson; appropriations to offer educational opportunities for 
300,000 adult illiterates, the vast majority of whom were Negroes; 
creation of a sinking and insurance fund to replace state property 
B'TMacon Beacon, Mar. 1, 1918. 
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destroyed by fire and storm; sale of the governor's mansion and pro-
vision for a simpler home for the governor; floating of a $25,000,000 
bond issue to build a system of modem highways touching every 
county of the state and a $5,000,000 bond issue for new buildings 
for colleges and eleemosynary institutions.3S 
The message denounced those who opposed the League of N a-
tions, "which is built upon the tears and blood of the teeming mil-
lions who died for the sake of humanity." It urged the dedication 
and consecration of the League to "the peace of the world, the 
brotherhood of mankind, and the freedom of the people of the 
earth." It denounced war profiteers and "money lords," who "would 
coin the tears and heartaches of those who gave their loved ones in 
the supreme sacrifice into filthy dollars to fill their yawning coffers 
that they might continue to live in luxurious ease."89 
Although Bilbo's term of office expired, the administration that 
succeeded him-Lee Russell's-had been hand-picked by him and 
promoted his program. The "high pressure," or progressive, senti-
ment was overwhelming in the legislature, and the "low pressure" 
members submittted gracefully. Final appropriations totaled 
$18,600,000, and the hospital bond issues requested by Bilbo were 
passed. The need for the appropriations seems to have been recog-
nized even by Bilbo's worst enemies. The arch-conservative and 
aging J. S. McNeily, still at the helm of the Vicksburg Herald, called 
the legislature, after its adjournment, "the most progressive . . . in 
twenty-five years."40 
Upon retiring from office Bilbo could pOint with pride to several 
notable improvements which he had promoted in the state's affairs. 
He claimed and it was admitted by his enemies that he had con-
tributed greatly to: the establishment of the State Tax Commission, 
adding $300,000,000 of property to the tax rolls; the establishment 
of a new state tubercular sanitorium; the erection of a state charity 
hospital at Laurel and provision for three additional ones; a state-
wide dipping law for the eradication of cattle ticks, and a hog 
vaccination law for the elimination of cholera; the creation of a state 
highway commission with projected plans for a network of modem 
roads; creation of a Board of Pardons which in four years had re-
8SMississippi, House Journal, 1920, pp. 38-72. 
89Ibfd., 33-35. 
40Vicksburg Herald, Apr. 8, 1920; MfssJss:lppf, Law, 1920, Chaps. I-XC, 1-95. 
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duced pardons from 2,200 to 800; passage of a uniform negotiable 
instrument act; abolition of the fee system in county offices; creation 
of a state Board of Legal Examiners; enactment of a blue sky law to 
prevent the marketing of worthless stocks; establishment of two 
lime-crushing plants where farmers could get crushed limestone at 
cost; enactment of an antilobbying law; restoration of the old capi-
tol; and the abolition of public hangings.41 
A month before his term expired the Clarion, which had been 
one of Bilbo's greatest critics, protested against a suggested disposal 
of future offices which did not include Bilbo. Admitting that it had 
"sometimes disagreed" with the governor and was not then in his 
"private counsels," it argued "in the name of justice . . . against the 
side-tracking of Bilbo in this manner. He has done the state some 
service and should not be thrown into the discard in the days of 
his young manhood."42 Such is the consistency of politics. 
41Mississippi, Laws, 1916, Chaps. XCVIII, CVIII, CLXVII, CLXVIII, CV1, 
CCXLlV, CII, CVII, XCVII, CXII, CV, CCXVIII; ibid., 1918, Chap. CCXLIII; Mis-
sissippi, House Journal, 1920, pp. 36-38; Vicksburg Herald, Jan. 8, 1920; Jackso'l 
Clarion-Ledger, Jan 8, 1920. 
42Jackson Clarion-Ledger, quoted in Vardaman's Weekly, Dec. 4, 1919. 
CHAPTER XXI 
THE FACTION DIVIDES 
WHEN Vardaman jOined John Sharp Williams in the Senate in 
1913 there were signs that a truce might be reached between 
the two senators, 1 but this went aground on the rocks of federal 
patronage and government policy. Under an old patronage agree-
ment representatives were to name, with certain exceptions, post-
masters in their districts, while senators had the allotment of judicial 
and treasury officials. Vardaman and Williams at first could not 
come to terms on a division of their share, but eventually an ar-
rangement was made whereby Vardaman was to have the naming 
of the marshals and their deputies, while Williams was to name the 
attorneys and their assistants.2 
For a time this worked well, but within two years Williams was 
complaining that terms of the agreements were not being complied 
with. Vardaman, he claimed, seemed to be getting a slice of the 
postal patronage pie; for postmasters were being appointed who 
were "the strongest supporters of Senator Vardaman." Williams 
himseH seems not to have been observing the agreement rigidly; for 
the basis of his complaint was that the Vardaman postmasters "put 
out my friends and put in friends of the opposite political faction." 
Obviously some arrangement had been made between each of the 
senators and those congressmen friendly to him on a division of 
these spoils. But Williams complained that Vardaman was hitting 
below the belt in another respect. Williams and his associated con-
gressmen were put "in the fiery furnace" by the Vardamanites 
through "campaign lies" charging they had "retained a nigger post-
master at Muldrow ... and refused to give the office to a white 
man." The facts of the case were, wrote Congressman E. S. Candler 
to Williams, that the Negro had received the office by default since 
no white man lived in the locality. Subsequently a white man 
moved to the community and sought the job, but in the meantime 
lThe Vicksburg Post and the Magnolia Gazette, both Vardaman papers, recom-
mended in the spring of 1913 that T. V. Session, a Vardaman supporter, not oppose 
Williams in the contest for Williams' successor in 1916. Quoted in Jackson Clarion-
Ledger, Apr. 10, 1913. 
2J. S. Williams to Gilbert J. Wood, Jan. 14, 1916; Williams to Wood, Jan. 14, 
1916; Williams to President Wilson, Oct. 8, 1915, Williams Papers. 
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the Negro had been placed under civil service and could not be re-
moved without cause. While Candler was seeking a "cause" for the 
Negro's removal he urged Williams to get the postmaster-general 
to write letters to their constituents explaining that they were not 
responsible for the Negro's appointment or retention. <1 hope to 
get the nigger out," wrote Candler, «and give the place to the white 
man."s The plight of the Mississippi Negro can be appreciated 
when it is realized that Candler and Williams were leaders of the 
faction denouncing Vardaman's racial program. 
Williams objected, too, to Vardaman's manner of exercising his 
<1egitimate" patronage. Although under the agreement each senator 
had the exclusive right to name certain officials, political etiquette 
called for them to appoint no one who was "personally obnoxious" to 
the other. Vardaman, he said, was disregarding this propriety and 
was appointing marshals "who have been without exception . . . 
shouting for Bilbo and working for him against me." Finally, when 
Williams' choice for the assistant district attomeyship at Jackson 
was turned down and a Vardaman supporter given the place, Wil-
liams could bear no more. He would, he wrote the President, retire 
from politics at the end of his term. He would retire at once, he 
said, save for the fact that he had "served the public so long and 
myself so badly that I need the salary,"4 
Before this incident occurred Williams and Vardaman had 
reached the point of open rupture. The occasion was precipitated 
by a newspaper interview in which Vardaman denounced as "pusi-
lanimous [sic]" and "treacherous" all who voted for repeal of the 
clause of the Panama Canal Act exempting coastwise steamers from 
the payment of canal tolls. Shortly afterward, he denied in the 
Senate that he had ever "uttered an unkind word" about any of his 
colleagues. Williams then arose and read the account of the inter-
view. Thereafter Vardaman refused to speak to Williams, and it 
was reported that he had said he would "see to it" that Williams was 
not re-elected.5 
No doubt Vardaman did toy with the idea of replacing Williams 
SH. C. Metzger and J. A. Gibson to Williams, Jan. 22, 1915; Williams to Albert 
S. Burleson, Apr. 26, 29, 1915; E. S. Candler to Williams, Aug. 9, 1916, ibid. 
4Williams to President Wilson, Aug. 2, 11, Oct. 8, 1915; President Wilson to 
Williams, Aug. 17, 1915, ibid. 
5Williams to W. H. Maybin, Jan. 11, 1915, ibid. 
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with one of his own faction, As early as the summer of 1914 rumors 
that he had given the nod to state Senator Hebron had Williams' 
friends worried and Williams resigned to his defeat, Later there 
was open speculation that Vardaman might run Bilbo or Swep 
Taylor against Williams,6 But Hebron's kite would not Hy, By the 
fall of 1914 Williams was being told by his friends that "things were 
looking mighty good for you" and that "most everyone looks upon 
Hebron's race against you as a joke," More reassuring still, men 
associated with Vardaman's organization were writing Williams as-
suring him of their support, One, who claimed to have "followed the 
political fortunes" of Vardaman "with a loyalty that never once 
failed or faltered," wrote to Williams that he would not follow Var-
daman "if it is his purpose , , , to oppose your re-election," "Father 
and I have always supported him [Vardaman] ," wrote another, but 
"We will support Senator Williams in 1916," "I hear on all sides, 
wherever I go," wrote Congressman Humphreys, "that many if not 
most of the Vardaman men throughout the Delta are strong for 
yoU,"7 
Perhaps some explanation of this can be found in Williams' 
changed attitude toward Bilbo, He wrote early in 1916 that he and 
Bilbo had not "up to date belonged to the same political faction in 
Mississippi," Yet, he wrote five months before, "There are some 
very violent Bilbo men that are almost equally violent Williams 
men," He could not explain how it had come about, but it seemed 
to be "undoubtedly true and it seems to be also beyond dispute that 
there are a very great number of them," Williams' opinion of Bilbo 
had been "rather emphatically uttered in the Percy campaign," yet 
he remained strangely quiet in the gubernatorial race of 1915, He 
would not, he said at that time, take the stump "in behalf of or 
against anybody," He would content himself with aiding candidates 
for minor office "on the dead quiet, of course," he wrote, and with 
"taking a turn at the county committees," By May, 1915, he was 
told by a competent observer that he was "stronger today than you 
have ever been" and that all he had to do to win was to "keep out 
6John M. Dabney to Williams, July 29, 1914; Williams to Dabney, Aug. 5, 1914, 
ibid.; Jackson Clarion-Ledg6f', Apr. 11, Aug. 8, 1915. 
7G. L. Donald to Williams, Nov, 13, 1914; Maybin to Williams, Jan. 5, 1915; 
B. Lampton Crawford to Percy Quin, Oct. 2, 1915; B. G. Humphreys to Williams, 
May 8, 1915, Williams Papers. 
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of the factional fight that is embroiling the state." After Bilbo's 
nomination he was assured that "Bilbo has sense enough to see that 
the thing for him to do is to back yOU ... next year, and then go 
against Vardaman next time."S 
One further obstacle in the person of former Governor Earl 
Brewer still stood in Williams' path. At Brewer's inaugural in 1912, 
he had promised a friend of Williams that he would not be a can-
didate against Williams in 1916. A few months later, however, 
Brewer <'had weakened." If the «Bilbo crowd" attacked him, he 
said, he might «need election to the Senate to show the world he 
was not what [they] said he was." <'It is as plain as day to me," 
wrote a friend to Williams in the spring of 1915, «that Brewer is 
right . . . now moving heaven and earth to get your place." His 
rout a few months later at the hands of Bilbo may have changed 
Brewer's mind. At any rate Brewer was not a candidate for Wil-
liams' seat. «I am for John Sharp Williams," he wrote the following 
spring, «for anything from President down."9 It is doubtful if either 
his support or opposition at that time was a factor to weigh with any 
candidate for office in Mississippi. 
Six months before the election all opposition had been swept 
aside and the coast was clear. «In my opinion," wrote Williams, «all 
I have got to do . . . is to ask for renomination and reelection and 
get it." But Williams forgot to announce his candidacy officially, 
and on the eve of the deadline it was "whispered around" that the 
state executive committee would declare Hebron the nominee by 
default. Learning of this, Williams hastily filed notice of his can-
didacy and forwarded his checks to the various county chairmen for 
his assessments.10 
At the last minute Hebron withdrew and Williams went into the 
primary unopposed. The vote, in contrast to recent ones, was light. 
8Williams to Robert R. Read, Feb. 29, 1916; Williams to V. P. Whitaker, Sept. 
22, 1915; Williams to B. P. Harrison, May 13, 1915; Williams to Humphreys, May 
22, 1915; Sargeant Prentiss Knut to Williams, Nov. 17, 1915; Harrison to Williams, 
May 13, 1915; Williams to Harrison, May 21, 1915; Knut to Williams, Nov. 17, 
1915, ibid. 
9Knut to Williams, May 8, 1915; Earl Brewer to Humphreys, June 20, 1916, 
Ibid. 
lOWilliams to President Wilson, Feb. 7, 1916; O. F. Lawrence to Williams, July 
7, 1916; Williams to Joseph E. Norwood, July 13, 1916; Williams to Robert Lewis, 
July 13, 1916, ibid. 
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"Not more than half the voters of the state, or perhaps not more than 
a third," said the Clarion, "attended ... and some ... forgot to fill 
out their ticket."ll 
Williams was "intensely gratified" over his unopposed election. 
He had not, he boasted, made "the slightest effort to be re-nomi-
nated." He had not, he said, published "for distribution a single 
speech," nor had he written "a single letter to a single man to ask 
his support." He did not feel that he owed the unanimity of his 
election "to the magnanimity of my enemies." There was quite a 
combined effort, he said, to defeat him, but it had "gone to pieces. 
They couldn't get any votes behind it." His enemies would, he said, 
"have fought if they had dared." He was chiefly glad he had won 
"because it kept some fellow of a different ilk, belonging to that 
crowd I don't like ... from winning out." He was growing tired of 
the "drudgery" and "insincerities" of politics and was determined to 
retire at the end of his new term. Perhaps, too, his pecuniary con-
dition had improved. He would not have run in 1916, he said, if 
anybody had been mentioned to succeed him "that I thought could 
have worthily represented the state of Lamar, George, and Walthall, 
and Jefferson Davis."12 
The next state-wide election would be in 1918 to choose a suc-
cessor to Vardaman, and interest began to center on that. Varda-
man seems to have struck the zenith of his political influence in the 
period from 1911 to 1915. Thereafter, his course in national politics 
together with new factional alignments in Mississippi produced a 
change and his fortunes went into decline. Long before the election 
of 1918 there was grave doubt that he could be re-elected. 
Early in his senatorial career Vardaman jOined the liberal bloc 
headed by Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin and George W. 
Norris of Nebraska. Along with them he supported the proposed 
Child Labor Amendment, the Underwood Tariff, the Income Tax 
Amendment, and voted for confirmation of Louis D. Brandeis as 
an associate justice of the Supreme Court. For these and other 
llJackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 15, 17, 1916. 
12Williams to Edward H. Woods, Aug. 14, 1916; Williams to John Richards, 
Feb. 15, 1917; Williams to Mrs. Lizette McF. Blakemore, Aug. 25, 1916; Williams 
to D. D. Colcock, Jan. 12, 1917; Williams to C. J. Money, Feb. 13, 1917, Williams 
Papers; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Dec. 21, 1916, Aug. 4, 1917. 
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stands Vardaman drew generous praise from the Mississippi press.13 
This praise was tempered, however, with hostile attacks. When he 
spoke in the Senate in complimentary terms of the old Populist 
program,14 and when Tom Watson, "the notorious Georgia Popu-
list," approved his stand on the Panama Canal tolls question, he was 
denounced as a Populist. "James K. Vardaman," said the Daily 
News, "is not . . . [and] never has been a Democrat." When he 
failed to make the national headlines four months after going to 
Washington, the Macon Beacon attributed it to the "inferiority" 
which made him incapable of dealing with the "brilliant" men there. 
"As the barnyard cock's influence and prowess is greatest when he 
crows upon his own dunghill," said the Beacon, "so is that of the 
White Chief at its maximum ... when indulging demogogic appeals 
to mislead the masses of his own state."15 
Vardaman early incurred the enmity of the Wilson administra-
tion through his independent stand on the Income Tax, the Panama 
Canal Tolls Bill, and the Ship Purchase Bill. He and his liberal bloc 
felt that the income tax rates proposed by the administration were 
not high enough. Vardaman refused to be bound to the adminis-
tration proposal by the party caucus, and he and his colleagues suc-
ceeded in materially increasing the rates.16 When President Wilson, 
after his inauguration, reversed his campaign pledge and urged 
Congress to repeal the law exempting coastal trading ships from 
paying the canal tolls, Vardaman refused to go along with the Senate 
majority. He denounced Wilson for repudiating his campaign com-
mitments and surrendering to British demands.17 After the out-
break of the World War the administration urged Congress to em-
power it to purchase the German ships interned in American ports. 
1SCongressional Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 14315, 14318, 14517, 14588, 14589, 
14593, 16154, 16170; ibid., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 12138, 12220; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 
June 16, Dec. 22, 1916; Hattiesburg News, Jan. 16, 1916; Jackson Issue, Apr. 25, 
1918; Scott County News, quoted in Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 14, 1915; Memphis Com-
mercial Appeal, quoted in Jackson I88U6, July 25, 1918. 
14Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 2159. 
15Jackson Daily News, May 1, 1914; Macon Beacon, July 10, 1914. 
16Wiley R. Huddleston, "The Senatorial Career of James Kimble Vardaman, 
MissisSippi's 'White Chief" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State UniverSity, 1935), 52-76. 
17Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 8823, 8824, 9526, 9723-26, 10160, 
10170, 10171, 10235-40; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 14, 1914. 
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Vardaman opposed this as a government subsidy to the "shipping 
trust."18 
But it was Vardaman's opposition to the administration's general 
policy through the period of neutrality-private and government 
loans to Allied nations, preparedness, the arming of merchant ves-
sels, the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany, and fin-
ally the declaration of war itself-which brought a complete rupture 
between him and the administration, and which helped to end his 
political career. 19 Throughout the period of neutrality Vardaman 
expressed his personal sympathy with the Allied cause. He main-
tained, however, that American interests could only be served by 
maintaining "an attitude of perfect neutrality,"20 and this, he 
charged, the administration was not dOing. He approved Secretary 
of State William J. Bryan's stand in resigning in protest against the 
dispatch of the Lusitania note in the summer of 1915. He toured 
the country that fall, urging peace, talking against preparedness, 
and charging that the administration was partial to the Allies. He 
became one of "the little group of wilful men" who, the President 
charged, were responsible for rendering the United States "helpless 
and contemptible before the world."21 "I will not," said Vardaman, 
"delegate to the President ... the power to execute a trust ... when 
I believe the delegation of such a trust . . . would in all probability 
bring on war." Mter the declaration of war he opposed some of 
the administration policies for waging it, such as the draft and the 
Food Control Bill.22 
Vardaman could not have been unaware that his opposition to 
the administration both before and after the war declaration was 
losing him friends in Mississippi. His continuation of his opposition 
18Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 1921, 1922, 1935, 1937; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 14, 1915. 
19Congressional Record, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1311,3478-80,3484,3486,3846,4105, 
5417, 5570, 5571; ibid., 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 2734, 4777; ibid., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 
5, 6; Huddleston, "James K. Vardaman," 76-83; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 4, Nov. 
13, 1915, July 20, Aug. 11, 1916, Feb. 8, Mar. 3, 6, 7, Apr. 26, 27, 29, 1917. 
2oColumbus Dispatch, Sept. 29, 1915. 
21Ibid., Sept. 29, 1915, Mar. 6, 7, 1917; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 4, Nov. 
13, 1915. 
22Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 5-6, 933, 1000, 1085, 1174, 1312-14, 
1320-22, 1464, 1471, 1483, 1494, 2645-47, 2986, 3039, 3777, 3919-22, 3934, 4064, 
4066-67, 4070, 4216, 4453-54, 4474, 4477-78, 4591, 4593-94, 4831, 44838, 4937 
4955,5261. 
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despite this seems to belie the charge of demagoguery, at least in 
this instance. A policy of benevolent neutrality toward the Allies 
in the early stages of the war and an all-out backing of the admin-
istration in its war policies after the United States had entered were 
popular in Mississippi, and Vardaman knew it. On the eve of the 
declaration of war Judge Winston Houston of Aberdeen made a 
special trip to Washington to urge Vardaman to vote for the war 
resolution. Vardaman acknowledged, according to Houston, that 
his failure to do so would probably end his political career. Never-
theless, he said, he could not conscientiously vote for the declara-
tion.23 A somewhat similar mission was undertaken shortly there-
after by a group of Vardaman's friends. This time the meeting was 
in the Roosevelt Hotel in New Orleans, where Vardaman had gone 
to speak. A graphic account of the interview was later given by 
one of the participants. 
We informed Senator Vardaman of the change in sentiment in Mis-
sissippi from peace to war ... and told him that we felt his attitude would 
cost him his seat in the Senate. 
He replied that his position on the war was the result of extensive 
investigation, great study and mature deliberation, and that he would 
not in conscience change it and that his loss of his seat in the United 
States Senate was nothing as compared with the loss of lives and liberty 
and opportunities which would follow such a war. 
We reminded him that if he lost his seat in the Senate that his great 
work on the negro question would not be carried on. He walked over t~ 
the window ... and stood there a few minutes silently, with his hands 
behind his back, and turning came over to us and said: "1 appreciate 
your coming down here to see me today. Some one else will carry on my 
work if 1 am defeated. 1 have an abiding faith in the people of the 
United States doing the right thing when they have an opportunity to 
think clearly. Even if it should cost me my life 1 cannot do what you now 
think you want me to do."24 
Evidence that Vardaman was losing political control was ap-
pearing before this. In 1915 it had been freely admitted by the op-
position that he could name any candidate for office in Mississippi. 
Yet in a special congressional election in January, 1916, his candi-
28Statement of A. S. Coody of Jackson, Mississippi, to author, Aug. 17, 1946. 
Coody said Houston told him the story. 
24Watkins, Address, May 17, 1936, p. 27, in Mississippi Department of Archives 
and History. 
THE FACTION DIVIDES 281 
date, J. H. Joyner, was defeated by Judge Webb Venable, a friend 
of Williams.25 Reports that the state executive committee had been 
wrested from Vardaman's control were substantiated when a con-
test developed over the chairmanship of the 1916 state Democratic 
convention. The Vardaman faction was said to be urging Speaker 
Conner for the chair, but the opposition was backing Congressman 
Pat Harrison. A "compromise" had to be made. Conner was elected 
temporary chairman, but Harrison received the permanent chair-
manship. In the fourth district congressional primary a few months 
later, T. U. Sisson, an anti-Vardaman candidate, defeated W. C. 
Ward, the son of Dr. B. F. Ward, "the High Priest of the cult of Var-
daman." Sisson carried every county by a large majority.26 
When Vardaman addressed the state legislature in the fall of 
1917, it was reported in the Jackson press that he received a "chilly 
reception." The following day the legislature adopted a resolution 
sternly censuring the press for saying so. It was noted, however, 
that the legislature also adopted a resolution pledging loyalty to the 
federal government, which nine Vardaman legislators opposed. 
"No doubt," said the Daily News, "the Junior Senator is beginning 
to be convinced that his official actions do not meet with the ap-
proval of the people of Mississippi."27 
He was attacked on all sides. Some wanted to read him out of 
the party. Frequently he was referred to as "Herr Von Vardaman," 
an "arch traitor and super demagogue," and "the Kaiser's Newest 
Friend." When he voted against entry into the war, the Macon 
Beacon published a front-page article entitled "Vardaman Earning 
the Kaiser's Iron Cross." When he voted against conscription the 
Clarion called him "a Kaiser-loving betrayer of the American 
people" and said it placed him "in the army of slackers." It urged 
the Senate to expel him.28 
25Marcus D. Herring to Williams, Jan. 14, 1916, Williams Papers; Yazoo Sentinel, 
Jan. 20, 1916. 
26Jackson Clarion-Ledger, May 1, 18, 19, June 8, 1916; Macon Beacon, Aug. 
25, 1916. 
27Mississippi, House Journal, 1917, pp. 222-23; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 
4, 13, 1917; Jackson Daily News, Oct. 13, 1917. 
28Yazoo Sentinel, Feb. 18, 1914; Macon Beacon, Feb. 5, Mar. 5, 1915, Aug. 17, 
1917; Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 15, 1917; Jackson Daily News, Aug. 4, 1917; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 14, Oct. 3, 1917. 
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Nor did such attacks come only from his old enemies. Many of 
them were from former friends and supporters. The Newton Record, 
Mayerville Spectator, Woodville Republican, Biloxi Herald, and 
many other papers openly repudiated him. The Herald wanted to 
know what Mississippi had done that she should be plagued with a 
man of his type. The Republican, after his vote against conscrip-
tion, said he had "gone the limit." J. G. Spenser of Port Gibson, 
claiming to have been a loyal Vardaman supporter for twenty years, 
announced that he had parted company with him.29 In vain did 
Vardaman point out the inconsistent motives given for American 
entry into the war. First, he said, it was to protect American rights 
on the seas; next it was a war "to make the world safe for democ-
racy"; finally it was urged that if we did not fight Germany then we 
would have to do so later alone and when she was much stronger. 
The real reason, he thought, was "interference on the part of Ger-
many with commerce between New York and London." Every 
statement he made was twisted by his enemies and given an un-
patriotic interpretation which his statement had not warranted. 
John Sharp Williams charged th~t his statements "graze the very 
edge of treason" and reported that there was "almost universal con-
demnation" of his course in Mississippi.30 
To be sure not all of Vardaman's old friends left him, and a few 
new ones even rallied to his support.31 These were but feeble props 
to bolster him against the withering attacks launched upon him by 
the overwhelming majority of the Mississippi press. 
Vardaman's position was further embarrassed by a coolness that 
had developed between him and Bilbo. The reasons for this change 
in their relations are as complex as the personalities of the two men. 
In general they both had the support of the lower-level economic 
classes, but it is probably true that the Vardaman people "believed 
they were a higher grade party than the Bilbo party."32 Too, a sort 
29Biloxi Herald, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledger, July 25, 1917; Newton 
Record, Woodville Republican, and Mayersville Spectator, quoted in Natchez News 
Democrat, Aug. 19, 21, 1917; Jackson Daily News, Nov. 5, 1917. 
30Vicksburg Herald, quoted in Macon Beacon, Aug. 17, 1917; Issac D. Wall 
to Williams, Mar. 5, 1917; Williams to R. S. Buck, Mar. 10, 1917; Williams to 
President Wilson, Aug. 16, 1917, Williams Papers. 
81Scott County News, Aug. 14, 1917; Jackson Issue, Nov. 29, 1917; Hattiesburg 
News, Aug. 25, 1917, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
I2Ro\\land, History of Mississippi, II, 346. 
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of jealousy seemed to grow between them after the election of 1911 
over who had contributed most to the success of the other. By the 
summer of 1915 the breach had grown to such an extent that there 
were rumors that Bilbo would oppose Vardaman for the Senate seat 
in 1918.38 
The opposition did what it could to fan the flames. During 
Bilbo's administration some Negro guards were employed at the 
state penitentiary farms. On one occasion it was reported that they 
had cursed and whipped some white prisoners. This was denounced 
by the opposition, who pointed out that such conditions could not 
have existed under Vardaman. "No negro guards were allowed to 
serve on our state farms . . . during the Vardaman administration," 
they said.34-
Supporters of both Vardaman and Bilbo suspected that the op-
position was attempting to split their faction. Any talk of pitting 
Bilbo against Vardaman, said the Columbus Dispatch, was a plot of 
the eneInies of both "to stake these gentlemen against each other in 
a race, knOwing that one or the other of them would be eliminated." 
But the Dispatch believed there was even "a deeper laid conspiracy." 
The plan, it thought, was to divide the Vardaman-Bilbo forces, "and 
then enter a third man and defeat them both."35 The Tupelo Herald 
agreed with the Dispatch's diagnosis. "There can be no doubt," it 
said, "that the enemies of Vardaman and Bilbo are at work to create 
a split between the two leaders." "They are seeking to bring this 
about," it added, "by feeding the vanity of Bilbo in assuring him 
that he can defeat Senator Vardaman for the Senate." Their only 
object, it warned, was to "split the dominant faction in Mississippi 
politics and thus secure control of the state themselves." Both the 
Dispatch and the Herald dismissed the possibility of the scheme 
succeeding. Neither did much to assuage Bilbo's vanity. One 
ascribed his success to Vardaman's support; the other said he had 
"no more chance of beating Senator Vardaman than he has of being 
elected Sultan of Turkey."36 The Yazoo Sentinel claimed to have it 
88Macon Beacon, July 10, 1914; Columbus Dispatch, May 10, 1916, in Varda-
man scrapbook; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 25, 1915. 
84Laurel Times, May 11, 1916, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
85Columbus Dispatch, May 10, 1916, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
86Tupelo Herald, May 20, 1916, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
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direct from "a leading member of the anti-Vardaman-Bilbo faction" 
that such was their scheme.87 
Whether this was true or not it was evident that the two leaders 
were not as close as they had formerly been. When Bilbo went to 
Washington it was remarked that he was seen much with Congress-
man Pat Harrison and little with Senator Vardaman. Mter Amer-
ica's entry into the war Bilbo was an enthusiastic supporter of the 
Wilson administration's policies, and the cleavage seemed more pro-
nounced. By the summer of 1917 it was "believed by many that the 
erstwhile good friends and political comrades in arms Vardaman 
and Bilbo, are now separated by an impassable gulf."38 
In August there was a "current rumor" that an alliance had been 
made between Harrison, Bilbo, and Russell. According to this 
rumor Bilbo was to be a candidate for Congress in Harrison's dis-
trict, the sixth. He was to have Harrison's support in exchange for 
his support of Harrison for the Senate. Russell was to receive the 
support of both for the governorship. He, it was thought, could give 
Harrison much aid in north Mississippi, where he lived.39 
On August 23 Harrison announced his candidacy at the Neshoba 
County Fair. His platform was one of "Loyalty to the President and 
to the country." He called on the spirits of Washington and John 
Paul Jones to inspire America. He attacked Vardaman's lack of pa-
triotism and charged him with "giving aid and comfort to the ene-
mies of the government." Seated on the platform giving "aid and 
comfort" to him was the incongruous trio, Bilbo, Brewer, and Fred 
Sullens.40 The incongruity did not pass unnoticed. "What potent 
and irresistible influence," asked the Magnolia Gazette, <Drought 
these ... heretofore fiercely antagonistic Mississippi politicians into 
such delightful harmony?" The spectacle of «the lion and the lamb 
lying down . . . placidly on the . . . hustings" drove it to sarcastic 
rhapsodies. «Blessed are the peacemakers," it said, «_for to them, 
peradventure, shall be given the dispensation of federal patronage 
in Mississippi." The Calhoun Monitor remarked, too, on the «strange 
37Yazoo Sentinel, quoted in Jackson Clarion-Ledg61', June 6, 1916. 
38Jackson Clarion-Ledg61', Sept. 5, 1916, July 1, Aug. 2, 1917. 
89Ibid., Aug. 2, 16, 1917, quoting New Orleans Times-Picayune and Magnolia 
Gazette; Ripley South61'n Sentinel, Aug. 17, 1917; Senatobia Democrat, Aug. 16, 
1917; Magnolia Gazette, Aug. 25, 1917, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
4oJackson Clarion-Ledg61', Aug. 24, 1917; Vicksburg Post, Aug. 25, 1917, in 
Vardaman scrapbook. 
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bedfellows," and the Kemper Herald-Star was outraged. "The new 
firm is now styled Brewer, Bilbo, Fred Sullens, Pat Harrison & Com-
pany," it said. It predicted that the voters would make short shrift of 
"that bunch of rotten political shysters." The McComb City Journal 
blamed the alliance on Bilbo. He, it said, had pushed Harrison into 
the race so that when the time came for selecting a successor to Wil-
liams, he would have Vardaman, Harrison, and Williams all out of 
the way. "Pretty smooth!" was its laconic conclusion.41 
Former Governor Noel announced also as a candidate for Var-
daman's seat. This was seen by some as a complicating factor for 
Harrison, as any votes Noel would get would supposedly detract 
from his. Since Bilbo had already announced for Harrison's seat in 
Congress, retreat for Harrison was cut off in that direction. He must 
go on. It soon became apparent, however, that Noel would not be 
much of a factor.42 
Harrison challenged Vardaman to joint debates, but Vardaman 
disregarded the challenge as he had those of previous opponents. 
Vardaman remained in Washington until shortly before the election. 
Most of his campaign was waged through that portion of the press 
which remained loyal to him. Harrison toured the state in early 
spring, 1918, for the alleged purpose of promoting war bond sales. 
He was able to intersperse his patriotic with political speeches. He 
attacked Vardaman's record of "consistent" opposition to President 
Wilson. He charged that in his opposition to the Ship Purchase Bill, 
Vardaman had actually "sold out" to the shipping interests, who, 
Harrison said, opposed the bill. "Many a bottle of champagne was 
opened ... by the shipping trust" the night before the final vote, he 
charged.4s Most of his attack was centered on the charge of Varda-
man's "disloyalty." Throughout the spring and summer of 1918 the 
Harrison press was filled with editorials and news stories impugning 
Vardaman's patriotism. He was denounced as "pro-German" and 
"anti-Wilson." Again and again it was pOinted out that he had op-
posed the bill for arming merchant ships, the war resolution, the con-
41Magnolia Gazette, Aug. 29, 1917; Calhoun Monitor, Aug. 30, 1917; Kemper 
Herald-Star, Aug. 24, 1917; McComb City Journal, n. d., in Vardaman scrapbook. 
42Vicksburg Post, Aug. 22, 25, 1917; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 12, 16, 1917; 
Aberdeen Weekly, n. d., in Vardaman scrapbook. 
4SEupora Progress-Warden, July 25, 1918, in Vardaman scrapbook; Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger, Nov. 29, 1917. 
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scription bill, and the espionage bill. His record, the papers said, was 
«indefensible," and his re-election would be an «indictment" of the 
«character and patriotism of Mississippi."44 
Vardaman's statements were shaded and twisted to give them an 
unpatriotic tenor. When he spoke at Meridian shortly before the 
election, a man arose in the audience and propounded to him a series 
of questions the answers to which might clarify his position. Varda-
man replied by reading from the Congressional Record in an attempt 
to prove that he was misquoted. One of the accusations, often re-
peated, was that he had said the United States by declaring war was 
«stabbing Germany in the back." Vardaman denied that he had 
made such a statement. The expression, he admitted, had been used 
by him, but only in an allegOrical sense. He was trying, he said, to 
show the inconsistency of the administration's neutrality policy and 
was only illustrating what others might say. But his explanation 
failed to satisfy his enemies. They continued their attack and pub-
lished statements of former Vardaman supporters who said they did 
not want «a senator who believes we are stabbing Germany in the 
back while England and France have her down." When Mississippi 
citizens were arrested for draft-dodging or for disloyalty, the opposi-
tion was quick to charge that they were Vardaman supporters. They 
did this too quickly on one occasion. They charged that such a citi-
zen of Greenville was a Vardaman man but a Vardaman paper ob-
tained and published a statement from him that he intended to vote 
for Noe1.45 
When Harrison first announced, Vardaman had attempted to 
wither him with scorn. He called Harrison «a peculiar species of em-
bryOniC statesmen," «the spawn and product of the slime-covered 
pools of war," «the evolution from the human microbe which found 
its origin in the troubled womb of abnormality." This «insignificant 
creature," he said, was «incubating an ambition to serve his country, 
or rather himself, in the halls of state."46 By the follOwing spring, 
however, Vardaman had gone on the defensive, fighting for his po-
litical life. The small portion of the press which remained loyal to 
44Good examples are the Macon Beacon, Aug. 2, 9, 16, 1918; Vicksburg Herald, 
June 11, 23, 1918. 
45Woodville Republican, July 20, 1918, in Vardaman scrapbook; Macon Beacon, 
Aug. 9, 1918; Jackson Issue, Jan. 10, July 25, 1918. 
46Yazoo City Sentinel, Aug. 22, 1917, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
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him devoted issue after issue to a defense of his patriotism. His 
record as a volunteer in the Spanish-American War was broadcast. 
It was pointed out that he had, after war was declared on Germany, 
offered to resign and raise a regiment for the battlefield, but had 
been turned down. It was pointed out that he had two sons in the 
service. It was denied that there was any issue between him and the 
President. Harrison was attacked as an enemy of labor and for being 
backed by the same crowd which had backed Percy. The charge of 
disloyalty, Vardaman's friends said, was merely "part of a scheme 
worked out by his enemies to encompass his defeat." It was pOinted 
out that Harrison, although comparatively a young man, had made 
no motion to volunteer for service. Harrison was also criticized for 
leaving his post in Washington at such a critical time to mend his 
political fences in Mississippi,47 
Some attempt was made by Vardaman to draw the campaign into 
other issues. He charged that the opposition to him was sponsored 
by big business because of his curbing of their predatory "activities 
while he was governor, because of his part in having the income tax 
rates raised from three to seven per cent, and because of his exposure 
of excess profits and graft in the procurement of war contracts." He 
pointed out that he had supported the administration on the 
Woman's Suffrage Amendment, while Harrison had opposed it. But 
the Harrison forces would not be led astray. "The issue is clearcut," 
said the Macon Beacon. "No attempt to muddy the waters can avail. 
It is not a question of class against class. It is not a question of trusts 
against the people. . . . It is purely a question of whether or not 
Mississippians shall show by their votes that they are loyal to this 
government."48 
At a meeting of the state Democratic executive committee prior 
to the election it was apparent that Vardaman had completely lost 
control. The secretary of the committee was absent, and Chairman 
Mullins, a Vardaman supporter, attempted to appoint a temporary 
substitute for him. The anti-Vardaman members revolted and passed 
47Jackson Issue, spring and summer of 1918, especially July 4, 18, 25; Ripley 
Sentinel, quoted in Vicksburg Herald, July 28, 1911; Yazoo Sentinel, Mar. 30, 1918; 
Vicksburg Post, Aug. 30, 1917, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
48Jackson Issue, Aug. 15, 1918; Yazoo Sentinel, July 17, 1918; Brookhaven 
Leader, Jan. 16, 1918; Jackson Issue, July 25, 1918, in Vardaman scrapbook; Macon 
Beacon, Aug. 16, 1916. 
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a resolution by a vote of 13 to 9 depriving the chairman of appointive 
power. Judge Harmon Thompson, an anti-Vardamanite, was then 
elected acting secretary by the same vote. Judge Robert Mayes, a 
Vardaman man, offered what was called a "mild" resolution endors-
ing the Wilson administration. W. Calvin Wells, Harrison's cam-
paign manager, then offered a substitute resolution bitterly de-
nouncing Vardaman. The substitute was adopted.49 
Despite expressions of confidence by some of the Vardaman 
press, it was believed by both sides that the race would be close. 
The Columbus Dispatch, a Vardaman paper, admitted that Varda-
man had "lost strength in the cities" but hoped he had "gained 
votes in the country where he has always been strong." It refused 
to predict the outcome. 50 On the other hand, some of the opposition 
were feeling none too sanguine. "Vardaman has laid his last egg," 
wrote a friend to John Sharp Williams a year before the election. 
The people "are not speaking of the long haired man in very com-
plimentary terms," wrote another. Yet there was "no telling what 
those red-necks will do (east of the I. C.)." A month before the 
election Williams was worried and was urging the President to 
see "that we get a fair representation of the soldier vote." The 
"Williams-Pat Harrison men in Mississippi are nearly all in the 
army," he wrote. Their side was "in a pretty bad fix" because "the 
slackers and skulkers who are supporting the other side" had stayed 
at home.51 
An important factor in the election was a letter which the Presi-
dent wrote to M. S. McNeil, a Harrison backer. The letter was in 
answer to an inquiry of McNeil's about the President's attitude 
in the race. "If the voters ... should again choose him [Vardaman] 
to represent them," said Wilson, " ... I should be obliged to accept 
their action as a condemnation of my administration." This letter 
was blazed across the front pages of the anti-Vardaman papers 
throughout Mississippi. It brought forth renewed appeals from 
49Jackson News, quoted in Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 10, 1918. 
500xford Eagle, Feb. 14, 1918; McComb City Enterprise, Mar. 7, 1918; Yazoo 
Sentinel, July 20, 1918; Brookhaven Leader, Aug. 10, 1918, in Vardaman scrapbook; 
Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 18, 1918. 
51James E. Hall to Williams, Mar. 12, 1917; L. C. Johnson to Williams, Mar. 21, 
1917; Williams to President Wilson, June 24, 1918, Williams Papers. 
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them to the voters to "stand by" the President and to "remain loyal" 
to the government. It was denounced by Vardaman as "unwarranted 
interference" in state affairs by the President. It was, moreover, 
he said, unjust, since he had "supported the administration 99 
times where I have opposed it once."511 
In the election Harrison received 56,715 votes, Vardaman 
44,154, and Noel 6,780.58 The total was considerably lower than 
others in recent years, but that can probably be accounted for by 
the absence of so many men of voting age in the armed services. 
Harrison's majority over both Vardaman and Noel was almost 
6,000, and he was thus the winner in the first primary. It was re-
ported that the word had been passed down by the anti-Vardaman 
forces not only "to beat Vardaman but to drown all the pups," and 
defeated candidates for minor offices attributed their setbacks to 
their having been associated with Vardaman in the past.54 
The usual post-mortems were indulged in by observers when 
the election results were known. Friends of Vardaman seemed 
grief-stricken. They looked upon his defeat as a blow to democracy. 
He was, they said, .. the only true friend" and .. the ablest advocate" 
the people of Mississippi ever had. Most of them attributed his 
defeat to the charge of "disloyalty," although some attributed it to 
"the· splendid Harrison organization and the money they spent." 
Most of them denied that the "real wishes" of a "majority of the 
white voters" had been voiced. Percy Maer, editor of the Columbus 
Dispatch and a Vardaman supporter, thought his defeat due to 
his stubborn defense of his unpopular course. Had he admitted 
error, thought Maer, and prOInised to change, the people would 
have forgiven him.55 
The hostile Vicksburg Herald agreed with Maer's analysis. At 
a time when "conciliation and consideration for the sentiments 
and opinions . . . of his friends and former supporters was called 
for," it said, Vardaman "roamed and rampaged over the state," 
5l1Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 11, 1918; Macon Beacon, Aug. 16, 1918; Magnolia 
Gazette, Aug. 15, 1918, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
68Blennial Report of the Secretary of State to the Legislature, in MlBaf8slppI 
OfficIal and StaUsUcal 1f.eglster, 1920-24, p. S415. 
54Macon Beacon, Aug. 22, 1918. 
65Kosciusko Herald, Sept. 27, 1918; Ripley Sentinel, Dec. 12, 1918; Oxford 
Eagle, Aug. 22, 1918, in Vardaman scrapbook; Columbus Dispatch, quoted in 
Macon Beacon, Aug. 30, 1918. 
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denouncing his opposition, and giving the impression that he would 
"do it again" if the people should send him back to Washington. 
"No other man living or dead," said the Herald, "held a stronger 
hold on the state . . . and no other man was ever so trusted, and 
forgiven for offenses that would have blasted others." The ease 
with which he distanced "better and abler men in the competition 
for public favor," said Editor McNeily, "turned his shallow head 
and led to his undOing." All admitted that Wilson's letter had done 
much to effect Vardaman's defeat. Vardaman and the Brookhaven 
Leader thought it was the decisive factor. Up to the time of the 
publication of the letter, said the Leader, "Vardaman's success at 
the polls was a matter only of counting the votes." It was con-
vinced, it said, that "the issue made by President Wilson ... brought 
about the defeat of Mr. Vardaman." Vardaman was equally 
emphatic. He denied that Harrison's popularity had prevailed over 
him or that the voters believed him disloyal. "The controlling in-
fluence was Woodrow Wilson."58 
Undoubtedly both Vardaman's stubborn behavior and Wilson's 
letter were factors in Vardaman's undoing. Perhaps if Vardaman 
had been more conciliatory in his campaign, he might have won 
despite Wilson's letter. Perhaps if Wilson had not written the letter, 
Vardaman might have pursued the same course and won. A third 
factor, of much greater Significance to Mississippi politics, seems 
to have been overlooked by contemporary observers in the smoke 
of battle. That was Vardaman's split with Bilbo. Had the two 
former allies held together it is doubtful that either of them could 
have been defeated. As it was both went down in defeat. 
Bilbo attempted to carry water on both shoulders during the 
campaign by issuing denials that he was supporting either candi-
date. 57 He mortgaged his farm in Pearl River County for enough 
money to buy an automobile and toured the sixth district in an ex-
tensive campaign for Congress. 58 He ran second in the first primary 
and was snowed under in the runoff. 59 
56Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 21, 1918; Brookhaven Leader, Aug. 21, 1918, in 
Vardaman scrapbook; Vardaman's Weekly, Oct. 9, 1919. 
57Vicksburg Evening Post, Aug. 28, 1917; Stone County Enterprise, Sept. 1, 1917, 
in Vardaman scrapbook. 
58Jackson Daily News, Dec. 20, 1917. 
59Report of Secretary of State, in 0Uicial and Stati8Ucal Regbter, 1920-24, 
pp. S46-48. 
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Thus, the faction which had dominated Mississippi politics for 
a decade had been divided and conquered. Both leaders were 
stripped of all power, relegated to private life, and their followings 
disorganized. For Vardaman, the eclipse was to be permanent 
Perhaps the illness which was soon to remove him from an active 
participation in affairs was already upon him. Throughout the 
campaign, dispatches from even friendly papers remarked on his 
"changed appearance," his '1ack of fire," his "broken voice," and 
his "prematurely aged appearance."60 Certainly, his speeches 
lacked the pungency and the Hair for showmanship which were 
characteristic of an earlier period. It could not have been due to 
age. He was still in the prime of life. As for Bilbo, his eclipse was 
temporary. Mter a decade he was to make a comeback. Never 
again, however, was he to have the overwhelming influence which 
he and Vardaman shared in the period from 1910 to 1918. 
60Quoted in Vicksburg Herald, July 26, 1918. 
CHAPTER XXII 
EXIT VARDAMAN 
EARLY in Bilbo's administration jockeying began within the old 
Vardaman-Bilbo faction for the succession to the governorship. 
Chief aspirants for the faction's support were Ross Collins, the 
attorney-general; H. E. Blakeslee, the commissioner of agriculture; 
and Lee Russell, the lieutenant-governor, who had Bilbo's support. 
By the spring of 1916 it was noted that Bilbo and Collins, who had 
been close friends for eight years, were no longer so and that Bilbo 
was consulting Judge Robert Mayes on state legal business instead 
of the attorney-general. It was rumored that Collins had refused 
to step aside in Russell's favor and was resolved to run despite 
Bilbo's wishes. Blakeslee was more amenable and accepted a three-
year appointment as director general of the Mississippi Centennial 
Exposition. This method of disposing of him was extravagantly 
termed by the Clarion the ""most gigantic political deal ever put 
over in Mississippi."l 
Collins' determination to run against Russell might have had 
disastrous results for the remnants of the Vardaman-Bilbo machine, 
save for the fact that the opposition too was divided. It had early 
been agreed by the latter that Oscar Johnston, antiadministration 
Delta planter in the state senate, should be its standard-bearer. 
Belatedly, former Governor Longino had announced that he would 
be a candidate. His candidacy would detract from Johnston's fol-
lOwing, just as Collins' would injure Russell's. 
There were issues of real importance, but they were almost 
lost sight of in the character attacks made on the several candidates. 
Russell, running on the record of the Bilbo administration, upheld 
the state tax commission. He also stood for the preservation of the 
pardon board, arguing that without it too much of the governor's 
time would be taken up with the study of clemency petitions. 
Johnston urged the abolition of the tax commission and the par-
don board. He argued both that the tax commission's authority 
was autocratic and that its legality was questionable. Longino, 
gentlemanly but innocuous as always, spent much of his time deny-
IJackson C~Ledger, June 8, July 16, 1916. 
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ing that he had used convict labor on his farm and that he had, while 
governor, pardoned a Negro condemned for rape. Collins, bitter 
after his break with his old comrades, pitched his campaign on 
the charge that Russell, if elected, would appoint Bilbo president 
of the Industrial Institute and College for Women at Columbus. II 
Controversy over this charge seems to have featured the cam-
paign. "Bilbo ••• has some experience with school girls boarding at 
schools taught by him," said Collins, "and the story of what hap-
pened during this period would make an interesting story if a 
certain ... educator ..• could be induced to tell the story." The 
Vicksburg Herald, crediting the charge, thought the mere sugges-
tion of placing "the defender and alleged participant in the insane 
asylum .•. scandal of lust at the head of the State Female College" 
was enough to make any prospective Russell voter "blush with 
shame." The Daily News, also eager to believe the charge, shud-
dered to think what would happen if "this combination of Don 
Juan and gay young Lothario" should be placed at the head of the 
college. "No father or mother," it said, "who cherishes the chastity 
of their [sic] daughter would care to send the girl to Columbus. 
It would be practically the same as sending her into the red light 
district."8 
Bilbo denied that he was an applicant for or would accept the 
post if offered him. ROguishly he suggested that he might an-
nounce that if Russell "was not elected" he might ask for the ap-
pointment. Then he could "announce that every vote against Rus-
sell would be construed as an endorsement of my application." 
Walter Dent, assistant attorney-general, produced and Collins read 
to an audience at Carrollton what purported to be a letter from 
Bilbo to one of the trustees of the college asking for the appoint-
ment. Bilbo challenged the authenticity of the letter, and it was 
later admitted to be spurious. Bilbo then issued a statement attack-
ing the characters of Collins and Dent, and for this he was kicked 
and knocked down in the streets of Jackson by Dent.4. 
IIJackson Dally N6W8. Aug. 3, July 23, 1919; Vicksburg Herald, July 15, 19, Aug. 
2, 3, 19, 24. 1919; Macon Beacon. Aug. 22, 1919; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 9, 1919. 
8Vicbburg Herald, July 19, Aug. 8, 1919; ibid., Aug. 22, 1919, quoting Jacbon 
Dally N6W8. 
4.Vicbburg Herald. July SI, Aug. 19. 24, 1919; Jackson Dally N6W8, July 23, 
1919. Macon Beacon, Aug. 22, 1919; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 9, 1919. 
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Many discharged soldiers had returned to the state after the 
February 1 deadline for the payment of poll taxes. The Democratic 
state executive committee had directed that the poll tax require-
ment should be waived in their cases. Despite the equity of such 
a ruling its legality seems questionable. When some of the county 
committees, allegedly supporting Russell, seemed reluctant to com-
ply with this directive, it was cited as "proof positive" that Russell 
feared "the soldier vote."5 
The campaign was said to be the "dullest" in the history of the 
state. The lethargy of voters was remarked generally and was said 
to be unprecedented. Political rallies were drawing hundreds where 
formerly they drew thousands. This was attributed to the fact that 
farmers were "too busy trying to save their crops from grass and 
boll weevils" and to a "tired feeling" resulting from "the lowered 
political standard culminating in the present adminisb"ation in 
scandalous and abusive events."6 
Despite this lethargy almost 150,000 votes were cast in the first 
primary. Russell led with 48,000; Johnston was second with 39,000; 
and Longino and Collins ran third and fourth respectively with 
about 30,000 votes each. 7 The latter two were thus eliminated, 
and Russell and Johnston fought it out in the second primary. 
The tempo of the campaign increased in the second primary. 
The anti-Vardaman-Bilbo press called on Johnston, Longino, and 
Collins to "ground arms, get together, pool their forces, and get 
ready to make the greatest three weeks canvass," in order to rid the 
state of the final vestige of ''Vardamanism and Bilboism" in the 
person of Russell. Longino's campaign manager and Collins at 
once announced their support of Johnston. It was claimed that 
Longino had pledged himseH for Johnston, but this Longino denied. 
For more than two weeks he remained strangely silent and then, 
on the eve of the election, announced that he would support neither 
candidate. Reliable information had come to him, he said, that 
some of Johnston's "close friends" had announced before the first 
primary that if Russell were in the runoff with Longino, they would 
support Russell. Thus, if they thought Russell fit to be governor 
IiJackson Daay NBtD8, July 28, 1919. 
6Vicksburg Herald, July 6, 9, Aug. 5, 1919; Natchez Democrat, Aug. 1, 1919. 
'1Beport of Secretary of State, In Official and Statl8tictzZ Regilt., 1920-24, P. 869. 
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then, with his Vardaman and Bilbo "predilections," they were 
estopped from demanding support for him now "because of [his] 
factional alignment."8 
Meanwhile Vardaman, who seemed reluctant to choose between 
Russell and Collins in the first primary, came out strongly for Rus-
sell in the second. He urged support of Russell largely on the 
grounds of his poverty. "No man," he said, "who has not known the 
hardships of the poor people is able to sympathize with them." Rus-
sell, he said, was one of the "common people." He had come from 
the "humbler walks of life" and was able to understand the poor. It 
was the same eternal struggle, said Vardaman, the rich against the 
poor. Lies and deception had been practiced on Russell in the first 
primary, and large sums had been spent to defeat him.D 
FollOwing the former practices of Vardaman and Bilbo, Russell 
issued appeals to his friends to send in small contributions "to 
meet the legitimate expenses of the campaign." This was denounced 
by the opposition as "demagoguery." Johnston was denounced as 
an enemy of labor and of the small farmer. He was pictured as a 
rich planter living in a river county. The issue, said Russell sup-
porters, was "whether the entire citizenship . . . should have a 
square deal." The rich Delta section and the large timber interests, 
they said, "had long escaped paying their just proportion of our 
state taxes." Now they were spending huge sums in an attempt to 
defeat Russell and repeal the tax equalization law. This argument 
was denounced by the Johnston forces as a «Hill Billy" appeal to 
"pasSion, prejudice, and narrowmindedness." But it had telling 
effect. It was, said Johnston's manager, «the hardest proposition I 
have to meet."lO 
He did the be~t he could. Russell, he charged, had opposed a 
bill introduced by Johnston in the last legislature to increase the 
age of consent for females from ten to fourteen years. Russell, he 
charged, «in order to keep a few negroes from getting their just 
8Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 7, 1919; Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Aug. 7. 1919; Natchez 
Democrat, Aug. 8, 1919; Macon Beacon, Aug. 8. 22, 1918; Jackson Dally NeWI, 
Aug. 8, 9. 1919; Memphis Commercial A1'1'lJIJl, quoted in Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 
21.1919. 
DVcmlaman', 'Weekly, Aug. 7, 1919. 
lOVicksburg Herald, Aug. 17, 1919; Ripley SentlneZ and Hinds County Gae#B, 
quoted in Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 26. 31. 1919. Macon Beacon. Aug. 19. 22, 1919. 
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deserts," was unwilling "to protect the white girls of Mississippi."ll 
Thus again the opposition to Vardaman and Bilbo made use of the 
much despised and demagogic tools when it served their purpose. 
The results of the election showed that, despite the defeats of 
Bilbo and Vardaman the preceding year, united they were still the 
strongest force in Mississippi politics. Russell received 77,427 
votes to Johnston's 69,565.12 Despite pre-election warnings by both 
sides that the enemy intended to use fraud, no charges were made. 
Johnston's defeat was attributed by his followers to the failure of 
the Longino forces to support their candidate. Russell, they said, 
was not elected by the Democrats, but by the "Bolshevists, the 
1. W. W.'s, the Socialists, the ignorant, the illiterate, the riff-raff, 
the rag-tag, and the bobtail of creation." "Don't blame God or the 
Democratic party," they said. The Jackson Daily News called 
Russell "a common little bounder and character assassin," a "shame-
ful liar and contemptible slanderer."13 
When the legislature met in January, 1920, it soon became 
evident that the new governor was to have a rocky road. A fight 
developed at once over the speakership. Conner, who had been 
elected speaker in 1916 with Bilbo's support, had split with him 
and Russell. He had campaigned against Bilbo in 1918 and against 
Russell the following year. Despite their opposition, however, Con-
ner was chosen speaker. 14 
A fight next developed over appropriations. The ''low pres-
sure" element had grown stronger, and there was much talk of 
economy. Speaker Conner insisted that there was little chance of 
retrenchment. Most of the revenue was expended on education and 
eleemosynary institutions, and even the most radical of the ''low 
pressure" members did not dare insist on a cut in these items. The 
house of representatives voted down an early resolution pledging 
a reduction in the tax levy and a trimming of appropriations by 
$5,000,000. Governor Russell's message called for an increase in 
appropriations for the department of labor, for a new department 
of forestry conservation, an increase for the highway department, 
llNatchez Democrat, Aug. 19, 1919. 
12Report of Secretary of State, in Official and Stati8tical Regi8ter, 1920-24, p. 369. 
13Jackson Daily News, Aug. 25, 28, 1919. 
14Mississippi, House Journal, 1920, pp. 22-23; Natchez Democrat, Jan. 2, 7, 
1920. 
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a new home for the aged and infirm, and for creation of a public 
utilities commission. He also urged employment of a state purchas-
ing agent, retention of the existing scale of state salaries, and a 
new anti-lobbying bill. IS Little was accomplished, however, and 
the session ended without much constructive legislation. 
During the next session, in 1922, a fight was again raging in the 
Delta counties over control of the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta Levee 
Board. Walter Sillers, son of Anse McLaurin's old henchman, was 
sponsoring a new bill to take the appointive power of board mem-
bers away from the governor and make them elective. Russell and 
the board were, of course, opposing the bill. A legislative investi-
gating committee was appointed after it was charged that the levee 
board had renegotiated with a contractor and paid him 78 per cent 
more for work than his contract called for. The contractor, it was 
charged, "was a strong political supporter" of Russell and had "con-
tributed to his campaign fund." When the board's engineer justi-
fied the transaction because of the increased costs after the contract 
had been made, the committee approved. It, however, censured 
the board in its report, and the legislature passed Sillers' bill over 
the governor's veto. IS 
In the midst of the session Miss Frances Birkhead, a former 
secretary of Russell, :filed suit against him in federal court for 
$100,000. She alleged that he had seduced her repeatedly under 
promise of marriage as soon as he could secure a divorce from his 
wife. She alleged further that he had arranged for the performing 
of an abortion on her which had left her an invalid for li£e.17 
Russell called the suit "the most damnable blackmail conspiracy 
in the history of MissisSippi" and attributed it "to malicious attempts 
of [my] enemies to blacken my character."18 He had the year before 
instituted an antitrust suit against a group of old-line fire insurance 
companies, as a result of which they had withdrawn from the state. 
He charged that they had concocted the damage suit against him. 
The anti-Russell faction in the house then passed, over Russell's 
opposition, a resolution calling for him to submit what evidence he 
had to substantiate his charges against the insurance companies. 
15Mississippf. Howe 1011f'f1l1l, 1920, pp. 195-228, 1472-
161b1d., 1922, pp. 941-55, 2156. 
lTNatchez Democrat. Feb. 7, 1922-
18Missfssippi, HOUIB 1011f'f1l1l, 1922, pp. 924-28. 
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Russell attempted to get the house to reconsider the resolution 
but failed. He then dispatched a letter to the house, declining 
to appear before it but stating that the information on which he 
based the charge had come from the state revenue agent. The 
revenue agent was called by the house, and he testified that the 
evidence was hearsay told him by several people. These latter 
when called were unable to verify, of their personal knowledge, 
any of the facts alleged by Russell. Thereupon the house. adopted 
by a vote of 61 to 20 a resolution branding Russell's charges "ground-
less and unwarranted."19 
The suit was removed from Jackson for lack of jurisdiction to 
the northern district, and was tried at Oxford, Russell's home, the 
following December. At the trial Miss Birkhead was completely 
discredited, and the jury acquitted Russell after only twenty-five 
minutes' deliberation.2o 
A feature of the case was the conduct of Bilbo. He had split with 
Russell before the suit was filed and was subpoenaed by the prosecu-
tion to testify against Russell. He had frequently stated that he 
knew much and when the time came he would tell it. Yet he re-
fused to answer the summons and was not found and brought 
before the court until after the verdict had been rendered. When 
he was found, he explained that his refusal to testify was on the 
ground that he had been Russell's attorney and had obtained evi-
dence in confidence which he was not at liberty to disclose. This 
was a weak excuse, as he could have answered the summons and 
been excused from testifying. It was alleged that his real reason 
for not appearing was quite otherwise: that he had been implicated 
in the plot to injure Russell; that he had discovered the absence of 
certain letters from his files that would disclose this; that he sus-
pected that Russell had obtained these letters and was prepared to 
incriminate him if he should appear. Under suc.h circumstances, 
said one observer, "thirty days in jail looked far preferable to thirty 
minutes on the witness stand subject to cross examination."21 Bilbo 
was found in contempt of court and sentenced to ten days in jail, 
which he served. 
19Ibid., 928-30, 956, 962-64, 978-79, 1345-46, 1895-1910, 1912; Natchez Demo-
crat, Feb. 24, 25, 28, Mar. 10, Apr. 2, 1922. 
20Ibid., Dec. 12, 1922. 
21VtI1'daman's Weekly, Aug. 2, 1923. 
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The affair left a nauseating stench in the nostrils of many Missis-
sippians. Several editors compared the recent political leaders with 
those of the generation before and found the modem generation 
falling short of the standard set by their predecessors. "Whether 
true or not," said the Newton Record of the charge against Russell, 
"can one imagine such a charge being brought against Stone, Lowry, 
McLaurin, and other governors on whom no such suspicion has 
ever rested?" Another editor thought the recent governors, "ex-
cepting Noel," had gone Nero, Claudius, and Caligula, "one better." 
Another, unfriendly to Russell, suspected that his charge of a 
"frame-up" was not groundless. "It's time that Mississippians got 
together," he said, "called a halt on such horrible conditions, and 
brought the old ship of state back to the moorings of honor and 
common decency."22 
Mter his defeat by Harrison, Vardaman returned to Mississippi, 
took up the publication of a new journal, Vardaman's Weekly, and 
began a campaign to secure John Sharp Williams' senatorial seat 
in 1922. Williams had announced that he would not be a candidate 
to succeed himself, but whether inspired by distrust of this state-
ment or of revenge for the part Williams had played in his 1918 
defeat, Vardaman centered his attack on him. Much of this was in 
the form of charges of insobriety on the part of Williams. The 
Carroll News was glad to note that Williams had "sobered up suf-
ficiently to support the administration's ... shipping lobby."23 The 
Vaiden News in successive issues in January, 1919, alleged that 
Williams was "drinking himself to death."24 Six months later Varda-
man himself remarked that "The poor old fellow [Williams] has 
been drunk for thirty years" and was "well-nigh a mental and phys-
ical wreck." He charged that Williams' mind "like most alcoholics' 
. . . moves around in a circle," and that he had not made a logical 
argument in ten years. Williams, he said, had tied himself to Presi-
dent Wilson because of expediency. He was undergoing "mental 
and physical decay" and presented "a pitiful spectacle." A month 
later he characterized a Senate speech by Williams as "drunken" 
22Newton Record, Sunflower Tocsin, and Yazoo Sentinel, quoted in Natchez 
Democrat, Feb. 7, 1922. 
2sCarroll News, Feb. 12, 1919, quoted, ibid. 
24Vaiden News, Jan. 9, 17, 1919, in Vardaman scrapbook. 
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and "nasty."25 He published a dispatch from a New York paper in 
which fellow senators had charged that Williams was drunk when 
he made an "incoherent and rambling" speech and that Senator 
Boies Penrose had protested against Williams' sleeping in Penrose's 
seat and had had him removed. 26 Vardaman even charged that 
Williams' victory over him in 1907 had been because of "the many 
votes he and some of his managers defrauded me of."27 
Vardaman did not neglect his old enemies, the trusts. It was 
they, he said, who had pictured him as pro-German and Williams 
as a super-patriot. The reason for this was that he had "voted to 
tax: the big profiteer and multimillionaires, while Williams wanted 
to be light on them." He upheld the cause of labor against capital. 
Labor, he said, had done a good job during the war. Some un-
usually high wages had been paid, but compared to the profits of 
big business they were nothing. "The man who says <Labor is a 
menace to the peace of the country' is both a fool and a liar," he 
said. "I should like to know," he added, "how long the capitalists 
would enjoy the luxuries of life if it were not for the products of 
the hands that toil."28 
Large sums, he said, had been spent by trusts to defeat him in 
1911 and 1918, and he had no doubt that "the plutocratic thieves 
that exploited Hog Island," together with the railroad interest, 
would contribute again to a campaign against him. He published 
a list of corporate executives, many of whom represented lumber 
interests of south Mississippi, who were actively opposing his 
election and who were "commanding" their employees to vote 
against him. He was alarmed, he said, because so much of the press 
was controlled by wealthy interests. Free government, he said, 
could not exist without "free speech, freedom of action, and the 
utmost freedom of thought." He appealed to his readers to obtain 
subscriptions for the Weekly. Otherwise, he said, he could not con-
tinue its publication.29 
Vardaman claimed much credit for the passage of the Flood 
Control Bill of 1918, whereby the federal government took over 
25Vardaman', Weekly, July 10, Aug. 14, 1919. 
26New York American, quoted, ibid., Oct. 23, 1919. 
27Vardaman', Weekly, Jan. 5, 1922. 
28JacksoD 1'lUe, Jan. 9, 1919; Vardaman', Weekly, May 8, 1919, Feb. 12, 1920. 
29Vardaman', Weekly, Apr. 24, May 8, 1919, June 16. Aug. 24. 1922. 
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the financing of levee building in the Mississippi Valley. This was 
very popular in the Delta and gained him some support in that 
section. Attempts were made by the opposition to discredit this 
claim, but Vardaman was able to publish statements from Delta 
citizens, received by him at the time of the bill's passage, com-
mending him for his "most valiant and effective work" in behalf of 
the legislation.'o 
Vardaman's opponent in 1922, Hubert D. Stephens, made 
an active campaign, but it was admitted by his friends that he was 
"not an orator." His lack of color, together with Vardaman's absence 
from the stump, tended to make the campaign another lethargic 
one. A novel feature was the presence in the race of a woman, 
Miss Belle Kearney of Flora. It was the first time a woman had 
ever been a candidate for office in Mississippi. She was conceded 
not even an outside chance to win, but it was thought she might 
draw enough votes from the recently enfranchised women to pre-
vent either of the male candidates from getting a majority in the 
first primary.81 
Most of Stephens' campaign was given over to a denunciation 
of Vardaman's "radical" backing and to the old charge of disloyalty. 
He accused Vardaman of having said that "Lenin and Trotsky are 
two of the world's greatest statesmen, and the principles of Bol-
shevism are right and should prevail the world over." Vardaman·s 
only supporters, he charged, were "I. W. W.'s, Communists, Bol-
shevists, radical-Socialists, pro-Germans, men who refused to sub-
scribe to Liberty Loan drives, draft obstructors, and confidants of 
Lenin and Trotsky." He admitted that Vardaman had made a good 
record as governor, but charged that his Senate record "gave more 
aid and comfort to the Kaiser than any other man in America ex-
cepting Messrs. [Eugene V.J Debs and Lafollette."82 
It was known that Vardaman's absence from the stump was 
due to mental illness. Occasionally he would sit on the platform 
while another spoke for him. It was said that he could not talk 
coherently on any subject for more than five minutes and that he 
IOSee clippings in Vardaman scrapbook, especially Memphis Commercial Appeal, 
Aug. 19, 1922; Cleveland Enterprise, Aug. 15, 1918; also Vardaman's Weekly, July 
. 3, 1919; Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 15, 23, 192e. 
81Vicksburg Herald, June 16, 1922. 
82IbId., Aug. 10, 81, 1922. 
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seemed to take "but little interest in what was going on." Late in 
the campaign he made one pathetic attempt to speak to an audience. 
Mter speaking for twenty minutes in a very low and feeble voice 
that could scarcely be heard, he sat down abruptly. His condition 
was openly remarked on by the press and was urged as further 
reason to defeat him. "It would be just as sensible," said the Daily 
News, "to go out to the Mississippi Insane Hospital, pick out one 
of the unfortunate inmates . . . , and adorn him with a Senatorial 
toga."88 
In this extremity Bilbo came to his aid and stumped the state 
vigorously in his behalf. This was hailed by the Stephens forces 
as a sign of desperation on the part of Vardaman. They claimed that 
he "thoroughly despised and detested" Bilbo and pointed to the 
fact that Bilbo had not spoken until late in the campaign. Now, 
they said, Vardaman had "surrendered" to him "in a last desperate 
attempt to stem the tide." It was said that Bilbo's aid was not pop-
ular with many of Vardaman's supporters and that a division in 
their ranks would result.84 
In the mst primary a record vote of 158,888 was cast. When it 
is considered that the list of eligible voters should have been 
doubled by the advent of woman's suffrage, this was in reality a 
light vote. Vardaman received 74,578, Stephens, 65,980, and Miss 
Kearney, 18,285. In the second primary Stephens received 95,851 
votes to Vardaman's 86,858.85 This was 28,000 more than had been 
cast in the primary three weeks before. The Vardaman forces 
charged that it was due to a disregard of the registration laws and 
the poll tax requirement. Registration books, they said, were in 
some places actually taken to the poIls, voters were registered, their 
poll taxes paid, and their votes cast all on the same day.86 There 
was no substantiation of this charge, but the great increase in 
such a short period of time was unprecedented in Mississippi 
elections. 
Vardaman's defeat was explained by his followers in still other 
88Ibid., June 16, Aug. 15, 1922; Jackson Daily News, July 27, 1922; Vardaman's 
Weekly, Aug. 18, 1922. 
84Vicksburg Herald, July 28, 1922; Jackson Daily News, July 29, Aug. 3, 1922. 
85Biennial Report of the Secretary of State to the Legislature, October 1, 19.28-
October I, 1925 (n.d., n.p.). 
86Vardaman's Weekly, Sept. 7, 1922. 
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ways. Country women, they said, were for Vardaman and had 
failed to register. City women, who were opposed to him, had 
done SO.87 In many counties, they charged, new registrations were 
ordered and "so handled that the voters were not freely permitted 
to register, even when their taxes were paid." In Newton County 
a registration had been made the year before, but a new one was 
ordered nevertheless. Many Vardaman voters, they said, thinking 
their previous registration was sufficient, neglected to register the 
second time and were disqualified. In still other counties poll 
books were purged between the two primaries, "a thing wholly 
illegal," and it was alleged that many Vardaman voters were dis-
qualified in this way.88 
Save for one significant statement which Vardaman issued the 
following year, the election was his last act of participation in Mis-
sissippi politics. He was taken to the home of a daughter in 
Birmingham, Alabama, where he spent the remaining years of his 
life secluded and perhaps unconscious of his and his faction's dis-
integration. 
Upon Bilbo's release from the Oxford jail where he had served 
a term for contempt of court, he made a speech from the jail steps 
announcing his candidacy for governor. The move seemed to be 
unpremeditated, for the campaign was already well under way. 
Four candidates-Henry L. WhitBeld, Percy Bell, Lester C. 
Franklin, and M. S. Conner-each with an organized backing, had 
been in the field for many months. All four had formerly been in-
timately associated with Vardaman. Franklin was supposed to have 
the backing of the old Vardaman following, while Conner and Whit-
field seemed to have support of the Vardaman opposition. Bell ap-
peared to have support of parts of each group. Bilbo had the back-
ing of nothing that could be termed a faction. Whitfield, running 
on a platform of reduced taxes, was embarrassed by the fact that 
as state superintendent of education he had been an advocate of 
37The state constitution had been amended to require the payment of the poll 
tax by women, but the question arose as to whether women against whom no levy 
had been made could register and vote in the primary. Attorney-General Clayton 
Potter ruled that they could, but the state executive committee ruled otherwise. 
A year later the Vicksburg Herald, June 22, 1923, an anti-Vardaman paper, admitted 
that had Potter's ruling been followed the year before Vardaman would have been 
elected. 
rBVardaman'B Weekly, Sept. 7, 1922. 
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high taxes. Conner advocated more lenient treatment of corpora-
tions and, after Bilbo's entry, spent much time in defending him-
self against Bilbo's charge that he was a "slacker" during the war.Bt 
Bilbo also attacked Franklin, a Delta farmer who had Russell's 
backing, charging that he and Conner both had "trust" backing. 
Bilbo had the most interesting program. He urged a state pur-
chasing board, payments of convicts' earnings to their dependents, 
a radical change in road building by utilizing convict labor to make 
brick for the roads, and erection of a state printing plant to print 
textbooks for all school children. He made an appeal for the en-
tire female vote by advocating the appointment of women members 
to all state boards and erection of a home for "fallen women." His 
entry into the race changed the tenor of the campaign. In June the 
Vicksburg Herald had noted an absence of "name-calling" and 
thought the state "after several years of indulgence in violent poli-
tics" was "turning the other way." By August it expressed its regret 
that the early indication had not been borne out. The last month, 
it said, had brought forth "as much mud-slinging and filthy politics 
as our state has ever witnessed." Most name calling was among 
Bilbo, Conner, and Franklin, and it was believed that whoever of 
them advanced into the second primary would be defeated by the 
opposition of the two eliminated.40 
Many women had registered since the preceding campaign. 
There were reported to be 65,000 of them prepared to cast their 
votes, and it was expected by some that politics would be improved 
and "there will be a better order through and through."41 
In the first primary more than 250,000 votes were cast, which 
was an increase of almost 100,000 since 1919, when women had not 
been permitted to vote. Whitfield had a plurality with 85,000. Bilbo, 
to the amazement of almost everyone, was second with 65,000. 
Conner was third, and Franklin fourth. Bell polled over 17,000 
votes, which was said to be a "personal tribute," since he was 
"ground between the upper and nether millstones of factionalism."42 
89Natchez Democrat, July 12, 13, 26, Aug. 10, 1923; Vicksburg Herald, June 13, 
July 3, 10, 1923. 
40Natchez Democrat, July 13, 1923; Vicksburg Herald, June 10, July 20, Aug. 
1,1923. 
41Natchez Democrat, July 26, 1923. 
42Report of Secretary of State, 1921-1928; Jackson Dally News, Aug. 8, 1923. 
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Mer the first primary, Franklin, contrary to prediction, effected 
a settlement with Bilbo and pledged his support. It was feared 
Conner might do so too. He remained ominously silent for awhile, 
but finally declared for Whit:6eld, as also did Bell. Senators Wil-
liams and Stephens were also backing Whitfield.'s 
It was conceded that in the second primary south Mississippi 
would go for Bilbo, while the Delta and the central part of the 
state would go for Whitfield. The northeastern section would be 
the battleground and would decide the issue. This was a region 
where Vardaman had always been strong, and a great effort was 
made by both candidates to win support of Vardaman's old follow-
ing. A week before the election State Senator Jeff Bell made a 
pilgrima~e to Birmingham to see the White Chief. He spent the 
week end with him, and on his return made a speech in Polkville, 
in Smith County. He had been told by Vardaman, he said, that 
Bilbo had not been loyal to Vardaman and was "neither his per.,. 
sonal nor political friend." On the other hand, Bell quoted him as 
saying, "Whit:6eld is a clean, decent man and should be elected 
Governor."" The message was headlined on the front page of all 
anti-Bilbo papers. Its authenticity, despite the absence of veri:6ca-
tion, was not questioned even by Bilbo. He took his medicine like 
a man, not even issuin~ a retaliatory statement against Vardaman. 
In the election Whitfield received 134,715 votes to Bilbo's 
118,148. Bilbo carried thirty counties, all of which were white. 
Large majorities were piled up against him in the black counties, 
in not one of which did he receive as much as 35 per cent of the 
vote.'S Whitfield's majority was more than 16,000. This was suffi-
cient to nominate him even if the votes of Coahoma, where eight 
ballot boxes had been destroyed, were thrown out. The Vicksburg 
Herald credited the victory to the vote of the women and praised 
them for having "made possible the redemption of Mississippi from 
the hands of the demagogues."'s 
The only other state-wide election of the period was that of 
1924 when Earl Brewer made an ill-timed effort to stage a come-
'8Natchez Democrat, Aug. 16, 1923. 
"Ibid., Aug. 26, 1923; Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 26, 1923; Jackson Dally NIJWI. 
Aug. 26, 1923. 
,s1leport of Secretary of State, 1921-1928. 
,sJackson Dally NeWI, Aug. 30, 1923; Vicksburg Herald, Aug. 30, 81, 19M. 
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back by unseating Harrison. His effort was abortive, however, and 
the campaign passed almost unnoticed by the state press. Harrison 
won without extending himseH, 80,371 to 17,496.'7 This was a 
decline of more than 150,000 in the vote cast the preceding year. 
Thus, the period closed with the complete rout of the forces 
represented in the persons of Vardaman and Bilbo. If the latter 
part of this story has seemed heavily weighted with the personalities 
and dOings of those two men, it is because they exercised a greater 
influence over their fellows, both friend and foe, than did any 
others of their time. In personality and character, as well as in 
appearance, they were radically different. In many ways they 
effected a revolution in the state, SOcially, politically, and economi-
cally. While no attempt has been made to judge the merits of the 
numerous and scandalous charges made against Bilbo-for none of 
which was he ever convicted-it is remarkable that, excepting the 
contingent fund affair, no question of Vardaman's integrity or 
morality was ever raised. For a politician active in a period when 
charges against other men were Hying thick and fast, and loved 
and hated as few men before or since, this is indeed a tribute. 
47B.eport of Secretary of State, 1923-1925. 
CHAPTER XXIII 
CONCLUSION 
THROUGHOUT the period from 1876 to 1925 the central thread 
in Mississippi politics is a struggle between economic classes, 
interspersed with the personal struggles of ambitious men. Before the 
Civil War agriculture had been the dominant influence in Missis-
sippi society. Industry was almost a negligible quantity. Almost 
everyone was engaged in agricultural pursuits, and leaders in 
thought and society were representatives of the agricultural class. 
Despite· social differences existing between small farmer and big 
planter, there was a remarkable similarity in their economic interests. 
The Civil War had effected great changes In economfc con-
ditions. The political and economic dominance of the rich planters 
was broken. Following in the wake of the war, industrialization, 
banking, and merchandising entered the state and complicated the 
former relatively simple agrarian society. The new interests en-
gaged but a small fraction of the people, and the overwhelming 
majority of the population continued to be employed in agriculture. 
But greater profits were to be made in the new businesses than in 
the old. Many former political leaders, quick to see and take ad-
vantage of this, began to subordinate their agricultural interests to 
money lending, merchandising, and rru.1road promotion. This pro-
duced an economic cleavage between them and the dirt farmers. 
The picture was further complicated by the presence of the 
Negro. His active participation in government caused a reaction 
among a large majority of white men, and all classes of them united 
to drive him out of the halls of state. W. E. B. Du Bois, a distin-
guished Ne~o historian, pictures this as a counterrevolutionary 
movement directed by the new business interests against the 
economic democracy which the Reconstruction governments were 
on the verge of establishing.t Such an interpretation may be ques-
tioned. It is doubtful if the new economic interests thrived any the 
less under Republican rule than they did under Democratic. 
Rather, it would seem, the class most endangered by the so-called 
'"black domination" was composed of the large landowners. The 
ascendancy of the Negroes both in politics and in the social scale 
tw. E. B. Du Bois, Black RecOt'l8tnlctlon (New York, 1935). 
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was a disturbing factor in the labor market and rendered large 
holdings a burden rather than an asset. Regardless of its origin, 
there can be no doubt that the movement to overthrow the Recon-
struction government was jOined in heartily by all classes of whites, 
rich and poor, large and small farmer, banker and merchant. 
Nor can there be much doubt that in the government estab-
lished after 1876 representatives of the new interests were in com-
plete control. Lamar, George, Walthall, and Lowry, the four who 
with Stone held an unshakable grip on the state's government 
until the end of the century, were all lawyers and represented ably 
the new business interests. George and Walthall, together with 
George's law partner, Wiley P. Harris, were the leading members 
of the Mississippi bar and were reputed to have the largest corporate 
practices in the state. Stone, while not a lawyer, was a devoted dis-
Ciple of Lamar, and both were admittedly partial to railroad in-
terests. 
These men were not evil tyrants bent upon despoiling the 
masses. They were probably no better or worse men than those 
who tried to unseat them, though they were probably shrewder 
and more capable political manipulators. They were doubtless 
sincere in the belief that they were representing the best interests 
of their constituents, and they may have been. But in succeeding 
decades when agriculture was undergOing the pangs of depression 
while business was thriving, vast numbers of farmers came to feel 
that their interests were not being served. Their leaders, they felt, 
had abandoned them and had allied themselves with banks, rail-
roads, and merchants, who had banded together to despoil the 
farmer. Generally, however, the farmers, because of the alleged 
threat of "negro supremacy," were loyal to the political leaders who 
had seized control at the end of the Reconstruction period. 
Presence of the Negro soon came to be a great asset to the 
leaders in power. They used him unsparingly to crush all incipient 
revolts against their authority. Did the people wish to return to the 
horrors of black rule? they asked. If not, they must support their 
present rulers. Only thus could a division be presented which would 
inevitably result in "black domination." Only by "white solidarity," 
by a meek submission to dictates of the reigning oligarchy, could 
such a catastrophe be averted. Furthermore, deals could be made 
with Negro leaders to keep the masses of Negroes from joining 
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such revolts. Should these efforts fail and the Negro masses refuse 
to follow their leaders, the opposition could be branded as con-
trolled by Negroes, and enough whites could be rallied to prevent, 
by violence or fraud or both, success of such a movement. 
Despite these well-laid plans the period was one of almost in-
cessant agrarian revolt. Greenback, Grange, Alliance, and Populist 
movements were tangible evidence of discontent. At the same 
time, the ambitions of individuals who felt that they had not been 
properly rewarded for the part they had played in overthrOwing 
RepubliCanism furnished leadership to the movement. Ethelbert 
Barksdale was the outstanding leader of the rebels during the 
1880's, just as Frank Burkitt was to be during the 1890's, and 
Vardaman after the turn of the century. To a large extent they 
seem to have been motivated by a certain amount of idealism as 
well as personal ambition. James R. Chalmers, on the other hand, 
seems to have been almost altogether intent upon gaining revenge 
upon Lamar and in gratifying his own ego. Both he and Burkitt 
committed the "unforgivable crime" of leading their followers out 
of the Democratic party. Barksdale and Vardaman, although par-
tial to much of the Populist program, thought it wiser to seek re-
form from within the party. 
Programs advocated by the rebels were generally popular and 
would have won had the political machinery operated on more 
democratic principles. But political control under the convention 
system was in the hands of a few who ruled with or without sup-
port of the masses. Whoever they chose must be elected by the 
[>eople. The alternative, the people were told and believed, was 
"black domination." With legal disfranchisement of the Negro ef-
fected by the constitution of 1890, this threat was less imminent, and 
revolting movements, particularly in county elections, became more 
[>revalent. But the old convention system of nominating was still 
used, and the small farmers who had urged the constitutional con-
vention found that political control was as far as ever from their 
grasp. Too, the poll tax had disfranchised thousands of white men 
who would have voted with the malcontents. It was not until the 
[>rimary was instituted after the turn of the century that the rebels 
bad any chance of success. Then, with anything like a "free ballot 
md a fair count," success was almost assured. 
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It is doubtful if Vardaman won because he was a more capable 
leader than Barksdale. He had bied twice for the gubernatorial 
nomination before the convention and failed, just as he was to fail 
again in the Secret Caucus of 1910. On the other hand, the mst 
time he went before the people in a popular election he won, as he 
also won by an overwhelming majority in the election of 1911, a 
year after his defeat by the "convention-like" legislature. 
It has been contended frequently that Vardaman was the first 
of the "demagogues" in Mississippi. H he was a "demagogue" -and 
certainly it must be conceded that he appealed to "passion and 
prejudice" -he cannot have been the first one. It is not reasonable 
to assume .. that a race which for a hundred years had produced 
outstanding men in the :field of government and politics, went sud-
denly 'moronic.' "2 "Demagogues" had been active in Mississippi 
since 1876, and probably before. The pleas for "white solidarity," so 
insistently urged by all leaders, from Lamar through George, Wal-
thall, Stone, Lowry, McLaurin, Percy, and Williams, were nothing 
but appeals "to prejudice and pasSion," just as Vardaman's crusade 
was. They urged exclusion of the Negroes from the polls as the only 
salvation for their society. Vardaman urged exclusion of the Negroes 
from the schools in order to make sure that they did not qualify for 
polls and as the only salvation for an impoverished school system. 
& to which of them was less sincere in his motives it is impossible 
to decide. Each of them climbed to power and maintained himseH 
there by appeals to racial prejudice. Nor did Vardaman's opponents 
in later years, even Williams himseH, hesitate to vie with him in 
competing for the Negro-hating vote. 
The cry of "demagogue" was sometimes thrown at Lamar, 
George, Lowry, and McLaurin. More often it was hurled at Barks-
dale and Burkitt, and later at Vardaman and Bilbo. The reason for 
this is that the latter group more frequently appealed to the "preju-
dice and passion" of their followers. & a general rule the former 
group did not have to make such appeals. Generally, their appeals 
were directed to small and select groups-to executive committees 
and such. It was unnecessary to appeal to the passions of these men. 
There were closer and dearer interests that could be touched. Only 
IDaDiel M. RobJsoD, "From Tillman to Long: Some Strildng Leaden of the 
Rural South." in 10U1f14l of Southern HfBtory, m (1937), 809. 
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when an opposition ticket was in the field, and the vaters had free-
dom of choice between candidates, did the existing leaders have to 
make appeals to the voters. Whenever these occasions arose the 
threat of "negro domination" was painted in such lurid colors that 
even the most illiterate might read. True, Vardaman was more vio-
lent and savage in his attacks upon the Negro than George, Lamar, 
and their followers had been. On the other hand, Bilbo in this 
period, and Barksdale and Burkitt in an earlier one, rarely appealed 
to racial prejudice. Yet they were denounced, as strongly as was 
Vardaman, as "demagogues." 
Barksdale, Burkitt, Vardaman, and Bilbo, as representatives of 
the opposition, had to rely for success upon appeals to the discon-
tented masses. They knew, just as Lamar and George knew, what 
appeals were strongest with these masses. That they did not hesi-
tate to stoop to such appeals is regrettable. It should not, however, 
serve to set them apart from the so-called <'better elements." It 
must be borne in mind that Vardaman's appeals were directed to 
voters whose general educational level was not high. They under-
stood little other than what they saw around them, and perhaps not 
all of that. There was little friction between Negroes and well-to-
do whites. But there were relatively few well-to-do whites in Mis-
sissippi in the period under consideration. On the other hand, be-
tween the poor whites and the Negroes "there is likely to be enmity 
and there is very sure to be suspicion."8 Vardaman's appeal was an 
emotional one. He campaigned in 1903 largely in the piney woods 
and «hill-billy" sections where poor whites abounded, advocating 
mob violence and free rein to lynchers. Results were to indicate 
that he had not miscalculated. He carried counties with large tenant 
farmer percentages and lost those where tenant farmers were com-
paratively few. ft 
It would be unfair to assume that Vardaman was insincere in his 
expressed fear of "negro domination" if radical measures were not 
taken. Certainly there were many intelligent men in and out of 
Vardaman's following who urged his racial program as a social 
necessity.& A Mississippi scholar wrote just a year before Varda-
man's first state-wide campaign: 
8Murphy, Problem8 of the South, 156. 
ftLadner. j. Ie. Vardaman in Mississippi Politics," loco cit •• 39-41; Eugene E. 
White, "AntI-RacIal AgitatioD," in loumal of Miulmppl History. VII (1945),90-91. 
IWatkins, Address, May 17. 1936, P. 16, in Mississippi Department of ArchiVei 
and History. 
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it is the consensus of opinion in the State at the present time [1902], 
that the number of negroes who are being qualified under the educational 
conditions of the suffrage by the school facilities ••• will continue to 
increase, and that it may be only a question of time when there will 
again be a majority of qualified negro voters in the State. S 
Such an opinion, while it may not excuse Vardaman from the 
charge of "demagoguery," at least might indicate his sincerity. 
But it must not be forgotten that there was much more to Var~ 
daman's program than its racial feature. For decades there had 
been a crying need for social reform, but the old-style politician 
went blindly on his way, paying lip service to the majesty of the 
people but doing nothing to alleviate their lot. There was con-
vincing evidence that the state was controlled by political "rings" 
rotten to the core. Huge treasury deficits were discovered in 1890 
and again in 1901.7 Moreover, the "rings" seemed to be in an al-
liance with the new business interests, which the farmers regarded 
as the source of all their troubles. In 1882 new railroads and manu-
factures had been exempted from taxes for a term of ten years. This 
had been, the farmers thought, but an opening wedge for newer and 
greater concessions later. It had become customary for politicians 
to rant against corporations, but little action had been taken to 
allay their monopolistic grip. Finally, in 1900 at his inaugural, 
Longino was honest, bold, or stupid enough to express an open 
friendship for them. He hoped, he said, that "no more sentimental 
or prejudicial opposition to railroads or other corporate enterprises 
will find favor with the legislature."8 Two years later he was 
pleased to report that "there exists . . . a becoming liberality of 
sentiment by the masses toward the corporate and other invest-
ments of money in our midst."9 
Vardaman and other "demagogues" did not think so. It was 
against these interests, as well as against the Negro, that they di-
rected their campaigns. Since they were fighting these interests, 
sJohnston. "Suffrage and Reconstruction," loco cit., 241. 
'1Anntud Cyclopedia, New Series, XV (1890). 559; 3rd Series. vm (1902). 
751-52. 
8Mississippi, H0U8B loumtil, 1900, pp. 95-96. 
9Ibid., 1902, p. 49. 
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the chief publicity agency, the press, was opposed to them. Suf-
fering under this handicap they had to resort to vivid and dramatic 
campaign tactics in order to publicize themselves. Their appeal was 
directed to poor as against rich, to farmer as against townsman, to 
the "common man" as against the aristocrat. Poverty, as A. B. Moore 
observes, seems to make the masses "susceptible to demagOgic ap-
peals." Frequently, he says, "people have turned ... for relief to 
the so-called demagogues."lo But it is too easy for those who con-
trol agencies of publicity to condemn their opponents as "dema-
gogues." 'Whether one is to be classed as a demagogue or a states-
man seems to depend quite often upon the respectability of his 
followers and upon the agencies of propaganda which support or 
oppose him."ll Thus, Burkitt was denounced as a "demagogue" 
when he allegedly advocated Negro voting, and Vardaman was sim-
ilarly denounced when he advocated greater safeguards against 
Negro voting. It is a remarkable coincidence that, despite their 
radical differences on the Negro question, Vardaman inherited Burk-
itt's following. 12 This would tend to belie the charge that Varda-
man's success was due to his Negro baiting alone. . 
"A demagogue," says Gerald W. Johnson, "is objectionable for a 
vast number of reasons, but he has at least the virtue of being alive; 
and when the choice lies between a demagogue and a political 
corpse," the voters must choose the former,l3 The old "respectable" 
Democratic leaders recognized no social responsibility other than 
the negative one of preventing "negro domination." That prOvided, 
they considered their duty done. Generally their rule was honest 
but selfish. Its gentility was enjoyed at the cost of the neglect of 
the social weHare of the masses of the population. It was not until 
the "demagogues" Vardaman and Bilbo awakened the social con-
sciousness of the people that any constructive social legislation was 
enacted in Mississippi. Vardaman started the ball rolling with his 
crusade against unspeakable conditions existing in the penitentiary 
and other state institutions. Bilbo carried it further with his com-
mission to eliminate adult illiteracy, a law to curb the textbook 
lOA. B. Moore, "One Hundred Years of Reconstruction," in Journal of Southern 
History, IX (1943), 174. 
llRobison, "From Tillman to Long," loe. cit., 298. 
12McCain, ''The Populist Party," 60. 
l8Johnson, "Live Demagogues or Dead Gentlemen," Zoe. cit., 14. 
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trust, the furnishing of transportation for children in the rural con-
solidated schools, and the passage of a compulsory school-attend-
ance law. Under his administration, too, laws were passed curbing 
the activities of corporations and the sale of bogus stocks, regulating 
public utilities, and breaking the insurance trust. He spollSored the 
building of hospitals and institutions for the subnormal, game and 
fish laws, temperance, laws to eradicate ticks and tuberculosis from 
cattle, estate and inheritance taxes, a tax-equalization commission, 
antilobbying laws, and the elimination of public hangings.14 
These accomplishments may not establish Vardaman and Bilbo 
as great statesmen, but they should tend to offset the charge of 
"demagoguery" which has been so generally hurled at them by the 
"respectable" press. If these reforms were effected by cOlrupt 
means, as was so generally charged of Bilbo, that is merely the price 
that has to be paid when reforms are neglected until a man of 
Bilbo's type comes to power. The astOnishing thing, as Gerald 
Johnson points out, was the conservatism of the programs of these 
"wild men" and the bitterness and hatred which the "wild men" 
provoked in the "respectable" people. Instead of turning the affairs 
of state into chaos, as was freely predicted, all they advocated and 
gained was what was generally regarded in other sections "as the 
merest routine of good government. Roads, schools, public health 
service, the imposition of taxes on those best able to pay."15 The 
success of both Vardaman and Bilbo is proof of the inadequacy of 
the kind of government in Mississippi before them. "Call these men 
demagogues if you will," says Ray Stannard Baker speaking of 
southern "demagogues" in general, " ... they yet represent a gen-
uine movement for a more democratic government in the South."16 
As for the Negro, whose presence in such large numbers in Mis-
sissippi has given such a distinctive influence to its politics, his lot 
did not change throughout the period. No one thought of him save 
to hold him down. No one sought to improve him. Whether race 
baiters like Vardaman were in power, or whether "respectable" 
politicians governed, he fared the same-no better, no worse. He 
was and is the neglected man in Mississippi, though not the for-
gotten man. 
lfMississippi, Laws, 1916, Chaps. ex, CLXXX, XCII, XCV, CC, CCI, CCII, 
CCIII, CCIV, CCV, CCVI, L, LXVII, LXVIII, CVlII; ibid, 1918, CCLVlII. 
15JohDson, "Live Demagogues or Dead Gentlemen," loco cit., 12. 
ll1Bay S. Baker, "The Negro in Politics,· loc. cit., 180. 
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES 
MANUSCRIPTS 
The most fruitful source of manuscript material used in the 
preparation of this book was the Letters of Governors Series in the 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History at Jackson, Missis-
sippi. Voluminous correspondence of the period up to 1899 is 
chronologically arranged in several hundred boxes. Practically all 
of the material in this collection is incoming mail to the governor's 
office. Much of it is routine correspondence-petitions for jobs and 
pardons. Yet scattered here and there are letters from local hench-
men of the governor revealing matters of utmost secrecy and import 
and giving some insight into the actual working of a political organi-
zation at its core. 
The John Sharp Williams Papers in the Division of Manuscripts 
of the Library of Congress contain more than two hundred boxes, 
chronologically arranged, of Williams' correspondence. The collec-
tion contains both outgoing and incoming mail. Most of the items 
are concerned with the period after Williams went to the Senate in 
1909. One letter of Williams to President Cleveland, written in 
December, 1892, throws some light on the Populist movement in 
Mississippi. There are several items in the period 1915-1917 which 
help explain the behind-the-scenes break between Williams and 
Vardaman and also the Vardaman-Bilbo split. 
The Henry L. Burkitt Diaries, 1875-1897, and the Frank Burkitt 
Diary for 1907, both in the possession of Mrs. Ruth Burkitt Gaskin 
of Paris, Tennessee, are most disappointing, containing almost no 
reference whatsoever to politics. The same is true of the James L. 
Alcorn Papers in the Southern Historical Collection of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina and the James T. Harrison Papers in the 
Stephen D. Lee Collection in the same institution. There were a 
few items of interest in the small Charlton N. Clark Collection and 
the George Wilson Humphrey Collection, both in the Mississippi 
Department of Archives and History. The James Z. George Papers 
and L. Q. C. Lamar Letterbooks in the same depository are small 
collections and reveal little of the great influence which both men 
executed on Mississippi politics. 
Of slight value to the student of the period are the Henry Patrick 
Papers at Duke University, the L. P. Reynolds Papers in the Missis-
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sippi Department of Archives and History, the Lamar and Mayes 
Papers in the Daniel Manning Collection, Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress, and the Grover Cleveland Papers in the 
Library of Congress. 
PuBLIC DOCUMENTS 
Mississippi House Journals, 1876-1924 (Jackson, 1876- ) and 
Mississippi Senate Journals, 1876-1924 (Jackson, 1876- ) were 
used for the identification of legislative activities, for governors' mes-
sages, and for special investigating committee reports. Mississippi, 
Secretary of State, Biennial Report to Legislature, 1896-1924 (Jack-
son, 1896- ), contains the annual reports of the several executive 
departments. Mississippi Laws, 1870-1924 (Jackson, 1870- ) 
contain the legislation enacted by the state legislature. The Missis-
sippi constitutions of 1868 and 1890 are printed in Francis N. Thorpe 
(ed.), The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and 
Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or 
Heretofore Forming the United States of America, 7 vols. (Wash-
ington, 1909), IV. The Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitu-
tional Convention of the State of Mississippi Begun at the City 01 
Jackson on August 12, 1890 and Concluded November 1, 1890 
(Jackson,1890) contains the proceedings of the convention but not 
the debates. Investigation by the Senate of the State of Mississippi 
of the Charges of Bribery in the Election of a United States Senator 
(Nashville, 1910) gives a complete transcript of testimony in the in-
vestigation following the Secret Caucus. 
The United States Census, 1880-1910, is the source for all popu-
lation statistics used. The Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 
64th Congress, and 65th Congress, is used for an evaluation of 
Vardaman's activities in the United States Senate. 
NEWSPAPERS AND PEmODlCALS 
The newspaper with the largest state circulation for the period 
was the Jackson Clarion and its successor the Clarion-Ledger. Next 
in importance to it were probably the Jackson News, the Natchez 
Democrat, and the Vicksburg Herald. They constituted the ''big-
city" press in contrast to the rural or "county" papers and were gen-
erally to be found defending the conservative side of all political 
issues and parties. An exception to this generality was the Vicksburg 
Herald's advocacy of Vardaman's cause from 1903 to 1909. A com-
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plete file of the Clarion-Ledger is in the possession of the Mississippi 
Department of Archives and History. The Department has numer-
ous issues of the others, but a more complete file of each is in the 
newspaper collection of the Library of Congress. Between the two 
collections the student can find all but a few issues in the period. 
Closely akin to the above in its editorial slant is the Macon Beacon, 
a very extensive file of which is in the Duke University Library. 
More liberal in policy were the Vicksburg Post and the Vicksburg 
Democrat-Commercial, numerous files of which are either in the 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History or in the Library 
of Congress. : 
Papers edited by James K. Vardaman were the Greenwood En-
terprise (1891-1893) and the Greenwood Commonwealth (1894-
1902). Files for these years are in the courthouse in Greenwood. 
Vardaman later edited the Jackson Issue and Vardaman's Weekly. 
Files of these latter two are in the Mississippi Department of Ar-
chives and History. 
Scattering issues of county papers examined were the Aberdeen 
Examiner, the Aberdeen Weekly, the Brookhaven Leader, the Car-
roll News, the Jones County News, the Oxford Eagle, the Senatobia 
Democrat, the Tunica Independent, and the Yazoo Sentinel. A few 
issues of Frank Burkitt's Okolona Chickasaw Messenger are in the 
possession of Mrs. Ruth Burkitt Gaskin of Paris, Tennessee. 
In the Library of Congress are scattered issues of several Negro 
papers published in Mississippi. Among these are the Jackson 
Weekly Pilot, the Vicksburg Golden Rule, and the Vicksburg Light. 
The Jackson Daily Times was a Republican paper which continued 
publication for only a few years after the revolution of 1875. 
Out-of-state papers of wide circulation in Mississippi were the 
Memphis Appeal and its successor the Commercial Appeal, the New 
Orleans Daily News, the New Orleans Daily Picayune and its suc-
cessor the Times-Picayune, and the New Orleans Sunday States. 
The follOwing periodicals published articles pertinent to this 
study: Outlook; American Magazine; Christian Century; Congres-
sional Digest; Cosmopolitan; South Atlantic Quarterly; New Re-
public; Scholastic; Atlantic Monthly; North American Review; 
Harpers Weekly; Virginia Quarterly Review; Journal at Negro 
History; Independent; Nation; American Political Science Review; 
Review at Reviews; and Survey Graphic. 
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STUDIFS IN MISSISSIPPI HISTORY 
The most significant recent publication concerning Mississippi 
history is Vernon L. Wharton's The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 
(Chapel Hill, 1947). Mr. Wharton traces all phases of the Negro's 
career in the early decades after emancipation. His cha.pters per-
taining to the Negro's participation in politics and the devious 
methods used to disfranchise him are a valuable contribution to an 
understanding of the period. An earlier work of value is James W. 
Gamer, Reconstruction in Mississippi (New York and London, 
1901). 
Mississippi's most prolific historian, Dunbar Rowland, gathered 
voluminous data on the history of the state, but many of his inter-
pretations are questionable. Of great value for this period are his 
History of Mississippi, the Heart of the South, 2 vols. (Chicago and 
Jackson, 1925) and Encyclopedia of Mississippi History, 2 vols. 
(Madison, Wis., 1907). He also contributed a chapter in Volume IT 
of The South in the Building of the Nation, 12 vols. (Richmond, 
1909-1913). He also edited The Official and Statistical Register of 
the State of Mississippi, 6 vols. (1904-1928). 'This latter is a com-
pendium of Mississippi political history with brief biographical 
sketches of many officials. 
Of considerable value to the student of :fiscal affairs is M. C. 
Rhodes, History of Taxation in Mississippi, 1798-1929 (Nashville, 
1930). A monograph of equal importance is Stuart G. Noble, Forty 
Years of the Public Schools in Mississippi (New York, 1918). 
William D. McCain's "The Populist Party in Mississippi" (M. A. 
thesis, University of MissiSSippi, 1931) has valuable interpretive 
material on Mississippi's excursion into populism. 
The Mississippi Historical Society's Publications, 14 vols. (Ox-
ford, 1898-1914), and Centenary Series, 5 vols. (Jackson, 1916-
1921), contain many articles of considerable value by contempo-
raries and students. Among the better are: Charles B. Brough, "His-
tory of Taxation in MiSSisSippi," IT, 113-124; Alfred Benjamin Butts, 
"Public Administration in Mississippi," Centenary Series, ITI, entire 
volume; S. S. Calhoon, "Causes and Events that Led to the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1890," VI, 105-111; Frank A. Johnston, "The 
Conference of October 15, 1875, Between General George and 
Governor Ames," VI, 65-77; Frank A. Johnston, "Suffrage and Re-
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construction in Mississippi," VI, 141-244; J. H. Jones, "History of the 
Measures Submitted to the Committee on Penitentiary in the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1890," VI, 111-128; J. S. McNeily, "Climax 
and Collapse of Reconstruction in Mississippi, 1874-1876," XII, 283-
474; J. S. McNeily, "History of Measures Submitted to the Commit-
tee on Elective Franchise, Apportionment, and Election in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1890," VI, 129-140; Edmond F. Noel, 
"Mississippi's Primary Election Laws," VIII, 239-251; and R. H. 
Thompson, "Suffrage in Mississippi," I, 25-49. 
Miss Willie D. Halsell has made some valuable contributions to 
an understanding of the so-called Bourbon period of Mississippi 
politics in articles published in the Journal of Mississippi History, II 
(1940), 123-125, and in the Journal of Southern History, VII 
(1941),84-101, and X (1944),37-58. Other articles in the Journal 
of Southern History are: William A. Mabry, "Disfranchisement of 
the Negro in Mississippi," IV, 318-333; A. B. Moore, "One Hundred 
Years of Reconstruction," IX, 153-183; and Daniel M. Robison, 
"From Tillman to Long: Some Striking Leaders of the Rural South," 
III, 289-310. 
The conclusions of Allied Holt Stone in "The Basis of White 
Political Control in Mississippi," in the Journal of Mississippi His-
tory, VI (1944), 225-236, are conventional but not to be trusted. 
Ray Stannard Baker published a series of articles analyzing the 
racial problem in the South. They may be found in American Maga-
zine, LXVI (1908), and LXIII (1907). 
BIOGRAPIDCAL MATERIALS ON MISSISSIPPI 
Full-length biographies of L. Q. C. Lamar by Edward Mayes 
and by Wirt A. Cate throw considerable light on the earlier decades 
of this period. George Osborn's John Sharp Williams (Baton Rouge, 
1943) does the same for the later decades. From a literary point of 
view the best book ever written about Mississippi is William Alex-
ander Percy's Lanterns on the Levee (New York, 1941). Its particu-
lar significance to the student is its reflection of the anti-Vardaman 
point of view during the period of reform in the early decades of 
this century. 
Practically all of the material on Vardaman was written by 
devoted followers of the "Great White Chief" and is not unbiased. 
A. S. Coody's Biographical Sketches of James Kimble Vardaman 
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(Jackson, 1922) is completely untrustworthy. Of somewhat more 
scholarly quality are: Wlley Rufus Huddleston, "The Senatorial 
Campaign of James Kimble Vardaman, MisSissippi's 'White Chief" 
(M. A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1935); and Heber A. 
Ladner, "J. K. Vardaman in Mississippi Politics" (M. A. thesis, Duke 
University, 1938). 
No full-length biographical studies have been made of other 
Mississippians of the period, but articles concerning them are: Mary 
Virginia Duval, "The Chevalier Bayard of Mississippi; Edward Cary 
Walthall," in Mississippi Historical Society, Publications, IV, 401-
413; James W. Garner, "Senatorial Career of J. Z. George," in 
Mississippi Historical Society, Publications, VIII, 201-226; and 
Garrard Harris, "A Defense of Governor Vardaman," in Harper's 
Weekly, XLIX (1905), 236-238. 
WORKS NOT ESPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH MISSISSIPPI 
The background for agrarian discontent is related in Emory Q. 
Hawk, Economic History of the South (New York, 1934); Julian 
A. C. Chandler and others, The South in the BUilding of the Nation, 
12 vols. (Richmond, 1909-1913); and Solon J. Buck, The Grang61' 
Movement: A Study of Agricultural Organizations and its Political, 
Economic, and Social Manifestations, 1870-1880 (Cambridge, 
1913). Buck traces the course of the movement in The Agrarian 
Crusade (New Haven, 1921). Good studies of the movement in 
other southern states are given in C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: 
Agrarian Rebel (New York, 1938), and in Francis Butler Simkins, 
Pitchfork Ben Tillman: South Carolinian (Baton Rouge, 1944). 
An able study of the resulting Negro problem in the South is 
Paul Lewinson, Race, Class, and Party (London and New York, 
1932). 
INDEX 
Agrarian discontent, 38-39, 44-48, 56, 85, 
92, 307 
Agricultural and Mechanical College, 
165-66, 254 
Alcorn, James L., 10 
Alcorn, W. A., 100 
Alexander, C. H., as a candidate, 191, 
211; speaks at Newton, 218; on white 
supremacy, 224-25; coalition willi 
Percy, 227; vote in 1911, 229; cam-
paign expenses, 230 
Allen, "Private" John, mentioned for 
senate, 103; origin of name, 106; op-
poses McLaurin, 106-17; supports Var-
daman, 119, 149; record, 111-12; sup-
ports Williams, 113 
American Book Co., 165 
Ames, Adelbert, 3 
Anderson, A. C., 200 
Anderson, W. D., 191, 206 
Apportionment, in Const. Cony. of 1890, 
78-84; issue in election of 1907, 186; 
black counties oppose change in, 141; 
Burkitt opposes, 236 
Archer, Rev. Stephen, 215 
Armistead, John, 143 
Armstrong, John W., 256 
Arnold, J. M., 249 
Artesia,6 
Australian ballot, 188 
Bailey, J. A., 200 
Baker, Ray S., 314 
Barksdale, Ethelbert, in election of 1891, 
31; editor, 50; political program, 50; 
splits with Lamar, 50-52; linked with 
Independents, 53, 91; in election of 
1889, 63-64; warns against Negro dis-
franchisement, 68; Alliance candidate, 
86, 90; opposition to 89-90; defeated, 
92; referred to in Dulaney's trial, 208; 
and demagoguery, 309-11 
Barr, T. P., 198 
Bell, Jeff, 305 
Bell, Percy, 303-304 
Bennett, J. G., 201 
Bilbo, Theodore G., charges Dulaney 
with bribery, 197-99, 204-209; candi-
date for It.-gov., 211-13; program, 
213, 236, 253, 259-61, 266, 270-71; 
condemned by press, 217-18, 220-21, 
231; assaulted physically, 218-20; 
elected gov., 229-30; feud with Brew-
er, 239, 241-58; candidate for gov., 
251-58, 303-305; break with Varda-
man, 252-53, 282-85, 290; administra-
tion, 269-72, 313-14; appointments, 
265; hospital scandal, 267-70; defeat, 
290-91; supports Russell, 292-96; is-
sue in senatorial election of 1919, 293-
96; in Birkhead scandal, 298; reunites 
with Vardaman, 302; waning influence, 
306; and demagoguery, 310-11 
Birkhead, Frances, 297-99 
Black counties, political influence, 27-28; 
white control in, 28-31; influence in 
conventions, 53; control of state gov't., 
60, 78-84, 90, 131, 141; opposed to 
prohibition, 61; in Const. Cony. of 
1890, 63, 66, 68, 71; election frauds, 
72, 75-77; and Populists, 98; favor 
conventions, 128; and Primary Law, 
131-32; education in, 137, 139-40, 146, 
186; taxes in, 150, 156, 262-63, 295; 
and social reform, 164 
Blakeslee, Henry E., 182, 198, 292 
Bland Bill, 50 
Blood, Adele, 255 
Blount, Robert C., 219-22 
Board, Equalization, 263-64 
Board, Health, 266 
Board, Legal Examiners, 272 
Board, Pardons, 271, 292 
Board, Prison, 169-74, 237-39; see also 
Convict labor 
Board, supervisors, 261, 263 
BolsheviSts, 296, 301 
Bond, Senator, 243 
"Bourbons," 8-9, 21, 50, 52, 94-95 
Boyce and Co., 237-38 
Brandeis, Louis D., 277 
Brewer, Earl, candidate for gov., 185-87, 
230, 232; program, 186-87; adminis-
tration, 236-58; feud with Bilbo, 239-
58; attacks Vardaman, 253; explains 
feud with Bilbo, 259; and Williams, 
276; alliance with Harrison and Bilbo, 
284-85; candidate for senator, 305-306 
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Brien, E. L., 249 
Bruce, Blanche K., 11, 16, 50 
Bryan, William J., 215-16, 279 
Bulldozing, 23-25, 45 
Burkitt, Frank, 233; opposes Lowry, 38-
39; farm leader, 48; opposes corpora-
tions, 54-57; urges const. conv., 60; 
office burned, 90; supports Barksdale, 
90; joins Populists, 92, 94, 98; candi-
date for gov., 99-101; on education, 
165-66; opposes reapportionment, 236; 
supports Bilbo, 254; and demagoguery, 
309-13 
Burns detectives, 245, 248 
Burrows, Senator, 243. 
Butler, George, 268 
Butler, R. M., 267-69 
Byrd, Adam, 191 
Calhoon, S. S., speech in Const. Conv., 
59; chosen pres. of conv., 65; author-
ship of poll-tax, 69-70; on convict-
leasing, 172 
Campbell, J. A. P., 67-68, 77 
Candler, E. S., 273 
Carlisle, G. W., 143 
Carpetbaggers, ~ 19 
Cassidy, James, 268 
Castleman, Steve, 243-47 
Catchings, Thos. C., 55, 97-98, 112, 168 
Chalmers, James R., chosen to Congress, 
9; joins Republican Party, 10; accused 
of fraud, 13; in elections of 1882 and 
1884, 11-15; evaluated, 309 
Child Labor Amendment, 277 
Chisholm, W. W., 24-25 
Cholera, hog, 26fl 
Chrisman, J. J., 58, 59,66 
Clark Memorial College, 199 
Coleman, Judge, 121 
Collins, Ross, 213, 219, 232, 250, 292-95 
Communists, 301 
Confederate Veterans Home, 267 
Conner, M. S., 259, 281, 296, 303-304 
Constitution of 1868, 67, 78 
Constitutional Convention of 1890, rea-
sons for calling, 59-60; opposition to, 
60-62; support for, 63; membership 
in, 65; Committee on Elective Fran-
chise, Apportionment and Election, 
65, 68-69; Negro disfranchisement 
schemes 66-68; women suHrage pro-
posed, 68; "understanding clause," 70-
71, 74; apportionment, 78-84; convict-
leasing, 169 
Contingent Fund investigation, 215-16, 
232-33 
Convict labor, 55, 167, 168-71, 172, 174, 
292-93 
Cook, Sam, 197 
Corporations, 54-57, 166,214 
Cotton prices, 93 
County executive committee, see Demo-
cratic county executive committee 
Cowart, J. 0., 198, 200-203 
Critz, Frank A., 118-20, 148-60, 191 
Crump, Will, 215 
Crumpacker Resolution, 183 
Culpepper, S. B., 199-200 
Cunningham, Senator, 219-20 
Dabney, Mayre, 67, 74 
Darden, Putnam, 48, 56, 63, 90 
Davis, A. C., 239 
Davis, Jefferson, 50, 277 
Debs, Eugene V., 301 
Delta, 96, 125, 128, 140, 171, 275 
Delta County scandal, 243-51 
Demagoguery, 225, 279-80, 281, 295-96, 
305,310-13 
Democratic clubs, 29 
Democratic county conventions, 28-31, 
35 
Democratic county executive committee, 
28-34, 122-23 
Democratic state conventions, 27, 33-34, 
53, 63-64, 79, 87, 118, 122-23, 128, 
309 
Democratic state executive committee, 
27, 38, 89, 122, 124, 126, 130, 294 
Dent, Walter, 293 
Dickinson, J. M., 202 
Dixon, H. M., 24 
Donald, Senator, 243 
Doxey, J. S •• 148 
Draft, 279 
DuBoiS, W. E. B., 307 
Dulaney, L. C., 197, 199, 207-208, 210, 
255 
INDEX 
Economic conditions, 85 
Economic interests, 307 
Education, system established, 136; 
quality of teachers, 137; funds, 136-38, 
139-41, 162, 165-66, 185-87, 213, 240, 
262, 265-66, 270-96, 310; illiteracy, 
138; in black counties, 146; Negro, 
136-37, 139, 145-46, 162-64, 180 
Edwards, George, 216 
Edwards House, 196, 199 
Eighteenth Amendment, 266 
Elections, commissioners of, 35-38; cam-
paign practices, 114, 230-31; officials, 
108; of 1881, 53; of 1882, 10-13; of 
1884, 15; of 1891, 31, 89-91; of 1895, 
99-101; of 1899, 63-64, 110; of 1903, 
148-61; of 1907, 178-90; of 1910, 191-
210, see also Secret Caucus; of 1911, 
211-30; of 1915, 251-58; of 1919, 292-
96; of 1923, 303-305; of 1924, 305·· 
306 
Electoral Commission of 1876, 4 
Fanners, 91-92 
Fanner's Alliance, 45, 64, 85-86, 309 
Featherstone, W. S., 64 
Feeble-minded, 166-67 
Fewell, J. W., 68 
Fifteenth Amendment, 66-67, 163, 180, 
183,235 
Flood Control Bill of 1918, 300-301 
Flowers, J. N., 186 
Food Control Bill, 279 
Ford, T. S., 66 
Forrest, N. B., 55 
Fourteenth Amendment, 66-67, 163, 180, 
183 
Fox, A. Fuller, 148, 150, 152 
Franklin, C. E., 200 
Franklin, Ed., 236-37 
Franklin, Lester C., 303-305 
Free-silver, 50, 85, 86, 96, 97, 99, 103 
French and Jobes, 167 
Fusion tickets, 8, 16-17, 22, 59, 72, 99· 
100 
Galloway, Chas. B., 154 
Garner, P. P., 265 
Geographic areas, Delta, 40.41; hill sec· 
tion, 41; Piney Woods, 41; prairie re-
gion, 41; politics of, 41-42 
George, James Z., organizes revolution, 3; 
collaborates with Lamar, 4; alleged 
Republican alliance, 11-12; urges 
white supremacy, 20, 116; in election 
of 1891, 31; corporate interests, 48, 
308; candidate for senate, 52; in Const. 
Conv. of 1890, 60-62, 70, 73, 79-80; 
opposes Sub-Treasury, 86; opposition 
to, 87-88; re-elected to senate, 92; an-
nounces retirement, 103; death, 105; 
and demagoguery, 310-11 
Gibbs, W. D., 218 
Gibson, J. E., 142 
"Gold Bug," see Free Silver 
Gore, J. E., 68 
Gowdy, W. B., 238-39 
Greenback Party, 8, 12, 21, 65, 309 
Gulf and Ship Island R. R., 55, 204-205, 
215 
Gully, John, 23 
Hall, Ruby, 199, 200-201, 203 
Hamilton, W. S., 239 
Hamilton and Co., 167-68 
Hamilton, Hoskins and Co., 55, 167 
Harris, Wiley P., 67, 70, 308 
Harrison, Pat, 281, 284-89, 306 
Heard, T. G., 235 
Hebron, Senator, 274·76 
Henry, J. J., 218-19 
Henry, Pat, 113, 120, 244-47 
Henry, R. H., 126, 159, 189, 204, 226, 
231 
Hightower, G. M., 254 
Hill, James, 11-15 
Hill-billies, 183 
Hill counties, 184 
Hines Lumber Co., 213-14, 250 
Hobbs, G. A., 243-47, 250, 251 
Hog Island, 300 
Holland, W. P., 254 
Hooker, Chas. E., 103-104, 122 
Houston, Winston, 280 
Howerton Resolution, 269 
Hudson, S. S., 213, 232 
Humphreys, B. G., 254 
Illinois Central R. R., 110 
Illiteracy, 265-66 
Imperialism, 180 
Income Tax Amendment, 277 
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Independent parties, 8, 18-26, 34, 38-39, 
53 
Industrial Training School, 270 
Industrial Institute and College for 
Women, 293 
Industry, 43, 307, 312 
Inge, J. J., 208 
Insane asylum, 239, 267-70 
Insurance companies, 164 
Italians, 185-86 
I. W. W., 296, 301 
Jackson, E. E., 173-74 
Jenkins, Capt., 170 
Johnson, Gerald W., 314 
Johnston, Oscar, 259, 269, 292-96 
Joint Committee on Contingent Funds, 
19S 
Jones, B. F., 256. 
Joyner, J. H., 280-81 
Kaiser, 301 
Kearney, Belle, 301 
King, Benjamin, 8 
Knights of Labor, 86 
Kyle, J. C., 191 
Kyle Law, 261-64. 
Lamar, L. Q. C., organizes revolution, 3; 
eulogy of Sumner, 4; supports Elec-
toral Commission of 1876, 4; collabo-
rates with George, 4; alleged alliance 
with Republicans, 11-12; party inHu-
ence, 15; urges white supremacy, 18; 
charged with dictatorship, 33; corpo-
rate interests, 48, 50, 308; views on 
free-silver, 50; split with Barksdale, 
50-51; charged with Bourbonism, 52; 
renominated in 1881, 53; distrusted by 
farmers, 57; reconciliation with Barks-
dale, 64 n; and farmer's unrest, 92; 
and demagoguery, 310-11 
League of Nations, 271 
Leftwich, Senator, 193, 206 
Legislative apportionment, in Const. of 
1868, 77; in Canst. of 1890, 78-84; 
black counties oppose change, 141; 
movement for reapportionment, 141-
42, 213; issue in 1907, 186; Burkitt 
opposes change, 236 
Lemon Hotel, 199, 201 
Lenin, NiCOlai, 301 
Lien Law, 44-46 
Lodge Bill, 59, 95 
Longino, A. H., candidate for gov., 118-
20, 292-95; urges primary law, 124-25, 
127-28; views on education, 140; 
builds capitol, 142-43; candidate for 
senate, 148-49; relations with Roose-
velt, 155; race views, 155-56; and con-
vict leasing, 171; corporate alliance, 
312 
Lowry, Robert, candidate for gov., 19; 
feud with farmers, 38-39, 56; urges aid 
for industry, 43; elected gov., 53; Re-
publican connections, 54; charged 
with inefficiency, 56; vetoes Conven-
tion bill, 50, 63; candidate for senate, 
103-105; and convict leasing, 168; cor-
porate interests, 308; and demagog-
uery. 310-11 
Lumber trusts, 166 
Lynch, John R., 9, 11-13 
Lynching, 163-64 
Maer, Percy, 289 
Mafia, 186 
Magee, Wood, 202. 
Manning, Van, 13 
Manufactures, 8ee industry 
May, George Q., 186 
Mayes, Robert, 288, 292 
McBeath, J. M., 249 
McCabe, H. C., 99 
McKee, George C., 12 
McLaurin, Anselm J., elected to senate, 
97, 103-105, 117; candidate for gov., 
99-101; nepotism, 107-108; insobriety, 
108-109; pardons, 109; and fraudulent 
elections, 112, 117; opposition to, 121; 
views on primary, 125; political boss, 
143; supports Longino, 149; and con-
vict leasing, 171, 174; opposes Varda-
man, 178; opposes Scott, 185; death, 
191; aligned with Percy, 212; author-
izes bond issue, 262; and demagog-
uery, 310-11 
McLaurin, H. J., 81-82, 170, 172 
McLaurin, Sidney, 212-13, 249 
McLaurin, W. K., 120, 178 
McNeill, M. S., 200-201, 288-89 
INDEX 
McNeily, J. S., delegate to Const. Conv. 
of 1890, 70; supports Vardaman, 120, 
154; opinion of Vardaman, 226-27, 
290; approves Bilbo's program, 271 
Memphis, Birmingham and Atlantic R. 
R.,55 
Miles, Nelson A., 182 
Miller, C. C., 124, 186 
Miller, Ivo, 109 
Miller, R. N., 202 
Mississippi, battleship, 215-16 
Mississippi Bank and Trust Co., 217 
Mitchell, Dr., 269 
Mobile and Ohio R. R., 164 
Money, H. D., supports George, 88; can-
didate for senate, 103-104, 148; ap-
pointed to unexpired term, 105; sup-
ports Vardaman, 119; favors primary, 
125; racial views, 156; re-elected to 
senate, 157; retirement, 178 
Monopolies, 46-48, 165. 
Montgomery, Isaiah T., 65, 81-82 
Montgomery, W. A., 118, 239 
Moore, A. B., 313 
Moore, Charles J., 217, 233 
Moseley, R. M., 205 
Mullins, 287-88 
Nabors, Senator, 243 
National Bank of Poplarville, 205 
National Park Hotel, 245 
Negro, 180, 194; disfranchised, 66-68, 
131; in election of 1891, 91; in black 
counties, 72, 77; voting, 116, 228; 
crime, 147; see also Education 
Neil, Mrs. C. J., 199, 202-203 
Neville, James, 186, 205 
Niles, Henry, 12, 13 
Noel, Edmund F., leader in primary 
movement, 123; candidate for gov., 148, 
185; program, 150, 186, 213; collabo-
rates with Critz, 155; in run-off primary, 
187; debate with Brewer, 187; victory, 
187; inaugurated, 191; Vardaman sup-
ports, 191; opposes Vardaman, 192; 
charges against by Vardaman, 195, 
211; in Secret Caucus, 202; backs 
Percy, 213; denies charges, 217; called 
on to purge rolls, 227-28; in contin. 
gent fund controversy, 233; candidate 
for senate, 280, 289 
Norris, George W., 277 
Norwood, Joseph E., 259 
Norwood Resolution, 237 
Oakley Farm, 173-74 
Old Soldiers Home, 215 
Owens, S. J., 200 
Palmer, Frederick, 179 
Panama Canal Act, 274, 278 
Parchman Farm, 239 
Patronage, 273-74 
Patty, R. C., 65 
Paxton, A. J., 67 
Penitentiary, 167-69, 172-75; see also 
Convict labor 
Penitentiary Board, see Board, Prison 
Penrose, Boies, 300 
Percy, Leroy, feud with McLaurin, 109-
10, 112-13, 121; supports Vardaman, 
149,192; candidate for senate, 191-210; 
opinion of Vardaman, 192-93, 220-21; 
leads coalition against Vardaman, 194, 
227; elected by Secret Caucus, 196-97; 
proposes joint canvass with Vardaman, 
211; supporters, 212-13, 215; program, 
214; attacks Bilbo, 220-21; heckled, 
222-23; views on white supremacy, 
224-25; defeated, 229; campaign ex-
penditures, 230; refuses to resign senate 
seat, 234; and demagoguery, 310-11; 
see also Secret Caucus. 
Percy, Will A., 202 
Piney Woods, 262-63, 311 
Planters Bank of Clarksdale, 254 
Planter's Bank bonds, 261 
Plunkett, Mattie, 246, 250 
Political patronage, uses of, 107-108 
Poll Tax, in Const. Conv. of 1890, 66, 69; 
legality of, 67, 72; black counties, 68; 
authorship of, 69-70; effect on electo-
rate, 74-75; candidates pay, 75, 117; 
national effects, 76; primary voting, 
115-16; Negro voting, 116, 228; dis-
franchises white voters, 131, 309; edu-
cation, 138-39; delinquents, 188-89, 
227-28 
Pollard, E. J., 200 
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Populist Party, reasons for forming, 93; 
composition of, 93-94, 98; platform, 
94-95, 98; opposed by Democrats, 95-
96; defeated, 96; reaches peak, 101; 
reasons for failure, 101; contributions 
of, 102; supports Vardaman, 184; ef-
fects on caucuses of 1894 and 1910, 
193-94; supports Bilbo, 254; Varda-
man supports, 278, 309 
Potter, Clayton D., 216, 268, 303 n 
Potter, Wiley, 200 
Powell, Robert J., 118, 186, 252 
Prewitt, R. K., 101 
Primary Law, urged, 33; factions for and 
against, 114-15; increased interest in, 
122-23, 127; Longino urges, 124-25; 
approved, 128-29; requirements, 129-
30, 155; a democratic move, 131; and 
new election technique, 132-34, 160-61; 
increases power of masses, 135, 309; 
first election under, 144-61; fraud 
under, 188-89; use in electing senators, 
191 
Privilege tax, 236 
Prohibition movement, 61, 188 
Puckett, Sargeant, 174 
Quinn, H. M., 252 
Raiford, F. T., 143 
Railroads, issue in elections, 46-48, 180, 
185, 186, 187, 307, 312; interest in 
building, 54; Memphis, Birmingham 
and Atlantic, 55; Gulf and Ship Island, 
55; Mobile and Ohio, 164 
Raney, J. L., 200 
Rankin County Farm, 174 
"Rednecks," v, 183, 212, 218, 288 
Reily, W. M., 252, 254 
Republican Party, disbanded by white 
leaders, 8; revived by Negro leaders, 8; 
aids Lamar and George, 10, 11-12; 
dom1riated by Negroes, 16 n, 20, 22, 
54; full ticket nominated, 59; negli-
gible factor after 1890, 72; coalition 
with Populists, 95 
Revels, Hiram R., 4 
Richards, William C., 81-82 
Robertson, Walter W., 196 
Roosevelt, Theodore, 155, 160 
Royal Hotel, 245 
Rural counties, 137 
Rush, Phil A., 143 
Russell, Lee, allied with Bilbo, 255, 284; 
elected It.-gov., 257; allied with Har-
rison, 284; candidate for gov., 292-96; 
program, 292, 296-97; supported by 
Vardaman, 295-96; administration, 
296; Birkhead affair, 297-99 
Sample, Ira W., 250 
Sanders, Hal, 251 
School Book Trust, 111 
Scott, Charles, supports Yerger, 104; op-
poses McLaurin, 109-10; supports 
Vardaman, 149; candidate for gov., 
185-87; charges fraud, 188; deserted 
by Vardaman, 189 
Scott, George Y., 39 
Seawright, J. L., 200 
Seay, R. S., 202 
Secret Caucus of 1910, 191-210; explana-
tion of, 193; comparison with caucus 
of 1894, 193-94; coalition against Var-
daman, 194, 196; issue in election of 
1911, 213, 228-30; contingent fund in-
vestigation, 215-16 
Session, T. V., 273 n 
Ship Purchase Bill, 278, 285 
Sillers, Walter, 112-13, 117 
Sillers, Walter, Jr., 297 
Sirnrall, H. F., 67 
Singleton, Otho R., 51 
Sisson, T. W., 185, 281 
Smith, C. C., 238, 253 
Smith, Murray, 109-10, 149 
SOCialists, 296, 301 
Southern Railroad, 164, 214 
Spenser, J. G., 282 
Stamps, Mary, 199-200 
State Democratic Convention, see Demo-
cratic State Convention 
State Democratic Executive Committee, 
see Democratic State Executive Com-
mittee 
State Prison Board, see Board, Prison 
Stephens, Hubert D., 301, 305 
Stirling, Attorney-General, 195 
Stone, James M., candidate for gov., 19, 
25, 54, 63-64, 97; defies executive 
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committee, 89; vetoes bond sale, 262; 
corporate interests, 308; and dema-
goguery, 310-11 
Stovall, P. S., 252 
Stower, J. R., 143 
Streit, H. M., 191, 196 
Streit, R. S., 201 
Sub-Treasury, 86 
Sullens, Fred, 208, 257-58, 284-85 
Sullivan, W. V., 105-106, 117, 125 
Sumner, Charles, 4 
Taft, William Howard, 195 
Tally, J. R., 252 
Tariff, 42, 42 n, 180 
Tax commission, 292 
Tax equalization, 261-64, 295 
Taxation, 150, 166 
Taylor, J. Swep, and secret caucus, 198-
200; and Bilbo-Hobbs scandal, 246; 
peacemaker, 249; splits with Bilbo, 
269; candidate, 275 
Teat, Judge, 249, 253 
Textbook commission, 165 
Third parties, 99 
Thomas, E. N., 185 
Thompson, Harmon, 288 
Toledo Convention, 86 
Trotsky, Leon, 301 
Truly, Jeff, decision on convict leasing, 
172; candidate for gov., 185; program, 
186 
Truly, R. H., 23 
Trusts, 180, 195 
Tuberculosis hospitals, 167 
Turnage, Mrs., 246 
"Understanding Clause," 70-71, 74 
Underwood, Oscar W., 235 
Underwood Tariff, 277 
Upper Levee Board, 192 
Urban counties, 137 
Vardaman, James K., candidate for gov., 
99, 118-20, 148-61; urges convention 
to select presidential electors, 124-25; 
a diSCiple of George, 144; program, 
145-50, 175-77; views on Negro edu-
cation, 145-46, 150, 162-64, 213; Ne-
gro baiter, 146-47, 163-64, 180-82, 
225; votes for educational appropria-
827 
tion for Negroes, 151-52; and dema-
goguery, 152, 181, 225, 279-81, 310-
14; denounces Roosevelt, 152-53; 
elected, 160; praised by opposition, 
162, 175-77, 225; urges repeal of 14th 
and 15th amendments, 163,224; views 
on taxation, 166; and corporations, 
166; insane and feebleminded, 166-67; 
and Prison Board, 171-72; and convict 
leaSing, 172-75; candidate for senate, 
178-84, 299-303; denounces Walter 
McLaurin, 178; friendship with Wil-
liams, 179, 273, 273 n; issues in elec-
tion of 1907, 180; joint debate with 
Williams, 183; defeated, 184; supports 
Noel, 187, 191; charges election fraud, 
188; accused of deserting Scott, 189; 
publishes Issue, 191; addresses Secret 
Caucus, 192; friendship with Percy, 
192; Percy's opinion of, 192-93; op-
ponent of trusts, 195, 287; charges 
Noel with improper use of patronage, 
195; defeated by Secret Caucus, 196-97; 
bribery charges in Secret Caucus, 204; 
Percy challenges to joint canvass, 211; 
alliance with Bilbo, 211-12, 218-19, 
252-53, 256, 282-84, 290, 302; urges 
legislative reapportionment, 213; op-
poses lumber tariff, 214; urges railroad 
regulation, 214; labor views, 214; con-
demned by conservatives, 215, 218; 
accused of shortage in contingent 
fund, 214-17; private life, 223-24; 
campaign funds, 224, 230; and Jews, 
224 n; popularity, 225-26; McNeilys 
opinion of, 226-27; elected to senate. 
229-31; contingent fund controversy, 
232-33; dominates party, 235; pa-
tronage. 273-74; break with Williams, 
274-75, 299-300; defies Wilson, 278-
79; joins senate progressives, 277-
79; opposes war, 278-80; effect of neu-
trality stand, 279-84; charges Wilson 
with interfering in state affairs, 282-
90; attacked by Harrison, 284-87; and 
woman suffrage. 287; defeated by Har-
rison, 289-90; supports Russell. 295; 
supports Whitfield, 305; declining in-
fluence, 306; rebel leader, 309; reasons 
for victory and defeat, 310 
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Vaughan, W. B., 208 
Venable, Webb, .280-81 
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Walthall, Edward C., 277; corporate in-
terests, 48, 308; candidate for senate, 
51; opposes Const. Conv. of 1890, 61; 
supports George, 88; resigns senate 
seat, 96; views on free-silver, 97; death, 
105; and demagoguery, 310-11 
Ward, Ben F., 198-200,256 
Watson, Tom, ISO, 278 
Webster, John D., 15 
Wells, W. Calvin,288 
White, Walter A., 205 
White counties, protest against unfair 
apportionment, 28; urge calling const. 
conv., 63; urge reapportionment, 66, 
68, 141; effect of George plan in, 79-
84; Populists strong in, 96, 98; favor 
state-wide primary, 128; dominate 
elections, 131; education in, 137, 145; 
inequity of school fund distribution 
in, 139-41 
Whitfield, A. H., 172 
Whitfield, Henry L., 303-305 
Wilkinson, W. C., fr1 
Williams, John Sharp, candidate for sen-
ate, 113-14, 178-84, 276-77, 288; sup-
ports Money, 148; opinion of Varda-
man, 177, 179, 273, 273 D, 282; 
background, 179-80; views on race 
question, 181-83, 273-74; joint debate 
with Vardaman, 183; elected, 184, 
191; denies charge of fraud, 188; sup-
ports Percy, 212-13; supports Wilson, 
235; opposes Bilbo, 254; patronage, 
273-74; breaks with Vardaman, 274-
75; support from Delta, 275-76; rap-
prochment with Bilbo, 275-76; de-
nounced by Vardaman, 299; supports 
Stephens, 305 
Williamson, C. M., 216, 219 
Wilson, Edgar S., 155 
Wilson, Woodrow, loses Mississippi dele-
gation to national convention, 235; 
hostile toward Vardaman, 278, 288-90; 
Bilbo supports, 284; letter to Missis-
sippi electorate, 290 
Woman suffrage, 68, 287 White supremacy, 25-26, 224-25, 308, 
310; used to suppress Independents, 
18, 20, 49; in black counties, 60; mo- yazoo and Mississippi Valley Rai1road, 
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